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2 
Abstract 
 
The Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) of the International Criminal Court (ICC) was 
conceived of as the Court’s gatekeeper and empowered in the Rome Statute to 
provide an essential counterbalance to the significant discretionary powers 
granted to the Prosecutor. This thesis analyses in detail the PTC’s powers at the 
different stages of the Court’s proceedings in which it is called to intervene – ie 
pre-investigation, investigation and pre-trial stages – and argues that, in general 
terms and save some limitations, the PTC has the necessary tools to carry out its 
function. In particular, the PTC has been empowered to prevent possible abuses 
of power and shield the Prosecutor from external pressures through the judicial 
review of his most critical discretionary decisions. By way of that judicial 
control, the PTC is meant to examine the rationale behind the Prosecutor’s 
decisions in order to guarantee that the exercise of discretion is not abusive or 
the result of improper political pressures. This is necessary to safeguard the 
legitimacy of the institution as a whole and to protect the rights of those that 
can be affected by the Court’s investigations and prosecutions. However, a 
systematic evaluation of the way in which these powers have been applied 
reveals that the PTC’s judges have adopted a rather cautious approach to their 
role, showing some reluctance to firmly scrutinise the Prosecutor’s exercise of 
discretion.  
As a result of the Court’s inherent limitations and the political climate in which 
it operates, there is a concrete risk that external actors may try to politicise the 
role of the Court, exerting political pressures on the Prosecutor. The adoption of 
a more proactive and firm role by the PTC will not only encourage a more 
transparent decision-making process by the Prosecutor, but will also urge 
cooperation and genuine investigations and prosecutions at the national level, 
therefore minimising the risk of the Court’s political instrumentalisation. 
Accordingly, this thesis argues that, for as long as the PTC boldly embraces its 
full powers, the ICC will function smoothly and strengthen its reputation as a 
fair and impartial means by which to obtain international criminal justice.  
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Introduction 
 
I trust you will not flinch from creating a court strong and 
independent enough to carry out its task. It must be an 
instrument of justice, not expediency. It must be able to 
protect the weak against the strong.1 
    Kofi Annan, Rome, 14 June 1998 
 
These were the words with which Kofi Annan, then Secretary General of the 
United Nations (UN), launched the Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on 
the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (Rome Conference). He 
knew that for the Conference to be successful it would have to create an 
institution legitimated by its strength and independence. He also knew that only 
a court with such qualities could break the cycle of impunity and provide 
effective justice for those who needed it the most. At the conclusion of the 
Conference, once the treaty establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC or 
Court), the Rome Statute (Statute),2 had been finally adopted, Kofi Annan closed 
ceremonies stressing the complexity of the negotiations and acknowledging that 
the result, while by no means perfect, represented an enormous achievement. 
He highlighted: 
No doubt, many of us would have liked a Court vested with even more far-
reaching powers, but that should not lead us to minimize the breakthrough 
you have achieved. The establishment of the Court is still a gift of hope to 
future generations, and a giant step forward in the march towards universal 
human rights and the rule of law.3 
Indeed, the Court’s creation was one of the most important accomplishments in 
the enforcement of international justice during the 20th century. It took almost a 
century of discussions and failed attempts for the moment to arrive in which the 
                                         
1 Rome Conference, Press Release. United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries 
on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court. UN Secretary-General Declares 
Overriding Interest of International Criminal Court Conference Must Be that of Victims and 
World Community as a Whole, L/ROM/6, 14 June 1998 (Department of Public Information - News 
Coverage and Accreditations Service - Rome 1998). 
2 UN Doc A/CONF.183/9, Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court (United Nations 
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court, 17 July 1998). 
3 Rome Conference, Press Release. United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries 
on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court. Secretary-General Says Establishment 
of International Criminal Court is Major Step in March Towards Universal Human Rights, Rule of 
Law, L/ROM/23, 18 July 1998 (1998). 
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international community came together, truly determined to put an end to 
impunity for the perpetrators of unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the 
conscience of humanity.4 The unprecedentedly swift process of ratification (by 
the standards of international law) allowed the Statute to enter into force 
shortly thereafter, on 1 July 2002, and since 16 June 2003 a fully operative 
Court has been a tangible reality.5  
At the start of this project in the fall of 2008, the subject of my study was thus a 
very young international institution upon which enormous expectations had been 
placed. Yet, although still in its infancy, the Court had already been confronted 
by a series of challenges and criticisms.  
The world’s preeminent political powers, three out of the five veto-wielding 
members of the UN Security Council (UNSC or Council) – the United States (US), 
Russia and China – had declined to join the Court. Moreover, the US was 
directing an aggressive campaign against it. The Bush administration, with the 
support of the Congress, declared its intention not to become party to the treaty 
(previously signed by President Clinton) and began instead to negotiate bilateral 
agreements with the greatest possible number of states (102 signed) in order to 
shield US citizens from the ICC’s jurisdiction. The US even passed a law – the 
American-Service Members’ Protection Act6 – prohibiting cooperation with the 
ICC,7 and threatening to limit US involvement in peacekeeping operations unless 
US citizens were granted immunity from ICC prosecution.8 John R. Bolton, Bush’s 
Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, passionately argued 
against the Court:  
The Court’s flaws are basically two-fold, substantive, and structural. As to 
the former, the ICC’s authority is vague and excessively elastic, and the 
Court’s discretion ranges far beyond normal or acceptable judicial 
responsibilities, giving it broad and unacceptable powers of interpretation 
                                         
4 Statute Preamble paras 1, 2, 5. 
5 This is the date on which the first Prosecutor was sworn in. The inaugural session with the 
swearing in ceremony of the first judges had taken place on 11 March 2003.  
6 American-Service Members’ Protection Act, HR 4775, Public Law 107-206, (US, 23 January 
2002). 
7 Ibid Sec. 2004. 
8 Ibid Sec. 2005. 
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that are essentially political and legislative in nature. This is most 
emphatically not a Court of limited jurisdiction.9 
A few years after the Court began to operate, African States, originally the 
Court’s most enthusiastic supporters, started to become disillusioned by the fact 
that the Court’s Prosecutor appeared in his10 selection of situations to be 
focusing exclusively on conflicts occurring in Africa, while disregarding those of 
comparable gravity occurring elsewhere in the world, such as in Colombia, Iraq, 
Afghanistan and Venezuela. The Prosecutor’s selection of cases was subject to 
further criticism due to perceptions of bias against rebel groups and political 
opponents of established state and governmental powers. In fact, no cases for 
crimes allegedly committed by governmental forces or groups supporting them 
had been initiated in Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) or the 
Central African Republic (CAR). Additionally, the Prosecutor’s selection of 
crimes for prosecution was criticised for being too narrow and therefore failing 
to capture the full extent of criminality and disregarding the suffering of 
important groups of victims. With particular regard to the situation in the DRC, 
the charges in the Lubanga (only recruitment and use of child soldiers) and 
Katanga (relating to a single attack on a small village) cases seemed incongruous 
in view of the protracted armed conflict, punctuated by widespread and 
systematic attacks on the civilian population.  
The practice of self-referrals, actively encouraged by the Prosecutor in the 
Court’s early days, was also targeted by critics who considered this as 
implementing a form of victor’s justice and therefore resulting in an 
instrumentalisation of the Court for political purposes not permitted within the 
Court’s legal framework. The Court’s proceedings were further attacked when 
attempts to find peaceful solutions to the conflicts in Uganda and Darfur failed. 
The Darfur situation created additional tensions when the Court issued its first 
warrant of arrest against a sitting Head of State, to which the African Union (AU) 
responded by encouraging States to withdraw from the Statute.  
                                         
9 John R. Bolton, ‘The United States and the International Criminal Court’ (Remarks to the 
Federalist Society, 14 November 2002)  <http://201-2009.state.gov/t/us/rm/15158.htm> 
accessed 13 October 2014. 
10 In order to avoid resorting to excessive use of ‘he or she’ or ‘his or her’, hereafter ‘he’ has 
been chosen as a generic gender pronoun to refer to the Court’s Prosecutor. 
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In a well-known speech to the UN General Assembly, Muammar Gaddafi, at the 
time the AU President, verbalised the frustration of African States with the 
supposed discriminatory treatment by the ICC:  
It is easy for Charles Taylor to be tried, or for Bashir to be tried, or for 
Noriega to be tried. That is an easy job. Yes, but what about those who 
have committed mass murder against the Iraqis? They cannot be tried? They 
cannot go before the ICC? If the Court is unable to accommodate us, then 
we should not accept it. Either it is meant for all of us, large or small, or 
we should not accept it and should reject it.11 
Almost without exception, the mounting criticism focused on the independence 
of the Court’s proceedings from domestic and international politics. The Court, 
and particularly its Prosecutor, was being accused of high politicisation and bias. 
The Court’s proceedings were being denounced as either politically motivated or 
for allegedly jeopardising the potential for pacific political solutions to 
particular conflicts. As such, already at the early stages of this research, it 
appeared doubtful whether Kofi Annan’s initial hopes for a strong and 
independent Court had actually been achieved at the Rome Conference. It 
should be remembered that Kofi Annan himself had said at the closing ceremony 
that he would have preferred the Court to have been vested with more powers. 
The question arose as to whether his words could be interpreted as recognition 
that the Court lacked the necessary independence.  
As the research progressed the doubts augmented. It was of particular concern 
that, only five or six years after its inauguration, the critics were already 
claiming that the Court had become politicised. Accordingly, it appeared 
necessary to determine whether politicisation was indeed possible and, if so, 
whether this was a problem of design or a problem of practice.  
The first step was then to determine whether the Statute provided sufficient 
mechanisms to avoid or prevent the Court’s politicisation. Were there sufficient 
restraints and checks and balances in order to safeguard the legality of the 
Court’s actions? Was the Court strong and independent enough to carry out its 
                                         
11 UNGA, A/64/PV.3, United Nations General Assembly Sixty-fourth session, Official Records 3rd 
plenary meeting, Wednesday, 23 September 2009. New York, Address by Colonel Muammar Al-
Qadhafi, Leader of the Revolution of the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (2009) 24. 
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tasks? It was concerning that most of the criticism was directed at the 
Prosecutor’s decisions, alleging that they were arbitrary or biased. Accordingly, 
the focus was directed at exploring the limits of the Prosecutor’s discretion in 
order to determine whether, and if so to what extent, the Statute actually 
provided sufficient mechanisms of control in order to avoid abuses of power. In 
order to determine the limits of the Prosecutor’s discretion the first question to 
be explored was whether, and if so to what degree, the Prosecutor was 
permitted to take into account political considerations in his selection of 
situations for investigation and cases for prosecution.  
The Preamble to the Statute clearly indicates that the Court was created as the 
legal response to a political problem: threats to ‘the peace, security and well-
being of the world’,12 posed by grave crimes committed during war and power 
struggles. Accordingly, it was to be expected that the Court would deal with and 
have consequences for domestic and international politics. The Statute and its 
preparatory works also reveal that, on account of the high political nature of the 
issues underlying the Court’s jurisdiction, the drafters, while outlining the 
general principles framing the scope of the Court’s action, left the 
particularities of matters on which general agreement was not foreseeable to be 
decided upon by the Court itself. As such, international political questions once 
reserved for international politics alone were to be decided by the Court itself, 
which became the ultimate arbiter as to the controversial choices included in 
the Statute.  
Thus, when the Prosecutor exercises his discretion, he not only decides on 
technical or procedural matters, but also necessarily takes a position on political 
issues. Of course, although affected by and – to a certain extent – affecting 
politics, the Prosecutor’s choices are nonetheless always limited by the Court’s 
legal framework. Nevertheless, due to the nature of the Prosecutor’s function 
and the lack of means at his disposal, when operating in complicated political 
environments the Prosecutor may abuse his discretion or otherwise succumb to 
illegitimate political influences. The Court’s legitimacy and the stability of the 
whole system however rest upon the essential requisite that the Court, and 
                                         
12 Statute Preamble para. 3. 
  
16 
above all its Prosecutor, is fully independent from external political pressures, ie 
does not become ‘politicised’.  
As to the mechanisms designed to avoid the Court’s politicisation, as will be 
discussed throughout this thesis, one of the most remarkable features of the 
Statute is the combination of elements of different legal traditions. The drafters 
conceived of an independent Prosecutor with wide discretion to decide whether 
to initiate investigations and to select and prioritise cases for prosecution, ie a 
figure with powers approximate to those enjoyed by prosecutors within the 
common law tradition. At the same time however, the drafters also included a 
judicial branch – the Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) – with powers to oversee the 
exercise of discretion by the Prosecutor, more akin – although not equivalent – 
to that of judges in the continental or civil law tradition. As such, it would 
appear clear that the traditions were combined as a way of dealing with the fact 
that, due to the high political nature of the issues underlying the Court’s 
jurisdiction, the Prosecutor’s discretion was necessarily going to touch upon 
political issues.  
An initial review of the powers conferred to the PTC by the Statute provided an 
ostensibly clear answer to the initial question as to whether the Court’s system 
includes sufficient mechanisms to avoid the Court’s politicisation. Save for one 
critical limitation in the Statute – insofar as it fails to afford the PTC a 
supervisory role over the Prosecutor’s positive assessment of a referral by the 
UNSC or a State Party – it appeared that the PTC was afforded with sufficient 
tools to scrutinise the legality of the Prosecutor’s actions. The PTC judges are 
entrusted with the responsibility of providing checks and balances to the 
Prosecutor’s discretion in order to avoid abuse of power, arbitrariness or bias 
and to ensure that the Prosecutor’s decisions are a legitimate exercise of his 
powers under the Statute. The central argument of this thesis then became that, 
through the judicial review of the Prosecutor’s most critical discretionary 
decisions, the PTC – the Court’s gatekeeper – guarantees the legitimacy of the 
institution and protects the rights of those who may be affected by abuses of 
prosecutorial power. As such, within the context of the wide discretion afforded 
to the Prosecutor, the judicial control of his actions by the PTC is essential to 
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preserve the institution’s legitimacy, as it ensures that the Prosecutor’s actions 
are not abusive or the result of improper political pressures.  
Accordingly, once it was determined that the Statute generally provides the PTC 
with the necessary tools to prevent the Court’s politicisation, it became 
necessary to explore whether the perceptions of partiality and bias were due to 
problems in the implementation of such provisions. Unusually, for such an 
important function there was remarkably limited case law and few focused 
commentaries on the gatekeeping role of the PTC. The research then developed 
into a detailed analysis of the PTC’s exercise of its powers during the Court’s 
first decade of existence, in order to determine whether the PTC was effectively 
complying with its role of guaranteeing the independence and legitimacy of the 
Court.  
The thesis is divided into six Chapters followed by general conclusions. Chapter 1 
presents the theoretical framework through which the nature of the Prosecutor’s 
discretion and the PTC’s judicial review is considered. The indeterminacy or 
open texture of the Statute is recognised, following Herbert L.A. Hart, as an 
advantage rather than a disadvantage, insofar as it allows for reasonable 
interpretation in the Statute’s application to situations and to types of problems 
that its drafters did not foresee or could not have foreseen, while additionally 
enabling a certain balancing between the requirements of stability and renewal. 
Regarding the issue of whether the Court is able to isolate itself from domestic 
and international politics, the thesis draws on the work of Alexander K.A. 
Greenawalt and Judith Shklar in arguing that there is, of course, politics and 
politics. Accordingly, it is possible to distinguish between the political 
considerations that should by definition remain outwith the Court’s scrutiny and 
decision-making and those broader political ideals that may legitimately guide 
the Prosecutor’s policy decisions. Subsequently, the work relies on Ronald 
Dworkin’s notion of constructive interpretation to argue that the interpretation 
of the Statute cannot invite ‘strong’ (free-wheeling) discretion, but must remain 
faithful to the political rationale underlying its enactment – the Statute’s goals 
and purposes – which alone circumscribe within proper legal limits the powers of 
the Court.  
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The discussion of the theoretical framework is followed by a descriptive 
Chapter, Chapter 2, which provides a review of the relevant drafting history of 
the Statute and a detailed description of the procedural steps through which the 
PTC exercises its functions.  
The following Chapters are exploratory and explanatory, analysing the way in 
which the interaction between prosecutorial discretion and the PTC’s judicial 
review has been interpreted and applied by the Court at the different stages of 
the proceedings.13 The analysis of the Court’s practice in Chapters 3 to 6 is 
aimed at determining whether the main argument of this thesis – that the PTC, 
as the Court’s gatekeeper, ensures the legality of the Prosecutor’s actions – is 
supported by systematic evidence. This part of the work follows closely the 
practice of the Court and the letter of the Statute and other relevant legal 
instruments that, according to Article 21,14 constitute the Court’s legal 
framework. It examines the way in which the principles and norms established 
by that legal framework are translated into prosecutorial and judicial decisions 
as well as considering whether and to what extent the Prosecutor and the PTC 
have, when incorporating political considerations, respected the constraints 
imposed by the goals and purposes of the Statute. The author, an ICC staff 
member, has also applied her own personal experience, particularly in 
identifying the points of controversy.15 
Chapter 3 focuses on the PTC’s role throughout the pre-investigative, 
investigative and pre-trial proceedings in determining the notions of 
complementarity, gravity and the interests of justice. These notions are critical 
in managing the tension between the legal goal of ensuring the prosecution of 
international crimes and the political aim of pursuing peace and preventing the 
                                         
13 The date of 31 August 2014 has been used as the cut-off date for the consulted practice and 
case law. 
14 In accordance with Article 21 of the Statute, the Court should apply: first, the Statute, the 
Elements of Crimes and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence; in second place, where 
appropriate, applicable treaties and principles and rules of international law, including the 
established principles of the international law of armed conflict; and, failing that, general 
principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of legal systems of the world. The 
latter include, as appropriate, the laws of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over 
the crime, provided that those principles are not inconsistent with the Statute and with 
international law and internationally recognized norms and standards.   
15 The views expressed in this research are those of the author alone and in no way reflect those 
of the ICC. 
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commission of atrocities. They provide the necessary flexibility allowing the 
Court to adapt to different scenarios in order to achieve its goals. However, 
depending on how these concepts are interpreted, the Court may be at risk of 
being perceived as taking sides in a conflict, being influenced or manipulated by 
political actors or becoming an instrument of victor’s justice. In principle, the 
Statute gives the Prosecutor independence and discretion to interpret and apply 
these concepts. However, in order to ensure the system’s legitimacy, the PTC 
can examine the Prosecutor’s choices under certain circumstances.  
Chapter 4 analyses the PTC’s role at the pre-investigative stage of the 
proceedings. The Court’s involvement can only be triggered by a referral from 
the UNSC or a State Party, or proprio motu by the Prosecutor. However, as 
feared by the drafters, any of these mechanisms may involve the danger of 
‘politically motivated or frivolous proceedings’,16 in which the independence, 
impartiality and credibility of the Court are at stake. The Chapter discusses the 
exercise of the PTC’s powers under the Statute and whether the mechanisms it 
provides are sufficient for the PTC to effectively prevent the introduction of 
‘inappropriate political influence over the function of the institution’.17 
Chapter 5 focuses on the PTC’s limited but critical supervisory role over the 
Prosecutor during the investigation stage of the Court’s proceedings. At this 
stage, the PTC’s function is to protect the interests and rights of those that can 
be affected by possible future prosecutions. The Chapter first analyses the way 
in which the participation of victims at the investigation stage has been dealt 
with, to argue that the different PTCs have failed to provide victims with 
meaningful means to present their views and concerns at this stage. It further 
examines the PTC’s partial but fundamental proprio motu powers to protect the 
rights of suspects, victims and States during the investigation of crimes, 
stressing the notorious reluctance of the PTC’s judges to exercise these powers. 
Lastly, the Chapter focuses on the exercise (or lack of it) of the PTC’s 
                                         
16 Philippe Kirsch and Darryl Robinson, ‘Initiation of Proceedings by the Prosecutor’ in Antonio 
Cassese, Paola Gaeta and John R.W.D. Jones (eds), The Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court: A Commentary (Oxford University Press 2002) 657. 
17 Ad-Hoc Committee, UN Doc A/50/22, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment 
of an International Criminal Court, 6 September 1995 (General Assembly Official Records, 
Fiftieth Session, Supplement No 22, 1995) para. 121. 
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assessment of the Prosecutor’s decision whether to initiate proceedings for 
specific crimes against identified alleged perpetrators. It thus examines the 
exercise of the PTC’s power to issue warrants of arrest and summonses to 
appear, as well as the way in which the Prosecutor has prevented the PTC’s 
review of his decisions not to prosecute.  
Chapter 6 analyses the PTC’s function as to the proceedings for the confirmation 
of charges, ie the pre-trial stage of the proceedings. The confirmation is an 
additional safeguard provided by the Statute for any person to be brought to 
trial. It is aimed at ensuring the Court’s efficiency, independence and 
impartiality, guaranteeing that only cases supported by sufficient evidence 
proceed to trial, protecting the interests of the suspects and providing access to 
justice for the victims. Accordingly, the judicial scrutiny of the charges is a 
necessary safeguard to avoid wholly unfounded prosecutions and to focus the 
Court’s efforts and resources on cases for which substantial evidence going 
beyond mere suspicion exists.  
Lastly, the concluding Chapter argues that, save for the critical limitation 
stressed above, the Court’s legal framework grants the PTC sufficient tools to 
serve as the Court’s gatekeeper, guaranteeing the legitimacy, fairness, 
effectiveness and expeditiousness of the Court’s proceedings as a whole. 
However, a systematic evaluation of the way in which those powers have been 
applied by the Court’s jurisprudence reveals that the PTC’s judges have adopted 
a rather cautious approach to their role, showing some reluctance to firmly 
scrutinise the Prosecutor’s policy decisions. It is argued that, for as long as the 
PTC boldly embraces its full powers, the ICC will function smoothly and 
strengthen its reputation as a fair and impartial means by which to obtain 
international criminal justice. 
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Chapter 1: The ‘gatekeeping’ role of the Pre-Trial Chamber of 
the International Criminal Court  
1.1 Background of the thesis 
1.1.1 The Court’s Legal Framework 
The ambition of establishing a permanent world tribunal with jurisdiction over 
the most serious crimes of international concern was finally realised with the 
adoption of the Statute, the treaty that created the Court, on 17 July 1998. Its 
early ratification by an overwhelming number of States made the Court a 
tangible reality on 1 July 2002. The Court is an independent treaty-based 
institution, not part of the system of the UN, but brought into relationship with 
the UN pursuant to an agreement of mutual cooperation.18 
What motivated the creation of the Court was the endemic impunity enjoyed by 
the perpetrators of human atrocities. As will be discussed in Chapter 2, save for 
some rare examples, up until the mid-twentieth century, crimes committed in 
the midst of political transformation, military campaigns, and wars were never 
prosecuted. The first serious attempts to bring to justice some of those 
responsible for heinous crimes came only in the late 1940s at the end of World 
War II (WWII). While the defendants were admittedly limited to those who had 
been on the defeated side of the conflict, the process, undertaken at both 
international and national levels, nevertheless produced the first body of 
substantive principles and jurisprudence, establishing the foundation upon which 
international criminal law (ICL) continues to rest.  
However, during the Cold War, the world’s bitter division between two 
competing blocks of power inhibited any further attempts to prosecute and 
punish the perpetrators of serious crimes. After 1989-1990, a radical change in 
the course of international politics brought the necessary consensus for justice 
efforts not seen in decades. In the mid-1990s the political will to punish heinous 
crimes eventually crystallised within the UNSC and two new ad hoc institutions 
                                         
18 Statute Article 2; UNGA, UN Doc A/58/874 (ICC-ASP/3/Res.1), Relationship Agreement 
between the United Nations and the International Criminal Court, 20 August 2004 (2004). 
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were created for the criminal punishment of the atrocities committed in the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. These tribunals contributed to the development 
of ICL with an additional body of substantive and procedural principles, within 
the setting of a more impartial approach to international criminal justice.  
However, the crimes of the Nazis and their allies in Europe and Asia and those 
committed in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda were not – unfortunately – the 
only massive crimes committed during the 20th century. For the remainder of the 
situations in which such crimes occurred, impunity persisted almost unchecked. 
In some cases it was achieved through amnesties, truth and reconciliation 
commissions or other mechanisms of transitional justice; but in many cases, 
crimes were simply ignored.19  
During the 20th century States progressively came to agree on the existence of 
the obligation to prosecute heinous crimes or extradite their alleged 
perpetrators according to the principle aut dedere aut judicare.20 However, 
although the relevant treaties normally contained agreed definitions of 
prohibited conduct, obliged the contracting parties to criminalise them at the 
national level and provided for mutual extradition of offenders, they were 
seldom employed by contracting States. Some States failed to pass the necessary 
implementing legislation or, when they did possess all necessary requirements 
for the exercise of criminal jurisdiction, they simply failed to make use of it.21 
At the same time, several States incorporated into their national orders the 
principle of universal jurisdiction, recognising on their own part the duty and 
                                         
19 For a detailed account of the different experiences and mechanisms implemented, if any, see, 
inter alia, Marta Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: facing history after genocide and 
mass violence. (Beacon Press 1998); Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice (Oxford University Press 
2000); Louise Mallinder, Amnesty, Human Rights and Political Transitions. Bridging the Peace 
and Justice Divide. (Hart Publishing 2008). 
20 See, inter alia, Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and 
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (First Geneva Convention), 75 UNTS 31, 12 August 1949 Article 
49; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked 
Members of Armed Forces at Sea (Second Geneva Convention), 75 UNTS 85, 12 August 1949 
Article 50; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Third Geneva 
Convention), 75 UNTS 135, 12 August 1949 Article 129; Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), 75 UNTS 287, 12 
August 1949 Article 146; Protocol Additional I to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1125 UNTS 3, 8 June 1977 
Article 85(1); UNGA, UN Doc A/RES/39/46, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 1984 (1984) Article 5(2). 
21 Antonio Cassese and others, Cassese's International Criminal Law (Third edn, Oxford University 
Press 2013) 19. 
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right to investigate and prosecute crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole, regardless of where or by whom the crimes were 
committed.22 However, these mechanisms were subject in their application to 
the sovereign prerogatives of each State and were hardly ever used. In the few 
exceptions in which States decided to deal with such crimes, the approaches 
adopted varied tremendously and were guided by pragmatic considerations. 
Accordingly, budgetary and institutional priorities, internal power struggles and 
international relations defined the responses adopted by States in addressing 
human atrocities.  
The entry into force of the Statute appeared to change the situation radically. In 
the Preamble, the drafters stated that they were ‘Determined to put an end to 
impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus contribute to the 
prevention of such crimes’.23 Pursuant to Article 12(1), upon becoming parties to 
the Statute, States conditionally delegate to the ICC their jurisdiction to 
investigate, prosecute and punish the crimes under the Statute. In accordance 
with Article 12(2) and (3), States may also accept the jurisdiction of the Court 
even without becoming party to the Statute. In addition, pursuant to Article 
13(b), the UNSC, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, may refer to the 
Prosecutor situations in which one or more of the crimes under the Statute 
appear to have been committed. In such a case, the Court can act even if the 
State in which the crimes were committed, or of which the alleged perpetrators 
are nationals, is a non-Party State and has not otherwise accepted the Court’s 
jurisdiction. The Court will thus exercise jurisdiction following the UNSC’s 
decision, which is binding on all UN Member States in accordance with Article 25 
of the UN Charter.24 Pursuant to Articles 13 to 15, the jurisdiction of the Court 
                                         
22 For the legislative provisions establishing universal jurisdiction in different States see (n 19) 
Mallinder Appendix 3 and Amnesty International, ‘Universal Jurisdiction. A Preliminary Survey of 
Legislation Around the World - 2012 Update’ (Amnesty International Publications, 2012)  
<http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/IOR53/019/2012/en/2769ce03-16b7-4dd7-8ea3-
95f4c64a522a/ior530192012en.pdf> accessed 9 November 2014. 
23 Statute Preamble para. 5 [bold in the original]. 
24 Some have contested the democratic legitimacy of the delegation of the power to investigate 
and prosecute from the UNSC to the Court. However, the creation an international criminal 
tribunal is a legitimate exercise of the Council powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. See, 
inter alia, The Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, (ICTY) IT-94-1-AR72 Decision on the Defence Motion 
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction Appeals Chamber, 2 October 1995. The same power is 
exercised when the Council refers a situation to the Court. Héctor Olásolo has argued that the 
establishment of the Court represents the transfer of States’ sovereign powers to the Court to 
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can then be activated by a referral from a State Party or the Council or indeed 
proprio motu by the Prosecutor with the authorisation of the PTC. 
A fundamental aspect of the Statute is that the condition under which the Court 
is allowed to exercise jurisdiction is the States’ inaction, unwillingness or 
inability to bring to justice the perpetrators of heinous crimes. Pursuant to 
Articles 1 and 17(1)(a) to (c), the Court is complementary to national criminal 
jurisdictions. Accordingly, at least in theory, the Statute creates an incentive for 
States to exercise their primary obligation to prevent and prosecute 
international crimes, without trespassing unnecessarily upon the jurisdiction of 
national courts. The Court’s raison d'être is to bridge the impunity gap that 
arises when crimes of concern to humanity as a whole are not prosecuted at the 
national level. The Statute includes both the recognition of the duty of every 
State to prosecute heinous crimes under its jurisdiction and the power of the 
Court to step in whenever States fail to comply with it.25 Significantly, pursuant 
to Article 17, upon judicial action being taken by a State, the ICC is prevented 
from acting unless the unwillingness or inability of the State to genuinely 
investigate or prosecute is proven.  
1.1.2 Substantive and Practical Dilemmas 
One might be forgiven for assuming that the establishment under the Statute of 
a new integrated system of international criminal justice – composed of both 
States primarily exercising their punitive powers and the Court acting as the last 
resort – would be sufficient to ‘put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of 
these crimes’.26 On the face of it, the system is most logical, establishing as it 
does that the perpetrators of crimes under the Statute should be prosecuted at 
the national level, but further providing that whenever States fail to do so, the 
Court will assume jurisdiction over these crimes. To date, 122 States are Parties 
to the ICC,27 ie 63 per cent of 193 UN Member States.28 Therefore, if crimes are 
                                                                                                                           
exercise universal jurisdiction, see Héctor Olásolo, ‘The prosecutor of the ICC before the 
initiation of investigations: A quasi-judicial or political body?’ (2003) 3 IntCLR 87-150, footnote 
19. 
25 Statute Preamble paras 6 and 10. 
26 Ibid Preamble para. 5. 
27 ICC, ‘The States Parties to the Rome Statute’ (International Criminal Court, Assembly of 
States Parties)  <http://www.icc-
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committed in the territory or by nationals of any of the 122 States Parties, the 
Prosecutor may proceed against them directly, either by referral or proprio 
motu. As regards the remaining 37 per cent, the Court’s jurisdiction can be 
activated by referral from the UNSC. Such conditions would appear to guarantee 
that the goal of the drafters of the Statute will be complied with, ensuring that 
the most serious crimes of international concern will not go unpunished, their 
effective prosecution being ensured by action at the national level and by 
enhanced international cooperation.29 That conclusion, however, reflects an 
incomplete reading of the Statute and a rather naïve understanding of 
international politics, for the following reasons.  
First, in accordance with the Statute, the Prosecutor is under no obligation to 
initiate an investigation with respect to every situation in which crimes under 
the jurisdiction of the Court have been committed, even in the case of a 
referral. In accordance with Articles 15(1) and 53(1), the Prosecutor has 
discretion to decide whether to request the PTC’s authorisation to initiate a 
proprio motu investigation and has the latitude to determine whether there is a 
reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation following a referral by a State 
Party or the UNSC. Similarly, the Council is under no obligation to reach an 
agreement under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and to refer a situation to the 
Court. In this respect, it may be noted that the US, Russia and China, all 
permanent veto-wielding members of the UNSC, are not as yet parties to the 
Statute. 
Second, the investigation or prosecution of a case at the national level is not the 
only potential source of inadmissibility before the Court. In accordance with 
Article 17(1)(d), even where complementarity is not at issue, a crime under the 
jurisdiction of the Court may still be inadmissible if not ‘of sufficient gravity to 
justify further action by the Court’. While all crimes under the jurisdiction of 
the Court are certainly grave, this provision establishes a further filtering 
mechanism by which the purview of the court may be concretely limited, 
                                                                                                                           
cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/Pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%20s
tatute.aspx> accessed 9 November 2014. 
28 UN, ‘Member States of the United Nations’ (United Nations)  
<http://www.un.org/en/members/index.shtml> accessed 9 November 2014. 
29 Statute Preamble para. 4. 
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although the Statute does not provide further specification as to what should be 
understood by ‘sufficient gravity’. 
Third, pursuant to Article 53(1)(c) and (2)(c), under certain circumstances the 
Prosecutor may decide that, although the situation or case falls within the 
jurisdiction of the Court and is admissible, the Court should avoid becoming 
involved because the investigation or prosecution would not serve the ‘interests 
of justice’. This concept is, again, not precisely defined, the provisions 
indicating only that a decision should be taken considering all the circumstances, 
including the gravity of the crime, the interests of victims, the age or infirmity 
of the alleged perpetrator and his or her role in the alleged crime.  
In addition, the drafters, as any legislators, were certainly unable to foresee ab 
initio all the possible combinations of circumstances that might arise in the 
future.30 They were also confronted by the intrinsic limitations of language in 
general and in the context of law in particular.31 More importantly, where the 
drafters were unable to reach a compromise – as was the case with a series of 
politically sensitive issues32 – they opted for a high degree of indeterminacy or 
‘creative ambiguity’,33 deepening, what Hart would have called, the ‘open 
texture’ of the Statute.34 In principle, as stressed by even the most prominent 
positivists, the ‘open texture’ or indeterminacy of a rule should be considered as 
an advantage rather than a disadvantage, in that it allows for reasonable 
interpretation in the rule’s application to situations and to types of problems 
that their authors did not foresee or could not have foreseen.35 However, it 
should then be acknowledged that, in order to interpret these vague terms of 
                                         
30 Herbert L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Paul Craig and Leslie Green eds, Third edn, Oxford 
University Press 2012) 128, 133. 
31 Ibid 126. See also Brian Bix, ‘H. L. A. Hart and the "Open Texture" of Language’ (1991) 10 L & 
Phil 51, 58 and Brian Bix, Law, Language and Legal Determinacy (Oxford Scholarship Online: 
March 2012 1995) 7-35, referring as well to Waismann’s theory of the open texture of language.  
32 Particularly the issues of complementarity, gravity and the interests of justice, as will be 
discussed in Chapter 3. 
33 David Hunt, ‘The International Criminal Court. High Hopes, 'Creative Ambiguity' and an 
Unfortunate Mistrust in International Judges’ (2004) 2 JICJ 56, 67. 
34 For discussion as to the ‘open texture’ of law see (n 30) Hart Chapter VII, Section 1, 124-136. 
See also, (n 31) Bix, 'H. L. A. Hart and the "Open Texture" of Language' and Bix, Law, Language 
and Legal Determinacy 7-35. For an answer to Hart’s previous arguments on the issue see Lon L. 
Fuller, ‘Positivism and fidelity to law - a reply to Professor Hart’ (1957) 71 HarvLRev 630, 661-
669.  
35 (n 30) Hart 129. 
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the Statute, the Prosecutor will necessarily have to employ his discretion.36 The 
Prosecutor’s conclusions will be, in effect, the result of a choice from an ample 
universe of alternatives where he will have to strike a balance, in light of the 
circumstances, between competing interests that may vary in weight from 
situation to situation and from case to case.37 As such, one could also argue, 
borrowing Dworkin’s terms, that the Prosecutor will have to find the ‘right 
answers’ to ‘hard cases’.38 
Last but not least, crimes falling under the jurisdiction of the Court will 
generally involve hundreds, if not thousands, of victims and perpetrators. The 
Prosecutor will therefore need to select and prioritise situations and cases to be 
brought before the Court. In addition, these crimes may be committed far from 
the Court’s headquarters in The Hague, and most probably, by powerful actors 
with the capacity to dissuade witnesses and tamper with or destroy evidence. 
The situation is further complicated by the fact that the Court has a limited 
budget and does not have police or enforcement powers of any kind nor 
subpoena powers for witnesses. The Court is therefore heavily dependent on 
States’ cooperation in issues like access to the information and evidence 
necessary for the investigation of crimes, the arrest and surrender of suspects, 
and for the facilitation of the voluntary appearance of witnesses. When 
cooperation is not available, the Prosecutor will be materially incapacitated in 
his endeavours to actually investigate and prosecute the crimes under the 
Statute, even if the conduct fall within the jurisdiction of the Court. In those 
situations, he may also use his discretion to choose to focus his efforts and 
resources only upon the situations and cases that he will be able to actually 
pursue before the Court.   
Consequently, in order to fulfil his role, the Prosecutor is afforded ample 
although not unlimited discretion. The exercise of discretion by the Prosecutor 
                                         
36 (n 31) Bix, Law, Language and Legal Determinacy 20. 
37 (n 30) Hart 135. 
38 It should be noted that this reference is not intended to enter into the debate about the 
existence of a single ‘right answer’ to every ‘hard case’. The reference to Dworkin refers to the 
fact that the Prosecutor will not exercise his discretion in the darkness, and that depending on 
the particularities of the situation or case there will be some courses of action that will be 
sounder than others, see Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Frank Kermode ed, Fontana Press 1986) 
225-227; and for Dworkin’s more recent arguments on the discussion Ronald Dworkin, Justice in 
Robes (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 2006) 41-43. 
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will be guided by his policy decisions as to where, when, how, why and against 
whom the Court’s limited resources should be focused, as framed by the object 
and purpose of the Statute. However, the ICC’s Prosecutor, unlike his national 
colleagues, is called upon to make these policy decisions within the context of 
an international political order where powerful global actors interact with less 
powerful ones. The Prosecutor cannot isolate himself from the political 
international order that actually created the Court to tackle a problem of 
common concern to the international community as a whole. In effect, far from 
being immune to politics, the Prosecutor must acknowledge his place within the 
international order and pursue policies that, while excluding partisan politics, 
take into account the Court’s setting and limitations.39 Accordingly, the 
Prosecutor is not expected to completely disregard the political circumstances in 
which he is called to act, or to be ‘apolitical’ in that sense. He is given in the 
Statute sufficient tools to effectively address and take into account political 
concerns. Nevertheless, the Prosecutor, and the Court as a whole, ought to be 
impartial and not take sides in any conflict. The fact that the Prosecutor enjoys 
discretion should not be interpreted as license to make merely arbitrary 
decisions. In the context of the Statute the Prosecutor’s discretion is better 
qualified as ‘a negative freedom, an absence of constraint, but not necessarily 
(or usually) an absolute freedom’.40   
It should also be taken into account that if the Prosecutor does not, for 
whatever reason, focus or deal with certain situations and cases, States will 
retain their sovereign powers to investigate and prosecute them. This may lead 
to States putting pressure on the Prosecutor to focus only on ‘convenient’ 
situations or cases. The Prosecutor may also want to avoid political difficulties 
and opt to focus on ‘easy’ targets, regardless of whether other situations or 
cases may objectively deserve more attention. The risk of arbitrary decisions 
being taken in a solitary fashion or otherwise being influenced by political 
prejudices and pressure from external actors is indeed very high.  
                                         
39 Matthew R. Brubacher, ‘Prosecutorial Discretion within the International Criminal Court’ 
(2004) 2 JICJ 71-95, 93-95. 
40 See (n 31) Bix, Law, Language and Legal Determinacy 27. 
  
29 
Accordingly, there are numerous dynamics through which the Court’s 
contribution to the fight against impunity may be curtailed – from the Statute’s 
legal limitation of admissible situations and cases, through the lack of resources 
and the failure of States to cooperate, to the risk that the Prosecutor, operating 
in a complicated political environment, may abuse his discretion in the selection 
of situations and cases for investigation and prosecution.  
1.1.3 The Fears of Politicisation and the PTC gatekeeping function  
Concerned by the dilemmas detailed above, the drafters of the Statute included 
within the Court’s architecture an additional judicial section, the Pre-Trial 
Division, conceived as a stronghold to protect the Court against the dangers of 
politicisation. The PTC was devised as the organ in charge of overseeing and 
controlling the Prosecutor’s exercise of discretion, aimed at preventing abuse of 
power and shielding the Prosecutor from external pressures.41 Judicial review of 
the Prosecutor’s discretion was recognised as having the potential to diminish 
‘the risk of politically motivated investigations as a result of abuse of political 
discretion by the Prosecutor’.42 The PTC was meant to act as a ‘bulwark against 
“politicisation”’.43 The different PTCs have also understood their role to be that 
of ‘prevent[ing] the Court from proceeding with unwarranted, frivolous, or 
politically motivated investigations that could have a negative effect on its 
credibility’,44 and ‘providing a judicial safeguard against frivolous or politically-
motivated charges’.45 However, the exact meaning of the term ‘politicisation’, 
which the drafters wanted to avoid, still remains a matter of uncertainty.  
                                         
41 Silvia A. Fernández de Gurmendi, ‘The Role of the International Prosecutor’ in Roy S. Lee (ed), 
The International Criminal Court The making of the Rome Statute Issues, Negotiations, Results 
(Kluwer Law International 1999) 183-184. 
42 (n 24) Olásolo 104.  
43 William A. Schabas, ‘The Short Arm of International Criminal Law’ in William A. Schabas, 
Yvonne McDermontt and Niamh Hayes (eds), The Ashgate Research Companion to International 
Criminal Law Critical Perspectives (Ashgate 2013) 397. 
44 Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09-19-Corr Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the 
Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya 
Pre-Trial Chamber II, 31 March 2010 para. 32. 
45 Situation in the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, ICC-02/11-15-Corr Corrigendum to 'Judge Fernández 
de Gurmendi's separate and partially dissenting opinion to the Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of 
the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of 
Côte d'Ivoire' Pre-Trial Chamber III, 5 October 2011 para. 16. 
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It is commonplace amongst members of the legal profession, most of us (if not 
all) trained as positivist lawyers, to defend a ‘strictly legalistic’ approach to 
judicial work in general. For the majority, to suggest that politics may play a 
role in criminal trials appears ‘equivalent to questioning the integrity of the 
courts, the morals of the legal profession’.46 The same view, of an ‘apolitical’ 
Court,47 extends to the ICC. As will be discussed in the following Chapters, the 
‘legalistic’ approach to the role of the Court is deeply rooted in the general 
understanding of its function. Under this perspective, the Prosecutor’s discretion 
and the PTC’s supervisory role should be strictly ‘technical’ and guided by 
‘uniform’, ‘legal’ criteria.  
It seems however rather artificial to approach the role of the ICC, or that of any 
organ of the Court, from the perspective of ‘law in a vacuum’. Such a view 
would appear to affirm the ideological posture that ‘politics’ and ‘law’ can be 
completely isolated from each other, because they are autonomous spheres of 
reality. However, particularly within the context of the Court, it is hard to argue 
that ‘law’ is absolutely autonomous from ‘politics’. If Judith Shklar had lived to 
witness the establishment of the ICC, she would have probably argued that the 
creation of the Court represents a new legalistic attempt at judicialisation of a 
political process, in accordance with the idea that political issues ought to be 
solved by court-like procedures.48 She described the legalistic program in 
international law as that where the aim was that all politics must be assimilated 
to the paradigm of just action: the judicial process.49 A process in which 
‘politics’ itself becomes a word of scorn, an ideological anarchy hardly 
distinguished from uncontrolled physical violence, or ‘pure chaos that reigns’.50 
Thus, in her view, for the legalists, and to a certain extent traditional legal 
thought in general,51 in order to maintain the opposition between ‘legal order’ 
and ‘political chaos’, it is not only necessary to define ‘law’ out of ‘politics’, but 
                                         
46 Otto Kirchheimer, Political Justice. The Use of Legal Procedure for Political Ends (Princeton 
University Press 1961) 47. 
47 An ideal shared by many commentators as noted by Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, ‘Justice 
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further necessary to ‘subdue this irrational political world’ by ‘a policy of 
uncompromising rules and rule following’.52  
Some would argue that ‘law’ should indeed preserve its autonomy from 
‘politics’, because politics is in fact not part and parcel of justice but rather of 
the realm of ‘power’, which is determined by war or ‘active or potential 
physical violence’.53 However, even if one accepts such a narrow understanding 
of the term ‘politics’, how can the rules of the Court – which was created 
precisely to deal with the consequences of war and violence – magically lift 
themselves above and beyond politics?54 Has international law eventually 
managed not only to regulate politics but also to replace it altogether?55 Or have 
we rather succumbed to the ‘intellectual fantasy’ of the replacement of politics 
by law as the solution to all the problems of international conflict?56 
The problem lies, as Greenawalt stresses, in the imprecision in the use of the 
terms ‘politicisation’, ‘politics’ and ‘political’.57 As noted by Shklar, ‘[t]he 
answer, of course, is that there is politics and politics’.58 Within the context of 
the Court, certain political considerations are indeed illegal by definition and 
should play no role in the Court’s decision-making. An illegal political 
consideration would be, for example, the fact that a government involved in the 
commission of crimes has a friendly relationship with or economic ties to a 
permanent member of the UNSC.59 However, the proscription against 
‘politicisation’ does not debar certain other extra-legal considerations, which 
are not concerned with illicit motives and may legitimately inform the proper 
exercise of the Prosecutor’s discretion.60 These would include, for example, a 
policy decision to focus on ‘those who bear the greatest responsibility’,61 
understood as meaning exclusively the highest in command, or that of 
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‘prosecuting lower level perpetrators where their conduct has been particularly 
grave and has acquired extensive notoriety’.62 
Accordingly, in order to ensure that the Prosecutor’s decisions are a legitimate 
exercise of his powers under the Statute and are not arbitrary or the result of 
improper political influence that may lead to the Court’s ‘politicisation’, the 
PTC is tasked with the judicial scrutiny of the Prosecutor’s exercise of 
discretion. The PTC’s function should further contribute to the Court’s 
impartiality and independence – which are essential for its credibility and 
legitimacy – and serve to protect the rights of those affected by the Court’s 
investigations and prosecutions.  
This is what will be referred to herein as the ‘gatekeeping’ function of the PTC. 
This function includes the PTC’s power to ‘filter-out’ unsubstantiated, 
inadmissible, unlawful, or politically motivated situations and cases that the 
Prosecutor may want to pursue. It also includes the PTC’s power to ‘filter-in’ (i) 
legitimate and legally grounded situations and cases that the Prosecutor has 
arbitrarily excluded on the sole basis of considerations of the ‘interests of 
justice’; and (ii) sufficiently substantiated cases and charges that the Prosecutor 
wants to pursue. Part of the PTC’s gatekeeping function is also the protection of 
the rights of those affected by investigations and prosecutions. 
1.2 The extent of the Prosecutor’s discretion 
1.2.1 The Concept of Prosecutorial Discretion and its applicability in the 
context of the Statute 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines discretion as ‘[a] public official’s power or right 
to act in certain circumstances according to personal judgment and conscience, 
often in an official or representative capacity.’63 Prosecutorial discretion is 
further defined as ‘[a] prosecutor’s power to choose from the options available 
in a criminal case, such as filing charges, prosecuting, not prosecuting, plea-
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bargaining, and recommending a sentence to the court.’64 To what extent can 
this definition be applied to the ICC Prosecutor’s discretion? How free is he in 
deciding to act in accordance with his personal judgment and conscience or 
within his own perception of what is fair and equitable? How loose or constricted 
is the Prosecutor’s power under the Statute? Is he subject to strict rules?  
The degree of prosecutorial freedom varies substantially from one system to 
another; of course, prosecutorial arbitrariness is not permitted under any system 
of criminal justice.65 However, already within the ‘continental’ or ‘civil law’ 
system it is possible to find two main approaches. On the one hand, in the 
Spanish legal system (Obligatoriedad de la Acción Penal) as well as the Italian 
one (Obbligatorietà dell’azione penale),66 the prosecutor is under a duty to 
investigate and prosecute whenever there are sufficient reasons to suspect that 
a criminal offence has been committed. Similarly, in Germany 
(Legalitätsprinzip),67 the prosecutor is under the same duty to investigate and 
prosecute, although there are some exceptions in relation to certain offences 
that are investigated and prosecuted only when there is a complaint from the 
victim and, more importantly, the prosecutor has the right to drop cases under 
certain circumstances. On the other hand, there are systems like the French 
(Opportunité des Poursuites)68 and Dutch (Opportuniteitsbeginsel),69 in which 
the prosecutor will be guided in his decisions by considerations related to the 
opportunity or desirability of prosecutions. The degree of judicial oversight and 
authority will also depend on the particular system, although the civil law 
traditions generally include – to different degrees – judicial oversight and control 
over the prosecutorial process.  
At the other end of the spectrum, in the US, save for unconstitutional 
motivations, the prosecutor has nearly unfettered discretion in deciding whether 
                                         
64 Ibid. 
65 Lenore F. Horton, ‘Prosecutorial discretion before international criminal courts and 
perceptions of justice: How expanded prosecutorial independence can increase the 
accountability of international actors’ (2010-2011) 7 Eyes on the ICC 5, 7-10. 
66 Héctor Olásolo, Corte Penal Internacional ¿Dónde investigar? Especial referencia a la Fiscalía 
en el Proceso de Activación (Tirant Lo Blanch 2003) 298-300. 
67 See K. Tiedemann and J. Vogel, ‘National Report of Germany’ in Mireille Delmas-Marty and 
J.A.E. Vervaele (eds), The Implementation of the Corpus Juris in the Member States, vol II 
(Intersentia 2000) 363. 
68 Jacques Leroy, Procédure Pénale (2 edn, L.G.D.J. Lextenso éditions 2011) 247-250. 
69 Geert J.M. Corstens, Het Nederlands Strafprocesrecht (4th edn, Kluwer 2002) 51-52. 
  
34 
to investigate and prosecute.70 Considerations such as the likelihood of 
conviction and the public interest in the prosecution will determine the 
prosecutor’s decision whether to proceed against certain individuals or crimes. 
In England and Wales, the police retain almost exclusive control over the 
investigation, while the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) is the government 
department responsible for prosecuting criminal cases. The police will generally 
have control over the decision whether a case should be prosecuted and the 
charges to be brought against an accused, although the CPS will advise the 
police on cases for possible prosecution and determine the charges in more 
serious or complex cases.71 
Héctor Olásolo explains that the discretion granted to prosecutors in systems 
like the American one is explained by reference to their democratic legitimacy 
and political responsibility.72 In these systems, he argues, the organs of 
investigation and prosecution form part of the executive power and their 
discretion is thus a reflection of their role as instruments at the service of the 
criminal policy of the executive.73 Conversely, in systems following mandatory 
prosecutions, the mere communication of the notitia criminis activates the 
initiation of the criminal investigation, and the existence of a ‘reasonable basis’ 
will automatically trigger the commencement of a criminal prosecution.74 
Olásolo argues that in the systems featuring mandatory prosecution, the 
functions of investigation and prosecution would be considered ‘quasi-
jurisdictional’ as their main goal is the protection of the general interests 
defined by law.75 Consequently, in Olásolo’s view, the choice between 
discretionary or mandatory investigation and prosecution will depend on 
whether these functions are conceived as tools to implement governmental anti-
crime policies or are aimed at preserving the general interests defined by law.76  
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Olásolo’s theory, although an analytical frame worth holding on to, leaves some 
questions unanswered. In particular, it is not exactly clear whether he implies 
that the options are mutually exclusive in the sense that, in a system based on 
discretion, the functions of investigation and prosecution are conceived (only) as 
tools to implement governmental anti-crime policies, and that only a system of 
mandatory investigation and prosecution is aimed at preserving the general 
interests defined by law. It is difficult to see how such an interpretation can be 
squared with the English system for example, where discretion is guided by 
public interests and not only by ‘governmental anti-crime policies’. Indeed, in 
accordance with the 2013 Code for Crown Prosecutors, the CPS discretion to 
decide not to investigate or not to prosecute or to accept out-of-court disposals 
or guilty pleas is based upon whether the ‘public interest’ would be properly 
served by those measures.77  
Olásolo also appears to argue that the choice between mandatory and 
discretionary investigation and prosecution will be guided by the supreme values 
of the particular legal system. He argues that the systems based on legal 
stability and equality before the law would adopt mandatory prosecution or the 
‘principle of legality’ (as it is known in the German tradition) and systems based 
on representative application of the law, democratic legitimacy, and political 
accountability would be more inclined to adopt the principle of political 
discretion.78 This distinction, although arguably applicable to some specific 
examples, does not seem to be easily extrapolated to other systems national or 
international. In effect, for example, although strictly speaking based on 
discretion, the French and Dutch ‘principle of opportunity’ is conceived within 
legal systems in which equality before the law and legal stability are pillar 
values of the system as much as in Spain and Italy.79 Similarly, although the 
Procurator Fiscal in Scotland enjoys considerable discretion, he is only 
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answerable to the Lord Advocate and generally declines to explain his decisions 
to anyone else.80  
The same can be said about the Statute. It could not be reasonably argued that 
the drafters have chosen that the Prosecutor should implement governmental 
anti-crime policies over preserving the general interests defined by law or that 
they have opted for political accountability or democratic legitimacy over 
equality before the law or legal stability, or the other way around. Articles 22, 
23 and 24 recognise the general principles of law providing for legal stability: 
nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege and non-retroactivity ratione 
personae. Article 27(1) provides for equality before the law, stating that the 
Statute applies equally to all persons. However, at the same time, in accordance 
with Articles 42(4) and 46(2) the Prosecutor is elected and may be removed from 
office by an absolute majority of the Assembly of States Parties (ASP). The ASP is 
the representative-political organ of the Court, in which each State that has 
ratified the Statute is represented pursuant to Article 112. The ICC’s Prosecutor 
is therefore politically accountable to the ‘democratic’ political organ of the 
Court. At the same time, however, he is not elected in order to implement the 
ASP’s policies, but to preserve the ‘general interest’ defined by the objects and 
purposes of the Statute. Further, as referred to in the previous section, the 
Prosecutor’s discretion is not unlimited but subject to considerable judicial 
control and oversight by the PTC. 
Accordingly, the extent of the Prosecutor’s discretion cannot be determined or 
rationalised through assimilation of the system created by the Statute to any of 
the traditional models of criminal justice. As stressed by Alexander Greenawalt, 
the policy dilemmas faced by the Prosecutor are heavily influenced by 
institutional goals and limitations that fundamentally distinguish international 
prosecution from its domestic counterparts.81 It should be acknowledged that 
the Court’s system is unique and does not emerge directly from principles or 
traditions of criminal justice commonly shared by all of its members. It is not 
the dreamed of ‘world penal court’ established on the basis of a ‘unified world 
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community’,82 but rather represents the result of political compromise between 
diverse and, at times, contradictory perspectives on the intrinsic values and 
purposes of criminal justice and punishment. As such, and as stressed above, the 
drafters opted for ‘creative ambiguity’ in circumstances where agreement would 
have proved difficult if not impossible to obtain.83 The extent and limits of the 
Prosecutor’s discretion should be therefore analysed in light of his concrete 
powers under the Statute and degree of judicial oversight at the different stages 
of the proceedings.  
1.2.2 The Prosecutor’s Discretionary Powers in Accordance with the Statute 
Previous models of international criminal justice, such as Nuremberg’s 
International Military Tribunal (IMT),84 Tokyo’s International Military Tribunal for 
the Far East (IMTFE),85 and the ad hoc Tribunals – International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)86 and International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR)87 – were created to deal with specific situations of crisis that 
were delimited ab initio. The political bodies that created them made the 
‘political’ choices of determining whether international adjudication was indeed 
justified, the margins of their jurisdiction, and, in certain cases, even the 
individuals who were to be investigated and prosecuted.  
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The system of the Court differs substantially. Provided that one of the triggering 
mechanisms operates, the ICC’s Prosecutor can investigate almost any situation 
of crisis, as long as it relates to a crime which falls under the subject matter 
jurisdiction of the Court, was committed after the entry into force of the Rome 
Statute, and – except in cases of UNSC referral – was committed by a national of 
a State Party and/or occurred in the territory thereof.88  
Pursuant to Article 53(1), when the UNSC or a State Party refer a situation to the 
Prosecutor, the jurisdiction of the Court will only be activated if the Prosecutor 
decides that there is indeed a ‘reasonable basis to proceed’. Consequently, the 
Prosecutor is not bound by the UNSC or State’s assessment of the necessity of 
the investigation or of the fulfilment of the Statute’s requirements. Similarly, in 
accordance with Article 15(1) and (3), based on the information he receives, the 
Prosecutor may request the PTC’s authorisation to initiate an investigation 
proprio motu. However, he is not obliged to initiate an investigation following 
every single communication of crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court that he 
may receive. Although Article 15(3) includes the mandatory expression ‘shall’, 
the operative term in sub-paragraph 1 of the same provision is ‘may’, giving 
discretion to the Prosecutor to decide whether to request authorisation to 
initiate investigations proprio motu. The Statute therefore does not recognise 
the principle of mandatory investigation triggered automatically by the 
communication of the notitia criminis. 
As will be discussed in Chapter 4, although subject to the PTC’s judicial scrutiny 
in the case of referrals and its authorisation when acting proprio motu, the 
Prosecutor is the key decision-maker as regards the situations to be investigated 
by the Court. He has to determine of his own accord whether the requirements 
to initiate an investigation are fulfilled, whether situations fall within the 
competence of the Court, whether they are of sufficient gravity to justify 
further action by the Court, and finally whether the interests of justice militate 
against the initiation of an investigation. It could be argued that when all the 
requirements of Article 53(1) are ‘objectively’ fulfilled, the Prosecutor has no 
option but to – in the language of the provision he ‘shall’ – initiate an 
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investigation. However, the threshold of ‘reasonable basis to proceed’ at which 
the Prosecutor should be satisfied is again nowhere defined with more precision. 
Accordingly, it will be for the Prosecutor to assess, in accordance with his own 
wisdom and experience whether or not the ‘objective’ requirements are 
complied with at the relevant threshold. When he reaches a positive conclusion 
as to the reasonable basis for the investigation, then the exact geographical, 
temporal and substantive boundaries of the situation to be investigated also 
have to be determined, which again, is not a pure mathematical assessment. As 
will be discussed in Chapter 4, the determination of the boundaries of a 
situation of crisis will depend on a series of – not necessarily ‘objective’ – 
factors.  
More generally, it should be acknowledged that it is practically impossible for 
the Prosecutor to deal with all the situations that could come under the Court’s 
scrutiny. The mere application of the margins of jurisdiction, complementarity 
and gravity will not sufficiently narrow the range of possible situations and cases 
that qualify to justify action by the Court. Similarly, it would appear that only a 
limited number of situations and cases, if any, would qualify to be dismissed 
based on the ‘interests of justice’. The Prosecutor will therefore realistically 
need to choose which investigations and prosecutions to pursue among several 
situations and cases deserving attention. In order to reach that decision the 
Prosecutor will have to make difficult choices for which there is no clear answer 
in the Statute. For example, should he be guided by qualitative or quantitative 
factors? Should he focus on the situations with more victims or those with more 
political impact? Would it be sensible to prioritise the prosecution of genocide 
over war crimes? Should he start by focusing on a particular geographical area or 
should he rather initiate investigations in different parts of the world in order to 
avoid perceptions of bias? Might he seek to pursue situations in which 
cooperation will be readily available or should he aim at the symbolic impact 
that an investigation involving powerful actors may have, even if the likelihood 
of cooperation is negligible? Would it be worthwhile to draw attention to 
international crimes and encourage international political action, even if there 
are limited prospects for immediate arrests and trials? Should he apply a 
comparative perspective as to the gravity of the different situations that may 
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deserve the Court’s attention? What should his approach to amnesties and 
transitional justice mechanisms in general be? These are the types of difficult 
questions that the Prosecutor will have to answer in order to select from various 
meritorious situations. 
Once the investigation is eventually launched, a particular feature of the Court’s 
system is that, pursuant to Article 54(1)(a) ‘the Prosecutor shall: (a) in order to 
establish the truth, extend the investigation to cover all facts and evidence 
relevant to an assessment of whether there is criminal responsibility under this 
Statute’. As stressed by Kress, the drafters of the Statute devised a role for the 
Prosecutor resembling that of an ‘officer of justice’ rather than a partisan 
advocate.89 Strictly speaking, the Statute does not give the Prosecutor the 
choice to decide whether to focus his investigations on specific incidents, crimes 
or individuals, but imposes on him the obligation to investigate the full extent of 
the situation of crisis for which the jurisdiction of the Court has been activated, 
‘in order to establish the truth’. Consequently, the Prosecutor’s duty in this 
context is not ‘merely’ to discharge the burden of proof by demonstrating 
beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of an accused in terms of Article 66, but 
rather to ‘establish the truth’, the same responsibility that is borne by the Trial 
Chamber (TC) in accordance with Article 69(3). As such, the Prosecutor cannot 
simply focus on obtaining a conviction, but must investigate the full extent of 
criminality in a given situation and only afterwards, ‘upon investigation’ in terms 
of in Article 53(2), will he enjoy discretion to decide whether to prosecute. As 
will be discussed in Chapter 4, this responsibility of the Prosecutor is consistent 
with the powers granted by Articles 56(3) and 57(3)(c) to the PTC, allowing it to 
intervene during the Prosecutor’s investigation and take measures for the 
protection and privacy of victims and witnesses, the preservation of evidence, 
the protection of suspects and the protection of national security information. 
As such, although the Prosecutor is, in principle, obliged to investigate all facts 
and evidence, he is under no obligation to initiate criminal proceedings against 
every individual and for every crime that he may investigate. As stated, ‘upon 
investigation’, the Prosecutor may conclude that there is ‘no sufficient basis for 
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a prosecution’. However, even where such a basis is found to exist, the 
Prosecutor is still not obligated to initiate a criminal investigation. Pursuant to 
Article 58(1), at any time after the initiation of the investigation the Prosecutor 
‘may’ request the PTC to issue a warrant of arrest or a summons to appear, if 
satisfied that there are ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ that the person has 
committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court. Again the operative term 
is ‘may’ rather than ‘shall’.  
In addition, the thresholds of ‘no sufficient basis’ and ‘reasonable grounds to 
believe’ are nowhere defined in the Statute. It may be argued that the Article 
58 standard of ‘reasonable grounds’ is a threshold higher than the ‘sufficient 
basis’ of Article 53. Consequently, even where the Prosecutor finds ‘sufficient 
basis’ for a prosecution, such that Article 53(2) does not operate to dismiss the 
case, he still has to be satisfied that there are also ‘reasonable grounds to 
believe’ that the person identified has committed a crime under the Statute 
before he may apply for an arrest or summons pursuant to Article 58.  
As will be discussed in Chapter 5, pursuant to Article 58 it is incumbent on the 
PTC to decide whether a warrant or summons will be issued, but only at the 
request of the Prosecutor. The Prosecutor has indeed ample discretion to decide 
against whom – and for what crimes – to request the initiation of criminal 
prosecutions. This decision has proven to be one of the most controversial 
discretionary powers of the Prosecutor. A single situation of crisis under 
investigation would normally involve numerous perpetrators, all of whom may be 
suitable targets for prosecution by the Court. In effect, Articles 25(3) and 28 
identify a wide range of modes of participation in the crimes under the Court’s 
jurisdiction. These include direct participation, indirect participation, ordering, 
aiding and abetting, contribution to the commission of a crime by a group acting 
with a common purpose, attempts, acts of omission where committed by 
responsible commanders and other superiors and – in the case of genocide – 
public incitation. Further, pursuant to Articles 27 and 33, official capacity, 
immunities, and superior orders are irrelevant under the Statute. The Prosecutor 
could therefore prosecute almost anyone in the chain of command or even 
persons not belonging to the groups principally involved in the conflict if they 
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contributed to the commission of the crime. Who then shall be the target? Might 
the Prosecutor go against the most notorious figure(s) or those most readily 
available for arrest and surrender? Could he try to pursue everyone in the chain 
of command or would it be more reasonable to maintain focus on particular 
levels? Should he target persons on all sides of the conflict in order to avoid 
perceptions of bias, or, rather, should he focus on those committing the gravest 
crimes? Again, these are the type of questions that the Prosecutor will ask 
himself before deciding whom to prosecute.  
Once the PTC has issued a warrant or summons and the individual concerned has 
been surrendered or otherwise appeared voluntarily before the PTC, the 
Prosecutor has to further decide on the charges for which that person should be 
brought to trial. As will be discussed in Chapter 6, while subject to the approval 
of the PTC, Article 61 leaves to the Prosecutor the power to determine the 
specific charges to be brought against the individual. As is demonstrated by the 
cases brought before the Court in its first ten years of existence, this is, again, 
not a straightforward or mathematical decision. Indeed, it has also been a 
vigorously contested aspect of the Prosecutor’s discretion. Considerations 
related to complementarity, investigative capacities, availability of evidence 
and, most significantly, the Prosecutor’s policy decisions have determined the 
type and extent of the charges that have been brought before the Court.  
1.2.3 The nature of the Prosecutor’s discretion 
As detailed above, the Prosecutor is entitled, in accordance with the Statute, to 
exercise discretion in the selection of situations and cases to be heard before 
the Court, the individuals to be prosecuted and the charges to be brought 
against them. Most of these decisions will be subject to the judicial control of 
the PTC, but the Prosecutor will preliminarily answer them himself, in 
accordance with his personal judgment. The Prosecutor will therefore exercise 
discretion, which is not unlimited and is subject to the restrictions imposed by 
the Court’s legal framework.  
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According to Olásolo, the ICC’s Prosecutor has two types of discretion: 
‘inherent’ or ‘technical’ on the one hand and ‘political’ on the other.90 For 
Olásolo, technical or inherent discretion is the margin of appreciation within 
which the Prosecutor may assess facts and interpret the law in order to find a 
technical solution to his legal tasks, exclusively guided by legal criteria.91 These 
tasks would include the selection of the facts to be investigated within the 
context of a situation, the determination of the best legal characterisation of 
the facts to be brought to trial, the means of proof to be submitted at pre-trial 
or trial, the assessment of whether there are reasonable grounds to submit a 
request for an arrest warrant and the decision as to when an investigation should 
be concluded.92  
In Olásolo’s view, the Prosecutor has also been granted ‘political’ discretion, 
particularly pursuant to Article 53, which allows him to make value judgments 
about whether certain actions will be convenient or appropriate to the 
fulfilment of determined political goals.93 The ‘political’ discretion afforded to 
the Prosecutor, Olásolo stresses, may be either limited or unlimited. It could be 
considered ‘limited’ where the ultimate political goals to be achieved through 
its exercise are specified and the Prosecutor is unable to alter them.94 
Conversely, absent such specification, as for example with the ‘interests of 
justice’ in terms of Article 53(1)(c) and (2)(c), the discretion given to the 
Prosecutor should be regarded as ‘unlimited’.95 Consequently, according to 
Olásolo’s approach, the Prosecutor is free to determine by himself the nature of 
the ‘political’ goals to be achieved through his discretion under provisions that 
do not specify these ends.  
As stressed above, there are politics and politics, and problems arise from the 
imprecision in the use of the terms ‘politics’ and ‘political’. Olásolo is correct in 
that within the framework of the Statute, the Prosecutor’s discretion is not 
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simply and strictly ‘technical’, in the sense that it will be always guided by legal 
criteria previously defined by the law. It is true that the Prosecutor is allowed to 
take into account certain extra-legal considerations when exercising his 
discretion and interpreting the vague terms of the Statute. However, the 
Prosecutor is not absolutely free to determine the ‘political’ goals to be 
achieved through his choices.  
As discussed in Sections 1.1.2 and 1.1.3 above, the Prosecutor should not isolate 
himself from the international political order that actually created the Court, 
which is aimed at the ultimate political goal of preventing threats to ‘the peace, 
security and well-being of the world’.96 The Prosecutor is thus not expected to 
completely disregard the political scenario within which he is called to act; he is 
given in the Statute sufficient tools to properly address political concerns. 
However, although free to set his ‘policy options’ within the framework of the 
Statute, the Prosecutor does not have license to operate arbitrarily and ought to 
be impartial and not take sides in any conflict. Indeed, although the Prosecutor 
may take into account extra-legal considerations, his decisions cannot be 
arbitrary or biased. As such, within the context of the Statute, certain ‘political 
considerations’ will be illegal by definition and should play no role in the Court’s 
decision-making. 
Yet how can the Prosecutor distinguish between the ‘politics’ or ‘political 
considerations’ that are illegal and those that are not? Dworkin’s constructive 
interpretation theory seems helpful in finding the distinguishing parameters.97 
He argues that interpretation is essentially concerned with purpose. The 
interpreter cannot make of the object of interpretation anything he might have 
wanted it to be, since the object itself constrains its available interpretations: 
interpretation is a matter of interaction between purpose and object.98 
Accordingly, when exercising his discretion, the Prosecutor is not allowed to 
make the Statute ‘anything he would have wanted it to be’, but is rather 
constrained in the policies he devises and applies by the Statute itself, which has 
its own purposes and goals.  
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1.2.4 The Prosecutor’s Policy Options 
Although constrained by the purposes and goals of the Statute, the Prosecutor 
has the power to take policy decisions exercising his discretion to interpret the 
ambiguity of the legal criteria included in the Statute and the subjective 
elements purposely attached to them.99 As stressed by Goldston, the 
Prosecutor’s discretion is: 
grounded in law and evidence, but, of necessity [takes] into account 
broader considerations of strategy and policy, even while refraining from 
‘politics’ in the sense of partisanship and/or bias for or against any interest 
external to the Court.100  
The Prosecutor is indeed entitled to choose between different possible ways of 
fulfilling his mandate, but the legitimacy of his choices will be determined in 
light of the purposes and goals of the Statute. 
For example, within different expressions of policy options adopted by the 
Prosecutor it is possible to identify, inter alia, the decision: (i) that the OTP 
‘should endeavour to maximise its impact while operating a system of low 
costs’;101 (ii) that the selection of individuals and charges to be brought before 
the Court should be guided by a strategy of focusing on ‘the leaders who bear 
most responsibility for the crimes’;102 and (iii) that the OTP will endeavour to 
conduct ‘short investigations (…) [where] incidents will be selected to provide a 
sample that is reflective of the gravest incidents and the main types of 
victimization’.103 The legitimacy of these policy options should therefore be 
assessed in light of the objects and purposes of the Statute. Particular 
consideration should be given as to whether they constitute a proper way of 
complying with the goal of ‘put[ting] an end to impunity for the perpetrators of 
these crimes and thus contribut[ing] to the prevention of such crimes’,104 
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bearing in mind that these crimes ‘threaten the peace, security and well-being 
of the world’.105 
Although not specifically required by the Statute, prosecutorial strategy should 
be transparently reflected in ex ante policy papers or sufficiently explained in 
his specific decisions. In principle, this fosters accountability and ensures 
transparency – a critical element of any institution’s legitimacy – as well as 
preventing arbitrariness and inequality and enhancing fairness and consistency. 
As is the case in domestic systems that allow prosecutorial discretion, the 
establishment of policy rules is essential to the legitimate exercise of 
discretion.106 A clear and transparent policy is all the more important in the 
ICC’s context where, as discussed above, the Prosecutor’s discretion is wide and 
where the specific purposes of criminal justice or punishment that he may 
consider to be within the objects and purposes of the Statute may not 
necessarily be recognised as such by all States Parties. Greenawalt notes, 
however, the risk that the kind of guidelines that provide for meaningful ex ante 
decisional rules likely to demonstrate the Prosecutor’s impartiality may not be 
the kind likely to embrace the full complexity and contingency of each 
situation.107 Certainly, policy papers should explain the different policy options 
to be adopted by the Prosecutor, but be delineated in sufficiently broad terms 
so as to preserve the intrinsic nature of discretion.  
The problem identified by Greenawalt arises when ex ante policy papers do not 
capture the complexity of certain discretionary decisions and the Prosecutor 
does not sufficiently explain the policy options adopted. It is of great concern, 
as emphasised by Goldston among others, that certain considerations that have 
crucially informed the Prosecutor’s determination in a number of cases, such as 
the prospects of arrest and State cooperation, have not been properly 
acknowledged.108  
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As described in this section, discretion allows the Prosecutor to take into 
account extra-legal considerations and the particularities of each case, but that 
does not give him carte blanche to act with arbitrariness or bias. The main 
safeguard provided by the Statute against possible abuse of prosecutorial 
discretion is the PTC’s scrutiny. The PTC is the organ responsible for ensuring 
that the Prosecutor’s decisions are a legitimate exercise of his powers under the 
Statute and that they are not arbitrary or the result of improper political 
influence.  
1.3 The PTC’s gatekeeping function 
1.3.1 The Counterbalancing Power of the PTC  
The idea of the inclusion of a PTC within the Court’s system grew in support 
throughout the Statute negotiations. The PTC was seen as the organ necessary to 
counterbalance the wide discretion given to the Prosecutor and to ensure that 
his actions were not abusive or the result of improper political pressures.109 The 
inclusion of the PTC within the Court’s architecture was the decisive element 
that sealed agreement between the opposing views as to the Prosecutor’s 
independence. On the one hand, there were those supporting the idea of a fully 
empowered Prosecutor able to initiate investigations and prosecutions whenever 
heinous crimes were committed in the territory or by nationals of a State Party. 
On the other hand, there were those who considered essential the authorisation 
of the relevant State(s) or the UNSC before the commencement of any 
investigation or prosecution. The main argument bringing the PTC into the 
equation was that, in the absence of political backing from the State or the 
Council, the Prosecutor would need the judicial backing of the Court.110 
Therefore, politically sensitive decisions would not be taken in a solitary fashion 
by the Prosecutor but in a collective manner, ie by the Prosecutor under the 
judicial control of the PTC, thus not only preventing possible abuses of power 
but also shielding the Prosecutor from external pressures.111  
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The role assigned to the PTC has been described in terms of its activities as: (i) a 
filter against futile, irrelevant, unreasonable or duplicate investigations; (ii) a 
safeguard for the rights of the accused and victims and the fairness and 
completeness of the investigation; and (iii) an impulse for the proceedings in 
view of the trial.112 The PTC may also be seen in more general terms to provide 
crucial supervision over the activities of the Prosecutor.113 The PTC exercises 
judicial control over fundamental prosecutorial choices as regards the situations 
and cases to be brought before the Court and ensures protection of the rights of 
those affected by the Court’s investigations and prosecutions.  
It could be argued that the fact that certain of the Prosecutor’s decisions are 
subject to judicial control by the PTC does not necessarily provide for further 
safeguards. Some may argue that there may be little reason to suspect that 
judicial decisions would be necessarily less susceptible to external pressures 
than those of a Prosecutor. In effect, Article 42 recognises the Prosecutor’s 
independence as a separate organ of the Court, who shall not seek or act on 
instruction from any external source and has full authority over the management 
and administration of the office. However, a contextual reading of the Statute 
supports the view that the PTC’s judicial review of the Prosecutor’s 
discretionary decisions does indeed make the Court less susceptible to 
manipulation from external actors.  
First, the PTC judges are also independent in the performance of their functions 
pursuant to Article 40(1). In practical terms, judges are more independent than 
the Prosecutor from the ASP – the, strictly speaking, ‘political’ organ of the 
Court – in particular considering their mechanism of election,114 and removal.115  
In addition, while the Prosecutor will take his discretionary decisions in a 
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solitary fashion, the judges are required to reach a collegial consensual decision 
on sensitive matters. While in accordance with Article 39(2)(b)(iii), a single 
judge can carry out the functions of the PTC, the most important decisions 
involving judicial control over the Prosecutor’s discretion must be concurred in 
by the majority of a PTC pursuant to Article 57(1)(a).  
Further, while both the Prosecutor and the judges are tasked with the same 
obligation of ‘finding the truth’ pursuant to Articles 54(1) and 69(3), the judicial 
function in itself makes the PTC judges less susceptible to pressures from States 
or the Council to act in one way or another. The PTC will be simply complying 
with its function if it decides not to authorise the commencement of an 
investigation, not to issue a warrant of arrest or not to confirm the charges 
brought by the Prosecutor. In contrast, the Prosecutor’s role is different insofar 
as he is tasked with conducting investigations and prosecutions and has the onus 
to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt pursuant to Article 
66(2) and (3). As such, unlike the judges, the Prosecutor’s performance will be 
judged by the number of situations and cases that he is able to successfully 
investigate and prosecute. As previously discussed, the Prosecutor does not have 
at his disposal a police force or enforcement or subpoena powers of any kind. 
Therefore, for the success of his investigations and prosecutions the Prosecutor 
is highly dependent on the cooperation of States and the Council. 
Within this context, the Statute gives the PTC the function of ensuring that the 
exercise of the ample discretion given to the Prosecutor is not an arbitrary or 
abusive exercise of his powers under the Statute. However, as will be discussed 
in the following Chapters, the drafters were rigorous in striking a balance 
between the need to counterbalance the Prosecutor’s discretionary powers and 
the necessity of preserving his independence. Accordingly, only some of the 
Prosecutor’s discretionary decisions are subject to judicial control by the PTC. 
The PTC does not have a general oversight power over the Prosecutor’s 
activities: it is better characterised as the Court’s ‘gatekeeper’. 
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1.3.2 The Instances of Control of the Prosecutor’s Discretion by the PTC 
The most important function of the PTC is the exercise of judicial control over 
fundamental prosecutorial choices as regards the situations and cases that the 
Prosecutor wants to bring to the Court’s attention. The PTC would then ‘filter-
in’ the situations and cases that can be allowed to pass through the Court’s 
gates. This includes the PTC’s powers to authorise investigations proprio motu, 
pursuant to Article 15, to issue warrants of arrest or summons to appear in 
accordance with Article 58 and to confirm the charges for which the individual 
will be committed to trial, pursuant to Article 61. As will be discussed in 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 below, in all these proceedings the PTC will ‘filter-in’ 
situations and cases, ensuring that the decision to focus the Court’s efforts and 
resources on certain situations, individuals and conduct is legitimate and has not 
been unlawfully influenced by political considerations.  
As previously described, the Prosecutor has discretion to choose the situations 
and cases that he considers, in accordance with his personal judgment, should 
be investigated and prosecuted by the Court. Although the Prosecutor may take 
into account extra-legal considerations when making such decisions, these 
cannot be arbitrary or biased. The role of the PTC therefore is to ‘guard’ the 
Court’s ‘gates’, avoiding abuse of discretion by the Prosecutor. However, as will 
be discussed in Chapter 4, there is one important legal vacuum in the Statute, 
which does not provide for judicial review of the Prosecutor’s decision to initiate 
an investigation following a referral by the UNSC or a State Party. This gap raises 
important concerns due to the potential abuse of referrals, and the possibility 
that the Prosecutor may be unduly influenced by the political agenda of the 
referring State or the Council.  
Although it will fall to the PTC to decide whether to issue a warrant or summons 
in relation to any case arising out of such investigations, when the Prosecutor 
has unduly opened an investigation following a referral, by the time the PTC is 
eventually allowed to scrutinise such a decision the Court’s time and resources 
will have been already compromised as will the public perception of the Court’s 
legitimacy. Accordingly, an amendment of the Statute is suggested in order to 
confer the PTC the power to assess, at the earliest opportunity, the legality of 
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the referrals, ensuring that the Prosecutor’s decision to open an investigation is 
a legitimate exercise of his powers under the Statute and is not the result of 
undue political influences.  
Another important manifestation of the PTC’s gatekeeping function is its 
responsibility to ensure that the rights of those affected by the Court’s 
investigations and prosecutions are respected. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, 
in line with the Prosecutor’s obligation to extend his investigation to cover all 
facts and evidence in order to ‘establish the truth’ in accordance with Article 
54(1)(a), the PTC has the power to intervene, proprio motu, in specific instances 
during the investigation stage. In particular, pursuant to Article 56(3), where the 
Prosecutor (unjustifiably) fails to take measures to collect and preserve 
evidence that may not be available subsequently for trial and the PTC considers 
that it would be essential for the defence, it may act on its own motion. 
Similarly, pursuant to Article 57(3), the PTC may act upon the request of the 
suspect or on its own motion when necessary for the protection and privacy of 
victims and witnesses, the preservation of evidence, the protection of the 
suspect or of national security information. Lastly, pursuant to Article 68 and 
Rule 93, the PTC may allow victims to participate and present their views and 
concerns throughout the Court’s proceedings, including during the investigation, 
and the Chamber may seek their views on any issue. 
In addition, as will be discussed in Chapter 3, the PTC decides on contested 
issues of jurisdiction and admissibility. Pursuant to Article 18, when the 
Prosecutor opens an investigation following a State referral or proprio motu, any 
State may inform the Court that it is investigating or has investigated the 
relevant conduct and request the Prosecutor to defer the investigation to it. In 
that case, the Prosecutor shall defer to the State or otherwise request the PTC 
to authorise the investigation. Further, pursuant to Article 19 the PTC can, on its 
own initiative, at the request of the Prosecutor or following a challenge from 
the suspect or the relevant State, rule on the jurisdiction of the Court or the 
admissibility of the case. Under these proceedings the PTC will review the 
Prosecutor’s discretionary assessment of the parameters of the Court’s 
jurisdiction and of the issues of admissibility, determining their concrete scope. 
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The PTC has also an important role in reviewing the Prosecutor’s decisions to 
‘filter-out’ situations and cases. First, pursuant to Article 53(3)(a), at the 
request of the UNSC or the State making the referral, the PTC can review the 
Prosecutor’s decision not to proceed with an investigation or prosecution and 
may request that the Prosecutor reconsider his determination. Even where the 
PTC disagrees with the Prosecutor’s determination, it may only request that he 
reconsider; it may not require him to begin an investigation or prosecution. The 
second type of review of a decision not to proceed is, however, a direct 
limitation on the Prosecutor’s discretion. In accordance with Article 53(3)(b), 
the PTC may, on its own initiative, review the Prosecutor’s decision not to 
proceed with an investigation or prosecution when that decision is based solely 
on the consideration that it will not serve the ‘interests of justice’. In such a 
case the Prosecutor’s decision will only be effective if confirmed by the PTC. 
Otherwise, pursuant to Rule 110, the Prosecutor shall proceed with the 
investigation or prosecution. The mandatory force of the PTC’s review in this 
particular case is justified by the highly political nature of a decision not to 
proceed solely based on the ‘interests of justice’.  
One may wonder whether it is appropriate to place such emphasis on the role of 
the PTC given that its decisions can in any case be appealed. Is it not the 
Appeals Chamber (AC) that, in the final analysis, exercises the gatekeeping 
function? The answer must be in the negative. Pursuant to Article 82, of all the 
PTC’s decisions, the only ones that can be appealed directly to the AC are those 
related to jurisdiction or admissibility, granting or denying release of an 
accused, or a decision to act on its own initiative under Article 56(3). All other 
decisions, including the most significant exercise of the PTC’s gatekeeping 
function in filtering-in and filtering-out situations and cases, ie decisions under 
Articles 15, 53, 58 and 61, are all subject to interlocutory appeal for which leave 
must be granted by the PTC. Pursuant to Article 82(1)(d), the requirements for 
leave to be granted are highly demanding. Specifically, the decision to be 
appealed must involve an issue: (i) that would significantly affect the fair and 
expeditious conduct of the proceedings or the outcome of the trial; and (ii) for 
which in the opinion of the PTC, an immediate resolution by the AC may 
materially advance the proceedings.  
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When deciding on a leave to appeal under Article 82(1)(d), the different PTCs 
have consistently reiterated that they are guided by three main principles:  
a) the restrictive nature of the remedy provided in this provision; b) the 
need for the application to satisfy the Chamber as to the fulfilment of the 
requirements embodied in this provision; and c) the irrelevance of 
addressing arguments concerning the merits of the appeal.116  
Further, the AC has clearly indicated that the provision does not confer a direct 
right to appeal PTC’s decisions; the right to appeal arises only if the Chamber is 
of the opinion that any such decision must receive the immediate attention of 
the AC.117 Consequently, the AC stressed, the PTC’s opinion ‘constitutes the 
definitive element for the genesis of a right to appeal. In essence, the Pre-Trial 
(…) Chamber is vested with power to state, or more accurately still, to certify 
the existence of an appealable issue.’118 Accordingly, save for the specific 
exceptions provided for in Article 82 and unless the PTC is itself of the view that 
there is an issue that requires immediate resolution by the AC, as a general rule 
the PTC is the final arbiter as to the appropriateness of the exercise of 
discretion by the Prosecutor. The PTC, and not the AC, is the Court’s 
gatekeeper.  
1.4 Conclusions 
As discussed in this Chapter, the Statute empowers the Prosecutor to exercise 
discretion in the selection of situations and cases to be heard before the Court, 
the individuals to be prosecuted and the charges to be brought against them. 
Such discretion, although extensive, is however not unlimited and is subject to 
the restrictions and safeguards provided by the Court’s legal framework. The 
most important safeguard is that the Prosecutor’s decisions are subject to the 
judicial control of the PTC. However, as stressed by Schabas, the nature of the 
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PTC’s judicial review of the Prosecutor’s exercise of discretion ‘remains a 
subject of some uncertainty’.119 Indeed, beyond the simple assumption that the 
PTC provides safeguards against ‘politically motivated’ investigations and 
prosecutions, the issue of how and to what extent the PTC is actually 
empowered to comply with that role has not been sufficiently explored.  
Schabas argues that the PTC could only exercise meaningful judicial oversight 
over the possibilities of ‘politicisation’ by addressing the policy considerations 
upon which the Prosecutor has acted.120 Olásolo however is of the view that the 
PTC and the AC, as ‘jurisdictional’ bodies that should be guided exclusively by 
legal criteria, should not have been granted the power to review ‘purely 
political’ considerations, as this turns them into ‘quasi-administrative’ bodies.121 
These are the two poles of opinion as to the manner in which the PTC should 
exercise its role. Either the PTC should fully engage in an analysis of the 
appropriateness of the Prosecutor’s policy options that lead to certain decisions 
or it should aim to detach itself from the Prosecutor’s ‘political’ discretion, by 
assessing concrete decisions – not the policy behind them – in isolation and 
subject strictly to ‘legal’ criteria. 
As discussed above, the ‘legalistic’ approach to the role of the PTC is deeply 
rooted in the general understanding of its function. The extreme manifestation 
of this view is the notion that the PTC acts as a ‘rubber-stamping’ body. From 
this perspective, the PTC’s review is strictly ‘technical’ and guided by ‘legal’ 
criteria. The PTC’s role is thus to determine whether the Prosecutor’s decisions 
comply with the ‘uniform’ requirements proscribed by the law. This approach, 
some would argue, provides procedural legitimacy, legal certainty and ensures 
the system’s stability.    
It seems, however, rather artificial to approach the role of the PTC in this 
manner. It should also be taken into account that the idea that the Court as a 
whole should be strictly ‘apolitical’, as noted by Greenawalt, confronts the 
problem that public perceptions of the Court’s legitimacy depend on 
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determinations that are sensitive to contingent political criteria in ways not 
susceptible to politically neutral rules.122 In particular, an emphasis on formal or 
procedural legitimacy may come at the cost of public perceptions of legitimacy, 
which will focus not on the procedural neutrality of the Court’s internal 
proceedings but on the outcome of its work for affected societies.123 In effect, 
as argued by Shklar:  
Formal justice depends for its social impact upon the total political 
environment in which juridical actions occur, and its functions cannot be 
understood in isolation. Yet isolation from politics is its first ideological 
demand.124  
The problem with ‘formal’ justice, which aims at procedural fairness taken in 
isolation from the political context in which it operates, is that it risks losing 
sight of the fact that the Court was actually created to pursue an ultimate 
political goal: to ‘put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of crimes’125 that 
threaten ‘the peace, security and well-being of the world’,126 ‘and thus to 
contribute to the prevention of those crimes’.127 As such, in the context of the 
Statute, the PTC cannot afford to focus only on ‘procedural perfection’ or on 
‘formal justice’ at the cost of failing to attend to the objects and purposes of 
the Statute.  
Accordingly, when overseeing the Prosecutor’s discretion the PTC should strike a 
balance between the need to follow procedures and the necessity to ensure that 
substantive justice – in the form of fairness (not only procedural fairness) and 
impartiality – are not sacrificed in a quest for mere formal justice. In particular, 
as will be discussed throughout this work, the PTC’s judges should be prepared 
when necessary to either reject a literal reading of the Statute in favour of an 
interpretation consistent with its purpose or to refuse to follow the plain 
meaning when it would lead to an absurd or unjust result.128 The PTC should 
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safeguard the ‘integrity’ of the Statute, deciding cases in a manner that 
expresses a coherent conception of justice and fairness.129 
In the following chapters these different aspects of the PTC’s gatekeeping 
function will be explored in order to determine whether the Statute actually 
gives the PTC the necessary tools to fulfil its role and whether this has been 
exercised to its full extent by the PTC judges. 
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Chapter 2: The Pre-Trial Chamber within the framework of the 
Rome Statute 
2.1 Introduction 
The necessity of confronting and punishing abuses committed during armed 
conflicts has been acknowledged since ancient times.130 In effect, the perceived 
necessity of imposing certain limits upon the recourse to force and to develop 
some rudimentary norms of warfare is reflected in literature from time 
immemorial.131 The recognition of the need to investigate and prosecute 
atrocities was similarly gradually developed domestically.132  
Only in the late 19th and early 20th centuries did such ideas begin to be 
conceptualised as international legal matters.133 The unprecedented 
developments in international humanitarian law and human rights law during the 
20th century provided the propitious scenario for the international community to 
develop a shared will to establish an independent institution responsible for the 
investigation and punishment of the most serious crimes of international 
concern.134 For it to succeed, however, two main obstacles needed to be 
overcome: (i) the understanding of State Sovereignty as an absolute right 
providing immunity from any external interference; and (ii) the lack of 
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recognition of individuals as agents and possible subjects of public international 
law.135 
The end of the Cold War and the international outrage concerning the atrocities 
committed in Yugoslavia and Rwanda provided the conditions that eventually 
permitted the creation of the Court in 1998. The final agreement for its 
establishment was, however, only reached after the incorporation in the Statute 
of a series of safeguards and checks and balances providing for a delicate 
balance of power, of which the PTC is a critical element. 
This Chapter analyses the reasons behind the incorporation of the PTC within the 
Court’s system and the concrete powers assigned to it. Section 2.2 provides an 
overview of the drafting history of the Statute with particular emphasis on the 
reasons that led to the incorporation of the PTC within the Court’s framework. 
Section 2.3 analyses in detail the Statute and the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence (Rules) in relation to the specific functions assigned to the PTC within 
the context of its gatekeeping role. Section 2.4 provides initial conclusions as to 
the strengths and weaknesses of the concrete powers assigned to the PTC at the 
different stages of the Court’s proceedings. 
2.2 The path towards the establishment of the ICC’s Pre-Trial 
Chamber  
2.2.1 The work of the International Law Commission  
The idea of the establishment of a permanent international body charged with 
responsibility for the international adjudication of heinous crimes dates back to 
the late 1800s.136 A new attempt was made in 1920 when, in the draft statute 
for the Permanent Court of International Justice, a recommendation was 
included suggesting that a High Court of International Justice be created ‘with 
jurisdiction in matters which affect international public order, such as crimes 
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against the universal law of nations’.137 The proposal was however dismissed as 
‘premature’.138 A further attempt was made in 1937, but again failed with the 
eruption of WWII.139 
Only in the aftermath of the great wars of the 20th century, and building upon 
the experience gained with the IMT and the IMTFE,140 were concrete steps taken 
towards the creation of a permanent international criminal jurisdiction. In 1947 
the UN General Assembly (UNGA) directed the International Law Commission 
(ILC) (i) to formulate the principles of international law recognised in the 
Charter and judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal (Nuremberg Principles); and 
(ii) to prepare a draft code of offences against the peace and security of 
mankind.141  
The following year agreement was finally reached on the Genocide Convention, 
which included the option for genocide to be prosecuted by an ‘international 
penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties 
which shall have accepted its jurisdiction’.142 Accordingly, the UNGA invited the 
ILC:  
to study the desirability and possibility of establishing an international 
judicial organ for the trial of persons charged with genocide or other 
crimes over which jurisdiction will be conferred upon that organ by 
international conventions.143  
In December 1950, the UNGA established a Committee for the preparation of 
one or more preliminary draft conventions for the establishment of an 
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international criminal court,144 resulting in a first Draft Statute for an 
International Criminal Court in 1952.145 Working in parallel, the ILC produced the 
first Draft Code of Offences in 1951 and a revised version in 1954.146 The work 
towards the finalisation of the drafts was however interrupted on account both 
of the Cold War and the lack of consensus on the definition of the crime of 
aggression. A definition of the latter was finally reached in 1974,147 following 
which, in 1981, the UNGA invited the ILC ‘to resume its work with a view to 
elaborating the draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind’.148 However, given the sustained tensions, the work on the proposed 
international criminal court did not resume until the end of the Cold War.   
In 1990, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the UNGA again invited the ILC to 
address within its work on the draft Code ‘the question of an international 
criminal jurisdiction, including the possibility of establishing an international 
criminal court or other international criminal trial mechanism’.149 The ILC 
worked again on both a draft Code and a draft Statute and submitted to the 
UNGA a final draft Statute for an International Criminal Court in 1994 (ILC 1994 
draft Statute),150 and a final draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security 
of Mankind in 1996 (ILC 1996 draft Code).151  
The ILC 1994 draft Statute conceived of a Court intended to ‘exercise 
jurisdiction only over the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole’, which was to be ‘complementary to national criminal 
jurisdictions’.152 The proposed Court did not include a PTC within its structure, 
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all the judicial functions at the pre-trial phase – which were considered ‘largely 
of a preliminary or procedural character’ – being entrusted to the Presidency.153 
The Presidency was to bear the overall responsibility for administration of the 
Court and to exercise pre- and post-trial functions of a judicial character, which 
could be delegated to a single judge.154  
The draft also envisaged the Prosecutor as ‘an independent organ of the Court 
responsible for the investigation of complaints (...) and for the conduct of 
prosecutions’.155 However, the project was largely characterised by a lack of 
meaningful independence for the Prosecutor, and for the Court as a whole, from 
the will of States or the Council. The proposed opting-in jurisdiction and the fact 
that the Court’s triggering procedures were limited to complaints from State 
Parties or the UNSC, envisaged a Court strictly subject to their consent.156  
The draft included, as a precondition to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court 
in the case of States’ referrals, the need for a specific acceptance of the Court’s 
jurisdiction in relation to the relevant crime. Such acceptance was required not 
only in relation to the referring State, but also the custodial and the territorial 
States and, if applicable, even from the State that may have requested 
extradition of the suspect. The only exception was in relation to the crime of 
genocide – the only crime for which ‘inherent’ jurisdiction was envisaged – but 
for which membership of the Genocide Convention was required.157 Although 
specific acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court was not required in the case 
of a UNSC referral, no prosecution could be commenced in relation to a situation 
that was ‘being dealt with’ by the Council under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter.158  
2.2.2 The Ad Hoc Committee 
Following the ILC’s recommendation that an international conference be 
convened for the study of the ILC 1994 draft Statute, the UNGA established an 
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Ad Hoc Committee to ‘review the major substantive and administrative issues 
arising out of the draft’ and to consider arrangements for the convening of an 
international conference of plenipotentiaries.159  
The Ad Hoc Committee submitted its report in 1995.160 Commenting on the ILC 
1994 draft Statute, it emphasised the essential character of the principle of 
complementarity.161 It stressed the need for the Court to be complementary to 
national courts and existing procedures for international judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters and that its jurisdiction should be limited to the most serious 
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole.162  
No proposal for the establishment of a PTC was discussed, although many 
delegations considered the powers conferred on the Presidency to be excessive 
and suggested further examination.163 Notably, the procedures at the pre-trial 
stage were viewed as insufficient and in need of further development, including 
elaborating upon the role of the judicial authorities.164 Of great significance for 
future developments and the later establishment of the PTC was the initiation of 
the discussions on the need to give to the Prosecutor the power to investigate 
and prosecute serious crimes under international law proprio motu, in the 
absence of a complaint by States or the Council.165  
Also highly debated was the issue of inherent as opposed to opt-in jurisdiction, 
with a number of delegations arguing that the future fate of the Court should 
not be left in the hands of and to the discretion of States, which could 
manipulate the functioning of the Court and set aside the interests of the 
international community.166 By the same token, there were serious reservations – 
including outright opposition by some delegations – to the role of the UNSC, 
given its political nature and the risk of subordinating the judicial function of 
the Court to the action of a political body.167 Invoking the gravity of the core 
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crimes, it was suggested that crimes against humanity and war crimes, together 
with genocide, should be included within the sphere of the Court’s inherent 
jurisdiction.168 
2.2.3 The Preparatory Committee 
In its Report, the Ad Hoc Committee noted that there were still different views 
on major issues and recommended further discussion. The UNGA thus convened a 
Preparatory Committee to take over the work, with a view to preparing a widely 
acceptable consolidated text of a convention as the next step towards its 
consideration by a conference of plenipotentiaries.169 In 1996, the Preparatory 
Committee submitted its observations and a list of proposed amendments to the 
ILC 1994 draft Statute.170  
For the first time, the need to include a ‘preliminary investigations chamber’,171 
‘pre-trial chambers’,172 an ‘indictment chamber’,173 or an ‘investigative 
judge’174 was discussed. Delegations were concerned with the need for a judicial 
body to be appointed permanently and exclusively in order to carry out pre-trial 
procedures, including issuing warrants, deciding upon indictment and 
admissibility.175 A judicial authority was seen as necessary to monitor the 
investigative activities of the Prosecutor and give judicial authority to his 
actions.176 In particular, it appeared essential to ensure equality between the 
prosecution and the defence, enabling the suspect to request that certain 
investigations be carried out,177 and providing the accused with the necessary 
guarantees.178 Accordingly, it was suggested that the Presidency’s duties ‘should 
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be limited to ceremonial and administrative functions over the administrative 
matters of the Court’.179        
With regard to the Court’s substantive jurisdiction, there was general agreement 
on the importance of this being limited to the most serious crimes of concern to 
the international community as a whole, in order to avoid trivializing the role 
and functions of the Court or interfering with the jurisdiction of national 
courts.180 There was also general agreement that the crimes should be defined 
with the clarity, precision and specificity required for criminal law in accordance 
with the principle of legality.181 In addition, attention was drawn to the 
definitions of crimes contained in the ILC 1996 draft Code and it was suggested 
these definitions ought to be considered for inclusion in the Statute.182 
It was suggested that the Prosecutor should be established to seek the truth 
rather than merely seek a conviction in a partisan manner and different views 
were put forward in relation to whether the Prosecutor should be allowed to 
initiate investigations ex officio,183 or on the basis of information obtained from 
any source.184 In order to prevent any abuse of process, it was suggested that – 
after satisfying himself that a prima facie case existed – the Prosecutor should 
present the matter to an indictment chamber, in order for it to decide whether 
or not the matter should be pursued by the Court.185 Still, some delegations did 
not agree with the notion of an independent Prosecutor, arguing that it may 
lead to the politicisation of the Court, undermining its credibility, and because 
the Prosecutor could be overwhelmed with frivolous complaints.186 More broadly, 
it was suggested that developments in international law had yet to reach a stage 
where the international community was prepared to empower the Prosecutor in 
such a manner.187  
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As to complementarity, it was stressed that achieving a proper balance between 
the Court and national jurisdictions was crucial for the Statute to be acceptable 
to a large number of States.188 It was further emphasised that the Court’s 
jurisdiction should be understood as having an exceptional character,189 in order 
for the limited resources of the Court not to be exhausted by taking up cases 
that could be dealt with at the national level.190 
Some delegations insisted on the extension of the inherent jurisdiction of the 
Court to encompass all core crimes rather than genocide alone; the issue was 
left unsettled, however, since a number of delegations still favoured the ‘opt-in’ 
regime.191 Although delegations agreed that the Statute should not affect the 
role of the UNSC, the relationship between the Council, as a political organ, and 
the Court, as a judicial body, remained a source of great controversy, with a 
number of delegations insisting that the Council ‘should not [be allowed to] 
undermine the judicial independence and integrity of the Court or the sovereign 
equality of States’.192   
The work continued and a further draft was produced in Zutphen, the 
Netherlands, in January 1998.193  This Draft still left unresolved critical issues 
such as the crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court,194 the choice between 
inherent or opt-in jurisdiction,195 the role of the UNSC,196 and the proprio motu 
powers of the Prosecutor.197 It did, however, contain important developments in 
relation to the role of the Pre-Trial/Preliminary/Investigative Chambers.  
Although the draft did not choose a clear option, presenting rather an 
alternative between the Presidency and a specialised Chamber, the possibility 
that a judicial body might be given responsibility for a series of functions 
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concerning the pre-trial proceedings was clearly included.198 Indeed, with regard 
to specific functions, the draft envisioned a judicial body which could: (i) issue 
subpoenas and warrants at the request of the Prosecutor;199 (ii) confirm the 
Prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute based on considerations of the interests 
of justice;200 (iii) review the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an investigation 
or not to file an indictment at the request of the complainant State or the 
Council;201 (iv) authorise the Prosecutor to initiate an investigation in spite of 
the existence of national investigations or prosecutions;202 (v) take measures to 
assure the efficiency and integrity of the proceedings in relation to a unique 
opportunity for an investigation;203 (vi) examine the indictment filed by the 
Prosecutor and decide whether to confirm it (in full or in part), order further 
investigation, or refuse to confirm it;204 and (vii) issue warrants for the pre-
indictment arrest of a suspect.205 
The final draft submitted by the Preparatory Committee,206 left the Conference 
of Plenipotentiaries to decide on the matter of which crimes would fall under 
the jurisdiction of the Court;207 the issue of inherent/opt-in jurisdiction;208 the 
role of the UNSC;209 the proprio motu powers of the Prosecutor;210 and whether 
a judicial organ would be established for conducting pre-trial proceedings.211 
However, it included a proposal for an authorisation procedure to be followed by 
the Prosecutor, before a Chamber, prior to the initiation of a proprio motu 
investigation.212 There were also specific articles establishing the relevant 
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procedures and precise thresholds for a Chamber to issue a warrant or 
summons213 and to confirm the charges before trial.214 
2.2.4 The Rome Conference 
The Rome Conference was held in Rome, Italy, from 15 June to 17 July 1998, 
with the participation of representatives from more than 160 States and with 
hundreds of International and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). The 
discussions and negotiations lasted until the very last moment of the Conference 
and concluded satisfactorily, on 17 July 1998, with the adoption of the final 
treaty, the Statute, with the assent of 120 States.215  
Late into the Rome Conference discussions continued concerning the subject 
matter jurisdiction of the Court216 but a final agreement was eventually reached 
to limit it to the ‘core crimes’: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, 
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and aggression.217 Pursuant to Article 12, the jurisdiction of the Court is 
restricted to crimes committed in the territory or by a national of a State Party, 
or of a State that has accepted the jurisdiction of the Court, except in the case 
of a referral by the UNSC.218 Unlike other international tribunals, the jurisdiction 
of the ICC is strictly prospective. Pursuant to Article 11, the Court has 
jurisdiction to prosecute only crimes committed after the entry into force of the 
Statute, ie 1 July 2002, or the date of entry into force for the relevant State in 
accordance with Article 126(2).219 As to aggression, pursuant to Articles 15 bis 
and ter, the Court’s jurisdiction will be activated only once the related 
amendments enter into force,220 and a decision is taken after 1 January 2017.221  
Although the discussions at the Rome Conference endowed the Court with 
inherent jurisdiction in relation to States Parties,222 there remains the need for a 
triggering procedure to operate in order to activate the Court’s jurisdiction. 
Pursuant to Article 13, the Court may exercise its jurisdiction only if activated 
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by: (i) a referral from the UNSC; (ii) a referral from a State Party; or (iii) proprio 
motu by the Prosecutor.  
One of the most important agreements reached during the Rome Conference 
ensures that, even once the jurisdiction of the Court has been activated, there 
remain certain ‘barriers to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court’.223 These 
are the issues of admissibility – complementarity, gravity, and double jeopardy 
or ne bis in idem – and the interests of justice.  
As described in Chapter 1 above, Articles 42 and 54 give the Prosecutor 
independence and discretion to interpret and apply the provisions of the Court’s 
legal framework. However, in order to ensure the Court’s independence and 
impartiality, the PTC was included as the Court’s gatekeeper. It is meant to 
counterbalance the wide discretion given to the Prosecutor and to ensure that 
his actions are not abusive or the result of improper political pressures.224 
Accordingly, Article 34 includes within the Court’s system a Pre-Trial Division, 
composed of no fewer than six judges predominantly with criminal trial 
experience, pursuant to Article 39(1). Article 39(2)(iii) stipulates that the 
functions of a PTC shall be carried out either by three judges or by a single 
judge, in accordance with the Statute and the Rules.  
The PTC’s gatekeeping function is exercised throughout the pre-investigation, 
investigation and pre-trial stages of the proceedings before the ICC. The 
different functions assigned to the PTC in the Statute and the procedures 
through which it exercises them are described below. The concrete application 
of these proceedings to the situations and cases brought before the Court and 
the jurisprudence so far developed will be analysed in the Chapters that follow. 
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2.3 The role of the PTC in determining the jurisdiction of the Court 
and the issues of admissibility and interests of justice throughout the 
proceedings 
As previously noted, although the Prosecutor independently interprets and 
applies the provisions of the Court’s legal framework, the PTC has been given 
the last word in interpreting the issues of jurisdiction, admissibility and the 
interests of justice. This function is exercised by settling disputes, responding to 
requests from the Prosecutor or by determining the issues on its own initiative, 
pursuant to Articles 18(2), 19 and 53(3). Accordingly, although the Prosecutor is 
the driving force behind the Court’s activities, the PTC has a critical gatekeeping 
function aimed at guaranteeing the Court’s independence and impartiality.  
2.3.1 PTC’s authorisation to initiate an investigation following a State request 
for deferral  
When the jurisdiction of the Court is triggered by a referral from a State Party or 
proprio motu by the Prosecutor, Article 18 and Rules 52 to 57 apply. The 
Prosecutor shall then notify the initiation of the investigation to all States that, 
taking into account the information available, will normally exercise jurisdiction 
over the crimes concerned.225 Within one month of notification, a State may 
inform the Prosecutor that it is investigating or has investigated its nationals or 
others within its jurisdiction with respect to the crimes that relate to the 
situation the Prosecutor has decided to investigate.  
It should be noted that in order to maintain impartiality, the Prosecutor should 
initiate an investigation into a general situation of crisis, without identifying at 
the outset the possible alleged perpetrators. However, a State will not succeed 
in obtaining a deferral of an investigation from the Court only by demonstrating 
that it is investigating, in general terms, the same situation the Prosecutor plans 
                                         
225 This suggests that the Prosecutor shall notify all States (party or non-party) that either have 
territorial or personal links with the crime or the suspect, or have recognised universal 
jurisdiction within their legislation. See Héctor Olásolo, ‘The triggering procedure of the 
International Criminal Court, procedural treatment of the principle of complementarity, and the 
role of the Office of the Prosecutor’ (2005) 5 IntCLR 121, 136; Mireille Delmas-Marty, 
‘Interactions between national and international criminal law in the preliminary phase of trial at 
the ICC’ (2006) 4 JICJ 2, 6. 
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to investigate. The State will have to demonstrate that it is investigating or has 
investigated ‘its nationals or others within its jurisdiction’, being required 
therefore to identify alleged perpetrators. However, a State considering an 
application for deferral may request additional information from the Prosecutor. 
This possibility gives the State the opportunity to ask that the Prosecutor 
identify possible alleged perpetrators that he may be considering to prosecute. 
Although at this stage the Prosecutor cannot be expected to have already 
identified concrete cases involving identified suspects, he could be expected to 
be able to provide States with information based on the criteria of ‘one or more 
potential cases within the context of the situation’.226 In particular, the 
Prosecutor should be able to identify at this stage  
(i) the groups of persons involved that are likely to be the focus of an 
investigation for the purpose of shaping the future case(s); and (ii) the 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court allegedly committed during the 
incidents that are likely to be the focus of an investigation for the purpose 
of shaping the future case(s).227 
The Prosecutor may request additional information from the State, following 
which he may decide either to defer to the State the investigation of the 
relevant individuals or to require the PTC’s authorisation to proceed with the 
investigation. If the Prosecutor opts for deferring to a State’s investigation, such 
deferral will be open to review by the Prosecutor after six months of the date of 
the deferral, or at any time, if there is a significant change of circumstances 
based on the State’s unwillingness or inability to genuinely carry out the 
investigation. The Prosecutor may request the State to periodically inform him 
about the progress of its investigations and any subsequent prosecution and to 
make the information on the proceedings available. Following any of these 
periodical reviews, the Prosecutor may apply for the PTC’s authorisation to 
initiate an investigation.  
If the Prosecutor decides to ask for the PTC’s authorisation to investigate, either 
when a State has submitted a request for deferral or following a review after an 
investigation has been deferred to a State, it should inform the State concerned. 
                                         
226 Kenya, ICC-01/09-19-Corr paras 48-52.  
227 Ibid para. 50. 
  
72 
It should be noted that the PTC’s review under Article 18 is limited to the 
examination of the Prosecutor’s request in light of the factors laid out in Article 
17. Consequently, the scope of the PTC’s authorisation under Article 18 is to be 
distinguished from that under Articles 15 and 53, in as much as this review is not 
directed to assess the Prosecutor’s determination that there is a ‘reasonable 
basis to proceed’ with an investigation considering all the requirements of 
Article 53(1). On the contrary, even if Rule 55(2) refers in general terms to 
‘consider the factors in article 17’, given the context of the request for deferral 
under Article 18, it appears that the scope of the PTC’s review under this 
provision is limited to the possible issues related to complementarity only and it 
does not even extend to a review of the assessment of gravity made by the 
Prosecutor.  
The PTC shall decide on the procedure to be followed and may decide to hold a 
hearing. Although the provision has not been applied so far, it appears that, 
even if not specifically mandated, the PTC should give the concerned State an 
opportunity to be heard before deciding on the Prosecutor’s application.228 The 
PTC’s decision should be communicated to the Prosecutor and the State as soon 
as possible, and may be subject to an interlocutory appeal in accordance with 
Article 82, either by the Prosecutor or the State concerned. A State that has 
challenged a PTC’s ruling under this Article may only later challenge the 
admissibility of a case on the grounds of additional significant facts or significant 
change of circumstances. 
Pending a ruling by the PTC on this issue or at any time during the deferral, the 
Prosecutor may, on an exceptional basis, request authorisation from the PTC to 
pursue necessary investigative steps for the purpose of preserving evidence 
where there is a unique opportunity to obtain such evidence or there is a 
significant risk that it may not be subsequently available.  
                                         
228 Daniel Nsereko, ‘Article 18. Preliminary rulings regarding admissibility’ in Otto Triffterer (ed), 
Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Second edn, C.H.Beck - 
Hart - Nomos 2008) 633. 
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2.3.2 PTC’s determination of the Court’s jurisdiction and the issues of 
admissibility   
Pursuant to Article 19(1) of the Statute, the Court shall satisfy itself that it has 
jurisdiction in any case brought before it and may, on its own initiative, 
determine the admissibility of a case in accordance with Article 17. Once a 
warrant or summons has been issued, pursuant to Article 19(2), the alleged 
suspect, the State which has jurisdiction over the case – and which is or has been 
investigating and prosecuting – or the State from which acceptance of 
jurisdiction is required, can challenge the jurisdiction of the Court or the 
admissibility of the case on the grounds referred to in Article 17.  
Article 19 and Rules 58 and 59 regulate the proceedings related to a challenge. 
The PTC will decide on the procedure to follow and may take appropriate 
measures; it may join the challenge to the confirmation, as long as this does not 
cause delay, in which case it should decide on the challenge first. The 
Prosecutor and the person who has been surrendered or who has appeared 
voluntarily can submit observations. The Registrar shall inform those who have 
referred the situation to the Court and victims who have already communicated 
with the Court of the challenge. The victims will then also be able to make 
representations. The admissibility of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court can 
be challenged only once by a person or a State and the challenge shall take 
place prior to, or at the commencement of, the trial unless, because of 
exceptional circumstances, leave for a challenge to be brought more than once 
or at a later time is granted. Challenges brought at the commencement of the 
trial or subsequently with the leave of the Court may be based only on Article 
17(1)(c) of the Statute.  
A State shall submit a challenge at the earliest opportunity, and in this case, the 
Prosecutor shall suspend the investigation until a determination on the challenge 
has been made. With that said, pending a ruling on the challenge, the 
Prosecutor may request the PTC’s authorisation to (i) pursue necessary 
investigative steps in order to preserve evidence when there is a unique 
opportunity or a significant risk that it may not be subsequently available; (ii) 
take a statement or testimony from a witness or complete the collection and 
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examination of evidence which had begun prior to the making of the challenge; 
and (iii) in cooperation with relevant States, prevent the absconding of persons 
in respect of whom the Prosecutor has already requested a warrant of arrest 
under Article 58.  
Unless otherwise decided, the submission of a challenge does not affect the 
validity of any act performed by the Prosecutor or any order or warrant issued 
by the Court. If the relevant Chamber decides that a case is inadmissible, the 
Prosecutor may submit a request for review when new facts have arisen which 
negate the basis on which the case had previously been found inadmissible.  
As will be analysed in more detail in the following Chapters, the grounds to 
challenge the jurisdiction of the Court are determined by the axes of the Court’s 
jurisdiction, ie ratione materiae (Article 5 in relation to Articles 6, 7, 8 and 8 
bis); ratione tempori (Article 11 in relation to Article 126); and ratione loci or 
ratione personae (Article 12). The grounds for a challenge to the admissibility of 
the case are determined by the issues of admissibility provided in Article 17, ie 
complementarity (Article 17(1)(a) and (b), in relation to 17(2) and (3)); ne bis in 
idem (Article 17(1)(c) in relation to Article 20); and gravity (Article 17(1)(d)).     
2.3.3 PTC’s review of a Prosecutor’s decision not to proceed with an 
investigation or prosecution based solely on the ‘interests of justice’  
Pursuant to Article 53(3)(b) and Rules 104 to 106, 109 and 110, if the 
Prosecutor’s decision not to proceed with an investigation or prosecution is 
solely based on the consideration that to do so would not serve the ‘interests of 
justice’, the Prosecutor is obliged to inform the PTC of such a decision, 
indicating the reasons for his conclusion. Within 180 days of the Prosecutor’s 
notification, the PTC may decide on its own initiative to subject the decision to 
review.229 Insofar as the PTC decides to exercise this power, the Prosecutor’s 
decision not to proceed shall be effective only if confirmed by the PTC. 
                                         
229 Pursuant to Rule 109, the PTC shall inform the Prosecutor of its intention establishing a time 
limit within which the Prosecutor may submit observations and other material. Where the 
referring State or the Council have requested the PTC’s intervention, they shall be informed of 
the PTC’s intention to review and may submit observations. Rule 93 also applies and the PTC 
may seek the views of victims. 
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Remarkably, if the PTC does not confirm the Prosecutor’s decision, he must 
proceed with the investigation or prosecution. Consequently, in the context of 
this particular procedure, the PTC is empowered to order the Prosecutor to 
initiate an investigation or prosecution, even against the Prosecutor’s own will. 
The mandatory force of the PTC’s review in this particular case acts as a 
safeguard in order to avoid arbitrariness and is justified by the highly political 
nature of a decision not to proceed solely based on the ‘interests of justice’.  
It should be noted that the practice so far demonstrates that it is highly unlikely 
that the Prosecutor would make determinations not to investigate or prosecute 
based on this consideration, in circumstances that the Court’s legal framework 
imposes on him neither a timeline for the completion of the investigations nor 
the obligation to investigate specific individuals or even pursue prosecutions 
within the context of the investigations. Although the provision has not been 
applied so far, it appears that it may only become relevant in the unlikely 
scenario that the Prosecutor refuses to open an investigation following a referral 
from a State Party or the Council based only on the consideration that it would 
not serve the interests of justice. When there is no sufficient basis for an 
investigation proprio motu or for a prosecution, the Prosecutor will simply not 
submit an application under Article 15 or 58 and, most probably, will continue 
his preliminary assessment or keep the investigation open. Therefore, the PTC 
will, in most cases, be prevented from scrutinising the Prosecutor’s decision not 
to investigate or prosecute.230 However, it should be noted that pursuant to 
Regulation 48(1),231 the PTC has the power to request the Prosecutor to provide 
information necessary for it to exercise its functions, including those under 
Article 57(3)(c). As will be discussed in Chapter 3, the PTC should exercise its 
inherent powers and, when warranted by the circumstances, request the 
Prosecutor to provide updates on the progress of his preliminary examinations 
and investigations and give reasons for the lack either of proper investigations or 
                                         
230 Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-582 Decision on the request of 
the legal representative of victims VPRS 3 and VPRS 6 to review an alleged decision of the 
Prosecutor not to proceed Pre-Trial Chamber I, 25 October 2010.  
231 Regulation 48(1) provides that ‘The Pre-Trial Chamber may request the Prosecutor to provide 
specific or additional information or documents in his or her possession, or summaries thereof, 
that the Pre-Trial Chamber considers necessary in order to exercise the functions and 
responsibilities set forth in article 53, paragraph 3 (b), article 56, paragraph 3 (a), and article 
57, paragraph 3 (c).’ 
  
76 
the failure to prosecute certain persons or groups. The assumption of a proactive 
role by the PTC in scrutinising whether the Prosecutor’s actions constitute the 
legitimate exercise of his discretion will not only encourage more transparent 
decision-making within the OTP, but will also urge genuine investigations and 
prosecutions at the national level.  
2.4 Role of the PTC at the pre-investigative stage of the proceedings 
In accordance with Articles 53 and 15 and Rules 104 to 110, the PTC exercises a 
supervisory role over the Prosecutor’s discretion to open investigations. The role 
of the PTC will differ depending on the applicable mechanism triggering the 
jurisdiction of the Court. 
In the case of a referral from the Council or a State Party, the Prosecutor has 
the discretionary power to decide whether to open an investigation. If the 
Prosecutor is satisfied that there is a ‘reasonable basis to proceed’ and decides 
to open an investigation, the PTC has no power to review this positive 
conclusion.232 The investigation in cases of referral will thus be formally opened 
directly by the Prosecutor without the intervention of any other organ. It has 
been argued that this is justified by the need to preserve the Prosecutor’s 
functional independence pursuant to Article 42(1) and further that Article 53 
provides sufficient safeguards to ensure that investigations will be opened only if 
warranted by the Statute.233 However, this particular discretionary power given 
to the Prosecutor has the potential to undermine the credibility and legitimacy 
of the Court if not subject to appropriate checks and balances. This lacuna in 
the Statute raises important concerns due to the potential abuse of referrals and 
the possibility that the Prosecutor may be unduly influenced by the political 
agenda of the referring State or the Council. As will be argued in Chapter 4, in 
order to effectively ensure the Court’s independence and impartiality, an 
additional safeguard should be included giving the PTC the power to review the 
Prosecutor’s positive assessment of the existence of a ‘reasonable basis to 
                                         
232 As has been the case with the situations in the DRC, CAR, Uganda, Darfur, Libya and Mali. 
233 Morten Bergsmo and Pieter Kruger, ‘Article 53: Initiation of an investigation’ in Otto Triffterer 
(ed), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Second edn, C.H. 
Beck - Hart - Nomos 2008) 1066. 
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proceed’ with an investigation following a referral. As the Statute stands now, 
however, the role of the PTC following a referral from a State Party or the 
Council is restricted to the cases in which the Prosecutor decides not to open an 
investigation. In such cases, under certain circumstances, the PTC can review 
the Prosecutor’s negative decision.  
The situation is different in cases where the Court moves to initiate a proprio 
motu investigation, ie without the situation being referred by the Council or a 
State, in which scenario the Prosecutor requires to be specifically authorised by 
the PTC to proceed with the investigation.  
2.4.1 PTC’s review of a Prosecutor’s determination not to initiate an 
investigation following a referral  
Article 53(1), (3)(a) and (4) and Rules 104, 105, 107 and 108 provide for one of 
the most remarkable manifestations of the Prosecutor’s independence and, 
indeed, of the Court as a whole. It ensures that a referral by a State Party or by 
the UNSC does not automatically activate the Court’s jurisdiction. Following a 
referral by the Council or a State Party, the Prosecutor shall analyse the 
seriousness of the information made available to him and decide whether there 
is a ‘reasonable basis to proceed’ under the Statute.234 Reasonable basis to 
proceed is  
the lowest evidentiary standard provided for in the Statute (...) thus, the 
information available to the Prosecutor is neither expected to be 
‘comprehensive’ nor ‘conclusive’, if compared with evidence gathered 
during the investigation.235  
The Court’s jurisprudence has interpreted the threshold to be satisfied with the 
existence of ‘a sensible or reasonable justification for a belief that a crime 
falling within the jurisdiction of the Court “has been or is being committed”’.236 
In order to determine if the threshold is met, the Prosecutor shall consider 
                                         
234 Pursuant to Rule 104(2), the prosecution may seek additional information from reliable 
sources and may interview witnesses. 
235 Kenya, ICC-01/09-19-Corr para. 27; Situation in the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, ICC-02/11-14-
Corr Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation 
into the Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire Pre-Trial Chamber III, 15 November 2011 para. 
24. 
236 Kenya, ICC-01/09-19-Corr para. 35; Côte d'Ivoire, ICC-02/11-14-Corr para. 24.  
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whether: (a) the information available provides a reasonable basis to believe 
that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been or is being committed; 
(b) the case is or would be admissible under Article 17; and whether (c) taking 
into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims, there are 
nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve 
the interests of justice.  
If the Prosecutor’s assessment were to lead him to conclude that there is ‘no 
reasonable basis to proceed’,237 he should promptly inform the Council or the 
referring State. The referring State or the UNSC may request the PTC to review 
the Prosecutor’s decision.238 If the Prosecutor’s decision is based on sub-
paragraphs (a) and (b) of Article 53(1), once the revision is concluded, the PTC 
can request the Prosecutor to review, in whole or in part, his decision not to 
initiate an investigation. Therefore, the PTC does not have the power to ‘order’ 
the Prosecutor to proceed with an investigation as would be the case if the 
Prosecutor’s decision had been taken pursuant to Article 53(1)(c), ie based on 
the interests of justice. In addition, this review process needs to be triggered by 
the referring party, the PTC being unable to review on its own initiative. Once 
the Prosecutor has taken a final decision following the request for 
reconsideration from the PTC, he shall notify the PTC and communicate his 
conclusion and the reasons that justify it to all those who participated in the 
proceedings. The Statute and the Rules strongly protect the independence of the 
Prosecutor, and therefore, no further recourse or review is provided for the 
Prosecutor’s final decision on this matter.  
2.4.2 PTC’s authorisation for the Prosecutor’s proprio motu investigation 
Article 15, Rules 46 to 50 and Regulations 49 and 50 establish the procedure for 
the PTC’s authorisation for a proprio motu investigation, which may be initiated 
by the Prosecutor on the basis of information on crimes within the jurisdiction of 
the Court. The Prosecutor shall analyse the information at his disposal and, 
                                         
237 Pursuant to Article 53(4), the Prosecutor may, at any time, reconsider his decision not to 
initiate an investigation, based on new facts or information.  
238 In accordance with Rules 93 and 107, the PTC can request the Prosecutor to transmit further 
information, may request observations from the referring State or the Council and may also seek 
the views of victims.  
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where necessary, may seek additional information and receive written or oral 
testimony at the seat of the Court. Even before the jurisdiction of the Court is 
triggered, Rule 47(2) authorises the collection of testimony that may not be 
subsequently available, providing for the PTC’s intervention in order to ensure 
the efficiency and integrity of the proceedings and to protect the rights of the 
defence.239 
The Prosecutor should analyse the seriousness of the information and determine 
whether or not there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation, 
considering the factors set out in Article 53(1)(a) to (c).240 If the Prosecutor 
determines that there is no reasonable basis to proceed he shall promptly inform 
his determination and reasoning to those who provided information. In these 
proceedings, Article 53(3)(a) does not apply and the PTC has no power to review 
the Prosecutor’s decision not to proceed with an investigation when based on 
Article 53(1)(a) and (b), as this review proceeding may only be triggered by a 
request from the referring State or Council.  
If upon analysis of the seriousness of the information, the Prosecutor concludes 
that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation, he shall seize 
the PTC and request its authorisation to commence an investigation, providing 
any supporting material collected. The Prosecutor should then immediately 
inform the victims in order to allow them to make representations to the PTC. 
The Prosecution’s request for authorisation shall provide the Chamber with clear 
and concise reference to the crimes allegedly committed and the reasons that 
                                         
239 An effective application of Rule 47(2) – particularly in the volatile environments in which the 
initial steps of investigations of situations of crisis are normally carried out – will be of particular 
importance given the strict judicial interpretation that Articles 69(2) and 74(2) and Rule 68 have 
received so far in the jurisprudence of the Court. See, in particular, The Prosecutor v. Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08-1386 Judgment on the appeals of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo and the Prosecutor against the decision of Trial Chamber III entitled 'Decision on the 
admission into evidence of materials contained in the prosecution's list of evidence' Appeals 
Chamber, 3 May 2011 paras 74-80. A testimony provided at the time of the events, or 
immediately in its aftermath, may be of critical importance during the trial stage of any case 
arising out of the particular situation. In accordance with Rule 47(2), statements collected at 
this stage should be admissible evidence in accordance with Article 69(4), and therefore, may be 
considered an exception to the requirement of viva voce or oral testimony provided in person at 
trial as pursuant to Article 69(2) and Rule 68. 
240 Rule 48 was introduced with the aim of filling the gap for a comprehensive provision 
regulating all the requirements for the PTC’s authorization to initiate an investigation proprio 
motu. The Rule indeed links Articles 15 and 53 stating that the former must be read in 
conjunction with the latter. On this, see the discussion on the preparatory works in Kenya, ICC-
01/09-19-Corr para. 23. 
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provide the reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation. In deciding the 
procedure to be followed, the PTC may hold a hearing and/or request additional 
information from the Prosecutor or any of the victims.  
The PTC shall review the assessment made by the Prosecutor considering the 
identical ‘reasonable basis to proceed’ standard,241 confirming that the 
requirements of Article 53(1)(a) to (c) are fulfilled.242 In case the PTC considers 
that there is a ‘reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation’, it shall 
authorize the commencement of the investigation. This is without prejudice to 
subsequent determinations by the Court with regard to the jurisdiction and 
admissibility of the cases arising out of the situation. The refusal of the PTC to 
authorise the investigation shall not preclude the Prosecutor from presenting a 
subsequent request based on new facts or evidence. 
2.5 The role of the PTC during the investigation stage of the 
proceedings 
As mentioned above, although the PTC occupies a supervisory position with 
regard to pre-trial proceedings, it does not possess autonomous prosecutorial or 
investigative powers and is not responsible for the Prosecutor’s investigation. Its 
role differs therefore significantly from that classically fulfilled by an 
investigative judge or a juge d’instruction in a continental system.243 The ICC’s 
system – which cannot be defined as belonging either to the civil or common law 
traditions – recognises an independent Prosecutor in charge of conducting 
investigations in accordance with Articles 42(1) and 54 of the Statute. The PTC 
does, however, maintain its gatekeeping function and supervisory role over the 
Prosecutor’s actions with the aim of ensuring that they are a legitimate exercise 
of his powers under the Statute and for the protection of the rights of those that 
may be affected by the Court’s investigations and prosecutions.  
                                         
241 Ibid paras 21 and 22.  
242 Ibid para. 24.  
243 For the differences between different legal systems in relation to Pre-Trial proceedings see (n 
112) Marchesiello 1231-1235 and (n 113) Fourmy 1209-1215. 
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Accordingly, in addition to the possibility of acting at the request of the 
Prosecutor – issuing orders and warrants as may be required for the purposes of 
the investigation – the PTC is entitled to exercise some powers in the course of 
the investigation at the request of the suspect or proprio motu. The gatekeeping 
function of the PTC during the investigative stage is essentially expressed 
through its powers regulated in Articles 68, 56(3)(a) and 57(3)(b) and (c) to: (i) 
allow for the participation of victims; (ii) take measures proprio motu in relation 
to a unique investigative opportunity for the preservation of evidence that 
would be essential for the defence at trial; (iii) upon request of a person who 
has been arrested or has appeared pursuant to a summons, issue orders or seek 
such cooperation as may be necessary to assist the person in the preparation of 
his defence; and (iv) take measures, proprio motu, where necessary, for the 
protection and privacy of victims and witnesses, the preservation of evidence, 
the protection of suspects and the protection of national security information.  
Upon investigation, the Prosecutor may either decide to initiate criminal 
proceedings against identified suspects or conclude that there is no ‘sufficient 
basis for a prosecution’. If the Prosecutor finds there to be sufficient basis for a 
prosecution, pursuant to Article 58, the PTC will exercise its most important 
gatekeeping function during the investigative stage, which is to review the 
evidence collected by the Prosecutor in order to make its own determination of 
whether or not a case should be initiated against an alleged perpetrator.244 
Further, in accordance with Article 53(3), the PTC may review a decision not to 
prosecute at the request of the referring State or the Council or proprio motu, 
under the same conditions as when reviewing the Prosecutor’s decision not to 
initiate an investigation. 
                                         
244 It is important to stress the distinction between the terms ‘situation of crisis’ and ‘case’. 
Their relevance is limited to the ICC’s system and was introduced at the Rome Conference in 
order to impose a limitation on the Security Council’s power to refer matters to the Court, see 
Lionel Yee, ‘The International Criminal Court and the Security Council: Articles 13(b) and 16’ in 
Roy S. Lee (ed), The International Criminal Court The making of the Rome Statute Issues - 
Negotiations - Results (Kluwer Law International 1999) 147. A situation of crisis refers to events 
that occurred in a particular territory within a time frame more or less determined and in which 
one or more crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court appear to have been committed. A case 
comprises specific actions, allegedly committed by one or more persons that constitute one or 
more crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court. Ania Salinas and James Sloan, ‘The Impact of 
the Distinction Between Situations and Cases on the Participation of Victims in the International 
Criminal Court’ in Claudio Michelon and others (eds), The Public in Law Representations of the 
Political in the Legal Discourse (Ashgate Publishing Limited 2012). 
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2.5.1 PTC’s exceptional powers during the Prosecutor’s investigation  
Article 68(3) of the Statute and Rule 93 of the Rules grant victims a general right 
to participate in the proceedings before the Court. Article 68(3) provides that, 
where the personal interests of the victims are affected, the Court shall permit 
their views and concerns to be presented and considered at various stages of the 
proceedings. Rule 93 gives the Court the power to seek the views of the victims 
on any issue. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, based on these provisions the 
PTC has granted victims the right to present their views and concerns in all 
stages of the proceedings, including the investigative stage.   
Further, pursuant to Article 54(1)(a) of the Statute, the Prosecutor shall extend 
his investigations to cover all the facts and circumstances in order to ‘establish 
the truth’ and should investigate incriminating and exonerating circumstances 
equally. Therefore, the Prosecutor is much more than simply a ‘party’ to the 
proceedings and is expected rather to function as an ‘impartial organ of justice’, 
following the principle of the civil law tradition aimed at levelling potential 
inequalities of resources between the parties.245  
Pursuant to Article 54(3), the Prosecutor may collect and examine a wide range 
of evidence at the investigative stage. However, Articles 69 and 74(2) provide, 
in accordance with the largely adversarial modelling of the ICC’s trial 
proceedings, that the testimony of witnesses at trial shall in principle be given in 
person and that the TC shall base its judgment only on evidence submitted and 
discussed before it at trial. Therefore, evidence collected at the investigative 
stage which may not be available subsequently – in order to be ‘submitted and 
discussed’ at trial – risks being totally disregarded.  
The ‘unique investigative opportunity’ of Article 56 is therefore that in which 
evidence that may not be available subsequently for the purposes of a trial may 
be collected. In compliance with the provisions of Article 56, evidence collected 
from the early stages of the investigation of a situation of crisis – when not even 
                                         
245 Giuliano Turone, ‘Powers and Duties of the Prosecutor’ in Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta and 
John R.W.D. Jones (eds), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, 
vol II (Oxford University Press 2002) 1165. 
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a potential suspect has been identified – may be ‘transported’ to the trial stage, 
as if ‘submitted and discussed’ at trial.246 In effect, in accordance with Article 
56(4), the admissibility of evidence preserved or collected for trial pursuant to 
this Article ‘shall be governed at trial by article 69, and given such weight as 
determined by the Trial Chamber’. Article 69(2) establishes the presumption in 
favour of oral testimony at trial, except to the extent provided by the Statute 
and the Rules. Rule 68, which regulates the conditions under which prior 
recorded testimony may be introduced in lieu of viva voce testimony at trial, 
provides that it should be applicable ‘when the Pre-Trial Chamber has not taken 
measures under article 56’. This exception is of particular significance, as it may 
allow the submission during trial of the testimony of witnesses taken even 
before the alleged perpetrator was identified, which may not be available at 
trial for cross-examination by the defence. 
In accordance with Article 56 and Rule 114, the PTC may intervene in relation to 
a unique investigative opportunity, either upon request of the Prosecutor or on 
its own initiative. Where the Prosecutor considers an investigation to present a 
unique opportunity to take testimony or statement from a witness or to 
examine, collect or test evidence which may not be available subsequently for 
the purposes of trial, he shall so inform the PTC. In such a case, the PTC may 
take measures as may be necessary to ensure the efficiency and integrity of the 
proceedings and to protect the rights of the defence.  
However, the PTC’s intervention on its own initiative when the Prosecutor has 
not sought measures pursuant to Article 56 is limited to the implementation of 
measures that may be required to preserve evidence which would be essential 
for the defence at trial. Therefore, since the power is restricted to the 
protection of the interests of the defence it appears that it shall be used 
exclusively for the collection of exculpatory evidence. Before implementing 
measures on its own initiative, the PTC shall consult with the Prosecutor as to 
whether there is a good reason for his failure to request the measures. If the 
PTC concludes that the failure was unjustified it may take such measures on its 
                                         
246 Christoph Safferling, ‘The Rights and Interests of the Defence in the Pre-Trial Phase’ (2011) 9 
JICJ 651, 660. 
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own initiative. Such a decision may be subject to appeal by the Prosecutor and 
such appeal shall be heard on an expedited basis. 
Pursuant to Article 57(3)(a), the Prosecutor may request the PTC’s intervention 
for the issuance of warrants and orders as may be required for the purposes of 
the investigation.247 In addition, in accordance with Article 57(3)(b), upon 
request of a person who has been arrested or has appeared pursuant to a 
summons, the PTC may issue orders, including measures under Article 56, or 
seek cooperation of States as may be necessary to assist the person in the 
preparation of his defence. Pursuant to Rule 116(2), before taking a decision to 
issue an order or seek cooperation, the PTC may seek the views of the 
Prosecutor. This is the logical consequence of the obligation imposed on the 
Prosecutor under Article 54(1)(a) to extend investigations to cover all the facts, 
investigating incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally.  
Lastly, Article 57(3)(c) empowers the PTC to take some proprio motu measures 
during the investigation. The provisions allow the PTC to act, where necessary, 
in order to provide for the protection of victims and witnesses, the preservation 
of evidence, the protection of persons who have been arrested or appeared in 
response to a summons, and the protection of national security information.248 
This provision is highly significant insofar as it empowers the PTC to take 
measures on its own initiative to protect the rights of those who may be 
affected the Prosecutor’s investigations, ie suspects, victims, witnesses and 
States. In addition, this provision may allow the PTC to take measures in relation 
to the preservation of evidence, even if not necessarily directed at assisting the 
suspect in the preparation of his defence. Although not specifically required by 
the Statute, it may be reasonable for the PTC to seek the views of the 
Prosecutor before making a decision under this provision, thereby allowing the 
Prosecutor to act directly if necessary.  
                                         
247 This power includes orders such as that provided in Rule 113 aimed at collecting information 
regarding the state of health of a suspect and those directed at allowing the undertaking of 
investigative steps that may infringe upon individual rights, see ibid 658.  
248 Some, however, giving a narrow interpretation to the provision, argue that Article 57(3)(c) 
does not grant additional powers to the PTC but only serves as a cross reference with other 
provisions of the Statute, see Fabricio Guariglia, Kenneth Harris and Gudrun Hochmayr, ‘Article 
57: Functions and powers of the Pre-Trial Chamber’ in Otto Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Second edn, C.H.Beck - Hart - Nomos 2008) 
1126. 
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It should be noted that the power of the PTC to act proprio motu is reinforced 
by Regulation 48, which gives the PTC the power to request the Prosecutor to 
provide specific or additional information or documents that may be necessary 
for the Chamber to exercise its functions and responsibilities under Articles 
56(3)(a) and 57(3)(c).  
2.5.2 PTC’s issuance of a warrant of arrest or a summons to appear 
Upon investigation, the Prosecutor shall analyse the requirements of Article 
53(2) and determine whether there is sufficient basis for a prosecution. The 
conditions for prosecution, according to that provision, are: (i) sufficient legal or 
factual basis to proceed according to Article 58; (ii) admissibility of the case 
under Article 17; and (iii) the absence of a determination against prosecution in 
the interests of justice, taking into account all the circumstances, including the 
gravity of the crime, the interest of the victims and the age or infirmity of the 
alleged perpetrator, and his or her role in the alleged crime.  
If the Prosecutor concludes that there is no sufficient basis for prosecution, 
Article 53(3) and Rules 107 to 110 will apply and the PTC may review the 
Prosecutor’s decision at the request of the referring State or the Council or 
proprio motu in the case of a decision based exclusively on consideration of the 
interests of justice.  
If the Prosecutor determines that there is sufficient basis for prosecution, he 
will submit a request for the issuance of a warrant of arrest or a summons to 
appear pursuant to Article 58. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, this is one of 
the most important contexts for the PTC’s exercise of its gatekeeping function. 
In accordance with Article 58, at any time after the initiation of an 
investigation, the Prosecutor may request the PTC to issue a warrant of arrest or 
a summons to appear. The PTC shall issue the request if, having examined the 
application and the evidence or other information submitted by the Prosecutor, 
it is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person in 
question has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court. 
Nevertheless, a warrant of arrest will only be issued by the PTC if it is satisfied 
that the arrest appears necessary to: (a) ensure the person’s appearance at 
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trial; (b) to prevent the person from obstructing or endangering the investigation 
or the Court’s proceedings; or, (c) where applicable, to prevent the person from 
continuing with the commission of that crime or a related crime which is within 
the jurisdiction of the Court and which arises out of the same circumstances. 
With regard to the issuance of a summons to appear, with or without such 
conditions restricting liberty (other than detention) as may be provided for by 
national law, the PTC must be satisfied that a summons is sufficient to ensure 
the person’s appearance. 
A case against an identified alleged perpetrator will only commence once a 
warrant of arrest or a summons to appear is issued.249 Therefore, the request for 
it to be issued generally will be an ex-parte proceeding in which the PTC will 
only analyse the information collected by the Prosecutor and the alleged 
perpetrator will not normally be able to contest the Prosecutor’s allegations. 
The role of the PTC at this stage is therefore precisely aimed at avoiding 
unfounded allegations, protecting the rights of the suspect, and ensuring that 
cases proceed only if substantiated by sufficient evidence.  
In addition, although the Prosecutor has the discretion to decide what evidence 
and information he will provide to the PTC in order to satisfy the ‘reasonable 
grounds to believe’ threshold,250 it is the Chamber and not the Prosecutor that 
needs to be convinced that the threshold is met. Thus, the PTC may refuse the 
request if it considers that the evidence and information submitted is 
                                         
249 There has been some discussion as to whether it is proper to hold that a case only starts after 
the issuance of the arrest warrant. PTC I in 2006 affirmed that the case ‘entail[s] proceedings 
that take place after the issuance of a warrant of arrest or a summons to appear’ Situation in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr Decision on the Application for 
Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 and VPRS 6 Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, 17 January 2006 para. 65. El Zeidy, while not finding such an interpretation 
problematic per se, considers that it causes difficulties within the context of examining 
admissibility during the arrest warrant phase, see Mohamed M. El Zeidy, The Principle of 
Complementarity in International Criminal Law. Origin, Development and Practice (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers 2008) 251.  
250 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-8-Corr Decision concerning Pre-
Trial Chamber I's decision of 10 February 2006 and the incorporation of documents into the 
record of the case against Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo Annex I: Decision on the Prosecutor's 
application for a warrant of arrest, Article 58, 10 February 2006 Pre-Trial Chamber I, 24 February 
2006 para. 9; The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-3 Decision on 
the Prosecutor's application for a warrant of arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir Pre-
Trial Chamber I, 4 March 2009 para. 24. 
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unconvincing.251 Moreover, the PTC is not bound by the entirety of the request 
nor by the legal characterisation of the facts provided by the Prosecutor,252 and 
may alternatively issue a warrant or summons of narrower scope, focused only 
upon those specific crimes for which it is convinced that the requirements are 
met. The Chamber is not required to ‘trust’ the Prosecutor’s assessment but 
should satisfy itself that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person 
has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court and that either the 
arrest or the summons appears reasonable.253 Nonetheless, the Prosecutor’s 
application should be detailed enough so as to contain specific identification of 
the crimes for which the arrest or summons is sought.254   
In reaching their conclusions, the different PTCs have consistently required an 
affirmative answer to three fundamental questions: (a) whether there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that at least one crime within the jurisdiction of 
the Court has been committed; (b) whether the alleged suspect has incurred 
criminal liability for such crimes in accordance with the Statute; and (c) whether 
an arrest appears to be necessary or rather a summons sufficient under Article 
58.255 Pursuant to Article 21(3), the different PTCs have interpreted the 
‘reasonable grounds to believe’ standard in a manner consistent with 
internationally recognised human rights. They have been guided by the 
‘reasonable suspicion’ standard under Article 5(1)(c) of the European Convention 
                                         
251 Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-8-Corr paras 9-10. 
252 Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-3 para. 31; Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-8-Corr para. 16; The 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08-14-tENG Decision on the Prosecutor's 
Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo Pre-Trial Chamber III, 10 
June 2008 para. 25. 
253 Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-8-Corr para. 10. 
254 PTC II has already dismissed in limine an application for a warrant of arrest for lack of 
specificity. See Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-613 Decision on 
the Prosecutor's Application under Article 58 Pre-Trial Chamber II, 31 May 2012. 
255 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-55 Decision on the evidence and 
information provided by the Prosecution for the issuance of a warrant of arrest for Germain 
Katanga Pre-Trial Chamber I, 5 November 2007 para. 24; Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-8-Corr para. 
79; Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-3 para. 28;  The Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-
02/07-3 Decision on the evidence and information provided by the Prosecution for the issuance 
of a warrant of arrest for Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui Pre-Trial Chamber I, 6 July 2007 para. 25; The 
Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, ICC-01/09-
01/11-01 Decision on the Prosecutor's Application for Summons to Appear for William Samoei 
Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang Pre-Trial Chamber II, 8 March 2011 para. 6; 
The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali, 
ICC-01/09-02/11-01 Decision on the Prosecutor's Application for Summonses to Appear for Francis 
Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali Pre-Trial Chamber II, 8 
March 2011 para. 6; The Prosecutor v. Sylvestre Mudacumura, ICC-01/04-01/12-1-Red Decision 
on the Prosecutor's Application under Article 58 Pre-Trial Chamber II, 13 July 2012 para. 8. 
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for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), in the 
manner interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) as requiring 
‘the existence of some facts or information which would satisfy an objective 
observer that the person concerned may have committed the offence’.256 In 
addition, the different PTCs have followed the jurisprudence of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) as regards the fundamental right to 
liberty enshrined in Article 7 of the American Convention on Human Rights 
(ACHR).257 A case against an identified alleged perpetrator would then 
commence once a warrant of arrest or a summons to appear is issued. 
2.6 The PTC’s role in determining the factual and legal scope of the 
Court’s cases 
Once a warrant or summons is issued, the pre-trial stage of the case against an 
identified alleged perpetrator will commence. The case will have then passed 
the first layer of control by the PTC and the Court’s ‘gate’ will have been 
opened for the case to enter into the Court’s domain. During this stage, the PTC 
will still ‘guard’ the Court’s gates, ensuring that the alleged perpetrator will 
only be sent to trial if and when there is sufficient evidence to establish 
‘substantial grounds to believe’ that the person has committed the alleged 
crime. The PTC will ensure that only cases supported by sufficient evidence to 
establish substantial grounds to believe that the person committed each of the 
crimes charged are committed to trial. 
The confirmation proceedings are a fundamental feature of the PTC’s 
gatekeeping function. Judicial scrutiny of the charges is a necessary safeguard to 
avoid wholly unfounded prosecutions and focus the Court’s efforts and resources 
on cases for which there is substantial evidence going beyond mere suspicion. At 
the same time, the confirmation proceedings ensure respect for the rights of the 
suspects and victims and otherwise guarantee the fairness, effectiveness and 
expeditiousness of the Court’s proceedings as a whole. Through this proceeding, 
                                         
256 Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08-14-tENG para. 24; Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-8-Corr para. 12; 
Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-3 para. 32. 
257 The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/11-9-Red Decision on the Prosecutor's 
Application Pursuant to Article 58 for a warrant of arrest against Laurent Koudou Gbagbo Pre-
Trial Chamber III, 30 November 2011 para. 27. 
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the PTC exercises its gatekeeping function by filtering the cases that should go 
to trial from those that should not and determining the factual scope of the 
cases to be brought to trial. 
Pursuant to Article 61(1), the confirmation of charges shall take place within a 
reasonable time after the person’s surrender or voluntary appearance before the 
Court. Although the provision begins by stipulating that this rule is ‘subject to 
the provisions of paragraph 2’, the latter providing for the confirmation of 
charges ‘in the absence of the person’, commentators have argued that the 
initial appearance is a pre-condition for the confirmation of charges proceedings 
to take place.258 The participation of the alleged perpetrator during the 
confirmation of charges is a cornerstone of the system established by the 
Statute. In this regard, as discussed in Chapter 6, the ICC system differs radically 
from that of other international tribunals, eg the ICTY and ICTR, in which the 
proceedings against an accused commence with the indictment, which is 
submitted by the Prosecutor and then reviewed and approved by a pre-trial 
judge, who should be satisfied that a ‘prima facie case’ exists.259 In such a 
procedure there is no intervention of the alleged perpetrator, against whom a 
warrant of arrest may be issued only after the indictment is confirmed.260 
The Statute grants the suspect important rights allowing him to meaningfully 
participate in the confirmation process in accordance with Article 61 and Rule 
121. In particular, the suspect must, within a reasonable time before the 
hearing, be provided with a copy of the Document Containing the Charges 
(DoCC) and be informed of the evidence on which the Prosecutor intends to rely 
at the hearing. At the hearing, the Prosecutor shall support each charge with 
sufficient evidence. However, he may rely on documentary or summary evidence 
and does not need to call witnesses to testify in person. The person may object 
to the charges, challenge the evidence presented by the Prosecutor, and present 
evidence in order to challenge that presented by the Prosecutor. Subject to the 
                                         
258 (n 112) Marchesiello 1244; (n 215) Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal 
Court 139.  
259 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (UNSC, 25 May 1993) 
Articles 18-19; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (UNSC, 8 November 
1994) Articles 17-18. 
260 (n 21) Cassese and others 368.  
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provisions of Articles 60 and 61, the suspect shall enjoy the rights set forth in 
Article 67. 
The confirmation of charges shall be conducted in accordance with Rule 122 or 
126, depending on whether the person is present at the hearing. On the basis of 
the hearing, the PTC shall determine whether there is sufficient evidence to 
establish ‘substantial grounds to believe’ that the person committed each of the 
crimes charged. Pursuant to Article 61(7), based on its determination the PTC 
may: (a) confirm those charges in relation to which it has determined that there 
is sufficient evidence and commit the person for trial on the charges confirmed; 
(b) decline to confirm those charges in relation to which it has determined that 
there is insufficient evidence; or (c) adjourn the hearing and request the 
Prosecutor to consider – within a time limit if required by the PTC – either 
providing further evidence, conducting further investigation with respect to a 
particular charge or amending the charges insofar as the evidence submitted 
appears to establish a different crime within the jurisdiction of the Court. The 
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges (DeCC) shall be notified in accordance 
with Rule 129. 
If the PTC declines to confirm a charge, the Prosecutor is not precluded from 
subsequently repeating his request with the inclusion of additional evidence. Any 
warrant previously issued will cease to have effect with respect to any charges 
that have not been confirmed by the PTC, or have been withdrawn by the 
Prosecutor. If the PTC is ready to confirm some of the charges but adjourns the 
hearing in relation to others, it may decide that the committal of the person to 
trial shall be deferred pending the continuation of the hearing. After the charges 
are confirmed and before the trial begins, the Prosecutor may amend the 
charges, with the permission of the PTC and after notice to the accused. If the 
Prosecutor seeks to add additional charges, or to substitute more serious ones, a 
new hearing under Article 61 must be held. After the commencement of the trial 
the Prosecutor may, with the permission of the Trial Chamber, withdraw the 
charges in accordance with Article 61(9) and Rule 128.  
Once the charges have been confirmed, the Presidency shall constitute a Trial 
Chamber, which shall be responsible for the conduct of the subsequent 
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proceedings. Once the Trial Chamber is constituted, in accordance with Rule 
130, the Presidency shall transmit to it the decision on the confirmation of 
charges and the record of proceedings created and maintained by the Registry 
pursuant to Rule 121(10). 
2.7 Conclusions 
As described in this Chapter, the aspiration of a permanent international 
institution empowered to investigate and prosecute heinous crimes was finally 
realised with the adoption of the Statute that created the ICC. The drafters 
were also successful in creating a Court that is as independent from the political 
will of States and the Council as possible, with an independent Prosecutor able 
to intervene in most cases in which crimes deserving the Court’s attention 
remain unpursued at the national level. Nevertheless, an institution established 
in order to deal with the consequences of war and conflict must always walk a 
treacherous path at constant risk of becoming politicised. Accordingly, in order 
to provide an additional safeguard and to prevent, as far as possible, the Court 
becoming an instrument of political bargain and manoeuvre, the drafters 
conceived of the PTC as a judicial organ charged with the responsibility of 
scrutinising the exercise of discretion by the Prosecutor: a collegial body of 
judges in charge of guarding the Court’s gate. 
The powers given to the PTC are indeed extensive and constitute a considerable 
limitation upon the exercise of discretion by the Prosecutor. The PTC is the 
gatekeeper in charge of ensuring that the Prosecutor can only go ahead with 
investigations and prosecutions that are strictly warranted by the Court’s legal 
framework. The PTC guards the Court’s gates, filtering-in situations to be 
investigated proprio motu and cases to be prosecuted. In addition, it scrutinises 
decisions to filter-out situations and cases, overseeing with particular mandatory 
powers those Prosecutorial decisions which are based solely on the highly 
political consideration of the ‘interests of justice’. The PTC is further tasked 
with protecting the rights of those who may be affected by the Court’s 
investigations and prosecutions, wielding exceptional powers to intervene during 
the investigations conducted by the Prosecutor and rule on issues of jurisdiction 
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and admissibility. There are however, as described, some important lacunae in 
the Statute, which does not establish PTC supervision over the initiation of 
investigations following referrals, thereby threatening the delicate balance of 
power achieved generally in the Statute. 
In the following Chapters, this thesis will develop an analysis of the manner in 
which the PTC’s gatekeeping function has been interpreted and applied at each 
different stage of the proceedings during the first decade of the Court’s 
existence. Particular attention will be placed on analysing whether the different 
PTCs have used the full extent of their powers to scrutinise the policies applied 
by the Prosecutor. 
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Chapter 3: The role of the PTC in determining the scope of the 
notions of complementarity, gravity and the interests of justice  
3.1 Introduction 
The issues of admissibility, also described as the ‘barriers to the exercise of 
jurisdiction by the Court’,261 are: the principle of complementarity,262 double 
jeopardy or ne bis in idem,263 and the gravity threshold.264 An additional basis 
upon which the Court may decide against exercising jurisdiction in relation to a 
concrete case or situation of crisis is the consideration of the ‘interests of 
justice’.265 These notions are at the core of the Court’s ‘political’ discretion. 
They are critical in managing the tension between the legal goal of ensuring the 
prosecution of international crimes and the political aim of pursuing peace and 
preventing the commission of atrocities. They provide the necessary flexibility 
allowing the Court to adapt to different scenarios and achieve its goal of putting 
an end to impunity while contributing to the prevention of crimes of concern to 
the international community as a whole.266  
Due to the impossibility of achieving consensus, the drafters of the Statute 
outlined the general framework of the issues but left the details to be 
determined on a case-by-case basis.267 In relation to the principle of 
complementarity, for example, they specified the general criteria as objectively 
as possible, but left politically sensitive issues undecided. In particular, as 
regards domestic proceedings, the concepts of ‘investigation’ and ‘prosecution’ 
were not clearly defined, and the question of whether an ‘investigation’ should 
be ‘criminal’ or ‘judicial’ in nature, or whether a truth commission or non-
punitive traditional mechanism would suffice, remained undetermined. Further, 
although the drafters provided some clarification as to the extent of the notions 
of ‘unwillingness’ and ‘inability’, subjective elements were included, such as the 
                                         
261 Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-772 para. 23. 
262 Statute Article 17(1)(a)-(b), (2), (3).  
263 Ibid Articles 17(1)(c) and 20. The principle of ne bis in idem, as a corollary to the principle of 
complementarity, will be analysed and discussed together with the latter. 
264 Ibid Article 17(1)(d). 
265 Ibid Article 53(1)(c), (2)(c). 
266 Ibid Preamble, para. 5.  
267 See, inter alia, (n 99) Holmes 74; Michael P. Scharf, ‘The Amnesty Exception to the 
Jurisdiciton of the International Criminal Court’ (1999) 32 Cornell Int'l LJ 507, 521-522. 
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terms ‘unjustified delay’, ‘independently and impartially’, ‘total or substantial 
collapse’ and ‘otherwise unable’. Similarly, the ‘gravity’ threshold and the 
concept of the ‘interests of justice’, included in the Statute as issues that may, 
under certain circumstances, prevent the Court from exercising jurisdiction, are 
nowhere defined.  
As noted in Section 1.1.2 above, the drafters could not foresee ab initio all the 
possible combinations of circumstances that might arise in the future.268 
Nevertheless, considering the wide range of alternative mechanisms of criminal 
justice in operation at the time the Statute was discussed and the extent of the 
debate about the existence of scenarios in which it might be appropriate to 
sacrifice criminal punitive mechanisms for the sake of peace and 
reconciliation,269 the drafters might have been expected to provide more 
concrete definitions or canons of interpretation to aid in the application of the 
contested issues of admissibility. This is not to suggest that the drafters should 
have created, to borrow Hart’s words, such a ‘formalist’s heaven’ or ‘heaven of 
concepts’,270 as to render in advance answers to every question that may have 
arisen, leaving no room for manoeuvre in application. However, the drafters 
could have provided at least a core understanding of these notions, minimising 
the universe of choices at the Prosecutor’s disposal, particularly in relation to 
concepts for which there is no common general understanding. This would not 
have prevented the drafters from leaving open for later settlement issues that 
could only be properly appreciated and determined in the context of a concrete 
situation or case. Rather, as they were unable to reach a compromise on these 
politically sensitive issues, the drafters opted for ‘open texture’ or ‘creative 
ambiguity’.271 Accordingly, the Prosecutor, as the person initially called upon to 
apply the concepts of complementarity, gravity and the interests of justice, has 
wide discretion when interpreting the terms used in the Statute. His conclusions 
are in effect a choice from an ample universe of alternatives where he will have 
                                         
268 (n 30) Hart 128, 133. 
269 For the general debate on transitional justice mechanisms and alternatives to criminal justice 
see, inter alia, (n 19) Teitel; (n 19) Minow; (n 19) Mallinder. 
270 (n 30) Hart 130, 139. 
271 (n 33) Hunt 67. 
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to strike a balance, in light of the circumstances, between competing interests 
that may vary in weight from case-to-case.272  
 
When determining the scope of the concepts of complementarity, gravity and 
the interests of justice in relation to concrete situations or cases deserving the 
Court’s attention, the Prosecutor’s independence and impartiality are under 
permanent scrutiny. Depending on how these notions are interpreted, the 
Prosecutor – and indeed the Court as a whole – is always at risk of being 
perceived as taking sides in a conflict, being influenced or manipulated by 
political actors or becoming an instrument of victor’s justice. Indeed, the 
Prosecutor’s decisions on these matters have been readily exposed to criticism 
as patently partisan or unjust, it being commonly asserted for instance that the 
Court has unduly focused on African States, targeted only the rebels in Uganda 
and the DRC and afforded greater weight to the killing of a dozen peacekeeping 
personnel by rebels in Darfur than to the killing by British forces of four to a 
dozen detainees and civilians in Iraq.  
In principle, the Statute gives the Prosecutor independence and discretion to 
interpret and apply the provisions of the Court’s legal framework. However, in 
order to ensure the latter’s objectivity and independence from political 
pressures – these being essential to its credibility and legitimacy – the 
Prosecutor’s actions are subject to judicial control and oversight. In effect, 
under certain circumstances the judges – mostly, although not exclusively, those 
sitting on the PTC – can examine the Prosecutor’s choices in order to ensure that 
they are not the result of improper political influence, but a legitimate exercise 
of his powers under the Statute. As such, although the PTC has not been 
afforded a general right to scrutinise the Prosecutor’s policy or actions, in order 
to avoid arbitrariness, the judges have been given the last word in interpreting 
the issues of admissibility – complementarity, double jeopardy and gravity – and 
determining the interests of justice. As mentioned in Section 2.3, the PTC 
exercises this function by settling disputes, responding to requests from the 
Prosecutor and by determining certain issues on its own initiative, pursuant to 
Articles 53(3), 15(4), 18(2) and 19. Consequently, although the Prosecutor is the 
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driving force behind the Court’s activities, the PTC has a critical gatekeeping 
function aimed at guaranteeing the Court’s independence and impartiality.  
This Chapter analyses the manner in which the notions of complementarity, 
gravity and the interests of justice have been interpreted and applied by the 
Court’s jurisprudence. The discussion does not represent an exhaustive analysis 
of the notions, focusing rather on the PTC’s gatekeeping role in determining the 
scope of the issues. The Chapter is divided into three main sections, each 
dedicated to the analysis of the PTC’s scrutiny of the Prosecutor’s choices as to 
the issues of complementarity (Section 3.2), gravity (Section 3.3), and the 
interests of justice (Section 3.4). Each section will start by providing a general 
description of the concepts and the interpretative issues they raise, before 
turning to focus on the Prosecutor’s approach to the issues and, where 
applicable, the relevant case law. The Chapter finishes with conclusions arguing 
for the PTC to adopt a firmer and more proactive role in scrutinising the 
Prosecutor’s exercise of discretion and, in particular, for the Chambers to be 
ready to take politically unfavourable decisions where necessary to ensure the 
Court’s independence and impartiality (Section 3.5). 
3.2 The Principle of Complementarity 
3.2.1 General Remarks 
The principle of complementarity is the cornerstone of the Statute.273 It 
regulates the balance of competence between the Court and national 
                                         
273 Given the limited reference to the principle of complementarity in this work, there will be no 
detailed analysis of the negotiation process or the discussions regarding the many – plenty still 
unresolved – issues arising therefrom. Complementarity in itself has been the sole subject matter 
of many doctoral theses and has been addressed by numerous scholars. Among the most 
relevant, see, inter alia, (n 249) El Zeidy; John T. Holmes, ‘Complementarity: National Courts 
versus the ICC’ in Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta and John R.W.D. Jones (eds), The Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, vol I (Oxford University Press 2002) 667-686; 
(n 99) Holmes, 'The Principle of Complementarity' 41-78; Sharon A. Williams and William A. 
Schabas, ‘Article 17: Issues of Admissibility’ in Otto Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court (Second edn, C.H. Beck - Hart - Nomos 2008) 605-
625; Emanuela Fronza, ‘Principio di complementarità, esercizio della giurisdiziones e 
adeguamento a livello interno’ in Enrico  Amati and others (eds), Introduzione al diritto penale 
internazionale quaderni di diritto penale comparato, internazionale ed europeo (Second edn, 
Giuffré Editore 2010) 39-75; Flavia Lattanzi, ‘Il principio di complementarità’ in Giorgio Lattanzi 
and Vitto Monetti (eds), La Corte Penale Internazionale, organi – competenza – reati – processo 
(Giuffrè Editore 2006) 179-214; Claudia Cárdenas Aravena, ‘The admissibility test before the 
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jurisdictions, aimed at ensuring an integrated system respectful of national 
sovereignty, based upon the primary exercise of national criminal jurisdiction 
complemented by a permanent international court. As such, complementarity 
strikes a balance between the two competing interests of: (i) the need to 
safeguard the States’ sovereign right to exercise domestic jurisdiction; and (ii) 
the aim of putting an end to impunity for the perpetrators of the most serious 
crimes of international concern.  
Complementarity has been defined by PTC II as ‘the principle reconciling the 
States’ persisting duty to exercise jurisdiction over international crimes with the 
establishment of a permanent international criminal court having competence 
over the same crimes’.274 The Court is therefore expected to reinforce the 
States’ primary obligation to prevent and prosecute international crimes 
imposed by conventional and customary law.275 The Court should bridge the 
impunity gap that emerges when States do not investigate or prosecute or are 
unable or unwilling to fulfil their obligations to do so. Consequently, States – and 
not the Court – are expected to be the main actors in the prosecution of 
international crimes. The Court was not created in order to replace national 
jurisdictions: it is meant to act only in the exceptional circumstances in which 
no State has investigated or prosecuted serious crimes of concern to the 
international community as a whole.  
                                                                                                                           
International Criminal Court under special consideration of amnesties and truth commissions’ in 
Jann K. Kleffner and Gerben  Kor (eds), Complementary views on complementarity Proceedings 
of the international roundtable on the complementarity nature of the International Criminal 
Court Amsterdam, 25/26 June 2004 (Asser Press 2006); (n 225) Olásolo, 'The triggering procedure 
of the International Criminal Court, procedural treatment of the principle of complementarity, 
and the role of the Office of the Prosecutor'; Florian Razesberger, The International Criminal 
Court. The Principle of Complementarity (Peter Lang GmbH Europäischer Verlag der 
Wissenchaften 2006); and Jann K. Kleffner, Complementarity in the Rome Statute and National 
Criminal Jurisdictions (Oxford University Press 2008). See also, Ania Salinas, ‘Principio de 
Complementariedad en la política persecutoria del Fiscal de la Corte Penal Internacional’ in Rule 
of Law and Fundamental Rights of Citizens: The European and American Conventions on Human 
Rights, vol European Public Law Series, Volume XCIII (Esperia 2009) 271-317; Sylvia Steiner and 
Ania Salinas Cerda, ‘Os desafios do princípio da complementaridade. Um balanço dos 10 anos da 
entrada em vigor do Estatuto de Roma do Tribunal Penal Internacional’ (2012) 8 Revista Anistia 
Política e Justiça de Transição 212. 
274 The Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo and Dominic Ongwen, ICC-
02/04-01/05-377 Decision on the admissibility of the case under Article 19(1) of the Statute Pre-
Trial Chamber II, 10 March 2009 para. 34. 
275 The obligation that derives from the aut dedere aut judicate requirement is included, inter 
alia, in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977 and the 
Genocide Convention.   
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According to Article 17(1)(a) and (b), the Court shall determine that a case is 
inadmissible where (i) the case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State 
which has jurisdiction over it; or (ii) the case has been investigated by a State 
which has jurisdiction over it and the State has decided not to prosecute the 
person concerned. In both instances, however, the case will be admissible if the 
State is actually unwilling or unable to genuinely carry out the investigation or 
prosecution. Article 17(2) and (3) provide for the parameters that the Court 
should take into account when deciding on the unwillingness or inability of a 
State genuinely to investigate or prosecute.276 
As will be discussed in detail below, although questioned by some commentators 
as contradicting the drafters’ intention,277 and supported by others as 
unambiguously provided for by Article 17,278 the Court’s jurisprudence has now 
conclusively determined that inaction makes a case admissible before the Court, 
subject only to the assessment of gravity. In such a scenario, there is no need 
for the Court to make any determination as to the principle of complementarity 
in accordance with Article 17. When no State has initiated an investigation or 
prosecution, the Court can exercise jurisdiction without the need for 
determining whether the competent State(s) are willing or able to investigate 
and prosecute.279 In other words, the Court can intervene not only in cases of 
                                         
276 According to Article 17(2) ‘In order to determine unwillingness in a particular case, the Court 
shall consider, having regard to the principles of due process recognized by international law, 
whether one or more of the following exist, as applicable: (a) The proceedings were or are being 
undertaken or the national decision was made for the purpose of shielding the person concerned 
from criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court referred to in article 
5; (b) There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which in the circumstances is 
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice; (c) The proceedings were 
not or are not being conducted independently or impartially, and they were or are being 
conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the 
person concerned to justice.’. Pursuant to Article 17(3) ‘In order to determine inability in a 
particular case, the Court shall consider whether, due to a total or substantial collapse or 
unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is unable to obtain the accused or the 
necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings.’ 
277 See, inter alia, (n 273) Williams and Schabas 615; Nidal Nabil Jurdi, ‘The Prosecutorial 
Interpretation of the Complementarity Principle: Does It Really Contribute to Ending Impunity on 
the National Level?’ (2010) 10 IntCLR 73, 74; Mahnoush H. Arsanjani and W. Michael Reiseman, 
‘The Law-in-Action of the International Criminal Court’ (2005) 99 AJIL 385, 396; Manisuli 
Ssenyonjo, ‘The International Criminal Court and the Lord’s Resistance Army Leaders: 
Prosecution or Amnesty?’ (2007) 7 IntCLR 361, 368.   
278 Darryl Robinson, ‘The Mysterious Mysteriousness of Complementarity’ (2010) 21 Crim LF 67, 
68; see also (n 273) Holmes, 'Complementarity: National Courts versus the ICC' 673. 
279 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-1497 
Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Germain Katanga against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber II of 
12 June 2009 on the Admissibility of the Case Appeals Chamber, 25 September 2009 para. 78; 
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the ‘unwillingness’ or ‘inability’ of States to investigate or prosecute but also – 
and indeed primarily – in cases of ‘inaction’.  
In effect, where a case is or has been investigated or prosecuted by a State with 
jurisdiction over it, there will be a rebuttable presumption that the case is 
inadmissible before the Court. However, as noted in Section 3.1, the issue of 
‘inactivity’ is not clear cut. The paradigmatic case will be an investigation or 
prosecution related to exactly the same conduct being considered by the Court, 
carried out under the regular system of justice of the State in question – ie 
police, public prosecutor, judiciary. Such proceedings will represent, in 
principle, ‘activity’ on the part of the State, such that only a determination that 
the State is in effect unwilling or unable to genuinely carry out the investigation 
or prosecution will enable the Court to retain jurisdiction over the case. 
However, outside of this archetypal scenario, a wide range of procedures may be 
adopted by a given State – particularly one recovering from or experiencing war 
and political conflicts – which may or may not amount to ‘activity’ in accordance 
with the Court’s jurisprudence. Indeed, the indeterminacy of the terms of the 
Statute problematises the ready submission of the binary action/inaction of a 
State to clear legal criteria. What about investigations conducted within the 
context of a truth and reconciliation commission or an amnesty applied after a 
full investigation?280 What about non-prosecutorial traditional mechanisms of 
justice?281 What about domestic proceedings within the regular justice system of 
a State addressing the same crime but under a different legal characterisation?  
                                                                                                                           
The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali, 
ICC-01/09-02/11-274 Judgment on the appeal of the Republic of Kenya against the decision of 
Pre-Trial Chamber II of 30 May 2011 entitled 'Decision on the Application by the Government of 
Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute' 
Appeals Chamber, 30 August 2011 para. 43 and The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry 
Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, ICC-01/09-01/11-307 Judgment on the appeal of the 
Republic of Kenya against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of 30 May 2011 entitled 'Decision 
on the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case 
Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute' Appeals Chamber, 30 August 2011 para. 44. 
280 For the argument that investigations by truth and reconciliation commissions and amnesties 
may, under certain circumstances, make a case inadmissible before the Court under the terms of 
Article 17, see, inter alia, (n 267) Scharf; Darryl Robinson, ‘Serving the Interests of Justice: 
Amnesties, Truth Commissions and the International Criminal Court’ (2003) 14 EJIL 481; (n 273) 
Cárdenas Aravena 127-139.  
281 For discussion of the operation of the complementarity provisions in relation to African 
dispute resolution mechanisms see, inter alia, Ifeonu Eberechi, ‘Who will save these endangered 
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These are the type of questions the Prosecutor will have to deal with when 
determining whether the State is inactive or is indeed conducting investigations 
and prosecutions. However, given the uncertainty of the notion of ‘national 
proceedings’, it may well be that, notwithstanding certain activity by the State, 
the Prosecutor decides to proceed with his own investigations or prosecutions. In 
such a case, the relevant State can still challenge the Court’s actions, either by 
requesting a deferral of the investigation, pursuant to Article 18, or by 
challenging the admissibility of the case, pursuant to Article 19(4). It should be 
noted however that, as stressed by PTC II:  
once the jurisdiction of the Court is triggered, it is for the latter and not 
for any national judicial authorities to interpret and apply the provisions 
governing the complementarity regime and to make a binding 
determination on the admissibility of a given case.282  
In case of disagreement, States are not permitted to unilaterally disregard the 
Court’s orders, being able only to challenge the admissibility of the relevant 
case, thereby triggering the PTC review procedure.283 As such, although the 
Prosecutor will initially assess within the scope of his discretion whether, in 
application of the principle of complementarity, due to the State’s action or 
inaction the Court should or should not act, in case of disagreement, the PTC 
will make the final determination as to whether the State’s activity actually 
prevents the Court from intervening.   
Notably, the Court was conceived of as part of a universal system of 
international criminal justice, as opposed to a closed system only relevant and 
applicable to the Contracting Parties, as with regional systems of human rights 
protection. Consequently, the investigation or prosecution of crimes under the 
jurisdiction of the Court by any State, whether or not party to the Statute, will 
constitute a bar to the exercise of that jurisdiction. Further, and following 
naturally from the above, any State may request a deferral or submit a 
challenge to the Court in relation to any case over which it has jurisdiction. Non-
                                                                                                                           
species? Evaluating the implications of the principle of complementarity on the traditional 
African conflict resolution mechanism’ (2012) 20 AJICL 22. 
282 Kony et al., ICC-02/04-01/05-377 para. 45. 
283 The Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, ICC-01/11-01/11-163 
Decision on the postponement of the execution of the request for surrender of Saif Al-Islam 
Gaddafi pursuant to Article 95 of the Rome Statute Pre-Trial Chamber I, 1 June 2012 para. 37. 
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party States enjoy the same procedural rights and are bound by the same 
requirements when challenging the jurisdiction of the Court or the admissibility 
of a case as any State Party.284 However, although they can invoke 
complementarity, non-party States can do so without becoming subject to 
obligations to cooperate with the Court. Indeed, the Statute does not include 
any obligation for non-party States seeking to prevent the Court’s 
intervention.285  
The second prong of the admissibility test is double jeopardy or ne bis in idem. 
Pursuant to Articles 17(c) and 20(3), ne bis in idem functions as in most systems 
of criminal justice: a case will be inadmissible before the Court where the same 
person has already been tried elsewhere for the same conduct which forms the 
basis of the case before the Court. However, Article 20 provides that the case 
will still be admissible if the previous proceedings were conducted for the 
purpose of shielding the person or otherwise were not conducted independently 
or impartially.286 Therefore, ne bis in idem acts as a corollary to the principle of 
complementarity: complementarity applies to investigations and prosecution and 
ne bis in idem to cases that have been already tried.287 Both complementarity 
and ne bis in idem have been considered by the jurisprudence of the Court as 
forming the first part of the admissibility test related to national proceedings.288 
As such, the analysis on complementarity in this Chapter shall be understood to 
apply, mutatis mutandis, to ne bis in idem.  
                                         
284 (n 99) Holmes, 'The Principle of Complementarity' 75. 
285 Robert Cryer, ‘The International Criminal Court and its relationship to Non-Party States’ in 
Carsten Stahn and Göran Sluiter (eds), The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal 
Court (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2009) 119. 
286 Article 20(3) stipulates that ‘No person who has been tried by another court for conduct also 
proscribed under article 6, 7, 8 or 8 bis shall be tried by the Court with respect to the same 
conduct unless the proceedings in the other court: (a) Were for the purpose of shielding the 
person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court; or 
(b) Otherwise were not conducted independently or impartially in accordance with the norms of 
due process recognized by international law and were conducted in a manner which, in the 
circumstances, was inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.’ 
287 For a detailed analysis of the negotiation process and the terms of the adoption of the 
principle of ne bis in idem in the Statute see (n 249) El Zeidy 283-298; Immi Tallgren and Astrid 
Reisinger Coracini, ‘Article 20: Ne bis in idem’ in Otto Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court (Second edn, C.H.Beck - Hart - Nomos 2008) 669-
699; (n 99) Holmes, 'The Principle of Complementarity' 56-60; Christine Van den Wyngaert and 
Tom Ongena, ‘Ne bis in idem Principle, Including the Issue of Amnesty’ in Antonio Cassese, Paola 
Gaeta and John R.W.D. Jones (eds), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A 
Commentary, vol I (Oxford University Press 2002) 705-729. 
288 Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-8-Corr para. 29. 
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The way in which the Prosecutor and the PTC has interpreted and applied the 
principle of complementarity is discussed below, with particular attention being 
paid to the PTC’s power, in scrutinising the Prosecutor’s decisions, to determine 
the concrete scope of the issues. 
3.2.2 The Prosecutor’s approach to complementarity 
On the day of his appointment as the first Chief Prosecutor of the ICC, Luis 
Moreno Ocampo set out the ground rules of his approach to complementarity. 
This shaped not only the work of his office during his entire mandate but also 
that of the Court as a whole. His motto for success was based on the premise 
that: 
as a consequence of complementarity, the number of cases that reach the 
Court should not be a measure [sic] its efficiency. On the contrary, the 
absence of trials before this Court, as a consequence of the regular 
functioning of national institutions, would be a major success.289  
As such, rather than focusing on conducting as many investigations and 
prosecutions as possible – as might be expected from any domestic prosecutor – 
the OTP anticipated concentrating its efforts on promoting and encouraging 
national proceedings. 
This understanding was supported by a report compiled by a group of experts290 
and outlined in a policy paper, both issued in 2003.291 These documents added to 
the idea of promoting national proceedings the notion that the Court was 
accessible to States and not competing for cases with them. On the contrary, 
the OTP was eager to reach agreements with States in order to share the 
‘common burden’ of putting an end to impunity. In a rather contradictory 
statement, arguably encouraging inaction more than the pursuit of domestic 
proceedings, the policy paper explained that there was ‘no impediment to the 
admissibility of a case before the Court where no State has initiated any 
                                         
289 Luis Moreno Ocampo, ‘Statement made at the ceremony for the solemn undertaking of the 
Chief Prosecutor of the ICC’ (Monday 16 June 2003) 2 
<http://www.iccnow.org/documents/MorenoOcampo16June03.pdf> accessed 18.12.2014. 
290 OTP, Informal Expert Paper: The principle of complementarity in practice (International 
Criminal Court, 2003). 
291 OTP, Policy Paper September 2003. 
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investigation’, as ‘there may be cases where inaction by States is the 
appropriate course of action’.292 In such cases, the Court and the State could 
‘agree that a consensual division of labour is the most logical and effective 
approach’, and that the Court is ‘the more effective forum’.293 Apparently giving 
some assurances to States concerned with the possibility that such agreements 
could trigger the OTP’s scrutiny of national systems, the paper stressed that, in 
such scenarios, ‘there will be no question of “unwillingness” or “inability” under 
article 17’.294  
In a subsequent Report on Prosecutorial Strategy issued in 2006,295 the OTP’s 
understanding was labelled ‘positive complementarity’ and was described as one 
of the pillars of the OTP’s strategy. Complementarity was originally devised to 
protect State sovereignty by preventing the Court from overriding genuine and 
legitimate national efforts to achieve accountability. The Court was seen as a 
potential threat to States’ sovereignty that needed to be contained. ‘Positive 
complementarity’ represented a break from that approach, emphasising instead 
the role of the complementarity principle in ensuring the international rule of 
law by creating an ‘interdependent and mutually reinforcing international 
system of justice’.296 The Court is no longer to be seen as a threat to States but 
as a partner holding the same shared burden: that of bringing about an end to 
impunity. In pursuit of this common goal, the Court will seek to negotiate with 
States in order to agree on a consensual division of labour.297 This ‘positive’ 
approach was further described by the OTP as one that ‘encourages genuine 
national proceedings where possible, relies on national and international 
networks; and participates in a system of international cooperation’.298 The 
Court should be then ‘no longer viewed as an institution of last resort, but as an 
entity that acts in conjunction with and in support of domestic jurisdictions 
                                         
292 Ibid 5. 
293 Ibid. 
294 Ibid. 
295 OTP, Prosecutorial Strategy 2006. 
296 Ibid 5. 
297 For a detailed analysis of the policy and its implications see Carsten Stahn, ‘Complementarity: 
A Tale of Two Notions’ (2008) 19 Crim LF 87; William W. Burke-White, ‘Implementing a Policy of 
Positive Complementarity in the Rome System of Justice’ (2008) 19 Crim LF 59; (n 249) El Zeidy 
214-222. 
298 OTP, Prosecutorial Strategy 2006 5. 
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through “dialogue” and “assistance”’.299 In that way, the Court should 
‘contribute to the effective functioning of national judiciaries’.300  
The same idea was reiterated in the OTP’s Report on Prosecutorial Strategy of 
2010,301 which further developed the notion, explaining that complementarity 
has two dimensions: (i) the admissibility test, related to the assessment of the 
existence of national proceedings and their genuineness, ‘which is a judicial 
issue’; and (ii) the concept of positive complementarity, which is ‘a proactive 
policy of cooperation aimed at promoting national proceedings’.302 The paper 
also tasked the OTP, in developing this ‘positive’ approach to complementarity, 
with: (i) sharing information with national judiciaries; (ii) allowing nationals 
from the relevant States to participate in the OTP’s investigative and 
prosecutorial activities; and (iii) outreach activities.303 
Although not expressly provided for in the Statute, in theory the positive 
approach to complementarity does not appear to directly contradict its plain 
reading.304 It has been argued that its implementation further stems from the 
Prosecutor’s inherent powers.305 No doubt, a policy of encouraging national 
proceedings is in line with the letter and spirit of the Statute. However, the 
approach has become double-edged in its application, as it appears to have 
actually encouraged inactivity. As a matter of fact, after almost 10 years of 
application, the record of this prosecutorial approach may be recognised more in 
the practice of self-referrals and waivers of complementarity by States than in 
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301 OTP, Prosecutorial Strategy 2009 - 2012 (International Criminal Court, 2010). 
302 Ibid 5.  
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the encouragement of genuine national proceedings, raising serious concerns 
about States’ adherence to the spirit of the Statute.306  
The practice of self-referrals will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. It will 
be argued that the opening of an investigation following a self-referral is 
perfectly compatible with the letter and spirit of the Statute. Indeed, the 
problem is not presented by the self-referral itself, but by the concessions the 
Prosecutor may potentially make in order to obtain cooperation from the 
referring State. It is of great concern in fact that, so far, in all cases arising out 
of investigations triggered by self-referrals, the only targets have been members 
of rebel groups or non-governmental parties to armed conflicts.307 
It might have been expected that governments would not readily agree to refer 
a situation to the Court insofar as it would result in their being placed under the 
Court’s magnifying glass. But a real ‘division of labour’ necessarily implies that 
the Court should refrain from pursuing the investigation or prosecution of 
certain groups or individuals only if and when States assume that task 
domestically. The problem is presented when, in the absence of national 
proceedings against a group allegedly involved in the commission of crimes, the 
Prosecutor dares not initiate an investigation or prosecution that may not be 
welcomed by a ‘cooperative’ self-referring State. Self-referrals indeed involve 
the risk of benefiting those in power, with the Court prosecuting only their 
political opponents. In effect, the great risk of a consensual managerial division 
of labour with States is the politicisation of the Court.  
The potential for States to manipulate a consensual division of labour with the 
Court is a concrete risk posed by the ‘positive’ approach to complementarity. 
There are a number of foreseeable dilemmas. What should be the approach, for 
instance, in relation to States which, despite having the capacity to conduct 
national proceedings, prefer instead to cooperate with the Court, yet only in 
                                         
306 See, inter alia, William A. Schabas, ‘Complementarity in Practice: Some Uncomplimentary 
Thoughts’ (2008) 19 Crim LF 5; (n 277) Jurdi; Gilbert Bitti and Mohamed M. El Zeidy, ‘The 
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relation to the prosecution of certain (‘convenient’) cases? How can the 
Prosecutor ensure his independence and impartiality in relation to States with 
whom he has agreed on a consensual division of labour? Can it be realistically 
expected that States will cooperate with the prosecution of those in power? Is it 
reasonable to expect that a previously unwilling State will undertake genuine 
domestic prosecutions in response to the threat of prosecution by the Court? Can 
such a ‘positive’ approach to complementarity reasonably be applied to non-
party States that are in clear opposition to the Court?308  
The experience of the first situations and cases initiated pursuant to this 
‘positive’ approach demonstrates that a policy based on partnership and 
dialogue could only work in an ideal scenario of States acting in good faith and 
where those in power (or pro-government forces) have no involvement 
whatsoever in the commission of crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court. 
Whenever there is any link between those in power and individuals or groups 
involved in the commission of crimes, the ‘positive’ approach to 
complementarity is likely to fail.309 Indeed, in those scenarios the ‘positive’ 
approach bears the risk of undercutting the logic of complementarity itself, 
undermining the key goals of the Statute by perpetuating the cycle of impunity. 
A more proactive involvement by the PTC could safeguard the independence and 
impartiality of the Court. Of course, the PTC cannot dictate the prosecutorial 
policies to be followed by the OTP, nor can it force the Prosecutor to prosecute 
certain individuals unless, pursuant to Article 53(3), the decision not to 
prosecute is based solely on the interests of justice. Nonetheless, pursuant to 
Article 54(1)(a) the Prosecutor, as an independent agent of justice, shall ‘in 
order to establish the truth, extend the investigation to cover all facts and 
evidence relevant to an assessment of whether there is criminal responsibility 
under the Statute’. Accordingly, and as ensured by Regulation 48(1), the PTC 
could exercise its inherent powers and, when warranted by the circumstances, 
                                         
308 It should be noted that the Prosecutor has applied the same policy when dealing with the 
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309 In the Kenya situation, for example, commentators refer to the failure of positive 
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request from the Prosecutor an update on the advances of his investigations and 
the reasons for the lack of prosecution of certain persons or groups. A proactive 
role by the PTC in scrutinising whether the Prosecutor’s actions are a legitimate 
exercise of his discretion will not only encourage more transparent decision-
making within the OTP, but it will also urge genuine investigations and 
prosecutions at the national level.  
Possibly taking into account some of the criticisms of the ‘positive’ approach to 
complementarity, under the auspices of the new Chief Prosecutor Fatou 
Bensouda there has been a clear change of rhetoric within the OTP. In the 
Strategic Plan 2012-2015 issued in October 2013, the focus has clearly shifted 
towards the quality and efficiency of the investigations and prosecutions 
undertaken by the Court.310 Although not directly declaring a departure from the 
‘positive’ approach to complementarity, the plan only mentions it once, and 
then only in reference to the prosecutorial strategy followed so far.311 Notably, 
it states that the OTP has to evaluate whether past strategies are ‘adapted to 
future challenges’312 and stresses that in relation to ‘close monitoring and 
frequent interaction with countries where situations are under preliminary 
examination’ the OTP ‘is presently not able to sustain such high intensity efforts 
due to lack of resources’.313 Notably, it emphasises the importance of the 
assistance by ‘States and other partners’ in enabling States to genuinely 
investigate and prosecute and places the OTP in the secondary role of 
‘[assisting] in such efforts where appropriate’.314 Further, it reframes the OTP’s 
objective as: 
Increased complementarity by encouraging genuine national proceedings 
where States show willingness and an ability to conduct genuine 
investigations and prosecutions, and by encouraging efforts of other States 
and partners to provide assistance.315  
It remains to be seen whether this new approach will actually encourage 
national proceedings and avoid negative public perceptions concerning the 
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Court’s partiality and lack of independence. The next section examines the 
manner in which the Court’s jurisprudence, particularly that of the different 
PTCs, has dealt with complementarity and responded to the Prosecutor’s 
approach. 
3.2.3 Complementarity in the Court’s jurisprudence 
The Chambers of the Court have already produced an impressive body of 
jurisprudence on issues related to complementarity. Given the ever-increasing 
amount of case law on the matter, the analysis below focuses only on aspects 
relevant to the PTC’s gatekeeping role.   
3.2.3.1 The same person – same conduct test 
The starting point for the two first prongs of the admissibility test to operate as 
an impediment to the Court’s action is the existence of ongoing national 
proceedings, ie investigations or prosecutions, pursuant to Article 17(1)(a) and 
(b), or a previous trial, pursuant to Article 17(c).  
In determining the scope of this requirement, PTC I developed in 2006 in the 
Lubanga case the test known as ‘same person-same conduct’, which established 
‘a condition sine qua non for a case arising from the investigation of a situation 
to be inadmissible that national proceedings encompass both the person and the 
conduct which is the subject of the case before the Court’.316 As such, although 
the language in Article 17(1)(a) and (b) (‘case’) is slightly different than that of 
Articles 17(c) and 20 (‘conduct’) they were equated, requiring that ‘case’ always 
relate to an ‘incident-specific conduct’.317 This approach was followed by the 
Court’s subsequent jurisprudence,318 particularly before the AC ruled on the 
validity of the test.319  
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This interpretation allowed the Court to take over cases and start judicial work 
during the first years of its functioning. However, it permitted the initiation of 
cases against individuals who were already being prosecuted at the national 
level, provided such prosecutions did not cover the specific conduct underlying 
the Court’s proceedings. As such, it endorsed the Prosecutor’s ‘positive’ 
approach to complementarity. In the Lubanga case, at the time the Court’s 
warrant was issued, Thomas Lubanga was already under arrest in the DRC for 
charges of genocide, crimes against humanity, murder, illegal detention and 
torture.320 Since the domestic proceedings did not include enlisting and 
conscripting children under the age of fifteen and using them to participate in 
the hostilities (the only conduct for which Lubanga was charged before the 
Court) the case was considered admissible.321 By the same token, when the 
arrest of Germain Katanga was requested, he had already been in detention in 
the DRC for more than 2 years under charges of, inter alia, crimes against 
humanity.322 Since the Prosecutor informed PTC I that the charges at the 
national level did not include the attack to the village of Bogoro on 24 February 
2003,323 (the only incident for which Katanga was charged before the ICC) the 
case was also considered admissible.324 These cases triggered considerable 
criticism of the ‘same person-same conduct’ test.325 In particular, commentators 
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argued that the DRC’s justice system was actually working and the State was 
thereby meeting its national obligations in terms of addressing impunity.326 It 
appears at least questionable whether in these particular cases the test 
developed by PTC I actually encouraged national proceedings within the DRC,327 
as the proceedings that were being conducted domestically concluded in order 
to allow the Court’s intervention.  
One could agree that in these particular cases the Court was the most effective 
forum to prosecute Lubanga and Katanga due to, for example, legal or factual 
impediments within the DRC. However it is regrettable that, although aware of 
the existence of domestic prosecutions, PTC I did not even enquire about the 
impact of the Court’s proceedings on domestic prosecutions. What was going to 
happen once the suspects were transferred to the Court? Were there going to be 
subsequent trials, or were the charges at the national level going to be dropped? 
And if so, was the Prosecutor, within the context of his ‘positive’ cooperation 
agreement with the DRC, to be provided with the evidence and information 
relating to the national proceedings in order to determine whether proceedings 
akin to those at the national level could be initiated before the Court should the 
charges in the DRC be dropped? None of these questions were asked and, as a 
result, the individuals were prosecuted by the Court for only some very specific 
conduct and incidents that were far from representative of the full extent of the 
criminality alleged against them at the national level.  
As such, after a few years of its application to the concrete cases brought before 
the Court, the test developed by PTC I proved insufficient and raised additional 
doubts as to the exact meaning of the word ‘case’. In particular, it was not clear 
whether ‘case’ required identical charges before the ICC and domestically in 
order to inhibit the Court from exercising jurisdiction. Were the domestic cases 
required to include the same underlying offense(s) and the same legal 
characterisation of the facts as that of the cases before the Court? A 
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clarification on these questions was of particular importance given that the 
recognition and incorporation of the crimes under the Statute at the national 
level has neither been uniform nor mandatory.  
A further difficulty relates to ascertaining, at the pre-investigative stage of a 
situation where cases have not yet been properly identified but the Court is 
nevertheless called to make assessments of admissibility pursuant to Articles 15, 
18 and 53, whether – and which – national proceedings operate as a bar to the 
exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction. When authorising the opening of the 
investigation in Kenya in March 2010, PTC II stated that the relevant provisions 
required contextual interpretation. Accordingly, ‘an assessment of admissibility 
during the article 53(1) stage should in principle be related to a “situation”’.328 
Considering that before the initiation of the investigation it was ‘not possible to 
have a concrete case involving an identified suspect (…) the admissibility 
assessment at this stage actually refers to the admissibility of one or more 
potential cases within the context of a situation’.329 The notion of ‘potential 
cases’ had to be constructed against the preliminary criteria of the group of 
persons and crimes ‘likely to be the focus of an investigation’.330 In relation to 
Kenya, since there was evidence of some domestic proceedings for minor 
offences against persons falling outside the category of those who bear the 
greatest responsibility,331 the latter being the likely focus of the Prosecutor’s 
investigations,332 the Chamber found the situation to be admissible given the 
‘lack of national proceedings (…) with respect to the main elements which may 
shape the Court’s potential case(s)’.333  
When authorising the investigation in Côte d’Ivoire in October 2011, PTC III 
followed the same approach to ‘potential cases’ when assessing the admissibility 
of the ‘situation’.334 In spite of the fact that there existed national proceedings 
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in Côte d’Ivoire and in France for a wide range of crimes and perpetrators,335 
PTC III found the situation to be admissible ‘due to the absence of national 
proceedings against those appearing to be most responsible for the crimes 
committed during the post-election violence’.336 However, PTC III clarified the 
reasons behind the lack of national proceedings against those individuals, noting 
that it was ‘the understanding of the Daola Prosecutor that the individuals with 
greatest responsibility for the most serious crimes will be prosecuted before the 
ICC’.337 This reveals that, even in relation to Article 15 investigations, the 
Prosecutor may have reached agreements establishing a division of labour with 
States, which again disincentives States from using the full extent of their 
capacities to meet their obligations to investigate and prosecute international 
crimes. 
A key opportunity to revise the ‘same person-same conduct’ test was presented 
in 2011 to PTC II in the cases arising out of the situation in Kenya.338 For the first 
time in the history of the Court a State challenged the admissibility of cases 
based on the principle of complementarity. The challenge submitted by the 
Kenyan government referred to the abovementioned notion of ‘potential cases’. 
In its challenge, Kenya contested the ‘same person-same conduct’ test, arguing 
that it should be possible to challenge the admissibility of cases for as long as 
‘national investigations (…) encompass the same conduct in respect of persons 
at the same level of hierarchy’.339 Accordingly, Kenya substantiated its 
challenge by relying on judicial reform and the promise of future 
investigations,340 arguing that national proceedings were devised with the 
intention of starting with the ‘investigation and prosecution of lower level 
perpetrators to reach up to those at the highest levels who may have been 
responsible’.341 In its decision PTC II however upheld the ‘same person-same 
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conduct’ test rejecting the challenges based on the absence of information ‘that 
there are ongoing investigations against the (…) suspects’.342    
Of great relevance to the development of the test are the AC judgments on the 
appeals submitted by Kenya against PTC II’s decisions.  343 In their judgments, 
the AC clarified that in its prior decisions it had not yet ruled on the correctness 
of the ‘same person’ component of the test.344 The AC recalled that Article 17 
does not only apply to admissibility determinations of concrete cases but also to 
preliminary rulings on admissibility pursuant to Articles 15, 18 and 53. 
Therefore, the AC stressed, the meaning of the term ‘case is being investigated’ 
in Article 17(1)(a), should be understood in the context to which it is applied.345 
For the purpose of proceedings related to Articles 15, 18 and 53, the AC 
specified, ‘the contours of the likely cases will often be relatively vague (…) 
[since] no individual suspects will have been identified at this stage, nor will the 
exact conduct nor its legal classification be clear’.346 In contrast, the AC 
specified, Article 19 relates to the admissibility of concrete cases, defined by 
the warrant or summons issued under Article 58, or the charges brought by the 
Prosecutor and confirmed by the PTC under Article 61.347 Consequently, the AC 
held that: 
the defining elements of a concrete case before the Court are the 
individual and the alleged conduct. It follows that for such a case to be 
inadmissible under article 17(1)(a) of the Statute, the national 
investigation must cover the same individual and substantially the same 
conduct as alleged in the proceedings before the Court.348  
Accordingly, the AC held in relation to Kenya that the cases would only be 
inadmissible before the Court ‘if the same suspects are being investigated by 
Kenya for substantially the same conduct’.349 The AC judgments are thus 
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relevant to both aspects of the test. As to the ‘same person’ component, it will 
depend on the stage of the proceedings at which the admissibility determination 
is made. Although not explicitly stated, the AC judgments appear to uphold the 
notion of ‘potential cases’ developed by the Article 15 authorisations of the 
investigations in Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire.350 Accordingly, before the proceedings 
progress to the stage in which specific subjects have been identified, the 
question would be that of ‘whether suspects at the same hierarchical level are 
being investigated’.351 As to the ‘same conduct’ component of the test, the AC 
made a subtle but significant clarification when stating that, for a case to be 
inadmissible, the investigation at the national level had to cover substantially 
the same conduct.352 This interpretation gives the test additional flexibility, 
arguably leaving aside the need for ‘identical’ charges and widening the scope of 
the PTC’s discretion in ruling on the admissibility of the cases brought before it.  
A new scenario was presented to PTC I in the case arising out of the situation in 
Libya, which is of particular significance for a number of reasons. Although the 
situation was referred to the Court by the UNSC,353 the subsequent fall of the 
regime and the establishment of a new interim government presented a 
completely new scenario. The State was no longer inactive nor did it claim to be 
unwilling or unable to prosecute. Quite the contrary, the State was perhaps too 
eager to prosecute the members of the former regime.354 For the first time the 
Court was presented with a true conflict of jurisdiction in which both the Court 
and the State invoked their right to investigate and prosecute the same 
individuals.  
Further, the Court’s struggle to reconcile different conceptions of 
complementarity became apparent.355 As soon as the interim government 
informed the Court of its will to investigate and prosecute Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, 
the Prosecutor declared to the media that Libya had the right to put the suspect 
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on trial in Libya and not transfer him to the Court.356 Although in a more 
moderate filing before PTC I the Prosecutor recalled that it was for the judges to 
decide on the admissibility of the case, he advanced different options for a 
negotiated coordination of the proceedings.357 PTC I, however, insisted that the 
suspect had to be surrendered to the Court.358 It later stressed that even if a 
challenge to the admissibility of the case had been submitted, it was for the 
Chamber to determine whether the State could postpone the person’s 
surrender.359 
In 2013, PTC I ruled on the challenges to the admissibility of the cases against 
Gaddafi and Al-Senussi which had eventually been submitted by Libya. In these 
decisions PTC I applied the greater flexibility given to the test by the AC 
judgments in the Kenya cases. Interpreting the AC judgments, PTC I noted that 
although the validity of the test had been confirmed, rather than referring to 
‘incidents’, the AC referred to the ‘conduct “as alleged in the proceedings 
before the Court”’.360 In the view of PTC I, the determination of what would 
constitute ‘substantially the same conduct’ would vary according to the 
concrete facts and circumstances of a given case, requiring a case-by-case 
analysis.361 Therefore, PTC I held that the parameters of the conduct allegedly 
under domestic investigation had to be compared to the conduct attributed to 
the subjects in the pending warrants of arrest issued by the Chamber.362  
In particular, PTC I noted that the events expressly mentioned in the warrant did 
not represent unique manifestations of the form of criminality alleged against 
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Gaddafi in the proceedings before the Court.363 Rather, they constituted 
‘samples of a course of conduct (…) which resulted in an unspecified number of 
[crimes]’.364 As such, in line with the purpose of complementarity, PTC I found it 
inappropriate to expect Libya’s investigation to cover exactly the same acts 
mentioned in the warrant as constituting instances of Gaddafi’s alleged course 
of conduct.365 Instead, it was considered necessary to assess the evidence in 
order to determine whether the domestic investigation related to the ‘same 
conduct underlying the warrant’, namely the course of conduct in the context of 
which the crimes were committed.366  
Addressing one of the main concerns raised by commentators,367 PTC I found 
that the assessment of domestic proceedings should focus on the alleged 
conduct and not its legal characterisation, emphasising that it is not 
determinative for an admissibility challenge whether the domestic proceedings 
were carried out with a view to prosecuting international crimes.368 Specifically, 
the Chamber held that ‘a domestic investigation or prosecution for “ordinary 
crimes”, to the extent that the case covers the same conduct, shall be 
considered sufficient’.369  
Although the Chamber found that the ordinary crimes under which Libya was 
investigating Gaddafi did not ‘cover all aspects of the offences to be brought 
under the Rome Statute’,370 given that certain provisions of the Libyan Criminal 
Code considered persecutory intent an aggravating factor to the offences, 
although not an element of any of the crimes,371 the Chamber was satisfied that 
they would ‘sufficiently capture’ Gaddafi’s conduct as alleged in the warrant of 
arrest.372 However, in a rather contradictory finding, after analysing the 
evidence submitted, PTC I stated that it was not persuaded that Libya was 
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investigating the same case as that before the Court,373 since the evidence as a 
whole did not allow it to discern the actual contours of the national case against 
Gaddafi.374  
As to Al-Senussi, PTC I further developed the test, in particular in relation to the 
definition of ‘conduct’. It stated that what is required at every phase of the 
proceedings before the Court is that the alleged criminal conduct be sufficiently 
described with reference to precise temporal, geographic and material 
parameters, but not that such conduct should invariably be composed of one or 
more incidents.375 PTC I further held that the ‘incidents’ or ‘events’ mentioned 
in the warrant were only ‘illustrative’ and ‘non-exhaustive’ examples of discrete 
criminal acts constituting the ‘conduct’ alleged against Al-Senussi.376 
Accordingly, the Chamber found that it was not required that the domestic 
proceedings concern each of those ‘events’ in order for it to be satisfied that 
Libya was investigating or prosecuting Al-Senussi for ‘substantially’ the same 
conduct as alleged before this Court.377 In applying this approach, PTC I was 
satisfied that the facts under investigation in Libya comprised ‘the relevant 
factual aspects of Mr Al-Senussi’s conduct as alleged in the proceedings before 
the Court’,378 including, at a minimum, the events described in the warrant.379 
Therefore, PTC I found that ‘Libya has demonstrated that it is undertaking 
domestic proceedings covering the “same case” as that before the Court within 
the meaning of article 17(1)(a) of the Statute’.380 
The appeals submitted by Libya against PTC I’s decisions were decided in May 
and July 2014 in divided AC judgments.381 The AC reiterated that ‘the 
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parameters of a “case” are defined by the suspect under investigation and the 
conduct that gives rise to criminal liability under the Statute’.382 Further, the 
‘conduct’ that defines the ‘case’ is both that of the suspect and that described 
in the incidents under investigation.383 Providing for some additional flexibility 
to the test, the AC stressed that, ultimately, what constitutes the same case and 
the extent to which there must be overlap will depend upon the facts of the 
specific case.384 If the underlying incidents are identical, the case will be 
straightforwardly inadmissible before the Court, subject to any finding of 
unwillingness or inability.385 At the other end of the scale, it will be hard to 
argue that the State and the Court are investigating the same ‘case’ when none 
of the incidents are the same, but the required degree of overlap could vary 
from case to case depending upon the precise facts.386 In any event, however, 
the incidents must always play a central role in the comparison.387 In the view of 
the AC, a judicial assessment would therefore be necessary to determine 
whether the cases mirror each other sufficiently. Such an assessment would 
include a consideration of the interests of victims and the impact on them by 
any decision that a case is inadmissible at the Court, despite not all of the 
incidents being investigated domestically.388 
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In her dissenting and separate opinion, Judge Ušacka argued for more flexibility, 
stressing that the ‘same person-same conduct’ test had been developed in the 
Court’s jurisprudence in the abstract, in relation to cases arising out of self-
referrals and on the basis of cases in which the State did not challenge 
admissibility and did not claim to have undertaken any steps for the 
investigation or prosecution of the alleged crimes.389 In her view, that 
interpretation disregards the principle of complementarity laid out in paragraph 
10 of the Preamble and Article 1.390 A rigid application of the test to situations 
in which States are actually dealing with the investigation and prosecution of 
crimes, she argued, could potentially preclude a State from focusing on a wider 
scope of criminality having ‘the perverse effect of encouraging that State to 
investigate only the narrower case selected by the Prosecutor’.391 Going even 
further, she suggested that domestic investigations and prosecutions in a process 
of transitional justice could better and more directly address the interests of the 
victims.392 Judge Ušacka further stressed,  
the task imposed on the Court is to find the appropriate balance between 
respecting the sovereignty of States and ensuring an effective Court, within 
the framework of the overarching common goal of the Court and the 
States, which is to fight against impunity.393 
This recent disagreement in the AC demonstrates that the issue of the validity of 
the ‘same person-same conduct’ test clearly remains unsettled and that further 
developments are probably still to come. The PTC should be aware of the 
necessity to be responsive to the concrete situations of each case and the need 
to adapt their responses to changing scenarios, avoiding rigidity in the 
application of theoretical solutions that do not necessarily respond to the 
concrete demands of unfolding events.   
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01/11-01/11-565-Anx2 paras 4-5. 
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3.2.3.2 When should admissibility be determined? 
Of great relevance to the gatekeeping function of the PTC is the timing of the 
determination of the admissibility of cases. Initially, the different PTCs followed 
a literal interpretation of Article 19(1) – which states that ‘[t]he Court shall 
satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in any case brought before it’ – and 
considered that an initial determination of jurisdiction and admissibility had to 
be made when deciding on a request for a warrant of arrest or a summons to 
appear. In particular, in July 2005, when issuing warrants of arrest against 
suspects of the Uganda situation, PTC II made initial findings that the cases fell 
within the jurisdiction of the Court and appeared to be admissible.394 When 
deciding on the request for a warrant against Lubanga and Bosco Ntaganda in 
February 2006, PTC I went even further and stated that, ‘an initial 
determination on whether the case (…) falls within the jurisdiction of the Court 
and is admissible is a prerequisite to the issuance of a warrant of arrest’.395  
However, the AC initially rejected this approach, stating in July 2006 that the 
issuance of an arrest warrant is not conditional upon an initial determination of 
the cases’ admissibility. In addition, it specified that, although the PTC has 
discretion to assess admissibility pursuant to Article 19(1), when deciding on ex-
parte prosecution only applications it shall ‘exercise such discretion only when it 
is appropriate in the circumstances of the case, bearing in mind the interests of 
the suspect’.396  
                                         
394 The Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo and Dominic Ongwen, ICC-
02/04-01/05-53 Warrant of arrest for Joseph Kony issued on 8 July 2005 as amended on 27 
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Prosecutor's appeal against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled 'Decision on the 
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Since the July 2006 AC Judgment, the different PTCs have made provisional 
findings on admissibility only when manifestly warranted by the circumstances of 
the case, ie when the Prosecutor has brought sufficient information to allow a 
finding, and stressing that the findings are, ‘without prejudice to any challenge 
to the admissibility of the case (…) [or] any subsequent determination’.397 
Otherwise, noting that the applications still remain ex parte and that no 
ostensible cause impelling the exercise of discretion exists, they have declined 
to use their discretionary propio motu power to determine the admissibility of 
the cases at the stage of the issuance of the arrest or summons.398 
This restrictive interpretation considerably limits the PTC’s exercise of its 
gatekeeping functions. Delaying admissibility determinations until the time the 
person is brought before the Court appears inconsistent with both the 
overarching principle of complementarity and with the interests of the suspects. 
An early determination by the PTC of whether the Court is indeed allowed to 
exercise jurisdiction in a given case would appear more in line with the object 
and purpose of the Statute.399 In order to ensure both compliance with the 
principle of complementarity and the Court’s independence and impartiality, 
the PTC should demand from the Prosecutor a detailed assessment of any 
national proceedings against the person he seeks to prosecute. In addition, 
particularly taking into account the evolving interpretation of the ‘same person-
same conduct’ test, it appears that a change of approach is now necessary. In 
order to avoid engaging in cases that are likely to be challenged and potentially 
found inadmissible, the PTC should engage in determining whether the target 
individual is being or has been prosecuted domestically for ‘substantially’ the 
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same conduct that the Prosecutor wants to bring before the Court, at the early 
stages of the proceedings.  
A positive jurisprudential development came in March 2009, when the AC 
appeared to partially reconsider its initial position. In deciding on the appeal 
against a proprio motu determination of admissibility made by PTC II in the Kony 
case, the AC stated that holding admissibility proceedings in the absence of the 
suspects does not necessarily impair their rights. In particular, the assessment 
would be appropriate when proceedings are not conducted in camera and the 
admissibility assessment is not aimed at determining gravity, being focused 
rather on whether domestic proceedings may render a case inadmissible.400  
Proprio motu determinations by the PTC, however, still remain the exception 
rather than the rule. It is then up to the affected party, ie the suspected 
individual or the relevant State, to challenge the jurisdiction of the Court 
pursuant to Article 19. Pursuant to Article 19(4), the person or State can only 
submit a challenge once, prior to or at the commencement of the trial and only 
under exceptional circumstances may the Court grant leave for a challenge to be 
brought more than once or at a later time. Challenges at the commencement of 
the trial, or subsequently, may only be based on Article 17(1)(c).  
In the Katanga case, TC II initially defined the term ‘commencement of the trial’ 
for the purposes of Article 19. It stated that what marked the commencement of 
the trial was the filing of the decision confirming the charges, which triggers the 
constitution of a TC.401 It follows from this interpretation that challenges could 
regularly be brought only before a PTC and, only in exceptional circumstances – 
                                         
400 The Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo and Dominic Ongwen, ICC-
02/04-01/05-408 Judgment on the appeal of the Defence against the 'Decision on the 
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and solely based on ne bis in idem – before a TC. TC II’s decision on this point 
has been harshly criticised as having ‘flawed legal reasoning’,402 and being based 
on ‘practicality, namely to determine at the earliest possible opportunity the 
forum conveniens which is better suited to deal with the case’.403 When ruling 
on the appeal to that decision, although apparently in disagreement with TC II’s 
approach, the AC refrained from pronouncing itself on which was the correct 
interpretation.404 A contextual interpretation of the Statute, particularly 
considering Article 64(8)(a),405 supports the conclusion that the trial commences 
with the hearing of the merits, ie when the TC reads to the accused the charges 
confirmed by the PTC. Accordingly, although the PTC should exercise its proprio 
motu powers and assess admissibility at the earliest opportunity, the States and 
the suspect can challenge the admissibility of a case on any ground at any time 
before the commencement of the hearing of the merits either before the PTC or 
the TC. 
The need to determine admissibility at the earliest opportunity is indeed of 
critical relevance to the suspects. As a matter of fact, suspects are in a 
precarious situation when challenging the admissibility of a case arising out of 
self-referrals and within the context of a consensual division of labour between 
the State and the Prosecutor. In such scenarios, it is highly unlikely that a 
suspect will succeed in a challenge based on Article 17(1)(a) and (b). This again 
calls into question the restrictive approach to the PTC’s discretion to determine 
proprio motu the admissibility of cases pursuant to Article 19(1) at the earliest 
opportunity. 
The Katanga case is a prime example of the need to assess admissibility at the 
earliest opportunity. Katanga was the first accused to ever challenge the 
admissibility of a case pursuant to Article 19. Only after the decision on the 
confirmation of charges was issued, and when the case was already before TC II, 
could his defence substantiate the allegation that the case was inadmissible at 
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the time of the issuance of the arrest warrant. Katanga’s defence argued that, 
in determining the admissibility of a case, account should be taken of the facts 
as they were at the time of the issuance of the warrant of arrest.406 This was of 
particular importance in that case because, the defence argued, when 
requesting Katanga’s arrest the Prosecutor concealed from PTC I crucial 
information demonstrating that he was being prosecuted in the DRC for the 
commission of crimes against humanity in the context of the attack on Bogoro.407 
The only incident for which Katanga was eventually tried and convicted by the 
Court was indeed the attack on the village of Bogoro on 24 February 2003.408  
In its observations, the DRC submitted that, at the time of the challenge, there 
were no pending investigations against Katanga because any investigation 
previously conducted was terminated when the suspect was transferred to the 
Court in October 2007.409 Further, the DRC’s Minister of Justice clearly indicated 
that the DRC was not willing to reinstitute proceedings against Katanga and that 
the problem of admissibility should have been raised at the beginning of the 
proceedings.410 Even more, and reflecting the understanding within the DRC of 
the nature of its relationship with the Court, the Minister stated: 
When we implement a warrant of arrest and surrender, we as a 
government, we do this pursuant to our commitments under cooperation 
with the ICC. And if later on the same court tells it us, ‘You have to take 
this gentleman and judge him back in the Congo,’ then I think there's a 
problem with that, and I think that this is going to call into question our 
cooperation with the International Criminal Court, and of course this will 
lead us to try to renegotiate or review our cooperation with the court.411  
This statement is worrying not only in respect of the DRC’s rather crude threat 
to review the terms of cooperation with the Court, but also insofar as it shows – 
once again – that a consensual division of labour with States entails a great risk 
of jeopardising the Court’s independence and impartiality. However, in a 
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decision characterised by its restraint and pragmatism,412 the AC held that ‘the 
admissibility of a case must be determined on the basis of the facts as they exist 
at the time of the proceedings concerning the admissibility challenge’.413 This is 
because the admissibility of a case depends primarily on the investigative and 
prosecutorial activities of States, which may change over time, and Article 17(1) 
requires the Court to determine whether ‘the case is inadmissible, and not 
whether it was inadmissible’.414  
The consistent approach subsequently followed by the Court is that admissibility 
is determined on the basis of the facts at the time of the challenge. The sole 
fact that proceedings existed in the past, or may exist in the future, does not 
impact on the admissibility determinations.415 Admissibility determinations are 
thus seen as an ‘ongoing process throughout the pre-trial phase’, with a plurality 
of parties being vested with the power to raise challenges in addition to the 
Court’s proprio motu powers.416 The admissibility of cases is not static, but 
‘subject to change as a consequence of a change in circumstances’.417 
The AC in the Katanga case further rejected the argument of the defence that 
States should not be allowed to relinquish domestic jurisdiction in favour of the 
Court.418 It held that the complementarity principle ‘strikes a balance between 
safeguarding the primacy of domestic proceedings vis-à-vis the International 
Criminal Court on the one hand, and the goal of the Rome Statute to “put an 
end to impunity” on the other hand’.419 Consequently, ‘there may be merit in 
the argument that the sovereign decision of a State to relinquish its jurisdiction 
in favour of the Court may well be seen as complying with the “duty to exercise 
[its] criminal jurisdiction”’.420 Since the Court has no power to order States to 
investigate or prosecute domestically, the AC was of the view that, ‘the general 
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prohibition of a relinquishment of jurisdiction in favour of the Court is not a 
suitable tool for fostering compliance by States with the duty to exercise 
criminal jurisdiction’.421 This reasoning, although defensible under a plain 
reading of the Statute and coincident with the status quo at the time the 
decision was taken, involves the risks of politicising the Court.422 Indeed, unless 
the Prosecutor actually ‘act[s] even-handedly when deciding on what incidents 
to focus investigations and who to indict’,423 allowing States to relinquish 
jurisdiction in favour of the Court presents the great risk of the Court being used 
as an instrument of victor’s justice or by one of the warring factions in an 
internal conflict to tip the balance in its favour. It also contradicts the ‘positive’ 
approach to complementarity by discouraging genuine national proceedings and 
running contrary to the idea that the Court should act as a court of the last 
resort.424 
3.3.2.3 Burden and standard of proof 
In the Bemba case, TC III first ruled on the burden of proof in the case of 
admissibility challenges. It held that the burden rests with the one bringing the 
challenge as ‘it falls to him to establish the facts and other relevant matters 
that are said to support the argument’.425 When ruling on the appeals against 
the challenges in the Kenya cases, the AC followed the same approach, stating 
that, ‘a State that challenges the admissibility of a case bears the burden of 
proof to show that the case is inadmissible’.426 In addition, PTC I stressed in the 
Gaddafi case that, ‘although [the one challenging] carries the burden of proof, 
any factual allegation raised by any party or participant must be sufficiently 
substantiated in order to be considered properly raised’.427  
Commentators have criticised this approach, with Claire Brighton arguing, for 
example, that ‘[t]he imposition of a legal burden on parties submitting 
challenges (…) conflict[s] with the object and purpose of upholding the primary 
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127 
right of states to prosecute international crimes, and to encourage domestic 
proceedings’.428 Brighton added that Articles 17 and 19 are designed to protect 
States’ sovereign right to prosecute and that this protection is reduced by the 
imposition of a legal burden on the challenging party.429 The burden on States 
would therefore ‘conflict with the presumption that states will, and ought to, 
prosecute in their domestic courts’.430  
However, it appears necessary to make a fundamental distinction depending on 
who submits the challenge. When a State is the one challenging the admissibility 
of cases, it seems unfair and contrary to the overarching goal of putting an end 
to impunity, to impose on the Prosecutor the burden to prove that the case is 
admissible. If that were the approach, non-cooperative States would consistently 
undermine any of the Court’s attempts to prosecute alleged perpetrators of 
crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court. The Prosecutor would, most 
probably, be unable to demonstrate that the cases are indeed admissible, as he 
will not have access to the records of the domestic proceedings. The fight 
against impunity would be easily frustrated. 
It is however similarly unfair to impose such a burden on suspects. As was 
apparent in the Katanga case, suspects may not have the necessary information 
or resources to demonstrate that the Court’s case is in fact inadmissible 
pursuant to Article 17(1). It appears more reasonable to take into consideration 
that, even if an admissibility determination is not a pre-requisite for the 
issuance of a warrant or summon in accordance with Article 58(1), admissibility 
is one of the elements to be considered by the Prosecutor when determining 
whether there is a sufficient basis for prosecution pursuant to Article 53(2). The 
Prosecutor should therefore, in any case, always assess the admissibility of the 
cases he seeks to prosecute before submitting any request to the PTC for the 
issuance of a warrant or summons. As a logical consequence, when the Chamber 
decides to determine admissibility pursuant to Article 19(1) or when a suspect 
challenges admissibility pursuant to Article 19(2)(a), the Prosecutor should bear 
the onus of demonstrating that the cases he seeks to prosecute are admissible. 
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Indeed, it could be argued that to require a suspect or accused to demonstrate 
that the case is inadmissible constitutes a reversal of the burden of proof. Such 
a reversal is not generally allowed in criminal proceedings because it 
contravenes the presumption of innocence, recognised by Article 67(1)(i) of the 
Statute, which the suspect enjoys as from the moment of his arrest or surrender 
pursuant to Rule 121(1).  
Taking into account the AC’s approach to States’ relinquishment of jurisdiction 
in favour of the Court,431 and the allocation of the burden of proof to the one 
bringing the challenge, it becomes essential for the protection of the rights of 
suspects that the PTC determine admissibility pursuant to Article 19(1) at the 
earliest opportunity and preferably before issuing a warrant or summons. This is 
crucial for the protection of the rights of suspects and to ensure respect of the 
principle of complementarity, particularly when the Prosecutor acts within the 
context of a cooperation agreement with the relevant State(s). This would 
constitute a meaningful exercise of the PTC’s gatekeeping function, which is 
essential to guarantee the Court’s independence and impartiality.  
As to the standard of proof, TC III in the Bemba case was of the view that, when 
the burden lies upon the defence in criminal proceedings, the standard to apply 
is the ‘civil standard’ or balance of probabilities.432 However, when confronted 
with a challenge brought by the State in the Kenya cases, the AC held that, ‘the 
State must provide the Court with evidence of sufficient degree of specificity 
and probative value that demonstrates that it is indeed investigating the case. It 
is not sufficient merely to assert that investigations are ongoing’.433 As such, in 
order for a State to substantiate a challenge based on the allegation that a case 
‘is being investigated’, it shall demonstrate that it is investigating the same 
person and substantially the same conduct by:  
taking steps directed at ascertaining whether those suspects are 
responsible for that conduct, for instance by interviewing witnesses or 
suspects, collecting documentary evidence, or carrying out forensic 
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analyses. The mere preparedness to take such steps or the investigation of 
other suspects is not sufficient.434  
Following this approach, PTC I held in the cases arising out of the situation in 
Libya that the State must provide the Court with ‘evidence [that] shall 
demonstrate that [the State] is taking concrete and progressive steps towards 
ascertaining [the individual]’s responsibility’.435 In particular, the Chamber 
requested Libya to provide ‘concrete, tangible and pertinent evidence that 
proper investigations are currently ongoing’.436 When applying this standard to 
the case against Gaddafi, PTC I found that, ‘Libya has fallen short of 
substantiating, by means of evidence of a sufficient degree of specificity and 
probative value, the submission that the domestic investigation covers the same 
case that is before the Court’.437  
Although pursuant to Article 19(5) States are obliged to make a challenge ‘at the 
earliest opportunity’, given the demanding standard of proof imposed, the AC 
has stated that the obligation to submit the challenge will only arise, ‘once [the 
State] is in a position to actually assert a conflict of jurisdictions. The provision 
does not require a State to challenge admissibility just because the Court has 
issued a [warrant or] summons to appear.’438 Consequently, a challenge should 
be submitted only when a State can present it ‘in such a way that it can 
[actually] show a conflict of jurisdictions’.439  
The demanding standard of proof imposed on States has been criticised for 
requiring States to, in effect, demonstrate that investigations are almost 
completed or significantly advanced, in circumstances in which the context, 
object and purpose of Article 19 appears to support a less demanding 
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threshold.440 Brighton argues that the stringent threshold imposed in the Kenya 
cases was aimed at dismissing the admissibility challenge on a procedural 
ground, instead of entering into the real issue of mistrust as to the genuineness 
of the Kenyan investigations.441 According to this view, the Kenya decisions had 
been influenced by political considerations directed at avoiding the fallout that 
would have arisen out of a determination of unwillingness on the part of Kenya. 
Such decisions, commentators argue, are undesirable precedents. In order to 
ensure its legitimacy, the Court should be prepared to make determinations 
even when politically unfavourable, demonstrating that it is effectively, 
transparently and independently fulfilling its role.442 
3.2.3.4 The concepts of ‘unwillingness’ and ‘inability’ 
The first attempt to define unwillingness was made by TC II in the Katanga case 
in July 2009. TC II was guided by the (false)443 premise that the Court should 
only act in cases of States’ unwillingness and inability, omitting mention of the 
need for the Court to act first and foremost in cases of States’ inaction. TC II 
stated that, according to the Statute, ‘the Court may only exercise its 
jurisdiction when a State which has jurisdiction over an international crime is 
either unwilling or unable genuinely to complete an investigation and, if 
warranted, to prosecute its perpetrators’.444 As such, TC II found it necessary to 
first determine whether the DRC was unwilling or unable to prosecute Katanga, 
in order to decide on the admissibility challenge. It then found that there were 
two forms of unwillingness: the first, recognised in the Statute, being 
‘motivated by the desire to obstruct the course of justice’; while the second, 
not expressly provided for in the Statute, ‘aims to see the person brought to 
justice, but not before national courts’.445 TC II however found that this ‘second 
form of unwillingness’, was in line with the object and purpose of the Statute, 
as it would respect the drafter’s intention to put an end to impunity while 
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adhering to the principle of complementarity.446 In addition, it found that the 
State would not infringe its duty to prosecute ‘if it surrenders the suspect to the 
Court in good time and cooperates fully with the Court’.447 
In a decision of great significance for the future understanding and development 
of the principle of complementarity,448 the AC set out a clear structure for the 
admissibility determination by ruling that ‘the question of unwillingness or 
inability (…) becomes relevant only where, due to ongoing or past investigations 
or prosecutions in that State, the case appears inadmissible’.449 Therefore, ‘the 
question of unwillingness or inability is [only] linked to the activities of the State 
having jurisdiction’.450 As such, ‘in case of inaction, the question of 
unwillingness or inability does not arise; inaction on the part of a State having 
jurisdiction (…) renders a case admissible before the Court, subject to article 
17(1)(d) of the Statute’.451 Since then, this has been the Court’s consistent 
jurisprudence: in case of inaction there is no need to delve into an examination 
of the unwillingness or inability of the State, which only become relevant in the 
scenarios provided by Article 17(1)(a) and (b).452 Consequently, even if inaction 
is the result of unwillingness and inability of a State to investigate or prosecute, 
the sole fact that the State is inactive allows the Court to act, without the need 
of assessing or determining the motivating factors of the State’s inaction. 
In addition, the AC stressed that the decision to surrender Katanga to the Court 
and to close domestic investigations against him as a result of his surrender did 
not amount to a ‘decision not to prosecute’ in the terms of Article 17(1)(b); 
rather, it was a decision that ‘he should be prosecuted, albeit before the 
International Criminal Court’.453 TC III and the AC followed this approach in the 
Bemba case,454 stating that the decision that the case should be referred to the 
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Court was not a ‘decision not to prosecute’. However, in the same Bemba case, 
contrary to what was argued by TC II in the Katanga case, TC III stated that the 
fact that CAR sought Bemba’s prosecution at the Court was not a manifestation 
of ‘unwillingness’ for the purposes of Article 17(1)(b). On the contrary, TC III 
stated ‘for the purposes of this provision the State is “willing” because it 
positively seeks the accused’s trial at the ICC’.455  
In the Bemba case, TC III further stressed that the relevant unwillingness or 
inability is that of the State, as opposed to that of the national judges or 
courts.456 Although the State can take into account observations made by the 
judiciary, they do not bind it, the relevant factor being therefore the State’s 
unwillingness or inability.457 TC III considered that the CAR had ‘neither the 
investigative resources to handle these offences adequately (notwithstanding 
the various witness statements taken by the investigating judge) nor the judicial 
capacity to try them’.458 Therefore, it accepted that ‘the prosecuting authorities 
and the national courts in the CAR would be unable to handle the case against 
this accused nationally’, which ‘leads inevitably to the conclusion that for the 
purposes of Article 17(3) of the Statute, the national judicial system of the CAR 
is “unavailable”, because it does not have the capacity to handle these 
proceedings’.459  
On appeal, the AC stressed that it is not the role of a TC to review decisions of 
domestic courts to decide whether they have correctly applied national law, 
since ‘when a Trial Chamber must determine the status of domestic judicial 
proceedings, it should accept prima facie the validity and effect of the decisions 
of domestic courts, unless presented with compelling evidence indicating 
otherwise’.460  
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The issues of ‘unwillingness’ and ‘inability’ of a State to genuinely investigate or 
prosecute was again touched upon by PTC I when ruling on the challenges 
submitted by Libya. PTC I held that the willingness and ability of a State 
genuinely to carry out an investigation or prosecution ‘must be assessed in the 
context of the relevant national system and procedures’, ie in accordance with 
the substantive and procedural law applicable in the relevant State.461 After 
analysing the different stages of the proceedings and the rights that the accused 
should enjoy under domestic legislation,462 the Chamber entered into the 
assessment of the facts and evidence of the cases in order to determine the 
ability and/or willingness of the State to carry out the proceedings.  
In the case against Gaddafi, although PTC I was not satisfied that the evidence 
presented by Libya demonstrated that it was investigating the same case, it 
found it necessary to continue its analysis to the second part of the test given 
the serious concerns existing about ‘Libya’s ability genuinely to carry out the 
investigation or prosecution’ against Gaddafi.463 After analysing the evidence 
submitted, the Chamber found that, despite the efforts deployed by Libya, 
‘multiple challenges remain and (…) Libya continues to face substantial 
difficulties in exercising its judicial powers across the entire territory’.464 In 
particular, it found that ‘although the authorities for the administration of 
justice may exist and function’,465 Libya (i) was unable to secure the transfer of 
Gaddafi from his place of detention under the custody of the Zintan militia into 
the State authority;466 (ii) lacked the capacity to obtain the necessary testimony 
due to the inability of judicial and governmental authorities to ascertain control 
over detention facilities and provide adequate witness protection;467 and (iii) 
was otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings, as it had not been able to 
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secure legal representation for the accused, which created a practical 
impediment to the progress of the domestic proceedings against him.468  
As such, PTC I found that Libya was unable genuinely to carry out the 
investigation or prosecution.469 In a surprising turn, however, and in spite of its 
finding that Libya was not investigating the same case, the Chamber went on to 
analyse Libya’s ability to prosecute, but not its willingness – thereby notoriously 
circumventing ruling on the highly sensitive matter of the allegations of serious 
human rights violations against Gaddafi. PTC I instead avoided the issue by 
simply stating that it was not necessary ‘to address the implications of the 
alleged impossibility of a fair trial for Mr Gaddafi on Libya’s willingness 
genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution’.470 
When ruling on the appeal in the Gaddafi case, the AC recalled its prior 
jurisprudence to the effect that the question of unwillingness or inability only 
arises when there is a positive determination as to whether the Court and the 
State are investigating the same case.471 Accordingly, as the AC found that Libya 
was not investigating the same case, it did not assess the findings of inability 
made by PTC I.472 In his separate opinion Judge Song, who would have concluded 
that Libya was investigating the same case,473 addressed PTC I’s findings on 
inability. Although agreeing with PTC I’s findings, he stressed that the concept 
of ‘unavailability’ is distinct from that of ‘collapse’ and that, in order to 
determine ‘inability’, the Court is required to find either ‘a total or substantial 
collapse’ or the ‘unavailability’ of the national judicial system.474 In addition, in 
light of the purpose of the Statute to put an end to impunity of the most serious 
crimes of international concern, Judge Song was of the view that it was 
‘sufficient for the system to be unavailable in respect of a particular case’.475 
Notably, neither the Majority nor the dissenting or separate opinions made any 
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reference to the impact on the domestic proceedings of the widely reported 
allegations of violations of Gaddafi’s fundamental human rights.476  
In the case against Al-Senussi, in October 2013 PTC I noted that the same factual 
circumstances could serve to support findings of either unwillingness or inability 
and therefore decided to assess them as a whole in order to make an overall 
determination.477 PTC I further stressed that willingness and ability must be 
assessed in relation to the specific domestic proceedings concerning the same 
case for which the Chamber was satisfied that there was not a situation of 
inactivity.478 Further, the Chamber took into account only the allegations that 
could constitute one or more of the scenarios described in Article 17(2) and (3) 
and only when sufficiently substantiated by the evidence and information at the 
Chamber’s disposal.479  
In relation to the critical issue of alleged serious violations of the defendant’s 
rights to due process and a fair trial, PTC I stressed that ‘alleged violations of 
the accused’s procedural rights’480 would ‘not per se [be] grounds for a finding 
of unwillingness or inability’ since ‘[i]n order to have a bearing on the 
Chamber’s determination, any such alleged violation must be linked to one of 
the scenarios provided for in article 17(2) or (3) of the Statute’.481 PTC I stressed 
that certain violations of the ‘procedural rights of the accused’ would be 
relevant to the assessment of the independence and impartiality of the national 
proceedings. However, it recalled that Article 17(2)(c) identifies two cumulative 
requirements and that a finding of unwillingness will proceed ‘only when the 
manner in which the proceedings are being conducted, together with indicating 
a lack of independence and impartiality, is to be considered, in the 
circumstances, inconsistent with the intent to bring the person to justice’.482 As 
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such, a lack of independence and/or impartiality during the national proceedings 
was not considered sufficient in itself to justify a finding of unwillingness. 
As to the defence’s allegations of possible violations of Al-Senussi’s human rights 
in the course of the domestic proceedings – which the defence was further 
unable to verify or substantiate due to Libya’s refusal to arrange for a legal visit 
– the Chamber qualified them as ‘generic assertions without any tangible proof’ 
and did not consider them to be ‘issues properly raised before the Chamber’.483 
PTC I further held that, although the burden of proof as regards the cases’ 
inadmissibility lay with Libya, this could not ‘be interpreted as an obligation to 
disprove any possible “doubts” raised by the opposing participants’ and the fact 
that ‘the defence did not have access to Mr Al-Senussi cannot per se lead to the 
positive conclusion that certain fundamental rights of Mr Al-Senussi have been 
violated (…) or be in itself sufficient to cast doubts on Libya’s counter-
assertions’.484 
As to the defence’s allegation that the security situation in Libya would affect 
the functioning of the judiciary and, in turn, directly impact on the national 
proceedings, the Chamber was of the view that the existence of ‘certain 
constraints under which a national system may be acting does not per se render 
the State unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out proceedings with respect to 
a specific suspect’.485 More specifically, the Chamber made it clear that ‘not 
simply any “security challenge” would amount to the unavailability or a total or 
substantial collapse of the national judicial system rendering a State unable’.486 
Further, PTC I found that the fact that certain incidents of threats or violence 
against judicial authorities may have occurred across the country ‘does not 
necessarily entail “collapse” or “unavailability” of the (…) judicial system such 
that would impede [its] (…) ability to carry out the proceedings’.487 
Its analysis of the evidence led PTC I to conclude that there was no indication 
that the proceedings against Al-Senussi were being undertaken for the purpose 
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of shielding him from criminal responsibility,488 nor that the national proceedings 
were tainted by an unjustified delay that would be inconsistent with the intent 
to bring him to justice.489 Stressing the ‘two cumulative requirements that may 
ground a finding of unwillingness under article 17(2)(c) of the Statute’ – and 
without indicating whether it considered the proceedings to have been 
conducted independently or impartially – PTC I held that Libya had ‘provided 
persuasive information’ demonstrating that the investigations into Al-Senussi 
were ‘not being conducted in a manner that is inconsistent with the intent to 
bring [him] to justice’.490 Accordingly, PTC I found that Libya was not unwilling 
to genuinely carry out the proceedings within the meaning of Article 17(1)(a) 
and (2).491  
As to Libya’s ability, PTC I found that, given that Al-Senussi was already in the 
custody of the Libyan authorities, Libya was not unable to obtain the accused.492 
Further, the Chamber found that some of the evidence and testimony necessary 
to carry out the proceedings against the suspect were already collected and that 
there was ‘no indication that collection of evidence and testimony has ceased or 
will cease because of unaddressed security concerns for witnesses’ or ‘due to 
the absence of governmental control over certain detention facilities’.493 As 
such, ‘while reiterating its concerns about the lack of appropriate witness 
protection programmes (…) in the context of the country’s precarious security 
situation’, it found that Libya was not unable to obtain the evidence and 
testimony that were necessary for the proceedings against Al-Senussi.494 
As to the possible residual form of inability on the part of Libya to ‘otherwise 
carry out proceedings’, the Chamber was of the view that ‘Libya’s capacity to 
carry out the proceedings against Mr Al-Senussi is not affected per se by the 
                                         
488 Ibid para. 290. 
489 Ibid para. 291. 
490 Ibid para. 292. It should be noted that the Chamber made this finding in spite of ‘the fact 
that Mr Al-Senussi’s right to benefit from legal assistance at the investigation stage is yet to be 
implemented’ holding that such a deficiency ‘does not justify a finding of unwillingness under 
article 17(2)(c) of the Statute, in the absence of any indication that this is inconsistent with 
Libya’s intent to bring Mr Al-Senussi to justice. Rather, from the evidence and submissions 
before the Chamber, it appears that Mr Al-Senussi’s right to legal representation has been 
primarily prejudiced so far by the security situation in the country’.  
491 Ibid para. 293. 
492 Ibid para. 294. 
493 Ibid para. 298. 
494 Ibid para. 301. 
  
138 
ongoing security concerns across the country’.495 Further, although noting that 
Al-Senussi ‘has not been provided with any form of legal representation for the 
purposes of the national proceedings against him up until now’,496 it found that 
the problem was not compelling at that time, although it had the ‘potential to 
become a fatal obstacle to the progress of the case’.497 However, since 
admissibility must be determined in light of the circumstances at the time of the 
admissibility proceedings and given Libya’s assurance of its ability moving 
forward to address security concerns and ensure adequate legal representation 
for Al-Senussi, the Chamber found that Libya was not unable to genuinely carry 
out the proceedings within the meaning of Article 17(3).498 Accordingly, PTC I 
found that Libya was not unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out its 
proceedings in relation to the case against Al-Senussi and found the case 
inadmissible before the Court pursuant to Article 17(1)(a).499  
The literal interpretation of Article 17(2)(c) followed by PTC I, although arguably 
based upon its plain reading,500 left aside the due process thesis advanced by 
commentators who argue that national proceedings should, at minimum, 
guarantee basic fair trial rights to suspects.501 PTC I followed Heller’s approach 
that a literal interpretation of Article 17 appears to support the view that the 
Court may find the State unwilling or unable only if its proceedings are designed 
to make the suspect more difficult to convict and not when they make it ‘easier’ 
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to convict, no matter how unfair the proceedings may be.502 Supporting this 
approach, others have added that the Court is a purely complementary 
institution concerned with putting an end to impunity rather than with fair trial 
violations and should not behave as a human rights court.503  
One could also argue however that the context and purpose of the Statute and 
the very reason for the creation of the Court leave room for a teleological 
interpretation of Article 17(2)(c), requiring a moderate form of due process 
applicable in cases of flagrant violation of fair trial rights.504 A strong case is 
presented by some who argue that, when domestic trials are flawed to the point 
that one cannot realistically say that there has been a trial at all, the idea of 
justice encompassed by Article 17(2)(c) has not actually been realised.505 A 
Kafkaesque political abuse of the judicial process for persecution rather than 
justice cannot be compatible with ‘an intent to bring the person concerned to 
justice’.  
PTC I could have applied a more constructive interpretation of what should be 
properly understood as ‘an intent to bring the person to justice’. The issue 
touches upon the very concept of ‘justice’ and ‘trial’ in the Statute – a 
substantive question that has not been directly addressed by the Court’s 
jurisprudence so far. The matter may be seen to be of critical importance. Might 
it be the case, for instance, that any trial – no matter how unfair – displays an 
‘intent to bring the person to justice’ within the context of the Statute? When 
the violations of the due process rights of defendants are of such magnitude that 
the trial has been, in fact, deprived of its essential character, can that properly 
be considered ‘justice’? When the trial proceedings are used to orchestrate what 
is, in fact, a show trial, or what merely represents vengeance or victor’s justice, 
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can that be considered compatible with the ‘intent to bring the person to 
justice’?  
It has been argued that the ‘intent to bring the person to justice’ can only be 
reconciled with that person’s submission to ‘a lawful judicial procedure with 
legal guarantees for determining the truth and arriving at a just decision’.506 
This interpretation is in line with a contextual and purposive interpretation of 
the Statute. Notably, paragraph 11 of the Preamble recalls that the Court was 
created ‘to guarantee lasting respect for and the enforcement of international 
justice’. Article 17(1)(a) and (b) add a requirement for national proceedings to 
be carried out ‘genuinely’.507 The principles and norms of due process 
‘recognised by international law’ are mentioned twice, in Articles 17(2) and 
20(3), as guidance for the interpretation of the complementarity regime. 
Further, Article 21(3) rules that the application and interpretation of the law 
‘must be consistent with internationally recognised human rights’. Of even 
greater significance is the fact that, within the crimes under the jurisdiction of 
the Court, the Statute includes as war crimes, in Article 8(2)(b)(xiv) and 
(c)(iv),508 certain conduct amounting to depriving suspects of their basic judicial 
guarantees. A coherent interpretation of the Statute cannot lead to the absurd 
conclusion that the very same conduct that would qualify as a crime under the 
jurisdiction of the Court – depriving suspects of their basic judicial guarantees – 
would nevertheless be insufficient to amount to an unwillingness of the State to 
investigate or prosecute for the purposes of an admissibility determination.  
Trials where suspects are deprived of the most basic due process rights 
recognised by international law – such as, among others, the right to legal 
representation, the right to be informed of the charges, the right to attend trial, 
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the right to defend oneself and to remain silent – are show trials and 
incompatible with an ‘intent to bring the person to justice’. In such cases, the 
PTC should be prepared to make politically difficult decisions and rise above the 
possible political bargaining in which the Prosecutor may have become involved 
in to secure cooperation. Although national action is, in principle, the preferred 
response to international crimes and States have the right to investigate and 
prosecute, such sovereign prerogative is not unrestricted. States can only retain 
jurisdiction to try the crimes under the Statute when they guarantee 
defendants, at a minimum, the most basic rights of due process recognised by 
international law. 
In July 2014, the AC confirmed PTC I’s decision holding that the concept of 
‘unwillingness’ is primarily concerned with a situation in which proceedings are 
conducted in a manner that would lead to a suspect evading justice.509 It 
confirmed the position that a State will be unwilling pursuant to Article 17(2)(c) 
only when there is a failure to conduct proceedings independently or impartially 
and such proceedings are inconsistent with an intent to bring the persons 
concerned to justice.510 The AC stressed that the Court ‘was not established to 
be an international court of human rights, sitting in judgment over domestic 
legal systems to ensure that they are compliant with international standards of 
human rights’.511  
However, the AC did address, to a certain extent, the abovementioned concerns 
by stating that, although admissibility is not an inquiry into the fairness of 
national proceedings, this does not mean per se that the Court must turn a blind 
eye to conclusive evidence that national proceedings completely lack fairness.512 
It stressed rather that, in the extreme, proceedings that are in reality ‘little 
more than a predetermined prelude to an execution’, which are contrary to the 
most basic understanding of justice, will not be sufficient to render a case 
inadmissible.513 Accordingly, the AC conceded that there may be circumstances:  
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whereby violations of the rights of the suspect are so egregious that the 
proceedings can no longer be regarded as being capable of providing any 
genuine form of justice to the suspect so that they should be deemed, in 
those circumstances, to be ‘inconsistent with an intent to bring that person 
to justice’.514  
However, the AC found that, in the Al-Senussi case, PTC I’s findings were not 
unreasonable and that Libya was not unwilling or unable to conduct the 
proceedings.515 
3.3 The Gravity Threshold 
3.3.1 General Remarks 
The third prong of the admissibility test is the gravity threshold. Pursuant to 
Article 17(1)(d), the Court may declare a case to be inadmissible when it is ‘not 
of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court’. The standard of 
gravity is not elaborated upon in the Statute, although it was clearly included by 
the drafters as an additional layer, filtering out the type of situations and cases 
that do not require the Court’s attention.516 All crimes falling under the 
jurisdiction of the Court are certainly sufficiently serious, but the provision was 
included in order to prevent the Court from being swamped by peripheral 
complaints.517 Pursuant to Articles 17(1) and 53(1) and (2), the assessment of 
gravity – as that of complementarity – is a mandatory requirement for the 
selection of situations and cases to be investigated and prosecuted by the Court.  
It should be noted, however, that the issue of gravity, while being initially 
virtually ignored by commentators,518 has, since being applied by the Prosecutor 
and PTC I, been the source of great debate. As will be discussed below, the 
Prosecutor and PTC have relied on the gravity test to justify both a focus on 
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senior leaders and qualitative and quantitative approaches to the prosecution of 
crimes. 
3.3.2 The Prosecutor’s Approach to Gravity 
Under Moreno Ocampo, the OTP’s understanding was that gravity ‘should not be 
exclusively attached to the act that constituted the crime but also to the degree 
of participation in its commission’.519 Consequently, the stated policy was that:  
as a general rule, the Office of the Prosecutor should focus its 
investigations and prosecutorial efforts and resources on those who bear 
the greatest responsibility, such as the leaders of the State or organisation 
allegedly responsible for those crimes.520  
Although recognising that this strategy ‘will leave an impunity gap unless 
national authorities, the international community and the Court work together 
to ensure that all appropriate means for bringing other perpetrators to justice 
are used’, no concrete action was proposed apart from stating that in some 
cases the focus ‘may go wider than high-ranking officers’ and that for other 
offenders ‘alternative means for resolving the situation may be necessary’.521 
The 2006 Report of Prosecutorial Strategy also mentioned the idea of ‘focused 
investigations’, reinforcing the understanding of gravity as the need to focus the 
OTP’s efforts ‘on the most serious crimes and on those who bear the greatest 
responsibility for these crimes’.522 Developing further the scenario of impunity 
that may result from such an approach to gravity, it stressed the need to 
encourage ‘national measures against other offenders’.523 It further explained 
that the OTP had adopted a ‘sequenced’ approach to the selection of cases 
within a situation, in accordance with which cases were selected on account of 
their gravity. It clarified that the factors relevant in assessing gravity are the 
scale, nature, manner of commission, and impact of the crimes.524 The OTP, 
moreover, explained that the policy of ‘focused investigations’ also entails the 
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selection of a limited number of incidents with a small number of witnesses 
called to testify, in order to carry out ‘short investigations and propose 
expeditious trials while aiming to represent the entire range of criminality’.525 
Incidents were to be selected which were ‘reflective of the gravest incidents 
and the main types of victimization’.526 The same approach was repeated in the 
Report published in 2010.527 
The approach to gravity adopted by the first Chief Prosecutor has been strongly 
criticised as being ‘invoked not so much as a justification for the selection of 
cases on which to proceed [but] as a justification for refusing to undertake other 
cases’.528 Indeed, the first Prosecutor originally used gravity to justify not 
opening an investigation into the crimes allegedly committed by British troops in 
Iraq.529 However, the strictly numerical argument used by him appears flawed 
when compared with other situations or cases that were undertaken by the OTP.  
The approach to gravity under Moreno Ocampo has also been criticised in the 
context of the lack of meaningful control by the PTC, particularly in relation to 
the refusal to investigate in Iraq and the lack of investigation beyond the child 
soldiers charge in the Lubanga case.530  
Under Fatou Bensouda, in a clear departure from the policy of her predecessor, 
the OTP completely transformed its approach to gravity. In its Strategic Plan 
published in 2013, it recognised the need for a change of approach in light of the 
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required evidentiary standards to prove the criminal responsibility of the ‘most 
responsible perpetrators’ and due to limitations in investigative possibilities 
and/or lack of cooperation.531 It further stated the OTP’s decision to abandon 
the notion of ‘focused investigations’, replacing it with the ‘principle of in-
depth, open ended investigations’.532 In its new approach, the OTP 
acknowledges that a different strategy ‘of gradually building upwards’ might be 
needed, in the sense of ‘first investigate and prosecute a limited number of mid- 
and high-level perpetrators in order to ultimately have a reasonable chance to 
convict the most responsible’.533 In addition, the new policy also includes 
‘prosecuting lower level perpetrators where their conduct has been particularly 
grave and has acquired extensive notoriety’.534 
Apparently addressing some of the abovementioned criticism, in the Policy Paper 
issued in November 2013, the OTP explained its approach to gravity in its 
preliminary examinations.535 It stated that impartiality in the selection of cases, 
which depends crucially on the gravity assessment, ‘does not mean an 
“equivalence of blame” between different persons and groups within a situation 
or that the Office must necessarily prosecute all sides’.536 It further argued that 
the OTP would focus its efforts ‘objectively on those most responsible for the 
most serious crimes within a situation (…) irrespective of the States or parties 
involved’.537 
3.4.2 Gravity in the Court’s jurisprudence 
When deciding on the initial request for a warrant of arrest against Bosco 
Ntaganda in February 2006, PTC I noted that the gravity threshold was an 
additional requirement to ‘the drafters’ careful selection of the crimes included 
in articles 6 to 8 of the Statute’.538 Therefore, it held that ‘the fact that a case 
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addresses one of the most serious crimes for the international community as a 
whole is not sufficient for it to be admissible before the Court’.539 Dwelling at 
length on literal, contextual and teleological interpretations of the Statute and 
resorting to the applicable rules of international law, PTC I held that a case 
would meet the gravity threshold only if: (i) the alleged conduct was either 
systematic or large-scale, giving due consideration to the social alarm that such 
conduct may have caused in the international community; and (ii) the person 
sought to be prosecuted would fall under the category of the ‘most senior 
leaders’ in the situation under investigation. The latter criterion was to be 
assessed on the basis of: (a) the organisational position of the person; (b) the 
role played by that person through acts or omissions when the organisation 
committed the crimes; and (c) the role played by the organisation in the overall 
commission of crimes within the situation under investigation.540  
PTC I held that the additional gravity threshold was a ‘key tool provided by the 
drafters to maximise the Court’s deterrent effect’,541 something which could be 
achieved, in the view of the Chamber, by concentrating the Court’s activities on 
the most senior leaders.542 Considering that Ntaganda occupied (only) the third 
level of the command structure of the military wing of a broader UPC/FPLC 
movement, the Chamber found that he did not fall within the category of the 
most senior leaders in the DRC situation and, therefore, that the case against 
him did not meet the gravity threshold provided for in Article 17(1)(d) of the 
Statute and was inadmissible.543 According to the PTC’s decision, the gravity 
assessment was a twofold exercise that required positive compliance with two 
requirements: the gravity of the conduct, or, as it will be called below, 
‘material gravity’, and the high rank of the individuals involved, or ‘personal 
gravity’. 
As noted in Section 3.2.3.2, in July 2006 the AC reversed PTC I’s decision on the 
grounds that the determination of the admissibility of a case was not a 
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prerequisite for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.544 Although, as a general 
rule, the practice of the AC is not to provide guidance on issues other than those 
strictly necessary for the disposition of an appeal, the AC found it necessary to 
address the matter of the interpretation of Article 17(1)(d), as it ‘could have an 
impact on the Court as a whole’.545 In the view of the AC, PTC I ‘erred in law in 
its interpretation of “sufficient gravity” under article 17(1)(d) of the Statute’.546 
In particular, the AC found that, in requiring that the conduct should be either 
systematic or large-scale, PTC I introduced an additional criteria that would 
effectively blur the distinction between war crimes and crimes against humanity 
established in Articles 7 and 8 of the Statute.547 Indeed, the requirement under 
the Statute that war crimes be committed on a ‘large scale’ is an alternative to 
the requirement that they be committed as ‘part of a policy’, while the 
requirement of ‘systematic’ is only relevant for crimes against humanity.548 
Further, the AC found that the subjective criterion of social alarm ‘is not a 
consideration that is necessarily appropriate for the determination of 
admissibility pursuant to Article 17(1)(d) of the Statute’.549 
As to PTC I’s call for a focus on senior leaders as a means of maximising the 
Court’s deterrent effect, the AC argued that it was difficult to understand how 
the deterrent effect would be higher if not all perpetrators could be brought 
before the Court. Indeed, it argued that it would be ‘more logical to assume 
that the deterrent effect of the Court is highest if no category of perpetrators is 
per se excluded from potentially being brought before the Court’.550 The AC 
further stressed that ‘the imposition of rigid standards primarily based on top 
seniority may result in neither retribution nor prevention being achieved’.551 In 
effect, ‘the predictable exclusion of many perpetrators (…) could severely 
hamper the preventive, or deterrent, role of the Court which is a cornerstone of 
the creation of the (…) Court’.552 Further, in the AC’s view the teleological 
interpretation of Article 17(1)(d) proposed by PTC I conflicts with a contextual 
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interpretation of the Statute, since various provisions do apply to persons other 
than the most senior leaders and the drafters did not include such a 
limitation.553 As such, the AC found the test devised by PTC I to be flawed and 
reversed the decision.554 Consequently, the AC eliminated from the gravity 
equation the individual requirement of personal gravity imposed by PTC I. 
Gravity in the AC’s tests only relates to the conduct – it is a single test focused 
only on material gravity. Indeed, the personal gravity criterion could only subsist 
as a prosecutorial policy choice,555 allowing prosecutorial discretion and 
management of the (likely) unlimited number of cases and situations that may 
qualify as crimes under the Statute. A contextual reading of the Statute supports 
the AC’s conclusion that personal gravity cannot be constructed as a legal 
requirement banning the Court from dealing with cases involving individuals who 
are not necessarily at the top of the line of command.556 While it is the 
argument of this thesis that the PTC has a supervisory role in relation to the 
Prosecutor’s discretion, this should be exercised in a balanced manner,557 
ensuring the independence and impartiality of the Court without hampering the 
Prosecutor’s exercise of his functions in the selection of situations and cases.        
In February 2010, in deciding on the confirmation of charges in the case against 
Bahar Abu Garda, PTC I – although with a slightly different composition than it 
had in Ntaganda – analysed anew the issue of gravity. This time however it 
focused only on the conduct charged, the material gravity, and held that 
‘several factors may be taken into account in the assessment of the gravity of a 
case’, such as the ‘nature, manner and impact’ of the alleged crime.558 Further, 
the Chamber held that the gravity of a given case should not be assessed solely 
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from a quantitative perspective, ie in relation to the number of victims, but that 
the ‘qualitative dimension of the crime’ should be a consideration.559 In 
addition, the Chamber found that other factors, such as those relevant for 
sentencing listed in Rule 145(1)(c), ie the extent of the damage caused, the 
harm caused to victims and their families, the nature of the unlawful behaviour 
and the means employed to execute the crime, could also serve as useful 
guidelines for the evaluation to the gravity threshold in Article 17(1)(d).560 
In March 2010, when deciding on the request to open an investigation into the 
situation in Kenya, PTC II did not focus only on the gravity of the conduct or 
material gravity. Instead it brought back into the gravity test a consideration 
related to the individuals involved in the commission of such crimes or personal 
gravity. However, rather than invoking the ‘most senior leaders’, PTC II changed 
slightly the language and referred to the ‘most responsible perpetrators’, 
although it is not clear whether it actually distinguished the notions. The 
Chamber stated that when determining gravity within the context of a situation, 
it was necessary to examine:  
(i) whether the persons or group of persons that are likely to be the object 
of an investigation include those who may bear the greatest responsibility 
for the alleged crimes committed; and (ii) the gravity of the crimes 
allegedly committed within the incidents, which are likely to be the object 
of an investigation.561 
As such, PTC II found it necessary to make a generic assessment as to ‘whether 
such groups of persons that are likely to form the object of investigation capture 
those who may bear the greatest responsibility for the alleged crimes 
committed’.562 After analysing the supporting material submitted by the 
Prosecutor, the Chamber found that it referred to the role of persons in ‘high-
ranking positions’, and held the requirement to be satisfied.563 As such, it 
appears that if the individuals had not held high-ranking positions, the Chamber 
might have decided that the potential cases were not of sufficient gravity and 
may not have authorised the commencement of the investigation. PTC II may be 
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seen then to have reinstated a twofold test requiring both material gravity and 
personal gravity. 
The approach followed by PTC II appears to disregard the clear position of the 
AC in the Ntaganda case that ‘the imposition of rigid standards primarily based 
on top seniority may result in neither retribution nor prevention being 
achieved’.564 Arguably, it should be possible to distinguish between the ‘most 
responsible perpetrators’ and the ‘most senior leaders’. A person may indeed 
exercise a key position in the commission of a crime, and be among its most 
responsible perpetrators, without necessarily being one of the most senior 
leaders of an organisation. Regrettably however, PTC II did not explain the 
rationale behind its position of reintroducing to the test the idea of personal 
gravity. As such, the move appears to be something of a backwards step insofar 
as it insists on including in the gravity test elements not provided by the Court’s 
legal framework.   
As to the gravity of the crimes, PTC II found it necessary to assess them ‘in the 
context of their modus operandi’.565 It held that gravity could be examined 
following a qualitative as well as a quantitative approach involving, in addition 
to the consideration of the number of victims, an inquiry as to the ‘existence of 
some aggravating or qualitative factors attached to the commission of 
crimes’.566 Following the approach of PTC I in the Abu Garda case, PTC II stated 
that factors related to sentencing could provide useful guidance on the issue of 
gravity.567  
When authorising the opening of an investigation into the situation in Côte 
d’Ivoire in October 2011, PTC III followed PTC II’s twofold approach, finding that 
the potential cases likely to be the object of the investigation must be of 
sufficient material gravity and personal gravity.568 As to the personal gravity 
requirement, PTC III was satisfied of its fulfilment in light of the Prosecutor’s 
submission as to the individuals likely to be the focus of the investigations, who 
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included ‘high-ranking political and military figures’.569 Once again, it appears 
that the investigation would not have been authorised if it had failed to include 
as potential targets high-ranking figures, which – in practice – returns to the test 
the personal gravity requirement and the concept of the ‘most senior leaders’ 
rejected by the AC. 
In January 2012, PTC II decided on the admissibility challenge submitted by 
Mohammed Ali based on Article 17(1)(d). Ali supported his challenge with 
reference to the decision of PTC I in the Ntaganda case, arguing that the case 
against him was not of sufficient gravity, as he was neither one of the most 
senior leaders nor one of the most responsible perpetrators of the crimes under 
investigation in Kenya.570 Possibly trying to amend its prior lapse when 
authorising the opening of the investigation in Kenya, PTC II stressed that the 
PTC I test in Ntaganda was, ‘explicitly found to be “flawed” by the Appeals 
Chamber’.571 Returning the test to a one stage analysis of material gravity only, 
leaving aside any reference to the need for personal gravity, PTC II held that, in 
determining the gravity of the case, factors such as the scale, nature and 
manner of commission of the alleged crimes, their impact on victims, and the 
existence of any aggravating circumstances, together with others listed in Rule 
145(1)(c) were of particular relevance.572 Consequently, it found that in the Ali 
case ‘the alleged crimes meet the gravity threshold of article 17(1)(d) of the 
Statute’.573 
3.4 Interests of Justice 
3.4.1 General Remarks 
The concept of the ‘interests of justice’, although not an issue of admissibility, 
is also a consideration that may relieve the Court from exercising jurisdiction in 
relation to a concrete situation of crisis or case. Pursuant to Article 53(1)(c) and 
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53(2)(c), the Prosecutor can decline to proceed with an investigation or 
prosecution of a situation or case otherwise falling under the jurisdiction of the 
Court and which is admissible if it would not serve the ‘interests of justice’.574 
To reach such a decision all the circumstances should be taken into account, 
including the gravity of the crime, the interests of the victims and the situation 
of the accused.  
As discussed in Section 2.3.3, in accordance with Article 53 and Rules 104 to 
110, the Prosecutor may decide that an investigation or prosecution is not 
warranted in the interests of justice. The PTC may decide on its own initiative 
to review such a decision, which will then only be effective if confirmed by the 
PTC. Otherwise, the Prosecutor shall proceed with the investigation or 
prosecution.  
This particularly ‘political’ power given to the Prosecutor, but ultimately to be 
wielded by the PTC, allows the Court to make determinations as to the 
possibility that it may not be in the interests of justice to investigate or 
prosecute. This has been the source of great interest and speculation from 
commentators. Although, based on the language of the Preamble, it appears 
that the Statute creates a presumption in favour of criminal prosecutions,575 
some have argued that the language of Article 53 gives some leeway to consider, 
under certain circumstances, alternative mechanisms to criminal justice.576  
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Rodman argues that not every exercise of political discretion constitutes 
‘politicization, amoral realpolitik’.577 Robinson adds that the notion of the 
interests of justice should be given a broad interpretation – one that is not 
confined to the interests of retributive or criminal justice.578 In certain 
circumstances, factoring in power realities is indispensable to the determination 
of the kind of justice and accountability mechanisms that are possible and 
necessary to end violent conflicts.579 At the other end of the spectrum, Human 
Rights Watch (HRW), for example, has argued that the Prosecutor’s duties should 
be interpreted in light of the object and purpose of the Statute, requiring a 
narrow construction of the ‘interests of justice’ test.580 Specifically, HRW insists 
that the Prosecutor should not fail to pursue an investigation or prosecution 
‘because of national efforts, such as truth commissions, national amnesties, or 
traditional reconciliation methods, or because of concerns regarding an ongoing 
peace process’.581 After all, it argues, issues related to international peace and 
security fall within the domain of the UNSC pursuant to Article 16, and not that 
of the Prosecutor.582 
3.4.2 The Prosecutor’s approach 
Once again, the Statute provides no definition or clarification as to the meaning 
of the terms ‘interests of justice’. Further, as previously mentioned, the 
Prosecutor has not so far made public any decision not to investigate or 
prosecute based on these provisions.  
The Prosecutor did, however, advance a policy on the issue in September 2007, 
giving at least some limited clarification as to the OTP’s approach, although 
stressing that the policy ‘deliberately does not enter into detailed discussions 
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about all of the possible factors that may arise in any given situation’.583 The 
OTP’s approach is based on three essential pillars. First, the exercise of 
discretion under Article 53(1)(c) and (2)(c) is exceptional in nature, as there is a 
presumption in favour of investigations and prosecutions whenever the criteria 
of jurisdiction and admissibility have been met. Second, the criteria to be 
adopted will be guided by the object and purpose of the Statute, ‘namely the 
prevention of serious crimes of concern to the international community through 
ending impunity’. Lastly, the OTP argues that there is a difference between the 
‘interests of justice’ and the ‘interests of peace’, and the latter ‘falls within the 
mandate of institutions other than the Office of the Prosecutor’,584 which 
appears to be a direct reference to the UNSC. 
The policy paper further specifies that the notion of the ‘interests of justice’ 
needs only to be considered when positive determinations have been made on 
both jurisdiction and admissibility.585 However, it argues, while jurisdiction and 
admissibility are positive requirements, the interests of justice are not. 
Accordingly, the interests of justice is only a ‘potential countervailing 
consideration that might produce a reason not to proceed’, such that the 
Prosecutor does not need to conclude positively that an investigation or 
prosecution ‘is’ in the interests of justice.586  
The policy paper also gives some guidelines as to the interpretation of the 
additional factors to be considered in accordance with the provisions. In relation 
to gravity, the OTP reiterates its approach that the scale, nature, manner of 
commission, and impact of the crimes are determinative.587 In relation to the 
interests of victims, it stresses that it will listen to the views of all parties 
concerned including ‘victims, their communities and the broader societies in 
which it may be required to act’.588 It further emphasises that, apart from the 
interests of victims in seeing justice done, there are other essential interests, 
such as their protection.589 As to the circumstances of the accused, it stresses its 
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policy of focusing on those bearing the greatest degree of responsibility, noting 
however that in certain circumstances justice may not be served by the 
prosecution of, for example, terminally ill defendants or suspects who have been 
subjected to serious human rights violations.590 
Highlighting the exceptional nature of the provisions on the interests of justice, 
the paper appears to draw a clear distinction between the ‘interests of justice’ 
and what it calls ‘the interests of peace’. It underlines that, with the entry into 
force of the Statute, ‘a new legal framework has emerged (…) [which] 
necessarily impacts on conflict management efforts’.591 Going even further, and 
arguably in response to the debate about the impact of the arrest warrants in 
the peace process of the Uganda situation,592 it stresses that:  
it is no longer about whether we agree or disagree with the pursuit of 
justice in moral or practical terms: it is the law. Any political or security 
initiative must be compatible with the new legal framework insofar as it 
involves parties bound by the Rome Statute.593  
However, in an approach that appears to contradict its emphasis on the pursuit 
of justice now being ‘the law’ – which appears to refer to criminal justice – the 
paper later endorses other complementary justice mechanisms, reiterating ‘the 
need to integrate different approaches’.594 Notably, it argues for the need for a 
comprehensive strategy to combat impunity, stressing that criminal justice 
provides only one part of the necessary response which, in itself, may prove to 
be insufficient.595 It further ‘endorses the complementary role that can be 
played by domestic prosecutions, truth seeking, reparations programs, 
institutional reform and traditional justice mechanisms in the pursuit of a 
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broader justice.’596 Finally, it stresses the valuable role of such measures ‘in 
dealing with large numbers of offenders and in addressing the impunity gap.’597  
The paper insists, however, that the interests of justice ‘should not be 
conceived of so broadly as to embrace all issues related to peace and justice’ 
and reiterates that comprehensive solutions addressing humanitarian, security, 
political, development and justice elements will be necessary.598 In an ostensible 
attempt to offload the responsibility for making difficult decisions as to whether 
and when those comprehensive solutions would be warranted, it reiterates that 
the Statute recognises a role for the UNSC in Article 16, as necessary for the 
maintenance of international peace and security.599 It stresses that the broader 
matter of international peace and security is not the responsibility of the 
Prosecutor, as ‘it falls within the mandate of other institutions’.600  
In the 2013 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, the OTP reiterates that 
matters affecting peace and security remain within the remit of the UNSC.601 
Accordingly, it states that the interests of justice provision ‘should not be 
considered a conflict management tool requiring the Prosecutor to assume the 
role of a mediator in political negotiations’.602 Further, advancing a novel 
argument, it stresses that feasibility is not a separate factor when determining 
whether to open an investigation, as it might prejudice the consistent 
application of the Statute and could encourage obstructionism to dissuade the 
Court from intervention.603 Lastly, it insists on a strong presumption in favour of 
investigations and prosecutions and reiterates that decisions not to proceed in 
the interests of justice will be highly exceptional.604 
Arguably in order to avoid being scrutinised, the Prosecutor has not so far 
explicitly taken any decision not to investigate or prosecute under this provision. 
Similarly, the PTC has followed a literal interpretation of the provisions and has 
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declined to exercise their inherent powers to review the Prosecutor’s actions. 
The PTC could have, for example and in accordance with Regulation 48(1), 
triggered an explicit decision from the Prosecutor by means of a request for 
specific information necessary for the PTC to exercise its functions and 
responsibilities set forth in Article 53(3)(b). The lack of explicit decisions by the 
Prosecutor is even more patent in cases when it seems quite obvious that tacit 
decisions have been taken, eg not to request authorisation to initiate a proprio 
motu investigation into the situation in Colombia, not to present new charges 
against Lubanga, not to prosecute Bemba within the context of the DRC situation 
and not to prosecute those other than the LRA commanders within the context 
of the Uganda situation. In order to ensure certainty, equal access to justice for 
victims and to avoid the perception that the Court is partisan, the PTC should 
more actively monitor progress during the Prosecutor’s preliminary examinations 
and investigations and, when warranted, ensure that their powers to review the 
Prosecutor’s decisions are not obstructed by the Prosecutor himself.  
3.5 Conclusions   
This Chapter has explored the essential role of the PTC in determining the scope 
of the concepts at the core of the Court’s ‘political’ action: those of 
complementarity, gravity and the interests of justice. The Statute gives the 
Prosecutor discretion to establish his own prosecutorial policy and to interpret 
and apply the concepts in the manner he considers appropriate. However, in 
providing for the necessary checks and balances to the Prosecutor’s discretion, 
the drafters created the PTC as the body responsible for scrutinising the 
Prosecutor’s actions and safeguarding the Court’s independence and 
impartiality. 
Although recognising that the ICC’s Prosecutors have both been, and certainly 
will also be in the future, individuals of outstanding capacity and with high 
moral values, one should not underestimate their limitations. There is a clear 
risk that the Prosecutor, being tasked with investigating and prosecuting cases in 
a highly political environment and undertaking the additional function of 
promoting national proceedings, yet being without a police force or enforcement 
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powers of any kind (not even to subpoena witnesses) and therefore rendered 
absolutely dependent on international cooperation and resources, may prove 
altogether too susceptible to political pressures.  
As has been amply demonstrated during the Court’s first decade, the Prosecutor 
cannot be left alone to guard the Court’s gates. The OTP has appeared in some 
situations powerless when trying to avoid political pressures and manipulation 
from States. The risk of the Court becoming politicised and being used as an 
instrument for victor’s justice is too high. The adoption of a proactive and firm 
role by the PTC in avoiding those types of pressures, by scrutinising whether the 
Prosecutor’s actions are a legitimate exercise of his discretion, will not only 
encourage a more transparent decision-making process within the OTP, but will 
also lead to genuine investigations and prosecutions at the national level.  
In line with its role, the PTC, as well as the AC, should be more prepared to 
make politically difficult decisions. Indeed, while operating within the legal 
framework of the Statute, the PTC should be responsive to the specific demands 
of the different scenarios it faces. Particularly when determining the scope of 
the highly sensitive issues of complementarity, gravity and the interests of 
justice, judges should exercise their supervisory role by carefully balancing the 
need to apply uniform criteria – applying impartially the same general rule to all 
those who are alike, without prejudice and without bowing to special interests 
or caprice and thereby ensuring legal certainty – against the need to identify 
when different cases should be treated differently. When a situation or case 
warrants a different interpretation, the PTC should resort to the flexibility 
purposely included by the drafters of the Statute and be ready to depart from 
previously devised tests or interpretations, while ensuring that the context, 
objects and purposes of the Statute are respected. 
  
  
159 
Chapter 4. The role of the PTC at the pre-investigative stage of 
the proceedings: activating the Court’s jurisdiction. 
4.1 Introduction 
Pursuant to Article 13, the Court may exercise its jurisdiction in relation to State 
Parties only if activated by (i) a referral from the UNSC; (ii) a referral from a 
State Party or (iii) proprio motu by the Prosecutor. In the case of non-party 
States, it will be necessary for the Court to be empowered either by a referral 
from the UNSC or by the relevant State’s acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction 
pursuant to Article 12(3), followed by any of the Article 13 triggering 
mechanisms.   
Article 19(1) provides that the Court shall satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in 
any case brought before it. This provision has been consistently interpreted in 
the Court’s jurisprudence as recognising the ‘power and duty, commonly 
referred to as ‘Kompetenz-Kompetenz’ or ‘la compétence de la compétence’.’605 
The different PTCs have stressed that it is a ‘fundamental principle that any 
judicial body, including any international tribunal, retains the power and the 
duty to determine the boundaries of its own jurisdiction and competence’,606 
which is a ‘part, and indeed a major part, of the incidental or inherent 
jurisdiction of any judicial or arbitral tribunal, consisting of its jurisdiction to 
determine its own jurisdiction’.607 Accordingly, only the Court has the power to 
determine whether a situation or case falls within its jurisdiction, whether the 
Court should in fact exercise jurisdiction and to frame the scope of its own 
jurisdiction.608  
This Chapter will analyse the PTC’s gatekeeping function at the pre-investigative 
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stage of the proceedings as regards the triggering the Court’s involvement. 
Particular attention will be paid to the interpretation of this role as elaborated 
in the Court’s case law during the first decade of its existence, with a focus on 
where further development or reform is needed in order to enable the PTC to 
safeguard the independence and legitimacy of the Court. Each triggering 
mechanism will be discussed in separate sections: Section 4.2 will focus on the 
UNSC’s referrals, Section 4.3 on State Parties’ referrals and Section 4.4 on 
proprio motu investigations. Section 4.5 provides conclusions as to the strength 
and use of the current mechanisms at the disposal of the PTC to comply with its 
gatekeeping role at the stage of the triggering the Court’s jurisdiction. 
4.2 Security Council Referrals  
4.2.1 Drafting History 
Since the beginning of the work towards a draft Statute, concerns had been 
expressed about the need to reconcile the role of the Court – as a legal entity in 
charge of investigating and prosecuting international crimes – with the Council’s 
fulfilment of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international 
peace and security in accordance with Article 24 of the UN Charter. At the same 
time, there was concern about the risk of reducing the credibility and moral 
authority of the Court if the UNSC – a purely political body – was to be allowed 
unlimited interference with the Court’s work.  
The ILC 1994 draft Statute envisaged the UNSC, acting under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter, referring ‘matters’ to the Court.609 However, concerns were raised 
as regards the substantial inequality that the UNSC’s power to activate the 
Court’s jurisdiction would create between members of the Council, particularly 
its permanent members, and other States. In particular, due to the fact that the 
permanent members could veto any referral not beneficial to their interests610 
such an inequality, it was argued, was ‘not likely to encourage the widest 
possible adherence of States to the Statute’.611 In addition, it was proposed that 
                                         
609 UN Doc A/49/10 (1994) Article 23(1). 
610 (n 244 ) Yee 147. 
611 UN Doc A/49/10 (1994) 88. 
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unless the Council so authorised, no prosecution could be initiated in relation to 
a case arising out of a situation ‘which is being dealt with by the Security 
Council as a threat to or breach of the peace or an act of aggression under 
Chapter VII of the Charter’.612 This limitation was considered by several ILC 
members as undesirable since the Court ‘should not be prevented from 
operating through political decisions taken by other forums’.613  
At the Ad Hoc Committee in 1995, several options were still under discussion, 
some of which involved granting the Council the ability to refer situations to the 
Court, therefore ‘obviat[ing] the need for the creation of additional ad hoc 
tribunals’.614 Others fiercely opposed such a role warning that it would: 
reduce the credibility and moral authority of the court; excessively limit its 
role; undermine its independence, impartiality and autonomy; introduce an 
inappropriate political influence over the functioning of the institution; 
confer additional powers on the Security Council that were not provided for 
in the Charter; and enable the permanent members of the Security Council 
to exercise a veto with respect to the work of the court.615  
The draft article that was eventually proposed by the Preparatory Committee to 
the Rome Conference was the result of a series of compromises between the 
different delegations and contained numerous options.616 The solution that was 
eventually adopted in Rome, after long debate,617 was to confer upon the 
Council two main roles: (i) to refer situations for the Court’s investigation, 
without the imposition of territorial or personal limitations but subject to the 
control of legality by the Court, as provided in Articles 13(b) and 53; and (ii) to 
defer investigations or prosecutions – or prevent them from being initiated – for 
a renewable period of up to 12 months, as provided in Article 16.  
The manner in which the triggering of the Court’s jurisdiction by the UNSC has 
operated in practice, and the way in which the different PTCs have exercised 
their gate keeping function, is discussed below. 
                                         
612 Ibid 85, Article 23(3). 
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614 UN Doc A/50/22 (1995) paras 121-122.  
615 Ibid para. 121.  
616 UN Doc A/CONF.183/2/Add.1 (1998) Article 10. 
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4.2.2 The Proceedings for the Activation of the Court’s Jurisdiction by a UNSC 
Referral  
According to Article 13(b), the UNSC acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter 
may trigger the jurisdiction of the Court by referring to the Prosecutor a 
situation in which one or more of the crimes under the Court’s jurisdiction 
appear to have been committed. As previously stressed, the territorial and 
personal parameters of the Court’s jurisdiction are not applicable to referrals by 
the Council. In such situations, the Court is empowered to exercise universal 
jurisdiction over the core crimes, as long as they are committed after the entry 
into force of the Statute.  
In order for the jurisdiction of the Court to be activated through this 
mechanism, it will be necessary for the Council to first reach an agreement to 
act under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Consequently, pursuant to Article 39 of 
the Charter, the situation in relation to which the Council may decide to 
intervene must amount to a ‘threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of 
aggression’ and the referral will act as a measure ‘to maintain or restore 
international peace and security’. In accordance with Article 24 of the Charter, 
the Council has been invested with the primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security.  
Article 53 and Rules 104 to 110 specify the proceedings that follow a UNSC 
referral. These provisions contain some legal safeguards aimed at preventing 
UNSC referrals from undermining the Court’s independence, impartiality and 
autonomy, as feared by the drafters of the Statute. The Council’s referrals will 
always be subject to the Prosecutor’s assessment of compliance with the 
statutory requirements for the activation of the Court’s jurisdiction. It should be 
noted that the Prosecutor is not allowed to assess the Council’s determination as 
to whether the situation indeed constitutes a threat to international peace and 
security, which is the exclusive domain of the UNSC. However, after analysing 
compliance with the requirements of Article 53(1), the Prosecutor will decide 
independently, before starting any investigation, whether or not there is a 
‘reasonable basis to proceed’ under the Statute. Where the Prosecutor is 
satisfied that there is a reasonable basis to proceed, he shall open an 
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investigation. However, as discussed in Chapter 2, this particular discretionary 
power given to the Prosecutor has the potential to undermine the credibility and 
legitimacy of the Court if not subject to appropriate checks and balances. In 
order to prevent the possibility that the Prosecutor could be unduly influenced 
by the Council’s political agenda, this thesis argues that an additional safeguard 
should be included. It is herein argued that the PTC should be given the power 
to review the Prosecutor’s positive assessment of the existence of a ‘reasonable 
basis to proceed’ with an investigation following a referral.  
As discussed in Section 2.4.1, if the Prosecutor’s assessment were to lead him to 
conclude that there is no reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation, the 
matter could be reviewed by a PTC, proprio motu or at the request of the 
Council in accordance with Article 53(3). So far, the Prosecutor has acceded to 
the UNSC and opened investigations in relation to the two situations referred by 
it. Therefore, there has been no opportunity for the PTC to intervene at this 
stage pursuant to Article 53.  
A close examination of the two situations referred by the UNSC to the Court so 
far provides a basis to affirm that the safeguards established by the Statute and 
the Rules are still insufficient to fully preserve the independence and 
impartiality of the Court. As described below, the PTC has a fundamental role to 
play in reinforcing the legitimacy of the Court as a whole, particularly in the 
context of UNSC referrals.  
4.2.3 The Practice of Security Council Referrals 
On 31 March 2005, taking into account the Report of the UN Commission of 
Inquiry that found that the Government of Sudan and an associated militia were 
committing crimes under international law against certain African tribes in 
Darfur,618 the UNSC passed Resolution 1593 (2005).619 The Resolution referred to 
                                         
618 UNSC, UN Doc S/2005/60, Report of the International Commission of inquiry on Darfur to the 
United Nations Secretary-General, pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 
September 2004, 1 February 2005 (2005). 
619 UNSC, UN Doc S/RES/1593, Adopted by the Security Council at its 5158th meeting, 31 March 
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the ICC’s Prosecutor the ‘situation in Darfur since 1 July 2002’620 and decided 
that ‘the Government of Sudan and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur, 
shall cooperate fully with the Court’.621 However, it explicitly recognised that 
‘States not party to the Rome Statute have no obligation under the Statute’.622 
Nevertheless, it urged ‘all States and concerned regional and other international 
organizations to cooperate fully’ with the Court and the Prosecutor.623 Soon 
after the referral, on 6 June 2005, the Prosecutor decided to open an 
investigation ‘into the situation in Darfur, Sudan’.624  
On 26 February 2011, in the midst of the ‘Arab Spring’, and following reports 
from the media, as well as from the AU,625 the UN,626 the Arab League and 
various NGOs,627 about serious violations of human rights and international 
humanitarian law – which included allegations of hundreds of civilian protestors 
being killed and persecuted by the government in Tripoli, Benghazi and other 
cities in Libya – the Security Council passed Resolution 1970 (2011).628 The 
Resolution referred to the Prosecutor the ‘situation in the Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya since 15 February 2011’.629 In exactly the same terms as the Sudan 
referral, it decided that the Libyan authorities must cooperate fully with and 
provide the necessary assistance to the Court and urged all States and concerned 
regional and other international organizations to also fully cooperate, all the 
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while recognising that non-Party States had no obligations under the Statute.630 
Soon after the referral, on 3 March 2011, the Prosecutor announced the opening 
of an investigation.631  
The experience of the Darfur and Libya situations demonstrate that the 
safeguards included in the Statute may not be sufficient to minimise the risk of 
UNSC referrals jeopardising the independence and impartiality of the Court. 
With the two referrals the Council has imposed personal and temporal 
limitations on the Court’s jurisdiction, in clear violation of the Statute, thereby 
undermining the Court’s autonomy. When faced with this situation, however, 
the Prosecutor did not object to the referrals and tacitly accepted the 
limitations, which raises doubts as to the OTP’s capacity to protect itself from 
the Council’s potential interference.  
As to the personal limitations, although ostensibly complying with the Article 
13(b) requirement of referring a complete situation of crisis,632 the Council 
included in both referrals an exemption from the Court’s jurisdiction for 
nationals from States not party to the Statute contributing to operations 
established or authorised by the Council or the AU.633 With this limitation, the 
Council contravened the Statute by not referring a complete situation of crisis 
but effectively only isolated acts, since it excluded from the Court’s jurisdiction 
such crimes as may have been committed by nationals of certain States. The 
Council further subjected ‘all alleged acts or omissions arising out of or related 
to operations’ committed by nationals of non-Party States to ‘the exclusive 
jurisdiction of that contributing State’.634 In that way, the Council disregarded 
the essential complementary nature of the Court and attempted to prevent it 
from complying with its key goal of fighting against impunity. If the limitation 
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634 Res 1593 (2005) para. 6 [emphasis added]; Res 1970 (2011) para. 6 [emphasis added]. 
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were to be applied as mandated by the Council, the Court and other States 
would be prevented from prosecuting individuals who may have perpetrated 
crimes within the context of the Sudan or Libya situations, who are nationals of 
non-Party States who fail to prosecute. The fight against impunity would then be 
frustrated.  
The attempt to reserve for contributing States exclusive jurisdiction over crimes 
committed by their nationals does not only contravene the Statute but also may 
be seen as contrary to the Geneva Conventions, which oblige State Parties to 
‘bring such persons [alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be 
committed grave branches to the Conventions], regardless of their nationality, 
before [their] own courts’.635 Arguably, it also contravenes Article 5 of the 
Convention Against Torture, which similarly obligates its State Parties to take 
measures to establish their jurisdiction over the offences covered by the 
Convention, even when perpetrators are not their nationals.636 According to the 
terms of the referrals, third States will also be prevented from exercising 
jurisdiction over non-nationals under their jurisdiction who are nationals of a 
contributing State non-party to the Statute.637  
In spite of the doubtful legality of the personal limitation imposed, the 
Prosecutor did not object to the referrals. As regards the Sudan situation, the 
acceptance of the referral appears to have been grounded on (i) the report of 
the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, which provided substantial 
evidence that crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court had been committed 
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with impunity,638 and (ii) the fact of it being extremely unlikely that a new UNSC 
Resolution without limitations could ever be agreed upon.639 When the situation 
in Libya was referred in February 2011 with the same restrictive paragraph, the 
urgency of the situation, likely coupled with the desire to avoid an appearance 
of inconsistency following acceptance of the qualification in the Sudan case, was 
sufficient to allow the limitation to pass without challenge.  
Since, as previously discussed, the Statute does not provide for a review by the 
PTC of the Prosecutor’s decision to open an investigation following a referral, 
the PTC did not have an opportunity to express its views at the time the 
investigation was opened. Nonetheless, the PTC could have declared the referral 
to be illegal at the time it was requested to issue a warrant or summons.640 
Indeed, pursuant to its powers under Article 19(1) to satisfy itself that it has 
jurisdiction in any case brought before it, the relevant PTC could have ruled that 
the triggering procedure was in breach of the Statute and, therefore, that the 
Court’s jurisdiction had not been properly activated. PTC I chose not to do so. 
However, one remark from PTC I in the Al-Bashir case appeared to represent a 
response to the Council’s limitation on the scope of the referral. When deciding 
on the request for a warrant of arrest, PTC I stressed that, by referring a 
situation to the Court pursuant to Article 13(b) of the Statute, the UNSC ‘has 
also accepted that the investigation into the said situation, as well as any 
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prosecutions arising therefrom, will take place in accordance with the statutory 
framework provided for in the Statute, the Elements of Crimes and the Rules as 
a whole’.641 This warning could be understood as an implied notice that the 
personal limitation – which was in clear breach of ‘the statutory framework 
provided by the Statute’642– was deemed inoperative. After all, it is for the 
judicial body, and not for the Council, to determine the scope of the Court’s 
jurisdiction even when activated by a referral. In effect, when referring a 
situation to the Court, the Council subjects the situation and cases arising 
therefrom exclusively to the terms of Statute and to the Court’s legal 
framework.  
The Court has not yet embarked on the investigation or prosecution of nationals 
other than those from the States in which the referred situation had taken place 
(referred States). It remains to be seen what the response of the Prosecutor and 
the PTC would be if and when crimes committed by nationals of a non-party 
State need to be addressed. It should be expected that they will disregard the 
limitation imposed by the Council and subject the referral to the Court’s 
‘statutory framework’, as signalled by PTC I. Accordingly, as long as crimes 
under the jurisdiction of the Court are committed within the territorial 
parameters of the situation for which the jurisdiction of the Court has been 
activated by the Council’s referral, the Court should be entitled to prosecute 
the perpetrators regardless of their nationality. In such a scenario, even if the 
Court may not be able to secure the arrest and surrender of a national of a non-
party State – given that cooperation will probably not be forthcoming and 
political pressures may be strong – the mere issuance of a warrant or summons 
would send a strong message as regards the Court’s independence and 
impartiality.  
As to the temporal scope of the situations of crisis referred to the Court, a plain 
reading of the Statute does not appear to allow for the imposition of arbitrary 
temporal limitations. Article 13 provides for the referral of ‘[a] situation in 
which one or more of [the crimes under the Statute] appears to have been 
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committed’. Therefore, the Prosecutor should have the power to investigate the 
full extent of the crimes committed within the context of the situation of crisis 
referred to him. The only temporal limitation unrelated to the context of the 
situation referred is that established by Article 11, which limits the Court’s 
jurisdiction to crimes committed after its entry into force, ie 1 July 2002 or the 
date of entry into force for the relevant State. In this respect, the initial 
temporal limitation imposed by the Council when referring the situation in 
Darfur is justified by the clear terms of Article 11.643 
More problematic are referrals purporting to establish starting dates later than 
the entry into force of the Statute. For example, the referral of the situation in 
Libya by UNSC Resolution 1970 sought to limit jurisdiction to crimes committed 
after 15 February 2011. Apart from that date, the referral does not contain any 
other indications as to the subject matter of the situation of crisis referred to 
the Court. Accordingly, it can be deduced that the Council referred to the Court 
only the situation related to the crimes committed during the popular uprising in 
Libya triggered by the so-called ‘Arab Spring Revolution’, and excluded the 
systematic abuses allegedly committed by the Gaddafi regime before that 
date.644 The revolutionary period may, of course, be differentiated from the pre-
revolutionary history of the Gaddafi regime, there being an arguable case for 
investigating the former in isolation. However, the starting date chosen by the 
UNSC appears arbitrary, in spite of the fact that it coincides with the first days 
of protests in Benghazi.645 Indeed, as stressed by PTC I, Muammar Gaddafi 
publicly condemned the uprising in Tunisia in speeches broadcast by Libyan state 
television as early as 15 January 2011.646 It is therefore at least probable that 
crimes directly linked to the plan, defined by PTC I as being to ‘deter and quell, 
by all means, the civilian demonstrations against the [Libyan] regime which 
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644 Some of the alleged abuses of the Gaddafi’s regime, during the period excluded by the UNSC 
referral were even mentioned by PTC I in the decision of the warrants of arrest in the Libya 
case. See Gaddafi and Al-Senussi, ICC-01/11-01/11-1 para. 20. 
645 Aljazeera, ‘Battle for Libya: Key moments. Timeline of decisive battles and political 
developments in Libya's uprising against Muammar Gaddafi. Last Modified: 23 Aug 2011 12:43’ 
(23 August 2011)  
<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/libya/2011/08/20118219127303432.html> 
accessed 05 September 2013. 
646 Gaddafi and Al-Senussi, ICC-01/11-01/11-1 para. 26. 
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began in Libya soon after the events in Tunisia and Egypt which led to the 
departure of their Presidents in the early months of 2011’,647 were committed 
before the date chosen by the Council. Notably, as found by PTC I, ‘people who 
were identified as dissidents to the regime or as planning the demonstrations of 
the 17 February were arrested [beforehand] by the Security Forces to prevent 
them from demonstrating’.648 As such, when limiting the scope of the referral to 
only crimes committed as from 15 February 2011, the UNSC may have excluded 
crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court committed within the context of the 
same ongoing situation.  
As noted above, pursuant to Article 13(b), the Statute defines the scope of 
investigations in terms of a ‘situation’. The term was not introduced at random; 
rather, it was carefully chosen by the drafters of the Statute in order to avoid 
politically driven prosecutions.649 With a view to preventing the Court from 
focusing only on specific crimes or on certain perpetrators or even on crimes 
committed by only one side of the conflict, the Statute requires that the 
subject-matter of referrals are ‘situations’ where crimes within the jurisdiction 
of the Court appear to have been committed. Accordingly, any arbitrary 
temporal limitation included in the referral goes against the clear terms of the 
Statute. The Prosecutor should not and cannot be precluded a priori from 
analysing the entire context of the situation of crisis for which the jurisdiction of 
the Court is activated or be prevented from choosing cases for prosecution 
within the overall extent of the situation. The temporal scope of an 
investigation can only be defined by the situation itself.  
In accordance with the current terms of the Statute, in cases where the 
Prosecutor does not exercise his power to investigate the full context of the 
situation of crisis regardless of the limitations imposed by the Council, the PTC is 
prevented from intervening at the time of the initiation of the investigation. The 
PTC’s intervention will only be triggered by the Prosecutor’s request for the 
issuance of a warrant of arrest or a summons to appear under Article 58. When 
the request complies with the requirements of Article 58(1) the PTC ‘shall’ issue 
                                         
647 Ibid para. 76. 
648 Ibid para. 28. 
649 (n 244) Yee 147. 
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the warrant or summons. That an investigation had been narrowed based upon 
limitations imposed by the Council is not in itself reason to refuse to issue a 
properly substantiated warrant or summons. It would be totally illogical, and 
contrary to the objects and purposes of the Statute, if the PTC was to prevent 
cases qualifying for prosecution and falling within the scope of the situation as 
referred to the Prosecutor from proceeding merely because the referral was 
unduly limited.  
As argued before, as an additional safeguard to the Court’s independence and 
impartiality, an amendment to the Statute granting the PTC the power to review 
the Prosecutor’s positive determination to open an investigation following a 
referral appears to be necessary. This would give the PTC the opportunity not 
only to assess the legality of the referral but would also allow it to determine ab 
initio the material scope of the situation of crisis to be investigated. This 
determination would be relevant since, as will be discussed in Chapter 5, 
pursuant to Article 54(1)(a), ‘[i]n order to establish the truth, [the Prosecutor 
shall] extend the investigation to cover all facts and evidence relevant to an 
assessment of whether there is criminal responsibility under the Statute’. 
Accordingly, although the Prosecutor has discretion to select cases for 
prosecution, he is nevertheless mandated to investigate the full extent of the 
situation in order to establish the truth. Only after investigating the full extent 
of the situation may the Prosecutor choose which cases to pursue from among 
the many qualifying for prosecution. That decision, although discretionary, 
cannot be arbitrary and must be justified either by a Prosecutorial policy (eg the 
necessity to focus on the most responsible perpetrators) or by practical 
considerations (eg the amount and quality of the evidence collected or the 
prospect of obtaining cooperation for a successful prosecution). Although the 
PTC does not have the power to dictate the Prosecutor’s policy or review the 
merits of the practical considerations involved in a decision not to prosecute, 
the PTC does have the right, pursuant to Regulation 48 and in order to be able 
to exercise its powers under Article 53(3) and Rule 110, to request from the 
Prosecutor information or documents necessary to determine whether the 
decision not to prosecute was based only on consideration of the interests of 
justice. Consequently, although the PTC has in fact no power to order the 
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Prosecutor to proceed against certain individuals or crimes – unless the decision 
not to proceed is based on the ‘interests of justice’ – it can stimulate 
transparent decision-making within the OTP, allowing for informed public 
scrutiny of his activities. The need to explain the concrete reasons for not 
proceeding against certain individuals, groups or crimes would encourage the 
Prosecutor to investigate fully and discourage him from acting based on political 
motives. Further, it would encourage the cooperation of States with the 
Prosecutor and the Court, since failure to cooperate will be also exposed to 
public scrutiny.    
This brings us to another matter that arises in relation to referrals from the 
Council, which is likely to be the main challenge for the Court: the issue of the 
enforcement of States’ obligations to cooperate with the ICC. In order to fulfil 
its mandate to investigate and prosecute, the Court needs the support of States. 
State cooperation is required, inter alia, to secure the arrest and surrender of 
suspects, to facilitate the production and collection of evidence and to ensure 
the appearance of witnesses. After all, the Court has neither its own police 
force nor enforcement powers of any kind. State cooperation is thus critical for 
the Prosecutor to be able to conduct meaningful investigations and prosecutions. 
In relation to this, the PTC has a fundamental role to play in compelling States 
to fulfil their duty to cooperate. Indeed, in order to ensure that the ICC is able 
to fulfil its mandate, Part 9 of the Statute establishes a detailed regime of 
cooperation by States. Article 86 imposes on States Parties the duty to 
cooperate fully with the Court. In addition, pursuant to Article 87(5)(a), the 
Court may invite non-party States to provide assistance to the Court on the basis 
of an agreement or on any other appropriate basis. In accordance with Article 
87(5)(b) and (7), where a State Party or a non-party State that has entered into 
an agreement fails to cooperate, the Court may inform the ASP or, where it is 
the referring party, the Council. 
Accordingly, there is no doubt that the Council referral is sufficient to activate 
the Court’s jurisdiction as regards States Parties, without the need for additional 
consent from the State. In such a case, Part 9 of the Statute directly applies and 
the State is obliged to cooperate with the Court. If the State fails to cooperate, 
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the Court, ie the PTC at the investigative or pre-trial stages of the 
proceedings,650 can make a finding of non-cooperation and refer the matter to 
the ASP or the UNSC as appropriate.  
However, in the case of non-party States – probably the main source of 
situations referred by the Council – the case will be different. If there is an 
agreement to cooperate with the Court pursuant to Article 87(5), but the State 
refuses to cooperate, there may be a finding of non-cooperation and referral of 
the matter to the ASP or the UNSC. If there is no Article 87(5)(a) agreement, the 
extent, source and nature of the non-party State’s duty to cooperate with the 
Court are at stake.651 In principle, as a treaty-based institution, the Court’s 
Statute is only binding on the States that have ratified it.652 As such, 
fundamental legal questions arise as to the applicability of the Statute to non-
party States, both those which are referred and also third-party States. Are the 
provisions of the Statute directly applicable to non-party States? Is the obligation 
to cooperate determined by the terms of Statute or by the terms of the referral? 
These questions will need to be addressed by the PTC as the judicial organ 
generally competent to determine whether a State’s failure to cooperate with 
the Court prevents it from exercising its functions and powers. 
As to the referred States, the UNSC’s resolutions have so far stated that they 
‘shall cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court and 
the Prosecutor pursuant to this resolution’.653 However, in spite of the fact that, 
under Article 25 of the UN Charter, UN Member States are obliged to accept and 
carry out decisions of the UNSC, commentators have discussed whether the 
wording of Resolutions 1593 (2005) and 1970 (2011) actually contain a binding 
                                         
650 For the argument that the term ‘the Court’ in Article 87(7) should be understood as the 
competent Chamber see Göran Sluiter, ‘Obtaining Cooperation from Sudan - Where is the Law? ’ 
(2008) 6 JICJ 871, 873-874. 
651 For discussion of the legal issues arising out of the Council’s referrals see, inter alia, ibid; 
Corrina Heyder, ‘The U.N. Security Council's Referral of the Crimes in Darfur to the International 
Criminal Court in Light of U.S. Opposition to the Court: Implications for the International 
Criminal Court's Functions and Status’ (2006) 24 Berkeley Journal of International Law 650; Dapo 
Akande, ‘The Legal Nature of Security Council Referrals to the ICC and its Impact on Al Bashir's 
Immunities’ (2009) 7 JICJ 333; Simon M. Weldehaimanot, ‘Arresting Al-Bashir: the African Union's 
opposition and the legalities’ (2011) 19 AJICL 208; Dapo Akande, ‘The Effect of Security Council 
Resolutions and Domestic Proceedings on State Obligations to Cooperate with the ICC’ (2012) 10 
JICJ 299. 
652 Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
653 See UNSC Resolution 1593 (2005), paragraph 2 and UNSC Resolution 1970 (2011), paragraph 5. 
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obligation for the referred States to cooperate with the Court under the terms of 
the Statute. Sluiter, for example, compares the vague language of Resolutions 
1593 and 1970 with the clear wording used by Resolution 827 (1993) that created 
the ICTY, which stated that full cooperation should take place in accordance 
with the Statute of the ICTY and obliged States to take any measures necessary 
under their domestic law.654 Does this mean that the referred States in 
Resolutions 1593 and 1970 are only obliged to cooperate in accordance with 
their domestic laws? Or should Resolutions 1593 and 1970 be understood as 
implying that the Statute applies mutatis mutandis to the referred States?655 Is 
Article 87(7) applicable to them in the sense of being considered a ‘State Party’ 
by virtue of and for the purposes of the referral? Or, is there simply no 
mechanism available for the Court to obtain cooperation from referred non-
party States?  
In the first decision addressing the issue in one of the cases arising from the 
situation in the Sudan,656 PTC I stressed that both the task of investigating and 
prosecuting crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court and the obligation of 
Sudan to cooperate with the Court stem directly from the UN Charter657 and 
Resolution 1593 (2005), which referred the situation to the Court.658 However, 
using slightly different language and not directly relying on Article 87(7), PTC I 
decided to ‘inform’ the Council of the lack of cooperation by Sudan, stating that 
                                         
654 UNSC  Resolution 827 (1993), by which the Council decided ‘that all States shall cooperate 
fully with the International Tribunal and its organs in accordance with the present resolution and 
the Statute of the International Tribunal and that consequently all States shall take any 
measures necessary under their domestic law to implement the provisions of the present 
resolution and the Statute, including the obligation of States to comply with requests for 
assistance or orders issued by a Trial Chamber under Article 29 of the Statute’. 
655 (n 650) Sluiter 876-878. 
656 It should be noted that the Prosecutor attempted to trigger from PTC I a finding of non-
cooperation within the terms of Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute. See The Prosecutor v. Ahmad 
Muhammad Harun and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman, ICC-02/05-01/07-48-Red Prosecution 
request for a finding on the non-cooperation of the Government of the Sudan in the case of The 
Prosecutor v Ahmad Harun and Ali Kushayb, pursuant to Article 87 of the Rome Statute Office of 
the Prosecutor, 19 April 2010. 
657 In particular article 25 of the UN Charter, by which the ‘Members of the United Nations agree 
to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present 
Charter’. 
658 The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Muhammad Harun and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman, ICC-
02/05-01/07-57 Decision informing the United Nations Security Council about the lack of 
cooperation by the Republic of the Sudan Pre-Trial Chamber I, 25 May 2010 6. 
  
175 
the Council was vested with the power to take any action related to Sudan’s 
failure to cooperate with the Court.659  
In the case arising out of the situation in Libya, however, PTC I has clearly and 
repeatedly affirmed that the Statute, and particularly Part 9, is directly 
applicable to the referred State.660 In May 2014, PTC I explicitly stated that, in 
case of Libya’s non-compliance with obligations to cooperate with the Court, 
‘one of the tools available to the Court is to make a finding of non-cooperation 
by the State and refer the matter to the Security Council’.661 It further stated 
that, pursuant to Regulation 109,662 before making such a finding the Chamber 
should hear from the State.663 Accordingly, the Chamber not only found that the 
Statute and Part 9 were applicable to a referred non-party State, but were also 
applicable to the provisions of the Statute specifically referring to States 
Parties.  
However, although Libya has not complied with requests to provide 
information,664 the Chamber has so far only threatened it with a possible finding 
of non-cooperation and transmission to the Council,665 failing to take any 
concrete action.666 PTC I appears to be reluctant to make a finding of non-
cooperation and refer the situation to the UNSC, instead preferring to give more 
time to Libya to comply with the requirements for a finding of inadmissibility in 
                                         
659 Ibid 6-7. 
660 The Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, ICC-01/11-01/11-72 Decision 
on Libya's Submissions Regarding the Arrest of Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi Pre-Trial Chamber I, 7 March 
2012 paras 12-13; Gaddafi and Al-Senussi, ICC-01/11-01/11-163 paras 27-30; The Prosecutor v. 
Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, ICC-01/11-01/11-269 Decision on the 'Urgent 
Application on behalf of Abdullah Al-Senussi for Pre-Trial Chamber to order the Libyan 
Authorities to comply with their obligations and the orders of the ICC' Pre Trial Chamber, 6 
February 2013 para. 21; The Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, ICC-
01/11-01/11-545 Decision requesting Libya to provide submissions on the status of the 
implementation if its outstanding duties to cooperate with the Court Pre-Trial Chamber I, 15 May 
2014 paras 2, 6-7; The Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, ICC-01/11-
01/11-563 Decisions on matters related to Libya's duties to cooperate with the Court Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, 11 July 2014 para. 2. 
661 Gaddafi and Al-Senussi, ICC-01/11-01/11-545 para. 7. 
662 Regulation 109 establishes the procedure for a finding of non-cooperation pursuant to Article 
87(7). 
663 Gaddafi and Al-Senussi, ICC-01/11-01/11-545 para. 7. 
664 Gaddafi and Al-Senussi, ICC-01/11-01/11-563 para. 12. 
665 Ibid para. 13. 
666 Ibid 6. 
  
176 
relation to the Gaddafi case.667 The Court continues to afford such latitude 
despite more than three years having passed since Libya first failed to comply 
with its cooperation requests.668 This approach may be sharply contrasted with 
that adopted in relation to Sudan, which was referred to the Council for it to 
take appropriate measures, although not technically through a finding of non-
cooperation.669 The stance adopted in relation to Sudan may be explained on 
account of its posture of direct opposition to the Court, the State having 
disregarded the Court’s actions and failed to take any measures to address the 
alleged crimes. Libya’s attitude is different insofar as its lack of compliance with 
the Court’s request to transfer the accused is motivated, at least ostensibly, by 
the desire to try the crimes domestically, rather than to shield the perpetrators 
from justice.  
As to the cooperation of third-party States in the investigation of situations 
referred by the Council, in the absence of an agreement pursuant to Article 
87(5), their duty to cooperate with the Court will depend exclusively on the 
obligations imposed on them, if any, by the UNSC Resolution. In scenarios where 
the referred States do not cooperate with the Court, the cooperation of third-
party States and of the Council itself through the execution of cooperation 
requests issued by the Court – particularly requests for the arrest and surrender 
of suspects, but perhaps also for the application of political or economic 
pressure – may be the only mechanism by which the Court will be able to 
effectively comply with its mandate.670 Regrettably however, instead of 
demanding international cooperation, the Council has opted to highlight that 
non-party States ‘have no obligation under the Statute’ and simply ‘urged’ them 
to cooperate fully.671  
                                         
667 As discussed in Chapter 3, in two decisions recently confirmed by the AC, after analyzing the 
domestic proceedings, PTC I found the case against Saif Al Islam Gaddafi to be admissible, while 
the case against Abdullah Al-Senussi was found inadmissible.  
668 Libya has failed to surrender Gaddafi to the Court despite his being under arrest since 19 
November 2011 see Gaddafi and Al-Senussi, ICC-01/11-01/11-163 para. 3. 
669 Harun and Kushayb, ICC-02/05-01/07-57. 
670 For an interesting discussion of the role that the US could potentially have played in securing 
Sudan’s cooperation with the Court had the referral imposed a compelling obligation, see Heyder 
654-656. 
671 Res 1593 (2005) para. 2; Res 1970 (2011) para. 5. 
  
177 
In the Bashir case, arising from the Darfur situation, PTC I originally interpreted 
the UNSC referral as providing the basis to request cooperation from non-party 
States.672 PTC I stated that, although the concerned State was not party to the 
Statute, it had been ‘urge[d]’ by the UNSC to cooperate fully with the Court.673 
However, in a more substantiated decision on Mauritania’s non-surrender to the 
Court of Al Senussi (a case arising from the Libya situation), PTC I noted that the 
Statute, as an international treaty, could only impose obligations and confer 
duties based on the consent of States.674 While the Council could alter this 
situation by imposing on non-party States obligations to cooperate, in the matter 
before the PTC, Mauritania was under no obligation vis-à-vis the Court since 
Resolution 1970 stressed that non-party States did not have obligations under 
the Statute and only ‘urge[d]’ them to cooperate.675 This decision was later 
followed in the Bashir case by PTC II, stressing that a non-party State ‘may 
decide to execute the outstanding warrant’, but noting that the Court does not 
have enforcement mechanisms to demand compliance.676 As such, PTC II 
emphasised that it ‘relies on the States’ cooperation, without which it cannot 
fulfil its mandate and contribute to ending impunity’.677  
However, the difficulty in securing cooperation is not limited to non-party 
States. Even in relation to States Parties – which undoubtedly have a binding 
duty to cooperate with the Court – the enforcement of their obligations in cases 
arising out of situations referred by the Council remains very problematic. 
Particularly in the case against Al-Bashir, it has been painfully evident that the 
Court by itself cannot ensure cooperation from States.678 The AU has taken the 
                                         
672 The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-145 Order Regarding Omar 
Al-Bashir’s Potential Visit to the Republic of Chad and to the State of Libya Pre-Trial Chamber II, 
15 February 2013 paras 12-13.  
673 Ibid para. 13. 
674 The Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, ICC-01/11-01/11-420 
Decision on the request of the Defence of Abdullah Al Senussi to make a finding of non-
cooperation by the Islamic Republic of Mauritania and refer the matter to the Security Council 
Pre-Trial Chamber I, 28 August 2013 para. 12. 
675 Ibid paras 14-15. 
676 The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-204 Decision on the 
'Prosecution's Urgent Notification of Travel in the Case of The Prosecutor v Omar Al Bashir' Pre-
Trial Chamber II, 7 July 2014 para. 11-12. 
677 Ibid para. 12. 
678 The Court has repeatedly informed the UNSC of the visits made by Omar Al-Bashir to different 
State Parties to the Statute in Africa, which have all refused to arrest him. See, inter alia, The 
Prosector v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-107 Decision informing the United 
Nations Security Council and the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute about Omar Al-
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position that Al Bashir’s immunity, as a sitting Head of State of a non-party 
State, should be respected and that his potential arrest would undermine the 
peace process in Darfur.679 Consequently, it has instructed its member states 
‘not to cooperate pursuant to the provisions of Article 98 of the Rome Statute of 
the ICC relating to immunities’.680  
Confronted with the recurring refusal of States Parties to comply with the 
request for arrest and surrender of Al Bashir, PTC I has stressed that, pursuant to 
Article 119(1), disputes concerning the judicial functions of the Court shall be 
settled by a decision of the Court itself.681 Therefore, States Parties cannot 
unilaterally disregard the Court’s requests and should bring the matter of any 
alleged conflicting international obligations to the Chamber in order for it to 
make a determination.682 As to the issue of whether sitting Heads of non-party 
States enjoy immunity, PTC I has held that the principle in international law that 
the immunity of either former or sitting Heads of State cannot be invoked to 
oppose a prosecution by an international court applies equally to former or 
sitting Heads of non-party States, whenever the Court exercises jurisdiction.683 
Accordingly, PTC I held that State Parties cannot rely on Article 98(1),684 since 
                                                                                                                           
Bashir’s presence in the territory of the Republic of Kenya Pre-Trial Chamber I, 27 August 2010; 
The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-109 Decision informing the 
United Nations Security Council and the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute about 
Omar Al-Bashir’s recent visit to the Republic of Chad Pre-Trial Chamber I, 27 August 2010; The 
Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-129 Decision informing the United 
Nations Security Council and the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute about Omar Al-
Bashir’s recent visit to Djibouti Pre-Trial Chamber I, 12 May 2011. 
679 See, inter alia, African Union, Assembly/AU/Dec.245(XIII), Decision on the meeting of African 
States parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), 3 July 2009 (2012) 
paras. 2-3. 
680 See, inter alia, ibid para. 10; African Union, Press Release No. 002/2012, On the Decisions of 
Pre-trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court (ICC) pursuant to article 87(7) of the 
Rome Statute on the alleged failure by the Republic of Chad and the Republic of Malawi to 
comply with the cooperation requests issued by the Court with respect to the arrest and 
surrender of President Omar Hassan Al Bashir of the Republic of the Sudan, 9 January 2012. 
(2012). 
681 See, inter alia, The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-139 
Decision Pursuant to Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the Failure by the Republic of Malawi 
to Comply with the Cooperation requests Issued by the Court with Respect to the Arrest and 
Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir Pre-Trial Chamber I, 12 December 2011 para. 11; The 
Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-140 Decision rendue en 
application de l’article 87-7 du Statut de Rome concernant le refus de la Republique du Tchad 
d’acceder aux demandes de cooperation delivrees par la Cour concernant l’arrestation et la 
remise d’Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir Pre-Trial Chamber I, 13 December 2011 para. 10. 
682 Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-139 para. 12; Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-140 para. 11. 
683 Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-139 para. 39. 
684 Article 98(1) provides that ‘The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or 
assistance which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations 
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there is no conflict between the State Parties’ obligations towards the Court and 
under international law, there being under customary international law an 
exception to the immunity of Heads of State where international courts seek 
their arrest.685 
As discussed, the different PTCs have made use of the mechanisms provided in 
the Statute in order to obtain cooperation from States to the maximum extent 
possible. However, it is clear that without concrete and meaningful action being 
taken by the Council, the Court will remain unable to effectively pursue justice. 
It should be noted that, as yet, some four years since the Court first informed 
the Council of the lack of States’ cooperation in the Darfur-Sudan situation,686 
the Council has taken no decision supporting the enforcement of the requests. In 
their reports to the Council the ICC’s Prosecutors have repeatedly stressed the 
lack of cooperation from Sudan and other States, yet the Council has failed to 
respond.687 The inability or unwillingness of the Council to secure cooperation is 
further evidenced by the Darfur situation, where Council Resolutions have simply 
highlighted the lack of progress in national proceedings, while refraining from 
even mentioning the need to cooperate with the Court.688 
Accordingly, unless and until the Council decides to effectively impose on States 
actual binding obligations to cooperate with the Court – reflecting a serious 
commitment to fight against impunity – the Court will continue to be unable to 
effectively comply with its mandate in relation to the Council’s referrals. The 
                                                                                                                           
under international law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or property 
of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of the third State for the 
waiver of the immunity.’  
685 Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-139 para. 43. 
686 The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Muhammad Harun and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman, ICC-
02/05-01/07-60 Report of the Registrar on the notification of the 'Decision informing the United 
Nations Security Council about the Lack of Cooperation by the Republic of Sudan' Registrar, 8 
July 2010. Annexes 1 and 2 attach acknowledgments of the reception by the UNSG of PTC I’s 
decisions informing lack of cooperation. 
687 OTP, ‘Statement to the United Nations Security Council on the situation in Darfur, the Sudan, 
pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005) ’ (International Criminal Court, 13 December 2012)  
<http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/statements/UNSC1212/UNSCDarfurSpeechEng.pdf.> 
accessed 24 August 2014. 
688 See, inter alia, UNSC, UN Doc S/RES/2063 (2012), Adopted by the Security Council at its 
6819th meeting, 31 July 2012 (2012), reaffirming its previous Resolutions without even 
mentioning Res 1593. Even more damaging, it expresses a ‘strong commitment to the sovereignty 
(...) of Sudan and its determination to work with the Government of Sudan, in full respect of its 
sovereignty’. While ‘expressing deep concern at the increased violence and insecurity in some 
parts of Darfur’, it only ‘urges the Government of Sudan to do its outmost to bring the 
perpetrators’ to justice. 
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role of the PTC in these types of situations is critical in creating a consistent 
jurisprudence stressing the Court’s impartiality and independence from 
international politics. The PTC should continue to keep a full record of those 
who fail to cooperate with the Court. The powerful message sent by judicial 
decisions of an international court, highlighting the evasive behaviour of the 
accused and identifying those who protect them, should not be underestimated. 
4.3 State Party Referrals 
4.3.1 Drafting History 
Another means of triggering the Court’s jurisdiction is through a referral from a 
State Party. In accordance with the Articles 13(a) and 14(1), a State Party may 
refer to the Prosecutor a situation in which one or more crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court appear to have been committed.  
In an initial proposal for a Draft Code of Offences, submitted by the UN Special 
Rapporteur in 1991, a right of complaint by States and international 
organisations was contemplated, but without clearly indicating which States 
should be entitled to lodge a complaint, referring only to ‘any states injured by 
an international offence’.689 In 1993, the ILC Working Group’s Draft restricted 
the right to lodge a complaint to State Parties and States retaining the custody 
of the suspect.690 In the hope of encouraging ratifications, the ILC 1994 draft 
Statute suggested limiting the right to lodge complaints to States Parties only.691 
However, since the draft conceived of an opting-in regime, wherein States would 
choose the crimes for which they recognised the Court’s jurisdiction, it allowed 
States Parties to lodge complaints based on a ‘reciprocity restriction’, ie only in 
relation to the crimes for which the complainant State had also accepted the 
competence of the Court. 
                                         
689 William A. Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute 
(Oxford University Press 2010) 305. 
690 Antonio Marchesi, ‘Article 14: Referral of a situation by a State Party’ in Otto Triffterer (ed), 
Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (C.H.Beck - Hart - Nomos 
2008) 575. 
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In 1995, the Ad Hoc Committee eventually rejected the opting-in mechanism and 
set aside the reciprocity restriction.692 At the same time, the option that States 
Parties be empowered to refer entire situations of crisis – and not only specific 
crimes – gained wide support.693 This was envisaged as a means to avoid 
politicisation and promote efficiency. It was also agreed that a State’s complaint 
should not automatically trigger the jurisdiction of the Court without notice 
being given to the States concerned and a determination being made as to 
whether any State was willing and able to effectively investigate and prosecute 
the crimes domestically.694  
Of further significance to the subsequent debate on the practice of self-
referrals, is that concerns were raised at the Ad Hoc Committee in relation to 
the possibility that State Party referrals could be used for frivolous or politically 
motivated purposes.695 Although this scepticism did not lead to an elimination of 
the States referral system as such, a proposal was submitted directed at 
restricting the ability to refer situations to ‘interested’ States only, ie the 
territorial State, the custodial State or the State of nationality of the victim or 
suspect.696 Later during the Rome Conference, the predominant view was that, 
by their very nature, the crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court were of 
concern to the international community as a whole, and therefore, every State 
was ‘interested’ in their prosecution.697 Therefore, the agreement during the 
Rome Conference was that any State Party could refer situations to the Court, 
not just those with links to the crime, victims or perpetrators. 
The fear of abuse of this triggering mechanism brought several proposals 
offering safeguards against ‘frivolous, groundless or politically motivated 
complaints’.698 Among the proposals that succeeded and were included in 
Articles 14(2), 53 and 18 are: (i) the requirement that the referring State 
provide sufficient information and supporting documentation to serve as the 
point for a future investigation; (ii) the provision that the Court’s jurisdiction 
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following a referral is not activated automatically, but only after an internal 
screening allowing the Court – the Prosecutor and to a certain extent the PTC – 
to reject frivolous referrals or those not warranting the Court’s intervention, 
and (iii) the obligation on the Prosecutor to notify interested States and, if 
warranted, to give them the opportunity to effectively investigate and 
prosecute.699 As discussed in Chapter 2, the PTC has a critical role to play in the 
proceedings under both Article 53 and Article 18 of the Statute. 
4.3.2 The proceedings for the activation of the Court’s jurisdiction by a referral 
of a State Party 
Pursuant to Articles 13(a) and 14, a State Party can refer to the Prosecutor any 
situation in which one or more of the crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court 
appear to have been committed. A plain reading of the provisions suggests that 
the threshold for the referral of a situation by a State Party is lower than the 
one imposed on the UNSC. After all, as discussed in Section 4.2.2, the Council 
can only refer a situation to the Court where it represents a threat to or breach 
of the peace or otherwise comprises an act of aggression. In the case of State 
referrals, however, the Statute does not contemplate any filter or specific 
procedure that the State must follow prior to a referral, such as obtaining the 
approval of the national parliament or judiciary.  
Nevertheless, pursuant to Article 14(2), the referral must specify the relevant 
circumstances and be accompanied by such supporting documentation as is 
available to the referring State. The referring State must therefore provide the 
Court with sufficient information to allow the Prosecutor to make the initial 
determination of whether there is a ‘reasonable basis to proceed’ in accordance 
with Article 53. The first part of the proceedings that will follow a referral by a 
State Party are identical to those in relation to referrals by the UNSC, 
particularly as regards Article 53 and Rules 104 to 110. As a result, the 
Prosecutor may only initiate an investigation if the information available to him 
provides a reasonable basis to believe that the situation complies with the 
requirements of Article 53(1).  
                                         
699 (n 693) Kirsch and Robinson, 'Referral by States Parties' 622. 
  
183 
As discussed above, within the context of the proceedings under Article 53, the 
Prosecutor will assess the information available and independently decide after 
this preliminary examination whether to open an investigation. Again, the PTC is 
not charged with assessing the merits of a decision by the Prosecutor to open an 
investigation. In the CAR situation the Prosecutor took more than two years to 
conduct preliminary examinations following the referral, which raised some 
concerns as to the possibility that the Prosecutor may leave situations under 
indefinite periods of preliminary examination in order to avoid triggering the 
PTC’s review of a decision not to investigate.700 Had this indeed been the 
Prosecutor’s strategy, it would have been an effective one – once again showing 
that the limitation of judicial oversight to formal prosecutorial decisions not to 
proceed has the potential to undermine the credibility and legitimacy of the 
Court. Therefore, an additional safeguard should be included so that the PTC is 
afforded the power to review the Prosecutor’s positive assessment that there is 
a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation following a State referral. As 
the Statute presently stands, the first opportunity for the PTC to assess the 
merits of the investigation will be when and if the Prosecutor requests the 
issuance of a warrant of arrest or a summons to appear against an identified 
suspect. Of course, if the Prosecutor decides not to open an investigation, the 
PTC may review the prosecution’s decision either at the request of the referring 
State or proprio motu, in accordance with Article 53(3). 
In the case of State Party referrals or when the Prosecutor initiates a proprio 
motu investigation pursuant to Article 15 an additional safeguard, aimed at 
ensuring that the Court only intervenes as a mechanism of last resort, is 
provided by Article 18 of the Statute and Rules 52 to 57 of the Rules. According 
to these provisions, once the Prosecutor has decided to open an investigation as 
a result of a referral from a State Party or proprio motu, it shall conduct initial 
proceedings that may lead to preliminary rulings on admissibility by the PTC. 
Based on this provision, it falls to the PTC both to check the legality of the 
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Prosecutor’s decision and to protect the Prosecutor from unfounded accusations 
and political manipulations.701  
As with referrals by the Council, with State referrals there have been no cases 
thus far in which the PTC has exercised its powers according to Articles 53 and 
18. However, State referrals have also presented new and unexpected 
challenges for the PTC in complying with its role of counterbalancing the 
Prosecutor’s discretion. 
4.3.3 The practice of State Referrals 
At the time of writing, the Prosecutor has opened investigations in four 
situations pursuant to Articles 13(a) and 14. These are the situations in Uganda, 
the DRC, the CAR and the Republic of Mali. A subsequent referral of a different 
situation in the CAR is still under preliminary examination by the Prosecutor. 
Against initial predictions, all State Party referrals to date have, in fact, been 
‘self-referrals’, ie the same States where the crimes have been committed have 
referred the situations to the Court.   
The situation in Uganda, the first situation referred to the Court, was submitted 
in terms of the ‘situation concerning the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)’ by the 
Ugandan President, Yoweri Museveni, in December 2003.702 After analysing the 
information submitted, the Prosecutor decided, ostensibly in order to avoid 
focusing only on the crimes alleged to have been committed by one side to the 
conflict, to broaden the scope of the situation. Accordingly, an investigation was 
opened into ‘the situation concerning Northern Uganda’ on 29 July 2004.703  
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On 19 April 2004, the DRC President Joseph Kabila referred to the Court ‘la 
situation qui se déroule dans mon pays depuis le 1er juillet 2002, dans laquelle 
il apparaît que des crimes relevant de la compétence de la Cour Pénale 
Internationale ont été commis.’704 On 26 June 2004, the Prosecutor decided to 
open an investigation into the ‘grave crimes allegedly committed on the 
territory of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) since 1 July 2002.’705 As 
part of the same wave of referrals actively encouraged by the OTP, on 7 January 
2005, the government of the CAR referred the situation concerning ‘crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court committed anywhere on the territory of the 
Central African Republic since 1 July 2002.’706 On 22 May 2007, more than 2 
years later, the Prosecutor opened an investigation.707 On 13 July 2012, the 
Republic of Mali referred to the Court ‘les crimes les plus graves commis depuis 
le mois de Janvier 2002 sur son territoire’,708 and the Prosecutor decided to 
open an investigation into that situation on 16 January 2013.709  
The fact that so far the only State referrals triggering the jurisdiction of the 
Court have been self-referrals from the territorial States has been a source of 
great debate among commentators. Arguments have been put forward both 
supporting and criticising the practice. Those who criticise it have focused their 
attention on the undesirable risk of ‘asymmetric or selective referrals’, by which 
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governments will primarily seek to refer crimes attributed to rebel groups or 
non-governmental parties to an armed conflict.710 Those supporting the right of 
sovereign States to relinquish jurisdiction in favour of international adjudication 
argue that given (i) the unprecedented capacity of non-State actors to commit 
large scale atrocities and to challenge and undermine the authority of States, 
(ii) the reality of failed States, and (iii) the manifest historical failure of inter-
State human rights complaint mechanisms, a common interest exists between 
States and the Court in the prosecution of international crimes.711 In particular, 
considerations related to the public perception of fairness, national security and 
the complexity and high costs involved in trials held in conformity with 
international standards, all support the argument that a referral to the ICC can 
be a beneficial solution for States that – although willing and able to prosecute – 
may be reluctant to carry out proceedings before national courts.712  
In view of the above, the recourse to self-referrals, although not found in a 
specific provision in the Statute nor likely to have been envisaged by the 
drafters as the primary source of situations and cases before the Court, should 
not have come as much of a surprise.713 Neither is the preponderance of such 
referrals necessarily problematic – nothing prevents a State with a direct 
interest in the prosecution of certain crimes from referring a situation to the 
Court.  
Nevertheless, the right of ‘interested’ States to refer situations to the Court 
should be exercised in a manner that is compatible with their duty ‘to exercise 
(…) criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes’, as 
recalled by paragraph 6 of the Preamble. It can be argued that self-referrals are 
reconcilable with a State’s duty to prosecute, since in light of the overarching 
goal of the Statute to end impunity, the State’s duty to exercise criminal 
jurisdiction ‘should be broadly understood as the obligation to ensure that a 
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genuine investigation be undertaken, be it by the State itself, be it by way of 
extradition to another State, or even by way of surrender to an international 
criminal jurisdiction’.714 Therefore, in principle, it seems perfectly permissible 
that a self-referral may be considered tantamount to a ‘waiver of 
complementarity’, ie a waiver of the State’s right to primacy under the 
Statute.715  
The Court’s jurisprudence has so far endorsed self-referrals, noting that they 
reflect a ‘purposive interpretation of the Statute’ aimed at avoiding the 
unchecked persistence of impunity and the denial of justice to thousands of 
victims.716 In the Katanga case, the AC stressed that there may be some ‘merit 
in the argument that the sovereign decision of a State to relinquish its 
jurisdiction in favour of the Court may well be seen as complying with the “duty 
to exercise [its] criminal jurisdiction”’717 and that a ‘general prohibition of a 
relinquishment of jurisdiction in favour of the Court is not a suitable tool for 
fostering compliance by States with the duty to exercise criminal jurisdiction’.718 
However, although self-referrals can be qualified as a legal and suitable way of 
triggering the Court’s jurisdiction, the safeguards provided by the Statute in 
order to minimize the risks that they may entail appear to be insufficient. In 
particular, the power granted to the Prosecutor to reject frivolous or politically 
motivated referrals and to define the scope of the situation to investigate may 
be meaningless in practice if the Prosecutor is unduly eager to bring cases 
before the Court and to secure cooperation from States. A close look at the first 
three situations triggered by interested States supports this view. In the 
situation in Uganda, for example, although the Prosecutor did not accept the 
limitation imposed by Museveni for the situation to comprise only the crimes 
allegedly committed by the LRA, at the time of writing, some ten years after the 
referral, the only case that has been initiated is that against the LRA’s leaders. 
Similarly, in the situations in the DRC and the CAR the Prosecutor has targeted 
only rebel groups as opposed to governmental forces. While the targeting of 
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rebel forces has not in itself been unjustified, when proceedings are initiated 
only against those recognisable as enemies of the governments referring the 
situations to the Court, the credibility and legitimacy of the institution is 
inevitably at stake.  
As indicated concerning Council referrals, pursuant to Regulation 48 in relation 
to Articles 54(1)(a) and 53(3)(b), the PTC could mitigate the risk of selective 
prosecutions by demanding more transparent decision-making within the OTP. 
This would allow public scrutiny of the Prosecutor’s functioning, thereby 
encouraging his efforts to investigate fully, incentivising genuine national 
proceedings and cooperation with the Court and discouraging attempts to 
influence the Prosecutor against proceeding with the investigation and 
prosecution of certain individuals or groups.  
Another crucial matter that arises in relation to all triggering procedures is the 
scope of the situation the Prosecutor is allowed to investigate. As discussed in 
Section 4.2.3, it appears contrary to the Statute to impose artificial temporal 
limitations on the situation of crisis for which the jurisdiction of the Court is 
activated. By the same token, the jurisdiction of the Court cannot be extended 
beyond the material margins of the situation of crisis that triggered the Court’s 
jurisdiction. Referrals are not perpetual and cannot be invoked in order to allow 
the Court to intervene in situations for which the jurisdiction of the Court has 
not been legally activated.  
PTC I expressed its view on the issue in the case against Callixte 
Mbarushimana,719 in which it had to decide whether the Court was competent to 
prosecute him in relation to crimes allegedly committed in 2009 in the North and 
South Kivu Provinces of the DRC. The issue at stake was whether the DRC 
referral of 3 March 2004 could encompass crimes committed more than five 
years later, without the need for a new referral or a proprio motu initiative in 
order to trigger the jurisdiction of the Court. PTC I held that in order for a case 
not to exceed the parameters of the original referral ‘the crimes referred to in 
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the Prosecutor's Application must have occurred in the context of the ongoing 
situation of crisis that triggered the jurisdiction of the Court’.720 PTC I explained 
that the situation might include:  
not only crimes that had already been or were being committed at the time 
of the referral, but also crimes committed after that time, insofar as they 
are sufficiently linked to the situation of crisis referred to the Court as 
ongoing at the time of the referral.721  
Accordingly, subsequent prosecutions for crimes under the ICC’s jurisdiction may 
be initiated, in principle, regardless of the time of their commission, provided 
that the crimes are part of the same situation of crisis that activated the 
jurisdiction of the Court. 
The OTP has occasionally attempted to interpret the Court’s jurisdiction more 
liberally, dispensing with the requirement that crimes committed subsequent to 
a referral be connected to the situation of crisis in relation to which the Court’s 
jurisdiction was activated. In relation to the situation in the DRC, former 
Prosecutor Moreno Ocampo claimed to have jurisdiction to investigate possible 
crimes that were allegedly committed during that country’s 2011 presidential 
elections.722 However, it is doubtful that the events related to the 2011 
elections could be considered to be part of the same ‘ongoing’ situation of crisis 
that triggered the jurisdiction of the Court through the referral letter sent by 
the DRC President on 3 March 2004.723  
Initially following the same approach, Prosecutor Bensouda affirmed her 
readiness to investigate and prosecute the crimes allegedly committed in the 
context of the 2013 coup d’etat in the CAR.724 Again, it was hard to argue that 
the situation in the CAR in 2013 was in any way related to the former CAR 
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situation. This incorrect interpretation of the jurisdictional margins of the 
situation of crisis was later amended by a declaration of the Prosecutor 
clarifying that the incidents and the serious allegations of crimes potentially 
falling within the jurisdiction of the ICC in the CAR since September 2012 
‘constitute a new situation, unrelated to the situation previously referred to the 
ICC by the CAR authorities in December 2004.’725 This declaration prompted a 
subsequent CAR referral on 30 May 2014 in relation to crimes committed in its 
territory since 1 August 2012.726 
In order to avoid uncertainties regarding the material scope of the situation and 
to provide sufficient checks and balances for the Prosecutor’s discretion, it 
appears necessary to extend to the case of State Referrals the PTC’s 
competence to review the decision to open an investigation. Vesting the PTC 
with the power to independently assess the legality of the referral would ensure 
that the Prosecutor’s decision to open an investigation is a legitimate exercise of 
his powers under the Statute and not the result of undue political influence. The 
PTC should have the authority to review the Prosecutor’s determination as to 
the material scope of the situation of crisis in order to ensure that the 
boundaries of the situation to be investigated are clearly specified. If the 
situation is still ongoing, it will not be proper to impose artificial temporal 
limitations, but the context of the situation under investigation should be clearly 
defined.    
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4.4 Proprio motu investigations 
4.4.1 Drafting History 
The final way in which the Court’s jurisdiction may be activated is by the 
Prosecutor acting on his own initiative. In accordance with Article 13(c) and 15, 
the Prosecutor ‘may initiate investigations proprio motu on the basis of 
information on crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court’. 
As stressed in Chapter 2 above, Article 15 was the result of extensive 
negotiations, which eventually resulted in granting the Prosecutor the power to 
take proprio motu action to activate the jurisdiction of the Court, subject to the 
prior authorisation of the PTC. Discussions on the Prosecutor’s proprio motu 
powers were closely related to the issue of the Court’s ‘inherent jurisdiction’, 
the principle of complementarity and the protection of national sovereignty. For 
the best part of the negotiations the matter divided those who advocated for 
the need for an independent and effective Court whose jurisdiction could be 
activated ex officio by the Prosecutor and those who saw such powers as 
unnecessarily broad and potentially resulting in ‘politically motivated or 
frivolous proceedings under an overly ambitious Prosecutor’.727  
During the ILC negotiations in 1994, the suggestion of one of its members to 
include in the draft an authorization for the Prosecutor to initiate investigations 
in the absence of a complaint from a State or the Security Council was 
immediately rejected. The detractors argued that such a possibility was not 
warranted ‘at the present stage of development of the international legal 
system’,728 submitting that ‘the autonomy of the Prosecutor was superfluous in 
international law’.729 Again at the Ad Hoc Committee in 1995, attempts to 
include in the draft a role for the Prosecutor to initiate ex officio investigation 
or prosecution of serious crimes failed, on account of certain States’ insistence 
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that State consent was essential for any mechanism to trigger the court’s 
jurisdiction.730  
At the Preparatory Committee in 1996, the idea re-emerged with informal 
proposals from Germany, Italy and Trinidad and Tobago.731 In its submission, the 
German delegation argued that: 
In order to strengthen the authority of the Court as an independent 
international body the prosecutor shall be entitled to initiate investigations 
in case that he/she receives sufficient factual evidence that a crime which 
falls under the jurisdiction of the Court was committed.732  
Although encouraged by the Committee Chairman, the idea again failed to gain 
sufficient support. This was mainly due to the fact that the directly related issue 
of the inherent jurisdiction of the Court was still far from being agreed, with 
many delegations strongly advocating ‘opting-in’ or ‘opting-out’ mechanisms.733 
Subsequently, the discussion resumed with a new element which afforded the 
necessary momentum for prosecutorial activation of the Court’s jurisdiction to 
finally garner broad support. The Swiss delegation in 1997,734 followed by the 
Argentinian delegation in 1998,735 suggested including the PTC within the 
equation of the proprio motu triggering procedure. The Argentinian suggestion 
was promptly seconded by Germany and both delegations submitted a formal 
proposal to the Committee on 25 March 1998.736 The proposal would later 
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become, almost without modification, sub-paragraphs 2 to 5 of Article 15. The 
idea was that the Prosecutor would independently examine the information 
obtained from reliable sources and determine whether there was a reasonable 
basis to initiate an investigation. When reaching a positive conclusion, the 
Prosecutor would be obligated to bring the matter to the PTC for independent 
judicial approval before proceeding further. During the Rome Conference the 
issue was again highly contested, but the matter was finally settled with the 
adoption of the requirement of independent judicial review and approval by the 
PTC prior to the Prosecutor embarking on any proper investigative steps.737 
As a result, the procedure governing the opening of an investigation upon the 
initiative of the Prosecutor was laid down in Articles 15 and 53, which were later 
complemented by Rules 46 to 50.  
4.4.2 The proceedings for the proprio motu activation of the Court’s 
jurisdiction  
As described in Section 2.4.2, the Court’s legal framework articulates a clear 
procedure to be followed by the Prosecutor and the PTC in order for the latter 
to authorise the former to initiate proprio motu investigations. However, the 
substantive extent of the PTC’s intervention is nowhere elaborated. As with 
many other issues, the critical dividing line between the Prosecutor’s discretion 
and the PTC’s powers is not directly addressed in the Court’s legal framework. 
This is one of those matters in which the lack of agreement during the 
preparatory works, coupled with the arduous and lengthy negotiations which 
continued until late in the final day of the Rome Conference, made a clear 
definition of substantive powers in the text of the Statute impossible. As such, it 
was left to the judges to determine the extent of their own powers.  
Among the unresolved issues is the extent to which the PTC can determine the 
Prosecutor’s investigative powers and the weight to be attached to the victims’ 
                                                                                                                           
original draft prepared by Argentina were related to: (i) the way in which the information on the 
commission of crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court would reach the Prosecutor – here a 
change in terminology from ‘notification’ to ‘information’ had important consequences; and (ii) 
the inclusion of victims as a possible source of additional information for the Prosecutor and, 
most importantly, their being afforded the right to make representations before the PTC.  
737 (n 16) Kirsch and Robinson, 'Initiation of Proceedings by the Prosecutor' 660-661. 
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representations. Indeed, it is not clear whether, by way of the authorisation 
procedure, the PTC can direct the focus of the Prosecutor’s investigations, 
particularly in relation to certain events that may not have been identified by 
the Prosecutor in his application. Further, Article 15(3) simply gives the victims 
the right to ‘make representations to the Pre-Trial Chamber’; what the PTC can 
actually do with those submissions is nowhere addressed.  
In relation to the extent of the PTC’s power under this procedure, Articles 15(4) 
and 42(1) may be interpreted as implying that the PTC is only entitled to review 
the Prosecutor’s assessment of the information available to him and his 
subsequent determination that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an 
investigation. This interpretation is grounded in an acknowledgment that the 
PTC is not an investigative Chamber, does not have investigative powers of its 
own, and is not responsible for directing the Prosecutor’s investigations.738 
However, one could also argue that the fact that the PTC does not have those 
powers does not mean that it should be relegated to the status of a ‘rubber 
stamping’ body. Particularly in relation to the Article 15 procedure, the PTC has 
the authority and power to guide the Prosecutor’s investigation. It could be 
argued that, in accordance with Article 15(3) and Rule 50(4) and (5), the PTC 
can use the information provided by victims and the additional information it 
collects in order to determine the scope of the situation to be investigated by 
the Prosecutor. Because the PTC is not bound by the Prosecutor’s definition of 
the situation, Rule 50(5) allows the PTC, should it so decide, to authorize only 
part of the Prosecutor’s request. In addition, pursuant to its powers under 
Article 15(4) to examine for itself the request and supporting material in order 
to determine whether ‘there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an 
investigation’, it may be argued that the PTC can extend or reduce the scope of 
the investigation originally envisaged by the Prosecutor in order to frame the 
scope of the investigation it authorises. 
Consequently, although the PTC cannot intervene in the Prosecutor’s 
investigation – such as by ordering the collection of evidence or compliance with 
specific procedures – the role to be fulfilled by the PTC goes well beyond the 
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simple review of the Prosecutor’s application and could imply the identification 
of a broader – or less extensive – temporal, territorial, material or personal 
scope than the one provisionally identified by the Prosecutor. Still, the authority 
to conduct the investigation and ultimately select cases for prosecution rests 
with the Prosecutor. The PTC has, however, the power to review the information 
collected and to assess the parameters of Article 53(1) of the Statute on its own, 
being guided, rather than limited, by the Prosecutor’s identification of the 
situation of crisis.  
4.4.3 The practice of proprio motu investigations 
In November 2009, the Prosecutor requested the PTC’s authorisation to 
commence an investigation into crimes against humanity allegedly committed in 
the Republic of Kenya following the Presidential election of 27 December 2007,  
‘including but not limited to’ the time period from the election to 28 February 
2008.739 After analysing the information collected, the Majority of PTC II740 
decided to authorise an investigation in relation to crimes against humanity 
committed within the broader period obtaining between 1 June 2005 and 26 
November 2009.741 Consequently, the date of entry into force of the Statute for 
Kenya, 1 June 2005, and the date of the Prosecutor’s application, 26 November 
2009, determined the temporal scope of the situation.742  
The extension of the temporal scope of the investigation was based, arguably, 
on the allegations of victims that ‘certain areas of Kenya have repeatedly 
experienced violence prior to 2007 and even subsequent to 2008’.743 When 
substantiating the extension so as to cover crimes committed since the entry 
into force of the Statute for Kenya, the Majority of PTC II affirmed that limiting 
the investigation to a narrower time frame would be inconsistent with: 
                                         
739 Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09-3 Request for authorisation of an investigation 
pursuant to Article 15 Office of the Prosecutor, 26 November 2009 para. 93. 
740 Judge Hans-Peter Kaul dissented on the authorisation since, in his view, the acts allegedly 
committed did not amount to crimes against humanity see Kenya, ICC-01/09-19-Corr 84-163. 
741 Ibid 83. 
742 Ibid para. 207. 
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(i) the purpose behind investigating an entire situation as opposed to 
subjectively selected crimes and; (ii) the Prosecutor’s duty to establish the 
truth by extending the investigation to cover all facts and evidence 
pursuant to Article 54(1) of the Statute.744  
Accordingly, it held that it was ‘logical to define the scope of the investigation 
as to cover events prior to December 2007 in relation to crimes against humanity 
allegedly committed within the entire situation’.745 It is worth noting that the 
Majority of PTC II reprimanded the Prosecutor for the use of broad terms such as 
‘including but not limited to’, affirming that it was the ‘responsibility of the 
Chamber to define the temporal scope of the authorization for investigation with 
respect to the situation under consideration’.746 PTC II eventually disregarded 
the Prosecutor’s material identification of the situation and extended the 
jurisdiction of the Court to a time frame covering crimes that may have been 
entirely unrelated to ‘the post-election violence of 2007-2008’. Regrettably, 
when moving the starting date of the investigation, PTC II did not define or 
delimit the material scope of the ‘new’ situation of crisis to be investigated. The 
Chamber only limited the material parameters of the investigation to ‘crimes 
against humanity’, without any requirement that they be related to the ‘post-
election violence’ the Prosecutor intended to investigate, or any other 
identifiable situation of crisis.747  
It should be stressed that criticism of the PTC’s decision to extend the temporal 
parameters of the investigation as such is not intended. The Chamber certainly 
had the power to conclude, after reviewing the information received, that the 
situation to be investigated was indeed broader than the one initially identified 
by the Prosecutor. In such a case, however, it was incumbent upon the PTC to 
identify in as much detail as possible the broader situation of crisis the 
Prosecutor was authorised to investigate. If PTC II considered that the post-
election violence was indeed part of a broader situation of crisis or that it was 
triggered by previous acts, it should have clarified this and defined the material 
scope of the situation it authorised the Prosecutor to investigate. 
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As to PTC II’s decision to limit the scope of the investigation to alleged crimes 
committed prior to the date of the Prosecutor’s application, this was justified 
with arguments that contradict those used to extend the starting date. PTC II did 
not refer – as before – to the need to investigate ‘the entire situation as opposed 
to subjectively selected crimes’, but held that ‘it would be erroneous to leave 
open the temporal scope of the investigation to include events subsequent to 
the date of the Prosecutor's Request’.748 In the view of the Majority of PTC II, 
since Article 53(1)(a) refers to a crime which ‘has been or is being committed’, 
it was clear that ‘the authorization to investigate may only cover those crimes 
that have occurred up until the time of the filing of the Prosecutor's Request’.749  
Therefore the date of the filing of the request was thus the last opportunity for 
the Prosecutor to evaluate the subject-matter of his submission and the range of 
criminal offences he would investigate. The rationale behind such an 
interpretation of Article 53(1)(a) arguably comes from an attempt to avoid the 
Prosecutor obtaining a carte blanche power to investigate future unknown 
matters, regardless of their connection to the situation initially identified. As 
has been discussed in relation to State referrals, at times the Prosecutor has 
appeared to suggest that referrals are perpetual, meaning that the fact of the 
activation of the Court’s jurisdiction in relation to crimes committed within a 
State allows him to investigate any future crimes occurring in the same State. In 
order to avoid perpetual referrals, the Majority decision of PTC II effectively 
demands that the Prosecutor identify, at the time of the request, the crimes he 
believes to have been, by then, committed and which he intends to investigate.  
By limiting the Prosecutor’s investigation to crimes clearly identified by the date 
of his application, PTC II limited in advance the crimes the Prosecutor could 
investigate. In that way, it may have indeed prevented him from investigating 
unknown matters, possibly avoiding – as expected by the drafters – future 
unwarranted, frivolous, or politically motivated investigations. However, it also 
limited the Prosecutor’s power to investigate crimes that, although committed 
after the filing of the request for authorisation, may be directly related to the 
context of the situation under investigation, such as, eg a possible retaliatory 
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attack. The literal interpretation of Article 53(1)(a) favoured by PTC II focused 
on the commission of specific crimes, disregarding the fact that crimes under 
the Statute are always embedded in a particular context: either a manifest 
pattern of similar conduct directed against a specific group in the case of 
genocide, an attack against the civilian population in the case of crimes against 
humanity, or an armed conflict in the case of war crimes. As such, crimes under 
the Statute are not generally comprised of a single act but include a series of 
incidents that will constitute the context of their commission. At the time of a 
request the context within which crimes are being committed may still be 
ongoing.  
PTC II’s interpretation may have the undesirable consequence that, in order to 
investigate fully, the Prosecutor will have to wait until the context under which 
the crimes are being committed has concluded before submitting his request for 
authorisation to investigate. This will be contrary to the objects and purposes of 
the Statute, with particular regard to the Court’s obligation to ‘contribute to the 
prevention of (…) crimes’.750 The launching of an investigation by the ICC while 
the context within which the crimes are being committed continues to develop 
can certainly contribute to preventing the commission of further crimes, 
because those that plan and organise the crimes will know that their acts are 
being closely followed by the Prosecutor. Moreover, it would be inconsistent to 
allow the UNSC or States to trigger the jurisdiction of the Court in relation to 
ongoing situations of crisis but prohibit the Prosecutor from exercising his 
proprio motu powers to do the same. The Council for example referred the 
situations in Sudan and Libya while the crimes were being committed, as a 
warning to Al Bashir and Gaddafi and specifically in order to dissuade the 
commission of further crimes. Similarly, PTC I in the Mbarushimana case held 
that the Court had jurisdiction to deal with a case involving crimes committed 
several years after the referral by the DRC, since these crimes were being 
committed ‘in the context of the ongoing situation of crisis that triggered the 
jurisdiction of the Court’.751  
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PTC II also allowed the Prosecutor to investigate crimes committed since 1 June 
2005, without imposing the need for them to be linked to any particular 
situation or context. In that way, the decision broadened the scope of the 
Prosecutor’s investigation and left the back door open for him to possibly focus 
on unrelated matters. Absent any safeguard to the effect that the crimes must 
be connected with a specific situation of crisis, the Prosecutor may eventually 
end up investigating crimes totally unconnected to the situation initially 
identified by him or that the Chamber had in mind. Consequently, PTC II in the 
Kenya situation failed to identify in clear terms the context and material scope 
of the situation of crisis it authorised the Prosecutor to investigate. It left open 
the possibility for him to investigate completely unknown matters, provided they 
occurred before the date of his request, while simultaneously prohibiting him 
from investigating crimes that could be directly linked to the situation of crisis 
he originally attempted to investigate, on account solely of their being 
committed after the request for authorisation. 
In June 2011, the Prosecutor requested an authorisation to initiate ‘an 
investigation into the situation in the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire since 28 
November 2010’.752 In its decision, the Majority of PTC III753 noted that although 
the Court has jurisdiction over crimes committed in Côte d’Ivoire since 19 
September 2002 – pursuant to the declaration lodged by the State under Article 
12(3) –754 the Prosecutor only intended to investigate crimes committed after 28 
November 2010. In the view of the Prosecutor, the temporal scope was justified 
because (i) the violence during that period (after 28 November 2010) reached 
unprecedented levels; and (ii) there was sufficient information for the 
reasonable basis threshold to be satisfied in relation to crimes committed during 
that period.755 However, the Chamber noted that the Prosecutor had also 
suggested that ‘once the Chamber has reviewed the supporting material, it may 
conclude that the temporal scope of the investigation should be broadened to 
                                         
752 Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, ICC-02/11-3 Request for authorisation of an 
investigation pursuant to Article 15 Office of the Prosecutor, 23 June 2011 para. 1. 
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encompass events that occurred between 19 September 2002 and the date of 
the filing of the request’.756 The Chamber considered it to be necessary to 
determine both whether the investigation could be authorized to cover crimes 
committed before 28 November 2010 and also whether such authorisation should 
include crimes committed after the filing of the Prosecutor’s application.  
As to the end date of the investigation, the Majority of PTC III stated that it 
would follow PTC I’s approach in the Mbarushimana case, ‘bearing in mind the 
volatile environment in Côte d’Ivoire’.757 It therefore authorised the 
investigation to cover crimes after the date of the Prosecutor’s application so 
long as ‘at least in a broad sense, [these crimes] involve the same actors and 
have been committed within the context of either the same attacks (crimes 
against humanity) or the same conflict (war crimes)’.758 In other words, the 
Prosecutor was allowed to investigate ‘crimes that may be committed after the 
date of the Prosecutor's application (...) insofar as the contextual elements of 
the continuing crimes are the same as for those committed prior to 23 June 
2011’.759 However, the Chamber added, as an extra requirement, that it was 
‘necessary to ensure that any grant of authorization covers investigations into 
“continuing crimes”’, defined as ‘those whose commission extends past the date 
of the application’.760 Consequently, the time-frame of the investigation was 
extended but only to cover ‘continuing crimes that may be committed in the 
future [after the date of the Prosecutor’s application] (…) insofar as they are 
part of the context of the ongoing situation in Côte d’Ivoire’.761  
Therefore, although the Prosecutor was authorized to investigate crimes that 
may be committed after his application, the Mbarushimana approach was not 
followed exactly. Moreover, it is unclear what the Majority of PTC III meant by 
including the concept of ‘continuing crimes’. It should be noted that the issue of 
‘continuing crimes’ was a source of great debate during the preparatory works 
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of the Statute.762 Continuing crimes are those offences that are committed and 
then maintained,763 in which the illegal conduct does not terminate with the 
carrying out of the initial criminal acts involved in the offence, but persists in 
time. The distinguishing character of a continuing crime is that its commission 
repeats itself every day, and thus a new offence is created each day, as long as 
the accused remains involved with the course of conduct.764 Examples of 
continuing crimes under the Statute include, inter alia, enforced disappearance, 
enslavement, imprisonment or other severe deprivations of physical liberty, 
sexual slavery, enforced prostitution and using children under the age of fifteen 
years to participate actively in the hostilities. The prototypical continuing crime 
is the crime against humanity of enforced disappearance of persons, which is 
initially committed when the victim is arrested, detained or abducted and the 
perpetrator refuses to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or to give 
information on the fate or whereabouts of the person. The situation of 
deprivation of freedom so created, accompanied by the refusal to acknowledge 
or provide information on the whereabouts of the victim – that is to say the 
consequences or effects of the crime – will continue for as long as the abducted 
person is unaccounted for.765  
The ruling of PTC III is unclear because it states that the authorization covers 
‘crimes (...) committed after the date of the Prosecutor’s application’,766 but 
                                         
762 Mohamed M. El Zeidy, ‘The Ugandan Government Triggers the First Test of the 
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later specifies that such authorization refers to ‘the investigation of any ongoing 
and continuing crimes that may be committed after the [date of the 
Prosecutor’s application]’.767 It is not clear whether the terms ‘ongoing’ and 
‘continuing’ are used as alternative or concurrent conditions. The term 
‘ongoing’ appears to refer to the necessary link between the crimes and the 
ongoing context of the situation of crisis in Côte d’Ivoire. If we understand the 
terms to have been used in the alternative, the Prosecutor could consider 
himself to be allowed to investigate both ongoing and continuing crimes. He 
could therefore focus on instantaneous crimes committed after the filing of the 
application for authorization so long as such crimes form part of the ongoing 
situation of crisis for which authorization to investigate was granted, the result 
being precisely the same as that following from the Mbarushimana decision. 
It seems, however, that the terms were used as concurrent conditions, since 
later in its conclusions the Majority of PTC III authorised the Prosecutor to 
investigate ‘continuing crimes that may be committed in the future (…) insofar 
as they are part of the context of the ongoing situation in Côte d’Ivoire’.768 The 
Majority of PTC III therefore imposed two concurrent conditions for the crimes 
committed in the future to become part of the authorised investigation: (i) they 
should be continuing crimes; and (ii) they should be part of the ongoing situation 
in Côte d’Ivoire that triggered the jurisdiction of the Court. 
The problem with the cumulative conditions imposed by the Chamber to 
determine the end date of the investigation is how it impacts upon the notion of 
a continuing crime. Even before the PTC set out its conditions, if a continuing 
crime was committed or, more appropriately, commenced before the date of 
the Prosecutor’s application and its effects were to continue after that date, the 
Prosecutor would have had the opportunity to investigate that crime; after all, it 
began within the cut-off date of the Prosecutor’s request. In other words, the 
formulation used by the Majority of PTC III does not appear to extend the leave 
to investigate beyond the date of the Prosecutor’s filing. To investigate 
continuing crimes the commission of which started before his request, the 
Prosecutor did not need an explicit authorization of the Chamber to go beyond 
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the date of his filing. The imposition of the cumulative conditions, therefore, 
solely serves to bar the Prosecutor from investigating any instantaneous offence 
under the ICC’s jurisdiction that may be committed from the Prosecutor’s 
request onwards, even though such offence(s) may be part of the ongoing 
situation of crisis in Côte d’Ivoire that triggered the Court’s jurisdiction. Any 
subsequent war crime or crime against humanity committed (however soon) 
after the date of the Prosecutor’s request appears to be excluded from the 
Prosecutor’s investigation – no matter how directly linked it may be to the 
ongoing situation that triggered the jurisdiction of the Court. 
The requirements imposed by PTC III could also be understood as including, 
within the concept of ‘continuing crime’, individual acts committed after the 
date of the Prosecutor’s application that, although constituting in itself a 
completed crime, will be jointly assessed as part of only one crime. This would 
be true, for example, of each act of enlisting or conscripting children into an 
armed forced or armed group, or each act of plunder committed as part of the 
pillaging of a town or place occurring for a prolonged period of time. It is, 
however, unclear whether this requirement would easily apply to any 
subsequent crime committed as part of the context of the investigation. For 
example, can any act of rape or murder committed after the cut-off date be 
considered part of a ‘continuing’ war crime or crime against humanity of murder 
or rape committed within the ongoing situation of crisis that triggered the 
jurisdiction of the Court? Accordingly, it appears that it would have been 
sufficient – and probably simpler – to only require that the instantaneous acts 
committed after the Prosecutor’s application be part of the ongoing situation of 
crisis, without the need to add the requirement that they also be ‘continuing 
crimes’. 
In relation to the starting date of the investigation, the Majority of PTC III 
initially outlined a similar approach based on the requirement that crimes 
committed before the starting date requested by the Prosecutor must be ‘part 
of the same situation’.769 The Chamber observed that ‘while the context of 
violence reached a critical point in late 2010, it appears that this was a 
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continuation of the ongoing political crisis and the culmination of a long power 
struggle in Côte d’Ivoire’.770 The Chamber further stressed that the information 
provided by the Prosecutor and the victims gave ‘indications of very serious 
human rights violations and abuses that have been committed since the 
September 2002 coup attempt that could amount to crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court’.771  
However, given that the Prosecutor did not refer in his application to specific 
incidents that may have occurred prior to 28 November 2010, the Chamber 
decided that it was ‘unable to determine whether the reasonable basis threshold 
has been met with regard to any specific crimes’772 and ordered the Prosecutor 
to revert to the Chamber with any additional information ‘on potentially 
relevant crimes committed between 2002 and 2010’.773 Regrettably, the Majority 
of PTC III did not retain the notion of ‘continuing crimes’ in relation to the 
starting date of the investigation. The two-prong test advanced for the end date 
of the investigation would have been useful indeed in relation to the starting 
date, as it could have allowed for the investigation of crimes committed within 
the context of the situation of crisis under investigation, even if their 
commission or initial execution was before 28 November 2010. 
Once the Prosecutor provided the further information requested, PTC III 
decided, in an unanimous decision in February 2012,774 that the events in Côte 
d’Ivoire in the period between 19 September 2002 and 28 November 2010,  
although reaching varying levels of intensity at different locations and at 
different times, are to be treated as a single situation, in which an ongoing 
crisis involving a prolonged political dispute and power-struggle culminated 
in the events in relation to which the Chamber earlier authorised an 
investigation.775  
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Consequently, it extended the scope of the authorisation to cover ‘crimes within 
the jurisdiction of the Court allegedly committed between 19 September 2002 
and 28 November 2010’.776 Regrettably however, PTC III did not specifically 
request that the crimes be linked to the situation of crisis it had just defined. 
Similarly, it did not clarify the issue of ‘continuing’ and ‘ongoing’ crimes in 
relation to the end date of the investigation. 
In order to effectively prevent the Court from focusing only on specific crimes 
within a given time frame, which may represent crimes committed by only one 
side of the conflict, it is particularly important for the PTC to define the 
material – in addition to the temporal – scope of the situation the Prosecutor is 
allowed to investigate. Given that the PTC was called to intervene in the 
exercise of his proprio motu power in order to ‘prevent the Court from 
proceeding with unwarranted, frivolous, or politically motivated investigations 
that could have a negative effect on its credibility’,777 the Chamber has the 
responsibility to outline, in as much detail as possible, the context of the 
situation of crisis the Prosecutor will be allowed to investigate. 
4.5 Conclusions 
Just as the drafters of the Statute feared, each of the three modes of triggering 
the Court’s jurisdiction involves the danger of ‘politically motivated or frivolous 
proceedings’.778 Indeed, there is always the risk that the political agenda of 
State Parties or of the UNSC – and, in particular, of its five permanent members 
– may prompt them to refer to the Court only ‘convenient’ situations or to 
support the Court’s efforts only to the extent needed to fulfil their purposes. 
There may also be the risk of either an ‘overly ambitious’,779 or an overly 
cautious, Prosecutor, who may pursue respectively only those situations likely to 
make the greatest impact (but not necessarily be the most deserving of 
attention) or those where cooperation is secure and no powerful actors will be 
‘disturbed’.  
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When faced with these types of situations, the independence, impartiality and 
credibility of the Court are at stake. It is at these moments that the PTC has a 
fundamental role to play as the Court’s gatekeeper.  
When assessing the role of the PTC at the stage of activation of the Court’s 
jurisdiction, it is necessary to distinguish between proceedings initiated by 
referral and those involving the exercise of the Prosecutor’s proprio motu 
powers. As regards referrals, although the Statute gives the PTC the role of 
overseeing the Prosecutor’s exercise of discretion, the mechanisms it provides 
are insufficient for the PTC to effectively prevent the introduction of 
‘inappropriate political influence over the function of the institution’.780 Indeed, 
as has been demonstrated by the situations referred to the Court so far, the 
Prosecutor appears to have lacked the courage to object to limitations of 
doubtful legality imposed by the Council or to resist the temptation presented 
self-referring States who are highly cooperative – at least for as long as the 
Court focuses on cases that those states consider to be ‘convenient’. As such it 
appears necessary, in relation to referrals from both the Council and State 
Parties, that the PTC is given the function of reviewing the Prosecutor’s positive 
assessment that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation. 
Through this review process the PTC will have the opportunity to assess the 
legality of the referrals and determine the context of the situation of crisis to be 
investigated.  
In relation to proprio motu investigations by the Prosecutor, the Statute has 
given the PTC a critical role in determining whether or not the investigation 
should be authorised, affording the Chamber the competence to conduct its own 
assessment of the evidence and information it obtains from the Prosecutor and 
the victims. However, the different PTCs have so far failed to properly 
determine the contextual scope of the situations they have authorised the 
Prosecutor to investigate. This deficiency carries the risk of undermining the 
rationale behind the authorisation procedure itself. Indeed, without a concrete 
definition of the material scope of the situation to be investigated, there is 
uncertainty as to which cases the Prosecutor may focus on and the risk that he 
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may concentrate on cases totally unrelated to the situation of crisis the PTC had 
in mind when authorising the commencement of the investigation.  
However, as will be discussed in the following Chapter, the determination of the 
contextual scope of the situation to investigate will not by itself sufficiently 
mitigate the risk of selective prosecutions. It should be complemented by a 
proactive role for the PTC in stimulating transparent prosecutorial decision-
making so as to allow public scrutiny of the Prosecutor’s functioning, thereby 
encouraging his efforts to investigate fully and incentivising genuine national 
proceedings and cooperation with the Court, while discouraging attempts to 
dissuade the Prosecutor from proceeding against certain individuals or groups.  
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Chapter 5. The role of the PTC at the investigative stage of the 
proceedings: navigating between adversarial and inquisitorial 
traditions  
5.1 Introduction 
Within the margins of the situation of crisis for which the Court’s jurisdiction has 
been activated, the Prosecutor has discretion to conduct his investigations and 
select cases for prosecution. The Prosecutor is however bound by his obligation 
to investigate fully in order to establish the truth and is subject to high 
international standards of due process. The gatekeeping role of the PTC at this 
stage is therefore essentially aimed at protecting the rights of those who may be 
affected by the Court’s proceedings, avoiding politically driven prosecutions and 
ensuring that the Prosecutor’s investigations are conducted in conformity with 
the requirements of due process.  
The Statute contains features of both traditional adversarial and inquisitorial 
models of criminal justice, particularly at the investigative stage of the 
proceedings.781 Article 42(1) provides for an independent Prosecutor with 
discretion to conduct his investigations without contemporaneous judicial 
supervision or direction. At the same time, however, Article 54(1)(a) imposes on 
the Prosecutor the obligation to extend his investigations to cover all facts and 
evidence necessary to ‘establish the truth’, investigating incriminating and 
exonerating circumstances equally. More importantly, the system provides for 
certain functions to be exercised by the PTC during the investigate stage of the 
proceedings. Although not transforming the PTC judges into inquisitorial 
investigative judges or juges d’instruction, these functions still afford them a 
significant role.  
Accordingly, apart from acting on the Prosecutor’s request issuing orders and 
warrants in support of his investigative efforts,782 or at the request of the person 
who has been arrested or appeared pursuant to a summons issuing orders 
                                         
781 For an instructive account of the traditional distinction between adversarial and inquisitorial 
systems of criminal procedure and the specific features adopted by the different international 
courts and the ICC, see (n 21) Cassese and others 329-346. For the differences in relation to the 
Pre-Trial proceedings, see also (n 112) Marchesiello 1231-1235; (n 113) Fourmy 1209-1215. 
782 Statute Articles 54(2)(b), 56(1)(b), 57(3)(a), 57(3)(d). 
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including measures such as those described in Article 56 or seek cooperation as 
may be necessary to assist the person in the preparation of his defence,783 the 
PTC has been given crucial powers to intervene on its own initiative during the 
investigative stage of the proceedings. These functions are aimed at ensuring 
full respect for the rights of those who may be affected by the Court’s 
investigations and future prosecutions. As described in Section 2.5, the PTC is 
empowered during the investigative stage, in accordance with Articles 68(3), 
56(3)(a) and 57(3)(c), to: (i) allow victims to present their views and concerns; 
(ii) take measures to preserve evidence that would be essential to the defence 
at trial when the Prosecutor has failed to request measures in relation to a 
unique investigative opportunity; and (iii) provide for the protection and privacy 
of victims and witnesses, the preservation of evidence and the protection of 
national security information, where necessary. 
Lastly, upon investigation and following the Prosecutor’s finding that there is no 
sufficient basis for prosecution, the PTC may review such a decision in 
accordance with Article 53(3), at the request of the referring State, the Council 
or acting proprio motu. Alternatively, if the Prosecutor finds there to be a 
sufficient basis for a prosecution, the PTC shall, in accordance with Article 58(1) 
and (7), issue a warrant of arrest or summons to appear if, having examined the 
application and evidence or other information submitted by the Prosecutor it is 
satisfied that a case should be initiated against an alleged perpetrator. 
This Chapter will assess the gatekeeping role entrusted to the PTC during the 
investigation stage of the Court’s proceedings, referring to the emerging 
practice of the Court during the first decade of its existence. As will be 
explained, while in the first situations brought before the Court PTC I exercised 
some monitoring activity of the Prosecutor’s investigation, the practice as it 
developed came to involve only very limited intervention by the PTC. 
Nonetheless, what kept the different PTCs occupied was mostly the delimitation 
of the role and extension of the participation of victims at the investigative 
stage. These issues will be discussed below. Section 5.2 will develop the issues 
raised in relation to the participation of victims at the investigation stage of the 
                                         
783 Ibid Article 57(3)(b). 
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proceedings, while section 5.3 will focus on the PTC’s powers to intervene 
proprio motu. Section 5.4 will examine the most significant function of the PTC 
at the end of the investigative stage – the review of the Prosecutor’s decision 
whether to initiate criminal proceedings against an identified alleged 
perpetrator. Section 5.5 provides conclusions stressing the notorious reluctance 
on the part of PTC judges to firmly scrutinise the Prosecutor’s actions or to 
become substantially involved during the investigative stage, in spite of the 
powers granted to the PTC by the Statute. 
5.2 The participation of victims during the investigation stage of the 
proceedings: the ‘victims of the situation’  
The recognition of a role for victims in the proceedings before the Court is one 
of the most important achievements of the drafters of the Statute and indeed 
represents a significant step forward in international criminal justice.784 Its 
inclusion in the Statute was the result of vigorous and sustained criticism of the 
lack of provisions of this kind at the ad hoc Tribunals.785 As a result, the Statute 
ensures that, throughout the ICC proceedings, the victims’ views will be taken 
into consideration, in addition to those of the accused, the Prosecutor and 
affected States.786 Further, and crucially, it affords victims a distinctive role as 
active subjects directly offended by the commission of crimes and counterpoises 
this with the status of witnesses, who, as passive objects of the criminal 
process, may be either victims of the crimes or mere bystanders. Additionally, 
the Statute’s provisions should be recognised as a confirmation of the approach 
taken by international human rights instruments and associated jurisprudence in 
                                         
784 Claude Jorda and Jérôme de Hemptinne, ‘The Status and Role of the Victim’ in Antonio 
Cassese, Paola Gaeta and John R.W.D. Jones (eds), The Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court: A Commentary, vol II (Oxford University Press 2002) 1388, stress that under the 
Statute victims of international crimes were accorded a ‘double status denied to them by the 
provisions setting up the ad hoc Tribunals’. 
785 David Donat-Cattin, ‘Article 68: Protection of victims and witnesses and their participation in 
the proceedings’ in Otto Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (2nd edn, C.H.Beck - Hart - Nomos 2008) 1277. 
786 In accordance with Article 68(3) and Rule 93. See, inter alia, Carsten Stahn, Héctor Olásolo 
and Kate Gibson, ‘Participation of Victims in Pre-Trial Proceedings of the ICC’ 4 JICJ 219, 221. 
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holding that the rights to an effective remedy and to access to justice are at the 
core of victims’ rights.787  
Article 68(3) and Rule 93 grant victims a general right to participate in the 
proceedings before the Court. Article 68(3) provides that, where the personal 
interests of victims are affected, the Court shall permit their views and concerns 
to be presented and considered at various stages of the proceedings. Rule 93 
gives the Court the power to seek the views of victims on any issue. Moreover, 
other provisions of the Statute and the Rules – such as, inter alia, Articles 15(3), 
19(3), 75 and 82(4) and Rules 72(2), 92(2), 119(3) and 143 – provide victims with 
specific participatory rights in a number of ICC proceedings.788 While victims are 
not recognised as equal players in the judicial process – they are ‘participants’ 
rather than ‘parties’ – neither the Statute nor the Rules unambiguously address 
the extent of the victims’ rights to participate. Instead, the parameters of their 
rights are left to the judges’ discretion.789  
Given the lack of any precedent for victims’ participation in international 
criminal justice procedures, the way in which the issue is approached at the 
national level will necessarily be the primary source for interpreting the Statute, 
in accordance with Article 21(1)(c). In this respect, it should be noted that one 
of the most distinctive features of the traditional inquisitorial system of criminal 
justice is that victims may, in respect of some offences and under certain 
circumstances, trigger the commencement of a criminal prosecution or seek a 
review of a decision not to proceed. In some systems they can also join the 
criminal proceedings as ‘offended individuals’ or ‘civil parties’ and thereby 
exercise their right to actively participate in the investigation by introducing 
evidence, requesting investigative steps or questioning witnesses.790 By contrast, 
                                         
787 Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09-24 Decision on Victims' Participation in 
Proceedings Related to the Situation in the Republic of Kenya Pre-Trial Chamber II, 4 November 
2010 para. 5. 
788 Sergey Vasiliev, ‘Article 68(3) and personal interests of victims in the emerging practice of 
the ICC’ in Carsten Stahn and Göran Sluiter (eds), The Emerging Practice of the International 
Criminal Court (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2009) 638, footnote 14. 
789 Gilbert Bitti and Hakan Friman, ‘Participation of Victims in the Proceedings’ in Roy S. Lee 
(ed), The International Criminal Court Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
(Transnational Publishers, Inc 2001) 459. 
790 See (n 21) Cassese and others 332; (n 788) Vasiliev 679-687. In Italy, the persona offesa dal 
reato (person offended by the crime), although not a parte (party) to the proceedings is a 
soggetto (subject), with the right to act as accusa privata (private prosecutor) and the power to 
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in most countries that follow the adversarial tradition, victims, while not 
completely excluded from the criminal justice process, are granted only very 
limited participatory rights, such as the opportunity to provide a statement to 
the Court, and in some cases, to seek a review of a decision not to prosecute.791  
Upon a preliminary reading of the Statute and the Rules, it appears questionable 
whether victims have any right to participate during the investigative stage of 
the proceedings. Article 68(3), which grants victims the general right to 
participate in the proceedings before the Court, is found in Part VI of the 
Statute dealing with trial. However, Rules 89 to 92, containing the procedural 
framework for victims’ participation, are included in Chapter IV of the Rules, 
                                                                                                                           
intervene as from the early investigative stage (indagini preliminari), see Mario Merconi, Diritto 
Processuale Penale (XIX edn, Edizione Giuridiche Simone 2011) 187-192; in France, the partie 
lésée par l’infraction (party damaged by the infraction) is entitled to trigger the investigation 
(mise en movement) and participate in the proceedings exercising the action civile (civil action). 
Prosecutions will ordinarily be triggered either by the Prosecutor (proprio motu or following a 
victim's complaint) or directly by a private party (victim or association), (n 68) Leroy 235-263; in 
Scotland, while the criminal procedure is largely adversarial, it is possible for an individual who 
has suffered a personal wrong to apply to the Court for authority to institute a prosecution. This 
procedure, known as a ‘bill for criminal letters’, is however rarely invoked and hardly ever 
succeeds, see Brown 18; in the Netherlands, the slachtoffer (victim) has the right to be notified 
by the police and the Prosecutor of the commencement and progress of the investigation, may 
have access to the relevant parts of the file, may add evidence and can seek a review of a 
decision not to prosecute, see Wetboek van Strafvordering (the Netherlands, 1921) articles 12, 
51; in Chile, under a new system introduced in 2000, victims (víctimas) are considered parties 
(interviniente) of the criminal process, are entitled to initiate a private criminal action (acción 
penal privada) and can oppose the Prosecutor’s use of his discretionary powers to dismiss or 
temporarily archive a case during the investigative phase by filing an independent criminal 
complaint (querella particular), thereby forcing the Prosecutor to move forward with the 
investigation. Victims who have filed a complaint (querellante) can file an accusation and 
continue with the case through trial, even if the Prosecutor decides not to pursue the case in 
court, see Ley 19696, Código Procesal Penal, (Chile, 12 October 2000).     
791 ‘Victims Impact Statements’ exist in the US, Australia, Canada and England and Wales, see Jo-
Anne Wemmers, ‘Where do they belong? Giving victims a place in the criminal justice process’ 
(2009) 20 Crim LF 395, 398. In England, the Code for Crown Prosecutors instructs Prosecutors, in 
deciding whether a prosecution is required in the public interest, to take into account the views 
of the victim and his family, see The Code for Crown Prosecutors (January 2013), England para. 
4.12(c). As of June 2013, the CPS has launched a new initiative called the ‘Victims' Right to 
Review Scheme’ which facilitates victims seeking a review of a CPS decision not to bring charges 
or to terminate proceedings. This initiative was based on the 2011 Court of Appeal judgment in 
the case of Killick, which stated that victims have a right to seek a review of a CPS decision not 
to prosecute, see R v Christopher Killick [2011] EWCA Crim 1608; Crown Prosecution Service, 
‘Victims' Right to Review Scheme’ (June 2013)  
<http://cps.gov.uk/victims_witnesses/victims_right_to_review/index.html> accessed 20 October 
2013. A recent Directive of the European Union establishes that all Member States shall ensure, 
inter alia, in Article 10(1) that, ‘that victims may be heard during criminal proceedings and may 
provide evidence’ and in Article 11(1) that, ‘in accordance with their role in the relevant 
criminal justice system, have the right to a review of a decision not to prosecute’, see European 
Union, Directive 2012/29/EU, Establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and 
protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA, 25 
October 2012 (2012). 
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together with provisions relating to the various stages of the proceedings. 
Nevertheless, from its earliest decisions, against the predictions of 
commentators792 and despite the Prosecutor’s fierce opposition,793 the different 
PTCs interpreted Article 68(3) as providing for a general participatory right for 
victims at all stages of the proceedings.794  
In its initial decision, PTC I took the view that the term ‘proceedings’, as used in 
Article 68(3), ‘does not necessarily exclude the stage of investigation of a 
situation’.795 As regards the Article 68(3) requirement that the ‘personal 
interests of the victims’ be engaged, the Chamber was of the view that: 
personal interests of victims are affected in general at the investigation 
stage, since the participation of victims at this stage can serve to clarify 
the facts, to punish the perpetrators of crimes and to request reparations 
for the harm suffered.796  
In order for victims to enjoy participatory rights, PTC I adopted a twofold 
procedure. First, the PTC had to decide whether victims, generally speaking, 
were able to participate at the investigation stage of the proceedings; if so, they 
would be granted the ‘procedural status of victims’. At the second stage, the 
Chamber would consider the extent of the participation of particular victims on 
a case-by-case basis. With regard to which specific proceedings the victims could 
participate in, PTC I held that it would ‘decide at the time of the initiation of 
such proceedings whether persons having the status of victims may participate in 
                                         
792 Early commentators envisaged the participation of victims as taking place at the trial or upon 
the confirmation of charges, see (n 215) Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal 
Court 173. 
793 See, inter alia, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-103 
Prosecution's Application for Leave to Appeal Pre-Trial Chamber I's Decision on the Applications 
for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 and VPRS 6 Office 
of the Prosecutor, 23 January 2006. 
794 See, inter alia, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr 
Decision on the applications for participation in the proceedings of VPRS1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 
4, VPRS 5 and VPRS 6 Pre-Trial Chamber I, 17 January 2006 para. 46; Situation in Uganda, ICC-
02/04-101 Decision on victims' applications for participation a/0010/06, a/0064/06 to 
a/0070/06, a/0081/06 to a/0104/06 and a/0111/06 to a/0127/06 Pre-Trial Chamber II, 10 
August 2007 paras 88-89; Situation in Darfur, ICC-02/05-111-Corr Corrigendum to Decision on the 
Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of Applicants a/011/06 to a/0015/06, 
a/0021/07, a/0023/07 to a/0033/07 and a/0035/07 to a/0038/07 Pre-Trail Chamber I, 14 
December 2007. The attitudes adopted by the PTCs differed however between systematic and 
casuistic approaches. While PTC I granted victims a general right to be heard and file documents 
during the investigation stage, PTC II specified particular judicial proceedings in which victims 
could participate.  
795 Congo, ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr para. 38. 
796 Ibid para. 63. 
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them (...) [taking] into account the impact that such specific proceedings could 
have on their personal interests’.797 In addition, persons granted the ‘status of 
victims’ were authorised ‘notwithstanding any specific proceedings being 
conducted in the framework of such an investigation, to be heard by the 
Chamber in order to present their views and concerns and to file documents 
pertaining to the (…) investigation’.798 In addition, victims were also entitled ‘to 
request the Pre-Trial Chamber, pursuant to article 68(3) of the Statute, to order 
specific proceedings’.799 This interpretation, particularly the possibility for 
victims to request the PTC to order specific procedures, potentially allowed the 
PTC to directly intervene in the Prosecutor’s investigation.  
On appeal, however, this broad approach was limited. In its judgment of 
December 2008, the AC observed that ‘the notion of procedural status of victims 
is nowhere defined, and it is difficult to attach a specific meaning to it’.800 In 
interpreting Article 68(3), it distinguished between prosecutorial or investigative 
steps conducted by the Prosecutor, and judicial proceedings, stressing that:  
‘proceedings’ [is] a term denoting a judicial cause pending before a 
Chamber. In contrast, an investigation is not a judicial proceeding but an 
inquiry conducted by the Prosecutor into the commission of a crime with a 
view to bringing to justice those deemed responsible.801  
                                         
797 Ibid para. 73. These included: (i) proceedings to be initiated proprio motu by the PTC 
(Articles 56(3) and 57(3)(c)), in which the Chamber would decide at the time of initiation of such 
proceedings whether persons having the status of victims may participate; (ii) proceedings 
initiated by the Prosecutor or the counsel representing the general interest of the Defence, in 
which victims would be entitled to participate only if they were public proceedings, unless the 
Chamber decided otherwise; and (iii) specific proceedings pursued by the Pre Trial Chamber at 
the request of victims, in case of which the PTC would rule on a case-by-case basis, after 
assessing the impact of such proceedings on the personal interests of the applicants. In addition, 
the victims were entitled to be notified of the proceedings before the Court. See ibid paras 73-
76. 
798 Ibid para. 71.  
799 Ibid para. 75. 
800 Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-556 Judgment on victim 
participation in the investigation stage of the proceedings in the appeal of the OPCD against the 
decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 7 December 2007 and in the appeals of the OPCD and the 
Prosecutor against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 24 December 2007 Appeals Chamber, 
19 December 2008 para. 43 [emphasis added]. 
801 Ibid para. 45.  
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Consequently, the AC found that victims’ participation could take place only 
within the context of judicial proceedings.802 Reinforcing prosecutorial 
independence, it further held that: 
authority for the conduct of the investigations vests in the Prosecutor. 
Acknowledgment by the Pre-Trial Chamber of a right to [sic] victims to 
participate in the investigation would necessarily contravene the Statute by 
reading into it a power outside its ambit and remit.803  
The AC stressed that ‘participation pursuant to article 68(3) of the Statute is 
confined to proceedings before the Court, and aims to afford victims an 
opportunity to voice their views and concerns on matters affecting their 
personal interests’.804 Nevertheless, it notably held that ‘victims are not 
precluded from seeking participation in any judicial proceedings, including 
proceedings affecting investigations, provided their personal interests are 
affected by the issues arising for resolution’.805  
Thus, according to the AC, victims are not entitled – as they theoretically were 
pursuant to prior decisions – to present their views and concerns in relation to 
the investigation, to file documents or to request the PTC to order specific 
proceedings.806 However, the PTC could still decide that victims would be 
allowed to participate in specific judicial proceedings held during the 
investigation stage. This decision should be taken on a case-by-case basis, 
depending on the impact of such proceedings on the victim’s personal 
interests.807  
The AC therefore clearly distinguished between investigative steps, conducted 
by the Prosecutor, and judicial proceedings, viewing them as distinct elements 
of the investigation process. Consequently, while victims cannot intervene in an 
                                         
802 Ibid. 
803 Ibid para. 52. 
804 Ibid para. 55. 
805 Ibid para. 56 [emphasis added]. 
806 Ibid paras 41-46. See also Situation in Darfur, ICC-02/05-177 Judgment on victim participation 
in the investigation stage of the proceedings in the appeal of the OPCD against the decision of 
Pre-Trial Chamber I of 03 December 2007 and in the appeals of the OPCD and the Prosecutor 
against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 6 December 2007 Appeals Chamber, 2 February 
2009 para. 7. 
807 Congo, ICC-01/04-556 paras 46-55; Darfur, Sudan, ICC-02/05-177 para. 7. 
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investigation conducted by the Prosecutor, they are still able to seek 
participation in judicial proceedings conducted at the investigation stage.808  
Following the AC’s judgments, PTC II held in the Kenya situation that there was 
‘no reason to depart from the unified approach undertaken by the different 
Chambers that victims may participate in proceedings related to the situation 
stage’.809 Reproaching the AC for not providing ‘any guidance as to the possible 
scenarios that could lead to [victims’] participation at the situation stage’,810 it 
indicated that victims could participate, inter alia, in judicial proceedings 
related to Articles 53,811 56(3)812 and 57(3)(c),813 Rule 93814 and other instances 
deemed appropriate by the PTC.815 These other instances would include, in 
particular, (i) judicial proceedings triggered by other parties or participants; (ii) 
judicial proceedings started proprio motu by the Chamber; and (iii) proceedings 
following from the Chamber being seized of a request from the victims 
themselves.816 
As to the procedural framework for potential participation – and presumably 
taking into account the considerable burden imposed by the procedure of 
individual assessment of each application previously applied – PTC II devised a 
system, later followed in other situations,817 which includes the assistance of the 
                                         
808 Congo, ICC-01/04-556 para. 57. 
809 Kenya, ICC-01/09-24 para. 9. 
810 Ibid para. 11. 
811 Related to the initiation of an investigation or prosecution. 
812 Related to unique investigative opportunities. 
813 Related to the measures that the PTC may take, inter alia, for the protection and privacy of 
victims and witnesses and the preservation of evidence. 
814 Which established that a Chamber may seek the views of the victims on any issue. 
815 Kenya, ICC-01/09-24 para. 12. 
816 Ibid paras 13-16. 
817 Situation in the Central African Republic, ICC-01/05-31 Decision on Victims' Participation in 
Proceedings Related to the Situation in the Central African Republic Pre-Trial Chamber II, 11 
November 2010 para. 2; Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-593 
Decision on victims' participation in proceedings relating to the situation in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo Pre-Trial Chamber I, 11 April 2011 para. 13; Situation in Libya, ICC-01/11-
18 Decision on Victim's Participation in Proceedings Related to the Situation in Libya Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, 24 January 2012 4; Situation in Uganda, ICC-02/04-191 Decision on Victim's 
Participation in Proceedings Related to the Situation in Uganda Pre-Trial Chamber II, 9 March 
2012. 
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Victims Participation and Reparation Section (VPRS) in the completion of the 
victims’ files and in the initial assessment of compliance with Rule 85.818  
As a result, the right of victims to participate in judicial proceedings at the 
investigation stage has been affirmed by the jurisprudence of the Court. 
However, the way in which the whole process has operated – even before the AC 
judgment – appears to have been such as to achieve only symbolic ‘procedural’, 
as opposed to substantive, participation. Indeed, despite the burdensome 
process for individually granting victims a right to participate in proceedings that 
may eventually be initiated,819 no significant involvement of victims at the 
investigation stage has ever materialised. Some commentators have stressed 
that the mere fact that the victims are no longer excluded from the criminal 
process, being instead recognised as participants and validated when allowed to 
participate, represents an exercise of restorative justice.820 However, others are 
of the view that the attempts of the different PTCs to recognise a role for 
victims during the investigation stage has been mainly theoretical, failing to 
provide meaningful participation.821 This could lead to frustrating the victims’ 
expectations and to ‘secondary victimisation’.822  
                                         
818 In particular, when the Chamber is seized of a request by a party or participant, including the 
victims of the situation, the Chamber will first determine whether they could lead or be linked 
to judicial proceedings. Once the Chamber has determined that judicial proceedings will take 
place – including when initiating them proprio motu – it will assess the requirements of Rule 85 
in relation to the witnesses whose applications can be linked to the issues at stake, before 
turning later to consider whether those victims’ personal interests are affected by the issue 
subject to judicial examination. VPRS will first distinguish between applications for participation 
and those seeking reparation, there being a presumption in favour of the latter in lieu of express 
indication. VPRS will review and ensure that they are complete – requesting additional 
information if necessary – and will perform an initial assessment of compliance with Rule 85, but 
the final assessment will be subject to judicial determination. A report on the VPRS’s 
assessment, together with the applications, should be submitted to the Chamber only when it is 
determined that judicial proceedings will take place, see Kenya, ICC-01/09-24 paras 13-23. 
819 For a critical review of the individualised procedure for victims’ application and the urgent 
need to find a feasible solution that, while recognising the importance of the role of the victims, 
does not undermine the fairness and effectiveness the judicial process, see Lorraine Smith-van 
Lin, ‘Victims' Participation at the International Criminal Court: Benefit or Burden?’ in William 
Schabas, Yvonne McDermontt and Niamh Hayes (eds), The Ashgate Research Companion to 
International Criminal Law Critical Perspectives (Ashgate Publishing Limited 2013). 
820 (n 791) Wemmers 416. 
821 Christine H.  Chung, ‘Victims' participation at the International Criminal Court: Are 
concessions of the Court clouding the promise?’ (2008) 6 Nw U J Int'l Hum Rts 459, 497. 
822 (n 788) Vasiliev 647; Elisabeth Baumgartner, ‘Aspects of victim participation in the 
proceedings of the International Criminal Court’ (2008) 90 IRRC 409, 416, who points out that 
with respect to any given situation, the majority of victims are unlikely to be received by the 
Court on account of the specific incidents concerned either not being investigated or not 
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Sources of frustration could well be identified in the few opportunities in which 
victims submitted concrete requests at the investigation stage, which were later 
rejected with apparently minimal involvement from the PTC. In one case, for 
example, the issue raised before PTC I by certain victims of crimes allegedly 
committed by Lubanga, but not included in the charges brought by the 
Prosecutor, was whether the Prosecutor had taken a tacit decision not to 
proceed with an investigation or prosecution in relation to these crimes and 
whether it had taken measures for the preservation of evidence.823 Similarly, 
some victims requested PTC I to review the Prosecutor’s alleged tacit decision 
not to prosecute Jean-Pierre Bemba within the context of the Congo situation.824 
The matter touched upon the highly sensitive relationship between the 
Prosecutor’s discretion and independence and the PTC’s role in scrutinising the 
Prosecutor’s actions during the investigative stage of the proceedings. PTC I 
however simply dismissed the requests stating that the Prosecutor had not taken 
a decision not to investigate or prosecute and that there was no indication that 
the Prosecutor had not taken measures to ensure the preservation of 
evidence.825 PTC I then missed, on two occasions, the opportunity to fully 
exercise its role of counterbalancing the Prosecutor’s discretion.  
One could argue that victims could be given a more active role during the phase 
of the investigation without unduly compromising the Prosecutor’s 
independence. In most cases, victims are in a ‘privileged’ position compared to 
the Prosecutor as they will have experienced themselves the crimes and be able 
to provide evidence of it. They will also be generally located in close proximity 
to the place where the crimes had been committed, with more direct and 
immediate access to the evidence needed for the prosecution of crimes. Victims 
could be thus the triggering force behind the exercise of the PTC powers 
pursuant to Regulation 48 to request information or documents from the 
Prosecutor, in order for the PTC to be able to exercise its proprio motu powers 
                                                                                                                           
becoming the subject of a specific case. These individuals will therefore be left with unfulfilled 
hopes and expectations. 
823 Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-399 Decision on the Requests of 
the Legal Representative for Victims VPRS 1 to VPRS 6 regarding 'Prosecutor's Information on 
further Investigation' Pre-Trial Chamber I, 26 September 2007 2-3. 
824 Congo, ICC-01/04-582 3. 
825 Congo, ICC-01/04-399 5-6; Congo, ICC-01/04-582 4-5. 
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under Articles 53(3)(b)826 or 57(3)(c).827 Unfortunately however, as will be 
discussed in the following section, so far the PTC has been quite reluctant to 
play any active role during the investigative stage and has avoided any sort of 
involvement that might be interpreted as scrutinising the Prosecutor’s exercise 
of discretion in the selection of cases for prosecution. Within this context, the 
PTC has in fact fallen short in providing victims with meaningful participation 
during the investigative stage and has limited their involvement to a symbolic 
acknowledgment that the applicants may be victims of the situation under 
investigation. However, victims have not been granted any concrete rights 
during the investigation stage.      
5.3 PTC’s intervention during the Prosecutor’s investigation 
As has become the norm with international criminal tribunals, the Statute 
provides for prosecutorial independence and a broad discretion in the selection 
of cases and evidence.828 ICL has been strongly influenced by the adversarial 
tradition since Nuremberg.829 Nonetheless, as a treaty-based institution resulting 
from negotiations among representatives from the different legal systems of the 
world, the Statute represents a novel hybrid system counterbalancing the 
independent Prosecutor with instances of judicial control and intervention by 
the PTC from the earliest stages of the investigation. A role for the PTC at the 
investigative stage was conceived of as a means to ensure the efficiency and 
integrity of the proceedings and the protection of the rights of the defence.830  
                                         
826 Review of the Prosecutor’s decision not to proceed in the interests of justice. 
827 Take measures to, inter alia, provide for the protection and privacy of victims and witnesses 
and the preservation of evidence. 
828 Statute Articles 42(1), 53(1) and (2), 54. 
829 Nuremberg Charter Articles 14-15; ICTY Statute Articles 16, 18; ICTR Statute Articles 15, 17; 
Statute of the Special Court for Sierre Leone (United Nations and the Government of Sierra 
Leone, 16 January 2002) Article 15. 
830 For the discussion during the drafting process of the Statute and the reasons that led to the 
inclusion of Articles 56-57, see, inter alia, Fabricio Guariglia, ‘Investigation and Prosecution’ in 
Roy S. Lee (ed), The International Criminal Court The Making of the Rome Statute Issues, 
Negotiations, Results (Kluwer Law International 1999) 233-238; Fabricio Guariglia and Gudrun 
Hochmayr, ‘Article 56: Role of the Pre-Trial Chamber in relation to a unique investigative 
opportunity’ in Otto Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (Second edn, C.H.Beck - Hart - Nomos 2008) 1108-1109; (n 248) Guariglia, Harris 
and Hochmayr 1118-1119; (n 113) Fourmy 1212-1215. 
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Although not entitled to conduct investigations by itself or to direct the 
Prosecutor’s investigations, the PTC has nonetheless important powers during 
the investigative stage. In particular, and in addition to the authority to provide 
for the participation of victims discussed above and the power to intervene at 
the request of the Prosecutor,831 Articles 56(3)(a) and 57(3)(b) and (c) empower 
the PTC to act upon the request of the person who has been arrested or 
appeared pursuant to a summons or to take some proprio motu measures during 
the investigation stage. These provisions allow the PTC to act either in relation 
to a unique investigative opportunity or in order to assist the person in the 
preparation of his defence or provide for the protection and privacy of victims 
and witnesses, the preservation of evidence and the protection of national 
security information. In order to exercise its functions and responsibilities set 
forth, inter alia, in Articles 56(3)(a) and 57(3)(c), Regulation 48(1) provides a 
powerful tool allowing the PTC to request that the Prosecutor provides the 
necessary specific or additional information or documents in his possession.  
This system, which represents an innovation from the practice of the ad hoc 
tribunals, allows for some judicial involvement during the investigation in order 
to protect the rights of those affected by the investigations.832 It has, however, 
hardly ever been used. Indeed, although the instances of possible intervention 
were agreed upon by the drafters and included in the Statute, the first decade 
of the Court’s existence has been marked by extreme cautiousness, with the PTC 
                                         
831 The different instances in which the PTC may act during the investigative stage of the 
proceedings at the request of the Prosecutor will not be analysed in detail here as they are not 
directed at counterbalancing the Prosecutor’s discretion but to support him in his investigations. 
They include, inter alia, those referred to in Articles 56(1)(b), 57(3)(a) and 54(2)(b) in relation 
to 57(3)(d). 
832 At the ad hoc tribunals of Yugoslavia and Rwanda and at the Special Court for Sierra Leone, a 
Pre-Trial Judge was designated by the Presiding Judge of a Trial Chamber in order to review the 
indictment and, only upon confirmation, issue such orders and warrants as requested by the 
Prosecutor; therefore, there was no judicial involvement during the stage of the investigation. 
See ICTY Statute Article 19; Rules of Procedure and Evidence (International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia, 11 February 1994) Rule 47; ICTR Statute Article 18; Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 29 June 1995) Rule 47; Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence (Special Court for Sierra Leone, 16 January 2002) Rule 47. The Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon includes within its composition an international Pre-Trial Judge, whose role 
is also primarily to review the indictment, but who is also allowed to issue orders as may be 
required for the conduct of the investigation. However, the Pre-Trial Judge can only issue orders 
at the request of the Prosecutor; therefore, unlike the ICC’s PTC, he does not have proprio motu 
powers. See Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (United Nations and the Lebanese 
Republic, 10 June 2007) Article 18; Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon, 20 March 2009) Rule 88. 
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judges appearing reluctant to exercise any sort of control over the Prosecutor’s 
discretionary powers. 
A clear example is the limited use made so far of Article 56, which provides a 
very powerful tool at the disposal of the Prosecutor and of the PTC, aimed at 
preserving evidence that may not be available subsequently for trial. In 
accordance with Article 56 and Rule 114, the PTC may intervene in relation to a 
unique investigative opportunity, either upon the request of the Prosecutor or 
on its own initiative. In the latter case, the PTC’s power to oversee the 
Prosecutor’s investigation is borne out of a desire on the part of the drafters to 
protect the rights of the defence.833 Pursuant to Article 56(3)(a), where the 
Prosecutor has not sought measures pursuant to this Article, but the PTC 
considers that such measures are required to preserve evidence that it deems 
would be essential for the defence at trial, it shall consult with the Prosecutor 
as to whether there is a good reason for his failure to request such measures. If, 
upon consultation, the PTC concludes that the Prosecutor’s failure is unjustified, 
the PTC shall take such measures on its own initiative.  
Guariglia and Hochmayr are of the view that the PTC will only be entitled to 
intervene if and when the Prosecutor informs it, pursuant to Article 56(1)(a), 
that a unique investigative opportunity exists. Such a reading places the 
determination of whether there exists a unique investigative opportunity 
entirely within the discretionary power of the Prosecutor.834 However, this does 
not appear to be in accordance with the drafters’ intention which, as also 
highlighted by the authors, was to ensure ‘at least partial “equality of arms” 
between an accused or a suspect and the Prosecutor at the stage of 
investigation and prosecution’.835 Demanding that the Prosecutor first determine 
that a ‘unique investigative opportunity’ actually exists in order for the PTC to 
be able to act may render the provision meaningless. Indeed, it is hard to 
imagine a Prosecutor simply informing the PTC that there is a unique 
opportunity to preserve evidence that may not be available subsequently for 
trial, but who does not then request the PTC to take measures necessary to 
                                         
833 UN Doc A/AC.249/1998/L.13 (1998) 93. Noting in footnote 160 that the involvement of the 
PTC was conceived of ‘in order to assure a fair trial/protect the interests of the defence’. 
834 (n 830) Guariglia and Hochmayr 1114.  
835 Ibid 1108. 
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ensure the efficiency and integrity of the proceedings. Impeding the PTC to 
determine that a unique investigative opportunity exists, when the Prosecutor 
fails to do so and after consulting with him, excessively limits the PTC’s role and 
its powers to ensure full respect for the rights of the suspect. 
Other commentators do not address this narrow interpretation given by Guariglia 
and Hochmayr and focus on other reasons that may have prevented so far a 
more extensive use of Article 56(3). Fourmy, for example, suggests that a crucial 
limitation on the PTC is imposed by the language of Article 56(3)(a), which 
mandates the decision to be based on the necessity to ‘preserve evidence that 
[the PTC] deems would be essential for the defence at trial’, ie the issue is to 
contribute efficiently towards ensuring a fair trial, which depends to a large 
extent on the Prosecutor’s strategy.836 Schabas notes that the defence itself 
cannot invoke Article 56, although that difficulty appears to have been repaired 
by Article 57(3)(b), which authorises the PTC, upon the suspect’s request, to 
order measures such as those described in Article 56.837 De Smet focuses on the 
practical limitations for the PTC to become aware of the existence of a unique 
investigative opportunity due to their lack of independent information about the 
situation on the ground and of investigative capacities.838 However, nothing 
prevents the PTC becoming aware of the existence of a unique investigative 
opportunity, either because of what is reported by the media or because the 
suspect or victims may have provided it with such information. This would be 
the case, for example, with the opportunity to preserve the official documents 
to be found in the offices or residences of deposed officials on the run when the 
media is notoriously reporting their raid, as was the case with Gaddafi’s 
compound or the Headquarters of Libya’s Intelligence Agency in Tripoli.839 
                                         
836 Fourmy 1218. 
837 Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute 693-694. 
838 Simon De Smet, ‘A structural analysis of the role of the Pre-Trial Chamber in the fact-finding 
process of the ICC’ in Carsten Stahn and Göran Sluiter (eds), The Emerging Practice of the 
International Criminal Court (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2009) 426-428. 
839 The Guardian, ‘Gaddafi compound hit in Nato attack. Libyans claim Nato directly targeting 
Gaddafi in violation of UN resolution after office building and reception area damaged’ (25 April 
2011)  <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/25/gaddafi-compound-hit-nato-attack> 
accessed 17 November 2014; Aljazeera, ‘Secret files: US officials aided Gaddafi. Al Jazeera 
uncovers evidence that influential Americans tried to help the now-deposed Libyan leader cling 
to power.’ (31 August 2011)  
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This provision, if more widely used at the investigative stage, has the potential 
to serve as a powerful tool to counteract the structural imbalance between the 
OTP and the defence and may serve to expedite proceedings. According to 
Kress, depending on how wide or narrow the term ‘unique investigative 
opportunity’ is interpreted there will be considerable repercussions for the 
overall architecture of the proceedings.840 A broader interpretation may diminish 
the dominant position of the Prosecutor during the investigation stage and the 
role of the trial as the climax of the proceedings.841 Notably, the provision 
allows the PTC to overrule a Prosecutor’s decision not to take evidence in a 
particular case, giving to the PTC a subsidiary proprio motu role as an 
investigative body.842 
In accordance with Article 56(4), the admissibility of evidence preserved or 
collected pursuant to Article 56 ‘shall be governed at trial by article 69, and 
given such weight as determined by the Trial Chamber’. This provision allows for 
evidence collected under Article 56 to be introduced at trial, without the need 
for it to be reproduced at that stage. It should be noted that Article 69(2) 
establishes the presumption in favour of oral testimony at trial, except to the 
extent provided by the Statute and the Rules. Rule 68, which regulates the 
conditions under which prior recorded testimony may be introduced in lieu of 
oral testimony at trial, provides that it applies ‘when the Pre-Trial Chamber has 
not taken measures under article 56’. These provisions, therefore, may allow for 
the testimony of a witness collected under this provision to be directly 
submitted at trial, without the need to comply with Rule 68.  
As noted by De Smet, witness recollection of relevant details diminishes 
considerably over time and the risk of extraneous influence on the witness 
increases when he or she has to wait for several years before testifying. 
Accordingly, this important fact-finding tool at the disposal of the PTC may be of 
use not only to ensure that evidence is preserved but also that it is captured 
                                                                                                                           
<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/08/2011831151258728747.html> accessed 
17 November 2014. 
840 Kress, 'The procedural law of the International Criminal Court in outline: Anatomy of a unique 
compromise' 607. 
841 Ibid 607-608. 
842 Ibid 608. 
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when the quality remains high.843 As such, the possibility of collecting evidence 
under this provision, if more frequently used, could be of great utility in the 
volatile environments of the situations under the Court’s jurisdiction. In 
addition, this provision is ostensibly of particular importance given that ICC 
investigations are generally lengthy, most of the time commencing long after the 
events have taken place, and are conducted with limited access to the territory 
and the victims affected by the crimes allegedly committed. In spite of its 
importance, however, it has hardly ever been used. Unless its exercise has 
remained confidential and/or under seal, it would appear that the Prosecutor 
has asked the PTC to take measures in order to obtain a forensic examination of 
certain data on only one occasion, and then ultimately did not even present that 
evidence at trial.844 However, the PTC has never even attempted to use its 
powers under Article 56(3)(a) in order to preserve evidence that may be 
essential for the defence at trial.  
A situation similar to that relating to Article 56 has occurred in relation to the 
exercise by the PTC of its powers under Article 57(3)(c). The provision allows the 
PTC, where necessary, to provide for the protection and privacy of victims and 
witnesses, the preservation of evidence, the protection of persons who have 
been arrested or appeared in response to a summons, and the protection of 
national security information. Guariglia and others argue that this provision does 
not grant additional powers to the PTC and that it only serves as a cross-
reference with other provisions of the Statute.845 However, the clear text of the 
chapeau of Article 57(3) ‘[i]n addition to its other functions under this Statute, 
the Pre-Trial Chamber may’, appears to contradict such a narrow interpretation 
of Article 57(3)(c).  
Regrettably, however, the PTC has also been rather reluctant to make use of 
this provision, which could have allowed, in the Lubanga case for example, a 
better scrutiny of the extent and modalities of the Prosecutor’s investigations 
and of the appropriateness of the measures taken by the Prosecutor to preserve 
evidence. Some victims of the DRC situation – who did not qualify as victims of 
                                         
843 (n 838) De Smet 426-428. 
844 Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-21 Decision on the Prosecutor's 
Request for Measures under Article 56 Pre-Trial Chamber I, 26 April 2005. 
845 (n 248) Guariglia, Harris and Hochmayr 1126. 
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the crimes included in the warrant of arrest against Lubanga – requested PTC I to 
ask the Prosecution for information pursuant to Regulation 48, and to order the 
preservation of the evidence relating to the victims pursuant to the PTC’s 
powers under article 57(3)(c). PTC I took into account the information provided 
by the Prosecutor that he had ‘temporarily suspended’ his investigations in 
relation to certain potential charges against Lubanga, but that he did ‘not 
exclude’ the possibility that he may continue his investigations into crimes 
allegedly committed by Lubanga in the future.846 After taking more than a year 
to decide, PTC I found that there was ‘no indication’ that the Prosecution was 
not taking measures to ensure the preservation of evidence; consequently, it did 
not deem it necessary to exercise authority under Article 57(3)(c), and found ‘no 
reason’ to resort to Regulation 48.847  
In the Lubanga case, PTC I clearly decided not to intervene with the 
Prosecutor’s discretion to select cases and charges for prosecution. As discussed 
in Section 1.1.2, the Prosecutor has discretion not to prosecute or amend 
charges, however, that decision, although discretionary, cannot be arbitrary. 
Although the PTC has no power to order the Prosecutor to proceed against 
certain individuals or crimes – unless the decision not to proceed is based on the 
‘interests of justice’ – it can stimulate transparent decision-making within the 
OTP, allowing for public scrutiny of his function. The PTC may also decide not to 
intervene and leave the Prosecutor to freely exercise his discretion. However, in 
spite of its conformity with the Statute and the Rules, in the particular case of 
the victims of the DRC situation, what was unfortunately lacking was a direct 
answer from the PTC to the victims’ request. The victims were entitled to know 
that, rather than the PTC being ‘satisfied’ that the Prosecutor was indeed taking 
the ‘necessary measures to ensure the preservation of evidence’,848 the PTC had 
in fact decided not to intervene in the exercise of discretion by the Prosecution.  
It should be noted however that, on at least one occasion, PTC I played a more 
proactive role. In the situation in Darfur, given the slow pace of the Prosecutor’s 
investigations and his reiterated claims to the UNSC that it was not possible to 
                                         
846 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-170 Prosecutor's Information on 
Further Investigation Office of the Prosecutor, 28 June 2006 paras 7-10. 
847 Congo, ICC-01/04-399 6. 
848 Ibid. 
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investigate inside Darfur because of the absence of a functioning and sustainable 
system for the protection of victims and witnesses, PTC I decided to act. In a 
rather unexpected move, in July 2006, using its powers under Rule 103(1) and 
Article 57(3)(c), PTC I requested observations on the protection of victims and 
the preservation of evidence from two amicus curiae: the then UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, and the Chairman of the 
International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, the late Antonio Cassese.849  
Both amicus curiae were very critical of the Prosecutor’s reluctance to conduct 
in situ investigations. Cassese proposed a series of general and specific measures 
to take advantage from the fact that the armed conflict was still underway, 
which could have a serious impact on the evidence potentially available. In 
particular, Cassese suggested the use of Articles 56 and 57, in order to interview 
as many persons in the refugee camps as possible, obtain documentary evidence 
and record the testimony of victims which may not be available subsequently at 
trial.850 Arbour stressed that it was possible to conduct serious investigations 
during an armed conflict in general, and in Darfur in particular, without putting 
victims at unreasonable risk,851 and demanded that the Court pursue ‘all 
available avenues to ensure that it fulfils its mandate to deliver justice in a 
timely fashion’.852 The Prosecutor responded that the measures recommended 
                                         
849 Situation in Darfur, ICC-02/05-10 Decision Inviting Observations in Application of Rule 103 of 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence Pre-Trial Chamber I, 24 July 2006. 
850 Antonio Cassese stressed that this was of critical importance ‘for taking the testimony of 
victims of rape, which may not be available subsequently at trial either (i) because the victims is  
[sic] likely to be harassed or intimidated by other persons including militias or State officials, or 
(ii) because the victims’ account is most likely gradually to fade or blur with the passage of 
time, or (iii) because the possible further deterioration of the security conditions in Darfur might 
make it impossible to present evidence in court.’ See Situation in Darfur, ICC-02/05-14 
Observations on issues concerning the protection of victims and the preservation of evidence in 
the proceedings on Darfur pending before the ICC Antonio Cassese, dated 25 August 2006, 
notified 1 September 2006 11. 
851 Situation in Darfur, ICC-02/05-19 Observations of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights invited in application of Rule 103 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence Louise 
Arbour, 10 October 2006 22. 
852 Ibid 25. 
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encroached upon his discretion,853 and stressed that he enjoyed discretion in 
choosing his investigative strategy.854  
Whilst failing to produce the overarching consequences that it might have had, 
PTC I’s ‘impatience with the Prosecutor’s pace’, to borrow Schabas’s words,855 
eventually brought some concrete results. Soon after the amicus curiae reports, 
the Prosecutor informed the States Parties and the UNSC that he was moving 
towards ‘the completion of the investigation and the presentation of evidence in 
relation to the first case’.856 A couple of months later, the first requests for 
warrants of arrest were submitted to the PTC.857  
Although in the Darfur case the PTC’s intervention arguably triggered the 
Prosecutor’s action, the PTC again missed the opportunity to have a more active 
and meaningful role during the investigation and make more extensive use of its 
powers under Article 57(3)(c). Indeed, there was a clear pattern during the first 
decade of the Court’s existence in that PTC was rather reluctant to exercise its 
proprio motu powers. In the situation in Kenya, PTC II stressed that ‘the Court’s 
statutory documents do not empower the Chamber to block the Prosecutor’s 
investigative activities, unless there is a compelling need to intervene in 
instances such as those contemplated in article 57(3)(c) of the Statute’.858 So 
far, however, despite the strong criticism of the way the former Prosecutor 
exercised his discretion,859 the different PTCs have not seen fit to intervene. It 
remains to be seen whether, as the Court matures and grows in confidence, the 
PTC will become more actively involved during the investigation stage. 
                                         
853 Situation in Darfur, ICC-02/05-16 Prosecutor's Response to Cassese's Observation on Issues 
Concerning the Protection of Victims and the Preservation of Evidence in the Proceedings on 
Darfur Pending before the ICC Office of the Prosecutor, 11 September 2006 para. 9. 
854 Ibid para. 28; Situation in Darfur, ICC-02/05-21 Prosecutor's response to Arbour's observations 
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights invited in Application of Rule 103 of 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence Office of the Prosecutor, 19 October 2006 para. 20. 
855 Schabas, 'Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial Activism at the International Criminal Court' 758. 
856 See Annex A to Situation in Darfur, ICC-02/05-40 Notification (with Annex) to Pre-Trial 
Chamber I Office of the Prosecutor, 19 December 2006. 
857 Situation in Darfur, ICC-02/05-56 Prosecutor's Application under Article 58(7) Office of the 
Prosecutor, 27 February 2007. 
858 Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09-39 Second Decision on Application by Nine 
Persons to be Questioned by the Office of the Prosecutor Pre-Trial Chamber II, 31 January 2011 
para. 23. 
859 See, inter alia, (n 518) Schabas, 'Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial Activism at the 
International Criminal Court'; (n 65) Horton; (n 47) Greenawalt; (n 100) Goldston. 
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5.4 Review of the Prosecutor’s decision whether to prosecute an 
identified alleged perpetrator 
The most relevant function of the PTC at the end of the investigative stage is 
the review of the Prosecutor’s decision whether to initiate criminal proceedings 
against an identified alleged perpetrator.  
Having undertaken an investigation, the Prosecutor may decide that there is no 
sufficient basis for a prosecution based on the criteria specified in Article 
53(2).860 In such a case, the Prosecutor shall inform the PTC and the referring 
party of his conclusion and the reasons therefore. In accordance with Article 
53(3), the PTC has the power to review the Prosecutor’s decision, either proprio 
motu where the Prosecutor’s decision is based solely on considerations relating 
to the interests of justice in terms of Article 53(2)(c), or at the request of the 
referring State or UNSC. 
Conversely, the Prosecutor may find reasonable grounds to believe that a person 
has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court and decide to 
prosecute him or her at any time after the initiation of the investigation. In such 
a case, the Prosecutor shall submit a substantiated request to the PTC in order 
that the Chamber – if satisfied that the requirements of Article 58 are met – 
issues a warrant of arrest or a summons to appear against an identified suspect. 
Both scenarios are examined below. 
5.4.1 Review of the Prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute 
Pursuant to Article 53(3), the PTC has the power to review the Prosecutor’s 
decision that ‘there is no sufficient basis for prosecution’ taken in accordance 
with Article 53(2). As stressed by commentators, the conditions for the 
                                         
860 Article 53(2) of the Statute provides: ‘2. If, upon investigation, the Prosecutor concludes that 
there is not a sufficient basis for a prosecution because: (a) There is not a sufficient legal or 
factual basis to seek a warrant or summons under article 58; (b) The case is inadmissible under 
article 17; or (c) A prosecution is not in the interests of justice, taking into account all the 
circumstances, including the gravity of the crime, the interests of victims and the age or 
infirmity of the alleged perpetrator, and his or her role in the alleged crime; the Prosecutor shall 
inform the Pre-Trial Chamber and the State making a referral under article 14 or the Security 
Council in a case under article 13, paragraph (b), of his or her conclusion and the reasons for the 
conclusion.’ 
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implementation of Article 53(2) are unclear, particularly since there is no 
definition of what exactly a ‘decision not to prosecute’ is and there is further no 
deadline imposed upon the Prosecutor as to when such a decision must be 
taken.861 A ‘decision not to prosecute’ may relate, for example, to: (i) a specific 
individual; (ii) certain crimes within the context of a given situation; (iii) a 
certain group of persons within the context of a situation; (iv) certain crimes 
committed by a specific individual, or indeed; (v) the failure to prosecute at all 
within the context of a given situation, such that no cases arise out of the 
situation under investigation.862 The different possible scenarios would result in 
different degrees of judicial review, but the drafters of the Statute again did not 
specify the boundaries between prosecutorial discretion and judicial review, 
leaving the matter to be determined by the Court’s practice. Regrettably, the 
PTC has so far been reluctant to scrutinise prosecutorial choices, consistently 
interpreting this provision as imposing the need for an explicit decision from the 
Prosecutor ‘not to prosecute’. As a result, the Prosecutor has not formalised any 
decision not to prosecute and has thus avoided exposure to any judicial control, 
with the provision remaining a dead letter.863 
In August 2007, PTC I denied a request in the situation in the DRC, from the NGO 
Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice, that the PTC supervise the exercise of 
discretion by the Prosecutor. PTC I argued that the power to review the 
Prosecutor’s decisions would only arise ‘when the Prosecutor decides “not to 
prosecute a particular person or not to prosecute a person for particular 
crimes”’.864 Similarly, in September 2007, after the Prosecutor announced that it 
had temporarily suspended the investigation in relation to other potential 
charges against Lubanga, PTC I denied a request by some victims of the DRC 
situation for a review pursuant to Article 53(3)(b) of the Prosecutor’s implicit 
                                         
861 Gilbert Bitti, ‘Article 53. Ouverture d'une enquête’ in Julian Fernandez and Xavier Pacreau 
(eds), Statut de Rome de la Cour Pénale Internationale Commentaire article par article, vol II 
(Editions Pedone 2012) 1199; Carsten Stahn, ‘Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Discretion: Five 
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863 (n 861) Bitti 1199. 
864 Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-373 Decision on the Request 
submitted pursuant to rule 103(1) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
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decision not to prosecute.865 As the Prosecutor had stated that the suspension 
was only ‘temporary’, PTC I was of the view that ‘since the Prosecutor has not 
taken any decision under Article 53(1)(c) or (2)(c)’ the request was ‘not 
appropriate at the present stage and has no legal basis’.866 The same approach 
was followed in October 2010 in relation to allegations of crimes in the Ituri 
region in the DRC, for which Jean-Pierre Bemba was alleged to have been 
criminally responsible.867 PTC I noted the Prosecutor’s submission that ‘to date 
no decision on “interests of justice” grounds not to proceed against Mr Bemba 
with respect to crimes allegedly committed in Ituri has been taken’, and found 
‘no reason to disbelieve, [that] there is no decision for the Chamber to review 
and there is, accordingly, no basis for it to exercise its powers under article 
53(3)(b) of the Statute.’868  
Therefore, the consistent approach so far has been for the PTC to wait for the 
Prosecutor to take an explicit decision not to prosecute; otherwise, the PTC 
considers that there is no appropriate basis to intervene. The literal 
interpretation of Article 53(2) followed by the Court’s jurisprudence to date has 
resulted in scenarios whereby, if a Prosecutor wanted to avoid being scrutinised, 
he need only ensure that he does not close any investigations or make any 
explicit decisions not to prosecute. In practical terms, however, it seems clear 
that in certain cases ‘tacit’ decisions have been taken, eg not to present new 
charges against Thomas Lubanga, not to prosecute Jean-Pierre Bemba within the 
context of the DRC situation and not to prosecute persons other than the FDLR 
commanders within the context of the Uganda situation.  
In order to ensure certainty and more equal access to justice for victims, which 
are critical aspects of the Court’s legitimacy, the PTC should develop an 
approach that would allow a more active monitoring of developments in the 
Prosecutor’s investigations and, when warranted, ensure that their power to 
review the Prosecutor’s decisions is not circumvented by the Prosecutor’s 
inaction. Without the need for getting involved in reviewing every one of the 
Prosecutor’s decisions as to specific persons or crimes, the PTC could, for 
                                         
865 Congo, ICC-01/04-399. 
866 Ibid 5. 
867 Congo, ICC-01/04-582. 
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example, exercise its inherent powers and periodically review prosecutorial 
strategies and choices within the context of a given situation. As previously 
argued, pursuant to Regulation 48 in relation to Articles 54(1)(a) and 53(3)(b), 
the PTC is entitled to demand more transparent decision-making within the OTP, 
thereby allowing scrutiny of the Prosecutor’s function and contributing to the 
public perception of the Court’s legitimacy.  
5.4.2 Review of the Prosecutor’s decision to initiate criminal proceedings 
against an identified alleged perpetrator  
The last function of the PTC at the conclusion of the investigation stage is to 
review the Prosecutor’s decision to initiate criminal proceedings against an 
identified alleged perpetrator of crimes under the Statute and, if warranted, 
issue either a warrant of arrest or a summons to appear.  
This important function of the PTC represents a critical innovation of the Statute 
compared to the prior experiences of international criminal tribunals. 
Proceedings against an alleged perpetrator at the ICTY, ICTR and STL, for 
example, commence with an indictment that, in very general terms, can be 
considered equivalent to the ICC’s Document Containing the Charges (DoCC). 
The indictment, as well as the DoCC, will be subject to judicial review. 
However, the main difference between the two systems is that, in the ICTY, the 
ICTR or the STL, only once the indictment is confirmed – and the person 
becomes an accused and is committed to trial – will an arrest warrant be 
issued.869 At the ICC, however, the proceedings against an identified alleged 
perpetrator include three clearly differentiated stages: (i) the issuance of the 
warrant or summons, (ii) the proceedings for the confirmation of charges, and 
(iii) the trial. All these three different stages of the proceedings before the ICC 
are subject to judicial control, but are distinct because they are subject to 
increasingly higher evidentiary thresholds – ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ for 
arrest or summons pursuant to Article 58(1)(a); ‘substantial grounds to believe’ 
for confirmation of charges pursuant to Article 61(7); and ‘beyond reasonable 
doubt’ for conviction pursuant to Article 66(3). Moreover, the suspect 
                                         
869 ICTY Statute Articles 18-20; ICTR Statute Articles 17-19; STL Statute Articles 18, 20. 
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participates in the proceedings even before the charges are confirmed and 
he/she is committed to trial. 
In order for a case to be initiated against an identified alleged perpetrator, upon 
investigation the Prosecutor will assess the requirements of Article 53(2) and 
determine whether there is sufficient basis for a prosecution. It should be 
stressed once again that the provision does not mandate the Prosecutor to 
request the initiation of a criminal prosecution every time he is satisfied that 
there is ‘sufficient basis’ for prosecution. Pursuant to Article 58(1), at any time 
after the initiation of the investigation the Prosecutor ‘may’ request the PTC to 
issue a warrant of arrest or a summons to appear, if satisfied that there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court. Again, the provision does not say that the Prosecutor 
‘shall’ submit a request for warrant or summons when he is satisfied that there 
are ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ that a person has committed a crime under 
the Statute. As such, cases that reach the threshold of ‘sufficient basis’ for 
prosecution, can still be dismissed by the Prosecutor if he considers that they do 
not fulfil the ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ standard. Even where he does 
consider that the latter standard has been met, it will be up to the Prosecutor’s 
discretion to decide whether to initiate criminal proceedings.  
Indeed, the thresholds of ‘sufficient basis for prosecution’ and ‘reasonable 
grounds to believe’ do not sufficiently narrow the number of cases that may 
qualify to be prosecuted by the Court. The Prosecutor will have to further apply 
his discretion to decide against whom – and for what crimes – to request the 
initiation of criminal prosecutions. The Prosecutor will then select cases and 
crimes for prosecution in accordance with his policy decisions and practical 
considerations. This decision, although discretionary, cannot be arbitrary or 
biased. Once the decision is taken, the Prosecutor will submit a substantiated 
request to the PTC for it to issue a warrant of arrest or a summons to appear 
against the person in accordance with Article 58. This will be the opportunity for 
the PTC to assess whether the selection of cases and crimes was a legitimate 
exercise of the Prosecutor’s discretion in accordance with his powers under the 
Statute and not arbitrary or the result of improper political influence. The 
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gatekeeping role of the PTC at this stage is thus aimed at protecting the rights 
of the suspect, filtering politically driven prosecutions and ensuring that cases 
go ahead only if substantiated by sufficient evidence. 
As discussed in Section 2.5.2, pursuant to Article 58(1), the PTC shall issue the 
request if, having examined the application and the evidence or other 
information submitted by the Prosecutor, it is satisfied that there are 
‘reasonable grounds to believe’ that the person has committed a crime within 
the jurisdiction of the Court and the arrest appears necessary (i) to ensure the 
person’s appearance at trial; (ii) to ensure that the person does not obstruct or 
endanger the investigation or the Court’s proceedings, or; (iii) where applicable, 
to prevent the person from continuing with the commission of the alleged crime 
or a related crime within the jurisdiction of the Court that arises out of the 
same circumstances. Alternatively, pursuant to Article 58(7), the Prosecutor may 
request the issuance of a summons for the person to appear. The PTC shall issue 
the summons – with or without conditions restricting liberty (other than 
detention) if provided for by national law – if satisfied that there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that the person committed the crime alleged and that the 
summons is sufficient to ensure the person’s appearance.  
The proceedings for the issuance of the warrant or summons will be generally 
conducted on an ex-parte basis. According to the PTC’s interpretation of Article 
58(1), even if the proceedings are of public knowledge the PTC will only analyse 
information and evidence submitted by the Prosecutor. The alleged perpetrator 
is not able to contest the Prosecutor’s allegations. PTC II held within the context 
of the Kenya situation that:  
the Court’s statutory provisions do not provide the person(s) named in the 
Prosecutor’s application with any procedural means to challenge the 
relevance and/or the probative value of the evidence and information 
submitted by the Prosecutor pursuant to article 58 of the Statute or the 
intrinsic quality of his investigations.870  
This interpretation may comport with the letter of the Statute and may help 
prevent delays of the proceedings with lengthy pleadings and discussions, which 
                                         
870 Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09-35 Decision on Application for Leave to Submit 
Amicus Curiae Observations Pre-Trial Chamber II, 18 January 2011 para. 10. 
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should be left for the confirmation of charges hearing that is truly adversarial in 
nature. However, that interpretation does not appear to be adjusted to the 
spirit of the Statute. Indeed as emphasised by Hall, although Article 58 does not 
expressly authorise the PTC to go beyond the application and evidence 
submitted by the Prosecutor, nothing in the Article appears to prevent the 
Chamber from considering other relevant information provided, for example, by 
the victims.871 Similarly, nothing should prevent the Chamber from considering 
relevant information that may be provided by the suspect in the context of a 
public request for a warrant or summons. This could include, for example, 
evidence that the arrest does not appear necessary or information that the 
evidence submitted in support of the Prosecutor’s request was obtained as a 
result of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment such that its 
admission would violate Article 69(7)(b). Indeed, as stressed in Chapter 1, the 
PTC should leave some flexibility in its interpretations of the Statute in order to 
avoid achieving formal or procedural legitimacy at the cost of substantive 
justice. There may be cases in which it will not be fair to ignore the information 
the alleged perpetrator or victims may provide, particularly in order to avoid the 
Court engaging in cases and issuing warrants or summonses which are manifestly 
unfair on account of partial or incorrect evidence provided by the Prosecutor.  
Further, although the Prosecutor has discretion to decide the type and amount 
of evidence and information he will submit to the PTC in order to satisfy the 
‘reasonable grounds to believe’ standard,872 under Article 58(1) the PTC should 
satisfy itself that the threshold is met.873 Consequently, if not intimately 
convinced by the application, the evidence and the information submitted by 
the Prosecutor, the PTC might request him to provide further materials or 
information.874 Alternatively, the PTC may simply refuse to grant a request if it 
considers that the request is unconvincing.875 Indeed, in spite of the PTC’s power 
to request further information, pursuant to Article 58(2), the Prosecutor’s 
                                         
871 Christopher K. Hall, ‘Article 58’ in Otto Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court (C.H.Beck - Hart - Nomos 2008) footnote 15. 
872 Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-8-Corr para. 9; Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-3 para. 24. 
873 Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-8-Corr para. 10. 
874 See, inter alia, in the context of the summons to appear issued within the Kenya situation it 
appears that PTC II requested, in a decision that still remains ex parte, that the Prosecutor 
submit all the witnesses’ statements he had relied on in his application, see Kenyatta at al., ICC-
01/09-02/11-01 para. 4; Ruto et al., ICC-01/09-01/11-01 para. 4. 
875 Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-8-Corr. 
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application should be specific enough so as to contain a concise statement of the 
facts which are alleged to constitute crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court 
for which the arrest or summons is sought, in order to allow the Chamber to 
evaluate whether the allegations are substantiated by sufficient evidence; 
otherwise, the request may be summarily dismissed for lack of specificity.876 
As to the issue of the amount and nature of evidence that the Prosecutor should 
submit in order to meet the evidentiary standard of Article 58, in the Bashir case 
the Majority of PTC I stated that this standard would only be met if the 
materials provided by the Prosecution ‘show that the only reasonable conclusion 
to be drawn therefrom is the existence of reasonable grounds to believe in the 
existence of [the crime for which the arrest is sought]’.877 On appeal, the 
Majority decision was reversed and the AC held that ‘the standard [PTC I] 
developed and applied in relation to ‘proof by inference’ was higher and more 
demanding than what is required under article 58(1)(a)’.878 In the view of the 
AC, requiring that the existence of an element ‘must be the only reasonable 
conclusion amounts to requiring the Prosecutor to disprove any other reasonable 
conclusion and to eliminate any reasonable doubt’; therefore, the standard 
applied was not that of ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ but rather ‘beyond 
reasonable doubt’.879 The AC held that, at this preliminary stage, the PTC does 
not have to be certain that the person committed the alleged offence, since the 
Prosecutor still has the chance to submit more evidence later.880 In subsequent 
cases, the PTC has applied the test developed by the AC stating that under the 
threshold of Article 58(1) ‘[t]he evidence need only establish a reasonable 
conclusion that the person committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Court, and it is not required that this be the only reasonable conclusion that can 
be drawn from the evidence.’881 
                                         
876 PTC II has already dismissed in limine an application for a warrant of arrest for lack of 
specificity. See Congo, ICC-01/04-613. 
877 Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-3 para. 158. 
878 The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-73 Judgment on the appeal 
of the Prosecutor against the 'Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest 
against Omar Hassan Al Bashir' Appeals Chamber, 3 February 2010 para. 39.  
879 Ibid para. 33. 
880 Ibid para. 31. 
881 Mudacumura, ICC-01/04-01/12-1-Red para. 19. 
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The PTC may also decide to issue a warrant or summons in relation only to 
certain specific crimes for which the Chamber is convinced that the 
requirements are met. It is not therefore bound by the entirety of the 
Prosecutor’s request nor by his legal characterisation of the facts,882 rather only 
on a factual basis by the evidence and information provided.883 The PTC can 
substitute the legal characterisation of the facts described in the Prosecutor’s 
Application if it considers that they constitute a different crime than the one for 
which the arrest is sought. For example, in one of the cases arising from the 
situation in Kenya, PTC II found that acts of forcible circumcision of men did not 
qualify as ‘other forms of sexual violence’ but were more properly qualified as 
‘other inhuman acts’.884 Similarly, when issuing the warrant of arrest in the 
Libya situation, PTC I did not agree with the Prosecutor’s legal characterisation 
of the mode of liability of the suspects,885 and issued the warrants of arrest for a 
slightly different mode of participation.886 Equally, the different PTCs have 
consistently refused to issue warrants or summonses in relation to specific 
crimes or incidents when they were not satisfied that there were reasonable 
grounds to believe that the alleged crimes had been committed.887 However, 
they made clear that this does not prevent the Prosecutor from presenting new 
evidence substantiating the rejected crime or incident in the future,888 ie at a 
later stage of the proceedings for the purposes of the confirmation of charges or 
by requesting an amendment of the warrant pursuant to Article 58(6).  
The related matter of whether different and alternative modes of liability 
should be simultaneously included in a given warrant or summons is still not 
settled. In one of the cases arising out of the situation in Kenya, PTC II rejected 
the attribution of an alternative of mode of liability stating that it was not the 
‘best practice to make simultaneous findings on modes of liability presented in 
                                         
882 Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-3 para. 31; Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-8-Corr para. 16; Bemba, ICC-
01/05-01/08-14-tENG para. 25. 
883 Gaddafi and Al-Senussi, ICC-01/11-01/11-1 para. 70. 
884 Kenyatta at al., ICC-01/09-02/11-01 para. 27. 
885 Gaddafi and Al-Senussi, ICC-01/11-01/11-1 para. 66. 
886 Situation Libya, ICC-01/11-12 Decision on the 'Prosecutor's Application Pursuant to Article 58 
as to Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi' 
Pre-Trial Chamber I, 27 June 2011 para. 71. 
887 See, inter alia, Kenyatta at al., ICC-01/09-02/11-01 para. 26; Ruto et al., ICC-01/09-01/11-01 
para. 33; Mudacumura, ICC-01/04-01/12-1-Red paras 30, 41. 
888 Ruto et al., ICC-01/09-01/11-01 para. 33; Kenyatta at al., ICC-01/09-02/11-01 para. 26. 
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the alternative. A person cannot be deemed concurrently as a principal and an 
accessory to the same crime.’889 As such, after finding reasonable grounds to 
believe that two of the suspects were responsible as principals,890 it found ‘no 
reason to examine their role in light of the alternative mode of liability’.891 By 
the same token, in a case arising out of the DRC situation, after finding that 
there were reasonable grounds to believe that Sylvestre Mudacumura was 
criminally responsible under Article 25(3)(b),892 PTC II did not address the 
alternative mode of liability under Article 28(a) advanced by the Prosecutor.893 
However, PTC II stressed that its findings did not ‘prejudice any subsequent 
finding regarding the applicability of a different mode of liability at a later stage 
of the proceedings’.894  
In a clear change of approach, in the case against Laurent Gbagbo, the 
Prosecutor based his request exclusively on the suspect’s participation as a 
principal under Article 25(3)(a), but PTC III found it to be:  
undesirable, particularly at this early stage of the case, for the Chamber to 
limit the options that may exist for establishing criminal responsibility 
under the Rome Statute, because this will ultimately depend on the 
evidence and arguments in the case.895  
PTC III then stressed that its findings ‘may well need to be revisited in due 
course with the parties and participants’.896 Similarly, in the case against Walter 
Barasa, the Single Judge of PTC II, Cuno Tarfusser found that it was: 
unnecessary to take at this stage a definitive position on (…) the specific 
form of individual responsibility (…) [it being] more appropriate that a 
definitive position on those issues be taken within the context of proper 
adversarial proceedings.897  
                                         
889 Ruto et al., ICC-01/09-01/11-01 para. 36. 
890 Ibid para. 37. 
891 Ibid para. 38. 
892 Mudacumura, ICC-01/04-01/12-1-Red para. 69. 
893 Ibid para. 59. 
894 Ibid para. 69, see also in similar terms Kenyatta at al., ICC-01/09-02/11-01 para. 52. 
895 Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/11-9-Red para. 74. 
896 Ibid para. 77. 
897 The Prosecutor v. Walter Osapiri Barasa, ICC-01/09-01/13-1-Red2 Warrant of arrest for 
Walter Osapiri Barasa Pre-Trial Chamber II, 2 August 2013 para. 19. 
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This change of approach may allow some flexibility leaving the decision as to the 
precise form of participation to a later stage of the proceedings when more 
evidence has been presented and the parties have been able to present their 
arguments. 
5.5 Conclusions 
The PTC’s exercise of its gatekeeping role at the investigative stage of the 
proceedings during the first decade of the Court’s existence denotes a certain 
reluctance on the part of the Judges to firmly scrutinise the Prosecutor’s actions 
or to be significantly involved during this stage. 
As described above, although an important part of the PTC’s efforts and 
resources were devoted for some years to facilitating victims’ ‘participation’ 
during the investigation stage, at the time of writing the role played by the 
victims has not in fact resulted in any concrete advantages for the victims 
themselves or for the Court’s fact-finding and truth searching mandate. Victims’ 
participation during the investigation of crimes has remained formal and has in 
fact represented nothing more than their ‘symbolic’ recognition. Victims have 
not been granted a meaningful right to present their views and concerns and to 
have them considered. As previously stressed, the PTC has missed the 
opportunity to ‘profit’ from the victims’ ‘privileged’ position as regards 
evidence and information and have fallen short in directly addressing the 
victims’ concerns by failing to explain the concrete reasons behind their 
decisions not to review the Prosecutor’s exercise of discretion. 
By the same token, the PTC has almost completely disregarded the considerable 
benefits that a more extensive use of their powers under Articles 56(3)(a) and 
57(3)(c) may have for the Court and the prosecution of crimes of concern to the 
international community as a whole. Given that pursuant to Article 54(1)(a) the 
Prosecutor is obliged to investigate fully ‘in order to establish the truth’, the 
PTC should more actively use Regulation 48 and request information and 
documents from the Prosecutor that may allow it to exercise its powers under 
Articles 53(3)(b), 56(3)(a) and 57(3)(c).  
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Taking into particular account the fact that the Court may potentially act in 
relation to ongoing conflicts, the possibility of obtaining evidence as early as 
possible and preserving it for trial, as well as providing for the protection and 
privacy of witnesses and victims from the earliest stages, are crucial 
mechanisms for the expeditious and responsible delivery of justice. The PTC 
should therefore re-assess its approach to involvement during the Prosecutor’s 
investigation as soon as possible, considering especially the length of the 
proceedings before the Court so far; the several incidents of allegations of 
witness tampering in the Bemba and Kenya cases; and the serious difficulties in 
prosecuting high-level officials such as Al Bashir and Kenyatta.  
Similarly, although the Prosecutor has discretion to choose cases and crimes for 
prosecution, his decisions cannot be arbitrary. As such, in order to ensure 
certainty and equal access to justice for victims, the PTC should more actively 
monitor developments in the Prosecutor’s investigations and, when warranted, 
ensure that its powers to review the Prosecutor’s decisions are not prevented by 
the Prosecutor’s non-action. Although the PTC has the power to order the 
Prosecutor to proceed against certain individuals or crimes only in those cases 
when the decision not to proceed is solely based on the interests of justice, the 
use of Regulation 48 may stimulate more transparent decision-making within the 
OTP, allowing scrutiny of the Prosecutor’s decisions and contributing to public 
perceptions of the Court’s legitimacy.  
Lastly, as to the PTC’s role in reviewing the Prosecutor’s decision to proceed 
against an identified alleged perpetrator and issue a warrant or summons, the 
PTC should continue to emphasise that it is for the Chamber to be satisfied at 
the required threshold that the requirements to proceed are complied with. The 
PTC should, however, be flexible in its interpretations and avoid the promotion 
of formal or procedural legitimacy at the cost of substantive justice. The PTC 
should ensure that the Court does not engage in cases or issue warrants or 
summons which are manifestly unfair on account of their being based on partial 
or incorrect information and evidence provided by the Prosecutor. 
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Chapter 6. The PTC’s role in determining the factual and legal 
scope of the Court’s cases 
6.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 5, pursuant to Article 58, for a warrant or summons to 
be issued the PTC has to be satisfied that the application and evidence 
submitted by the Prosecutor provide ‘reasonable grounds to believe that the 
person has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court’. The issuance 
of a warrant or summons marks the commencement of a ‘case’, which relates to 
concrete conduct amounting to crime(s) under the jurisdiction of the Court 
allegedly committed by one or more identified alleged perpetrator(s). Once the 
person has been arrested or has appeared voluntarily, a further step has to be 
followed before he is committed to trial. As an additional safeguard and 
precondition for the trial to start, the PTC must hold a hearing – in the presence 
of the Prosecutor, the person charged and his counsel – aimed at deciding 
whether to confirm the charges on which the Prosecutor intends to seek trial.  
The confirmation of charges hearing is aimed at avoiding unfounded allegations 
as well as ensuring the Court’s efficiency, independence and impartiality. It 
guarantees that only cases supported by sufficient evidence go ahead, 
protecting the interests of the suspects and providing, at the same time, access 
to justice for the alleged victims. Pursuant to Article 61, the PTC will confirm 
the charges only when satisfied that there are ‘substantial grounds to believe 
that the person committed each of the crimes charged’. This standard, more 
demanding than that for arrest or summons, is justified by the critical 
importance of the DeCC, which crystallises the factual scope of the case against 
the accused, and therefore, of the trial.  
At the time of writing, charges against 16 suspects have passed the confirmation 
or pre-trial stage of the proceedings and 12 individuals have been committed to 
trial, while charges against the remaining four have not been confirmed.898 The 
                                         
898 The charges against Bahar Idriss Abu-Garda, Callixte Mbarushimana, Mohammed Hussein Ali 
and Henry Kiprono Kosgey have not been confirmed by the PTCs. See Abu Garda, ICC-02/05-
02/09-243-Red; The Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, ICC-01/04-01/10-465-Red Decision on 
the confirmation of charges Pre-Trial Chamber I, 16 December 2011; Kenyatta et al., ICC-01/09-
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different PTCs have taken on average approximately one year to conduct these 
proceedings.899 That duration, and the issue of whether the proceedings have 
become in fact ‘a mini-trial or a trial before the trial’,900 has been the source of 
some of the most pointed criticism of the role of the PTC.901  
This Chapter, however, argues that the confirmation proceedings are a 
fundamental feature of the PTC’s gatekeeping function. As emphasised by PTC 
III, Article 61 ‘reflects in essence the filtering function of the Pre-Trial 
Chamber’.902 Judicial scrutiny of the charges is a necessary safeguard to avoid 
wholly unfounded prosecutions and to focus the Court’s efforts and resources on 
cases for which there is substantial evidence going beyond mere suspicion. At 
the same time, the confirmation proceedings ensure respect for the rights of the 
suspects and victims and guarantee the fairness, effectiveness and 
expeditiousness of the Court’s proceedings as a whole.903  
This Chapter analyses the manner in which this fundamental role entrusted to 
the PTC has to this point been interpreted and applied in the Court’s 
                                                                                                                           
02/11-382-Red; The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap 
Sang, ICC-01/09-01/11-373 Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) 
and (b) of the Rome Statute Pre-Trial Chamber II, 23 January 2012.   
899 The duration of the pre-trial stage will certainly depend of a series of circumstances. Among 
the factors which may occasion delays are requests for postponements by either party as well as 
requests for additional information, adjournments pursuant to Article 61(7)(c), the assessment of 
the accused’s fitness and the possible joining of cases. When looking only at numbers, it 
generally takes approximately one year to conduct the pre-trial proceedings  See (i) Lubanga 
case, Initial Appearance (IA) 20 March 2006 – DeCC 29 January 2007; (ii) Katanga case, IA 22 
October 2007 – DeCC 26 September 2008; (iii) Ngudjolo case, IA 11 February 2008 – DeCC 26 
September 2008; (iv) Mbarushimana case, IA 28 January 2011 – DeCC 16 December 2011; (v) 
Bemba case, IA 4 July 2008 – DeCC 15 June 2009; (vi) Abu Garda case, IA 18 May 2009 – DeCC 8 
February 2010; (vii) Banda and Jerbo case, IA 17 June 2010 – DeCC 7 March 2011; (viii) Ruto et al 
case, IA 7 April 2011 – DeCC 23 January 2012; (ix) Kenyatta et al case, IA 8 April 2011 – DeCC 23 
January 2012; (x) Ntaganda case, IA 26 March 2013 – DeCC 9 June 2014; and (xi) Gbagbo case, IA 
5 December 2011 – DeCC 12 June 2014. 
900 The PTCs have consistently reiterated that ‘the confirmation hearing has a limited scope and 
purpose and should not be seen as a “mini-trial” or a “trial before the trial”’, see, inter alia, 
The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-717 Decision 
on the confirmation of charges Pre-Trial Chamber I, 30 September 2008 para. 64.  
901 See, inter alia, Volker Nerlich, ‘The Confirmation of Charges Procedure at the International 
Criminal Court: Advance or Failure?’ (2012) 10 JICJ 1339; War Crimes Research Office, 
Expediting Proceedings at the International Criminal Court (American University Washington 
College of Law 2011) 18-25. 
902 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08-388 Decision Adjourning the Hearing 
pursuant to Article 61(7)(c)(ii) of the Rome Statute Pre-Trial Chamber III, 3 March 2009 para. 9. 
903 For approaches to ensure fairness and expeditiousness of pre-trial proceedings see, inter alia, 
Ekaterina Trendafilova, ‘Fairness and Expeditiousness in the International Criminal Court's Pre-
Trial Proceedings’ in Carsten Stahn and Göran Sluiter (eds), The Emerging Practice of the 
International Criminal Court (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2009). 
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jurisprudence. Section 6.2 discusses the object and purpose of the confirmation 
proceedings as envisaged by the drafters of the Statute and interpreted by the 
Court. Section 6.3 examines more specifically the evolution of the Court’s 
understanding of the role of the PTC in framing the factual scope of the case. 
Section 6.4 focuses in turn on the development of the Chamber’s function as 
regards the determination of the appropriate legal characterisation of the facts. 
Finally, Section 6.5 presents conclusions. 
6.2 The object and purpose of the proceedings for the confirmation of 
charges  
As discussed in Section 5.4.2, the proceedings for the commencement of a 
prosecution against an alleged perpetrator at the ICC substantially differ from 
other experiences of international criminal justice. At the ICTY, ICTR, SCSL and 
STL the proceedings commence with an indictment.904 In very general terms, the 
indictment is more or less equivalent to the ICC’s DoCC. However, although both 
are subject to judicial review, the level of judicial intervention necessary for 
their issuance differs substantially.  
At the ICTY/ICTR for example, the Prosecutor issues an indictment when 
satisfied that a prima facie case exists.905 One judge is required to confirm the 
indictment, but the review is ex parte and the standard of proof is only on a 
‘prima facie’ basis.906 In light of this, during the first years of the tribunals’ 
activities, most indictments issued by the ICTY/ICTR Prosecutors were summarily 
confirmed without further consideration. This created procedural difficulties and 
delays later at trial. In particular, the indictments had to be frequently 
amended, by the addition or withdrawal of charges, on account of the 
                                         
904 The proceedings at the ECCC are rather different, being based on a non-adversarial hybrid 
system in which the co-prosecutors, on the basis of a complaint or proprio motu, initiate 
prosecutions. After conducting a preliminary examination, if the co-prosecutors have reason to 
believe that crimes under the ECCC jurisdiction have been committed, they will open the 
judicial investigation and send an introductory submission to the co-investigative judges. The co-
investigative judges will then investigate the facts, concluding their investigation either by 
charging the person or dismissing the case. See Guido Acquaviva, ‘New Paths in International 
Criminal Justice? The Internal Rules of the Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers’ (2008) 6 JICJ 
129. 
905 (n 112) Marchesiello 1234. 
906 Ibid. 
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Prosecutor’s failure to clearly identify the case in the indictment document.907 
The parties would frequently fail to focus their presentation of evidence on the 
issues in actual dispute and would enter into extensive discussions on evidentiary 
matters.908 As such, after years of lengthy trials, new rules were devised 
imposing greater judicial control during the pre-trial phase with the aim of 
streamlining the proceedings while ensuring their fairness and effectiveness.909 
Nonetheless, these problems led ICTY Judge Iain Bonomy, among others, to 
suggest that a purely adversarial procedure – as was essentially in operation at 
the ICTY/ICTR – was not suitable for trying complex and highly political 
international criminal cases.910  
Learning from these experiences, the ICC’s Statute provides for increased 
judicial control over the activities of the Prosecutor.911 Although there were 
different views as to the model to be adopted, during the preparatory works of 
the Statute there was a general consensus that the effectiveness of the 
investigation and prosecution of crimes had to be balanced with the need to 
ensure fairness to the accused.912 The understanding was that ‘there will be no 
fair trial without a fair pre-trial’.913 The model eventually adopted resembles 
preliminary hearings held under common law procedure,914 with the addition of 
certain mechanisms found in continental judicial systems aimed at speeding up 
proceedings and supervising the Prosecutor.915 In accordance with this 
framework, proceedings for the confirmation of charges are held by a Chamber, 
                                         
907 (n 113) Fourmy 1211. 
908 See, inter alia, Ian Bonomy, ‘The Reality of Conducting a War Crimes Trial’ (2007) 5 JICJ 348, 
350-351; Mark B. Harmon, ‘The Pre-Trial Process at the ICTY as a Means of Ensuring Expeditious 
Trials. A Potential Unrealized’ (2007) 5 JICJ 377, 389-392. 
909 For the measures implemented in order to ensure expediency in the proceedings and the 
critical role assigned to ICTY’s pre-trial judges see, inter alia, (n 908) Bonomy; (n 908) Harmon. 
910 See, inter alia, (n 908) Bonomy 349-350; Jérôme de Hemptinne, ‘The Creation of Investigating 
Chambers at the International Criminal Court. An Option Worth Pursuing?’ (2007) 5 JICJ 402, 404-
405; Robert Heinsch, ‘How to Achieve Fair and Expeditious Trial Proceedings before the ICC: Is it 
Time for a More Judge-Dominated Approach? ’ in Carsten Stahn and Göran Sluiter (eds), The 
Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2009) 488-
489. 
911 Kuniji Shibahara and William A. Schabas, ‘Article 61 Confirmation of the Charges before the 
Trial’ in Otto Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (Second edn, C.H. Beck - Hart - Nomos 2008) 1173. 
912 (n 830) Guariglia, 'Investigation and Prosecution' 234. 
913 (n 112) Marchesiello 1232. 
914 (n 215) Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court 140; (n 112) Marchesiello 
1233. 
915 (n 113) Fourmy 1211-1213; (n 112) Marchesiello 1232-1233. 
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composed of three judges, before which the person charged has the right to be 
present and to contest the evidence.916 Going even further and given the 
experience of the ad hoc tribunals, some have even suggested that it would have 
been appropriate to have built in even greater judicial control by establishing 
investigating chambers to further enhance the effectiveness, legitimacy and 
fairness of the international proceedings.917  
One of the most significant differences between the systems of international 
tribunals is that, in the ICTY, ICTR or STL, the arrest warrant is issued only after 
the indictment is confirmed and the person has become an accused committed 
to trial.918 The suspect however does not have any involvement in the 
proceedings for the confirmation of the indictment. The ICC’s Statute, in 
contrast, gives the person the right to participate in the confirmation 
proceedings. According to Article 61(1), the confirmation should take place 
within a reasonable time ‘after’ the person’s surrender or voluntary appearance 
before the Court. Although this is ‘subject to the provisions of paragraph 2’, 
which regulate the confirmation of charges ‘in the absence of the person’,919 an 
initial appearance by an accused is nonetheless a pre-condition for the 
confirmation to take place.920 The participation of the alleged perpetrator in the 
confirmation hearing makes the Court’s system radically different from that of 
the other tribunals, in which the individual cannot participate before the 
issuance of the indictment.921  
According to Article 61(7), based on the hearing the PTC may: (a) confirm all or 
some of the charges; (b) decline to confirm all or some of the charges, or; (c) 
adjourn the hearing and request the Prosecutor to consider providing further 
evidence, conducting further investigations or amending a charge. Pursuant to 
Article 61(9), after the charges are confirmed and before the trial begins, the 
                                         
916 For the main differences between the ICTY/ICTR review of the indictment and the ICC 
confirmation of charges see The Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, ICC-01/04-01/10-514 
Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 16 
December 2011 entitled 'Decision on the confirmation of charges' Appeals Chamber, 30 May 2012 
para. 43. 
917 (n 910) de Hemptinne 414-417. 
918 ICTY Statute Articles 18-20; ICTR Statute Articles 17-19; STL Statute Articles 18, 20. 
919 Article 61(2) deals with situations where the accused waived his right to be present or fled. 
920 (n 112) Marchesiello 1244; (n 215) Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal 
Court 139.  
921 (n 21) Cassese and others 368. 
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Prosecutor may amend the charges with the permission of the PTC, but if the 
Prosecutor seeks to add additional charges or substitute the initial charges for 
more serious ones, a new confirmation of charges hearing must be held.922  
The different PTCs have consistently stressed that the confirmation proceedings 
are ‘designed to protect the rights of the Defence against wrongful and wholly 
unfounded charges’.923 The pre-trial proceedings indeed ensure that 
prosecutions are not frivolous, thereby protecting the accused from 
prosecutorial abuse.924 The PTC acts as the ‘judicial guarantor of the 
proceedings’,925 ensuring that only those persons ‘against whom sufficiently 
compelling charges going beyond mere theory or suspicion have been brought’ 
will be committed to trial.926  
In addition to helping avoid wrongful prosecutions, the confirmation proceedings 
ensure ‘judicial economy by allowing to distinguish between cases that should go 
to trial from those that should not’.927 They also give the defence the 
opportunity to challenge the evidence submitted by the Prosecutor and gather 
and present its own evidence, which ensures equality of arms and guarantees 
efficient and effective trial proceedings.928 At the confirmation hearing ‘a 
                                         
922 It should be noted that although the Statute refers to the confirmation ‘hearing’, the 
established jurisprudence considers the hearing to include not only the oral sessions of the 
confirmation proceedings but also the written submissions, this is relevant due to the deadline 
imposed by Regulation 53 for the Chamber to deliver its written DeCC within 60 days from the 
date the confirmation hearing ends. See, inter alia, Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08-388 paras 30-37. 
923 Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN para. 37; Katanga and Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-717 
para. 63; Abu Garda, ICC-02/05-02/09-243-Red para. 39; The Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda 
Abakaer Nourain and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus, ICC-02/05-03/09-121-Corr-Red Decision on 
the Confirmation of Charges Pre-Trial Chamber I, 7 March 2011 para. 31; Mbarushimana, ICC-
01/04-01/10-465-Red para. 41; Kenyatta et al., ICC-01/09-02/11-382-Red para. 52; The 
Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/11-432 Decision adjourning the hearing on the 
confirmation of charges pursuant to article 61(7)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute Pre-Trial Chamber I, 3 
June 2013 para. 18. 
924 (n 215) Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court 140. 
925 Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08-388 para. 28. 
926 Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN para. 37; Abu Garda, ICC-02/05-02/09-243-Red para. 39; 
Banda and Jerbo, ICC-02/05-03/09-121-Corr-Red para. 31; Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/11-432 para. 
18. 
927 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08-424 Decision Pursuant to 
Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre 
Bemba Gombo Pre-Trial Chamber II, 15 June 2009 para. 28; Banda and Jerbo, ICC-02/05-03/09-
121-Corr-Red para. 31; Mbarushimana, ICC-01/04-01/10-465-Red para. 41; Ruto et al., ICC-
01/09-01/11-373 para. 40; Kenyatta et al., ICC-01/09-02/11-382-Red para. 52; Gbagbo, ICC-
02/11-01/11-432 para. 18. 
928 (n 113) Fourmy 1225. 
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suspect may contest both matters of statutory interpretation and evidential 
aspects of the Prosecutor’s case’.929  
Another fundamental difference between the ICC and the other tribunals is that, 
as described in previous Chapters, for the first time in the history of 
international criminal justice, the victims have a role to play and can participate 
in the proceedings. This includes the confirmation hearing since, as stressed by 
PTC I, this is ‘an essential stage of the proceedings’930 in which the victims of 
the alleged crimes are entitled to participate in order to satisfy their right to 
truth and justice.931 Accordingly, victims have been consistently allowed to 
present their views and concerns and participate throughout the pre-trial 
proceedings with substantial procedural rights.932 
In terms of Article 61, the threshold to be satisfied for the charges to be 
confirmed is ‘substantial grounds to believe’. For the interpretation of this 
standard of proof the different PTCs have so far relied on internationally 
recognised human rights jurisprudence.933 Accordingly, they have requested the 
Prosecutor to ‘offer concrete and tangible proof demonstrating a clear line of 
reasoning underpinning its specific allegations’.934 The evidentiary rules at 
confirmation are more relaxed than those for trial – pursuant to Article 61(5) the 
Prosecutor may rely on documentary or summary evidence and does not need to 
                                         
929 The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein 
Ali, ICC-01/09-02/11-425 Decision on the appeal of Mr Francis Kirimi Muthaura and Mr Uhuru 
Muigai Kenyatta against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of 23 January 2012 entitled 'Decision 
on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and(b) of the Rome Statute' Appeals 
Chamber, 24 May 2012 para. 33. 
930 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-462-tEN Decision on the 
Arrangements for Participation of Victims a/0001/06, a/0002/06 and a/0003/06 at the 
Confirmation Hearing Pre-Trial Chamber I, 22 September 2006 5. 
931 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-474 
Decision on the Set of Procedural Rights Attached to Procedural Status of Victim at the Pre-Trial 
Stage of the Case Pre-Trial Chamber I, 13 May 2008 paras 31-44. 
932 For a summary of the different procedural rights granted to victims at the pre-trial stage in 
the Lubanga, Katanga, Kony, Bemba and Abu Garda cases see Salinas and Sloan 247-251 
933 Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN para. 38; Katanga and Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-717 
para. 65. 
934 Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN para. 39; Katanga and Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-717 
para. 65; Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08-424 para. 29; Abu Garda, ICC-02/05-02/09-243-Red para. 37; 
Mbarushimana, ICC-01/04-01/10-465-Red para. 40; Ruto et al., ICC-01/09-01/11-373 para. 40; 
Kenyatta et al., ICC-01/09-02/11-382-Red para. 52; The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, ICC-
01/04-02/06-309 Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the 
Charges of the Prosecutor Against Bosco Ntaganda Pre-Trial Chamber II, 9 June 2014 para. 9; The 
Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/11-656-Red Decision on the confirmation of charges 
against Laurent Gbagbo Pre-Trial Chamber I, 12 June 2014 para. 19. 
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call the witnesses expected to testify at trial. Nonetheless, the different PTCs 
have stressed that they would commit a suspect to trial only if, after analysing 
the evidence, they are ‘thoroughly satisfied that the Prosecution’s allegations 
are sufficiently strong’.935  
While of critical importance and aimed at achieving a series of purposes, the 
confirmation proceedings nevertheless have a limited scope and ‘should not be 
seen as a “mini-trial” or a “trial before the trial”’.936 As a consequence, the 
different PTCs have refrained from entering into any premature in-depth 
analysis of the guilt or innocence of the suspects, refusing to evaluate ‘whether 
the evidence is sufficient to sustain a future conviction’,937 so as not to exceed 
their mandate. As emphasised by De Smet, the confirmation proceedings ‘serve 
as a protection for the accused against unsubstantiated accusations, not as a 
preparatory condemnation’.938 
Marchesiello characterises the PTC’s role during the confirmation proceedings as 
‘filtering, safeguarding and pushing ahead’.939 The PTC has indeed actively 
exercised their ‘filtering’ and ‘safeguarding’ functions. However, the way in 
which the role of the PTC has so far been interpreted has not actually permitted 
it to contribute substantially to ‘pushing ahead’ the Court’s proceedings as a 
whole. The contribution of the DeCC and of the confirmation proceedings in 
general to the preparation of the trial itself has been, in fact, very limited.940 
The PTC is however not principally responsible for this.  
Article 74(2) states that the TC’s decision on the merits of the case (i) shall be 
based on its evaluation of the evidence and the entire proceedings; (ii) shall not 
exceed the facts and circumstances described in the charges and any 
amendments thereto; and (iii) the Court may base its decision only on evidence 
submitted and discussed before it at trial. However, one particular decision of 
                                         
935 Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN para. 39. 
936 Katanga and Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-717 para. 64. See also Abu Garda, ICC-02/05-02/09-
243-Red para. 39. 
937 Abu Garda, ICC-02/05-02/09-243-Red 40. See also, Mbarushimana, ICC-01/04-01/10-465-Red 
para. 44; Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06-309 para. 100. 
938 (n 838) De Smet 428. 
939 (n 112) Marchesiello 1238. 
940 For a similar view see (n 838) De Smet 438; (n 901) Nerlich 1348-1354. 
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TC I in the Lubanga case, subsequently followed by the other TCs, limited the 
impact of the work of the PTC in the subsequent trials, particularly in relation to 
the probative value of the evidence submitted and relied upon at pre-trial. TC I 
stressed that the Court’s legal framework ‘undoubtedly established the 
unfettered authority of the Trial Chamber to rule on procedural matters and the 
admissibility and relevance of evidence’.941 Accordingly, it ruled that the 
evidence presented for confirmation ‘must be introduced, if necessary, de novo’ 
at trial.942 More importantly, it stated that the record of the pre-trial 
proceedings transmitted to the TC pursuant to Rule 130 is ‘to be used [only] as a 
“tool” to help with preparation and the progress of the case’.943 According to 
this approach, which is based on a rather strict interpretation of Article 74(2),944 
although the TC receives the full record of the pre-trial proceedings in which the 
parties have submitted and discussed the evidence, that very same evidence 
upon which the PTC based its findings has to be submitted, admitted and 
discussed again at trial.  
Arguably, within the scope of its powers under Article 69(2),945 Rule 132(2),946, 
and Regulation 54(g) and (i),947 the first step that a TC could take in preparation 
for trial would be to confer with the parties concerning the extent to which the 
evidence included in the record of the pre-trial proceedings should be admitted 
for the purposes of trial. Evidentiary submissions by the parties and an item-by-
item decision by the TC as to their admissibility should be sufficient for it to be 
able to rely on that evidence as ‘submitted and discussed before it at trial’ in 
                                         
941 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-1084 Decision on the status before 
the Trial Chamber of the evidence heard by the Pre-Trial Chamber and the decisions of the Pre-
Trial Chamber in trial proceedings, and the manner in which evidence shall be submitted Trial 
Chamber I, 13 December 2007 para. 5. 
942 Ibid para. 8. 
943 Ibid. 
944 Article 74(2) provides: ‘The Trial Chamber's decision shall be based on its evaluation of the 
evidence and the entire proceedings. The decision shall not exceed the facts and circumstances 
described in the charges and any amendments to the charges. The Court may base its decision 
only on evidence submitted and discussed before it at the trial.’ 
945 Allowing for the introduction of documents and written transcripts. 
946 Which allows the TC to confer with the parties in order to facilitate the fair and expeditious 
conduct of the proceedings. 
947 Regulation 54 allows the TC to issue any orders in the interests of justice for the purposes of 
the proceedings, including in sub-paragraph (g) to determine the number of documents referred 
to in Article 69(2) to be introduced at trial and sub-paragraph (i) the extent to which a 
participant can rely on recorded evidence, including the transcripts and audio and video-
recorded of evidence previously given. 
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accordance with Article 74(2). A change of approach in this direction should be 
encouraged as it may substantially expedite the trial proceedings. 
Further, PTC I in the Banda & Jerbo case opined that the role of the PTC goes 
beyond the filtering of cases,948 and includes the power to ‘determine the 
factual ambit of the case for the purposes of the trial and circumscribe it by 
preventing the Trial Chamber from exceeding that factual ambit.’949 Pursuant to 
Article 74(2) and Regulation 55(1), the TC cannot exceed ‘the facts and 
circumstances described in the charges and any amendments to the charges’.950 
Accordingly, the factual margins of the case against the accused – and therefore 
of the trial – are those delimited by the PTC in its DeCC. 
The DoCC prepared by the Prosecutor has no mandatory force in itself. As 
stressed by PTC I, a favourable decision by a PTC does not amount to a 
confirmation of the DoCC, but of the charges contained therein.951 What 
constitutes the ‘charges’ against an accused is not the DoCC, but rather, the 
charges ‘as confirmed’ by the PTC. As such, the DoCC has to be read in 
conjunction and in light of the DeCC. Although the Statute does not define the 
term ‘charge’, pursuant to Regulation 52,952 charge has been understood as 
being composed of both ‘the facts and circumstances underlying the alleged 
crime as well as of their legal characterisation’.953 Therefore, the essential 
elements of a charge are: (i) a factual description of the crimes; and (ii) their 
                                         
948 Banda and Jerbo, ICC-02/05-03/09-121-Corr-Red para. 32. 
949 Ibid para. 34. 
950 Regulation 55(1) gives the TC the authority to modify the legal characterisation of the facts, 
stating: ‘In its decision under article 74, the Chamber may change the legal characterisation of 
facts to accord with the crimes under articles 6, 7 or 8, or to accord with the form of 
participation of the accused under articles 25 and 28, without exceeding the facts and 
circumstances described in the charges and any amendments to the charges.’ 
951 Banda and Jerbo, ICC-02/05-03/09-121-Corr-Red para. 38. 
952 Regulation 52 requires the DoCC to include: ‘a) The full name of the person and any other 
identifying information; b) A statement of the facts, including the time and place of the alleged 
crimes, which provides a sufficient legal and factual basis to bring the person or persons to trial, 
including relevant facts for the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court; c) A legal characterisation 
of the facts to accord both with the crimes under articles 6, 7 or 8 and the precise form of 
participation under articles 25 and 28.’ 
953 Ruto et al., ICC-01/09-01/11-373 para. 44; Kenyatta et al., ICC-01/09-02/11-382-Red para. 
56. 
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legal characterisation, including both the crimes and the form of 
participation.954  
Below the different interpretations given thus far to the PTC functions in 
determining the factual scope of the case and its legal characterisation are 
examined. 
6.3 The PTC’s role in determining the factual scope of the case 
Together with establishing which cases should proceed to trial, the 
determination of the factual scope of the cases that pass this screening is one of 
the most important manifestations of the PTC’s gatekeeping function at the pre-
trial stage. The jurisprudence of the different Chambers of the Court has 
consistently stressed that ‘[t]he power to frame the charges lies at the heart of 
the Pre-Trial Chamber’s functions’.955 However, the extent to which the PTC 
may in practice delimit the factual scope of the trial remains greatly contested. 
What can a PTC actually do when presented with facts and circumstances not 
properly, or not at all, captured in the charges brought by the Prosecutor? Can 
the PTC alter the charges of its own accord when issuing the DeCC? To what 
extent can a PTC use its Article 61(7)(c) power to adjourn the hearing and 
request that the Prosecutor provide further evidence, conduct further 
investigations or amend a charge? Are any ‘facts and circumstances’ discussed 
during the confirmation hearing that amount to a crime under the jurisdiction of 
the Court ‘relevant’ for the PTC’s consideration? Is the PTC limited in its analysis 
of the facts by the crimes identified by the Prosecutor in its DoCC? Different 
answers to these questions have been advanced through the different cases that 
have come before the Court. They are analysed below to illustrate the current 
understanding of the PTC’s function and identify its strengths and deficiencies.  
                                         
954 Dov Jacobs, ‘A Shifting Scale of Power: Who is in Charge of the Charges at the International 
Criminal Court?’ in William A. Schabas, Yvonne McDermontt and Niamh Hayes (eds), The Ashgate 
Research Companion to International Criminal Law Critical Perspectives (Ashgate Publishing 
Limited 2013) 207. 
955 Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-1084 para. 39. 
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6.3.1 Which facts are to be delimited by the PTC in the DeCC? 
The Lubanga case was the first to progress to confirmation proceedings. As has 
been extensively reported, the charges brought by the Prosecutor were 
controversially limited to the war crimes of conscripting, enlisting and using 
children under the age of fifteen to participate actively in the hostilities,956 
pursuant to 8(2)(e)(vii).957 It was alleged by the Prosecutor that the crimes were 
committed in Ituri between September 2002 and December 2003, within the 
context of an armed conflict ‘not of an international character’.958 At 
confirmation, the defence contested the characterisation of the armed conflict, 
alleging that Ituri was under the control of Uganda, Rwanda and the United 
Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) 
during the relevant period.959 The legal representative of victims also stated that 
the involvement of Uganda and Rwanda was common knowledge, however, it 
recalled that the Statute qualifies the alleged acts as criminal under the Statute 
whether committed in an international or non-international conflict.960  
In light of the evidence submitted,961 PTC I found that the armed conflict was of 
an ‘international character’ from July 2002 to 2 June 2003, due to the presence 
of Uganda as an occupying power,962 and that between 2 June and late 
December 2003 the armed conflict was ‘not of an international character’.963 
PTC I took note of Article 61(7)(c)(ii),964 under which it would have been possible 
for the PTC to adjourn the hearing and request the Prosecutor to consider 
amending a charge, but stressed that the purpose of the provision was to 
‘prevent the Chamber from committing a person for trial for crimes which would 
be materially different’ from those set out in the DoCC.965 Since Articles 
                                         
956 Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN paras 9-12. 
957 The provision proscribes, in armed conflicts not of an international character, the conduct of 
conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into armed forces or groups or 
using them to participate actively in hostilities. 
958 Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN paras 9-12. 
959 Ibid para. 200. 
960 Ibid. 
961 Ibid paras 167-199, 212-219. 
962 Ibid para. 220. 
963 Ibid paras 227-237. 
964 Ibid para. 202. 
965 Ibid para. 203. 
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8(2)(b)(xxvi)966 and 8(2)(e)(vii) ‘criminalise the same conduct’, their 
differentiation resting solely on whether the armed conflict may be considered 
international in character, the PTC did not find it necessary to resort to Article 
61(7)(c)(ii).967 Accordingly, without any formal amendment, the Chamber 
confirmed the crimes charged under both Article 8(2)(b)(xxvi) and 8(2)(e)(vii).968 
In short, PTC I in effect committed the suspect to trial for three newly added 
charges not brought by the Prosecutor. 
The decision of PTC I, presided over at that time by the French Judge Claude 
Jorda, was consistent with the proactive approach originally taken by that 
Chamber. As discussed in Section 5.3, this was the same Chamber that actively 
requested information as to the progress of the Prosecutor’s investigations in 
Sudan and the DRC. The addition of charges in the Lubanga DeCC, although 
triggered by the submissions of the suspect and the victims, was based on the 
evidence and information provided at the hearing. It has however been criticised 
as infringing upon the separation of powers created in the Statute between the 
Prosecutor and the PTC.969 Indeed, a literal interpretation of Article 61(1),970 
(4),971 (7)(c)972 and (9)973 supports the conclusion that the Prosecutor retains the 
exclusive power to decide on the individuals and conduct to be brought to trial. 
Nevertheless, as discussed in Section 1.2.3, although the Prosecutor enjoys 
discretion, his decisions cannot be arbitrary or biased. The PTC’s power to 
review the Prosecutor’s decisions in order to determine whether they are a 
legitimate exercise of his discretion is then exercised at this stage of the 
proceedings when deciding whether or not to confirm the charges brought by the 
Prosecutor. However, the PTC does not have the power to amend the charges 
                                         
966 This Provision proscribes, in international armed conflicts, the conduct of conscripting or 
enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into the national armed forces or using them to 
participate actively in hostilities. 
967 Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN para. 204. 
968 Ibid 156-157. 
969 (n 954) Jacobs, 'A Shifting Scale of Power: Who is in Charge of the Charges at the International 
Criminal Court?' 210. 
970 Given that the provision refers to the ‘charges on which the Prosecutor intends to seek trial’. 
971 Given that the provision allows the Prosecutor, before the hearing, to continue the 
investigation and amend or withdraw any charges. 
972 Allowing the PTC to suspend the hearing and request the Prosecutor to consider either 
provide further evidence or amend a charge. 
973 Allowing the Prosecutor to amend the charges after confirmation with the permission of the 
PTC or to withdraw the charges after the commencement of the trial with the permission of the 
TC. 
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directly. The Chamber must assess the evidence submitted and determine 
whether it indeed fulfils the threshold for the case to be committed to trial. If it 
does not, pursuant to Article 61(7), the PTC has only two alternatives: either to 
decline to confirm the charges or otherwise to ‘request the Prosecutor’ to 
‘consider’ providing further evidence, conducting further investigations or 
amending the charges. The PTC is not allowed to charge a suspect by itself or to 
alter the charges without the Prosecutor’s consent.  
The fact that the PTC is not permitted to charge a suspect or alter the charges 
submitted by the Prosecutor does not however imply that the PTC’s function is 
that of a rubber-stamping body. In the Lubanga case PTC I rightly understood 
that its role was not limited to a simple revision of the Prosecutor’s DoCC, yet 
no doubt technically speaking when adding charges by itself it failed to follow 
the procedure provided by Article 61(7) the Statute. PTC I was right in that, as a 
general rule, a PTC does not have to simply follow the Prosecutor’s 
characterisation and ignore any fact that comes to its attention if not related to 
the charges brought by the Prosecutor. The PTC should rather use the full extent 
of its powers during the confirmation proceedings and request the Prosecutor to 
consider providing further evidence, conducting further investigations or 
amending the charges whenever warranted by the evidence or information 
provided at the hearing. This would allow the PTC to exercise meaningful 
judicial control over the Prosecutor’s choices, in accordance with the Statute 
and without infringing upon the Prosecutor’s independence.    
In the same Lubanga case both parties sought, unsuccessfully, leave to appeal 
the DeCC. Instead of granting appeal, PTC I directed the parties to raise the 
matter before the relevant TC pursuant to Regulation 55,974 stressing that ‘there 
is nothing to prevent the Prosecution or the Defence from requesting that the 
Trial Chamber reconsider the legal characterisation of the facts described in the 
charges against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and as confirmed by the Chamber’.975 This 
approach was rather unfortunate. As described in the previous section, the 
PTC’s involvement at the pre-trial stage of a case should contribute to the 
                                         
974 See above footnote 950. 
975 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-915 Decision on the Prosecution 
and Defence applications for leave to appeal the Decision on the confirmation of charges Pre-
Trial Chamber I, 24 May 2007 para. 44. 
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preparation and streamlining of the trial proceedings. Leaving to the TC issues 
that could have been effectively addressed at the pre-trial stage – by the AC if 
not by the PTC itself – can only delay proceedings. In addition, although PTC I 
treated the issue as one of the ‘legal characterisation of facts’, it is clear that it 
actually added to the charges facts that were not pleaded by the Prosecutor, 
but by the suspect and the victims (specifically the involvement of third party 
States in the conflict within a certain period of time).976 A review by the AC 
would have given some clarity as to whether PTC I was actually acting within the 
scope of its powers when adding those facts. The use of Regulation 55 at trial is 
not the proper method of resolving discrepancies that have arisen already at the 
confirmation stage. The disagreement about the inclusion of these new facts and 
the PTC’s recommendation that the parties request at trial a re-characterisation 
of the facts pursuant to Regulation 55, only created uncertainty for the suspect 
about the nature, cause and content of the charges, infringing upon his rights as 
guaranteed by Article 67(1)(a), to be informed promptly and in detail of the 
nature, cause and content of the charges.  
As encouraged by PTC I, as soon as the TC in charge of the trial was constituted, 
the Prosecutor requested it to either rule that PTC I had acted ultra vires or to 
use Regulation 55 to modify the legal characterisation of the facts.977 In a 
decision of great relevance to the interpretation of the role and functions of the 
PTC, TC I clearly stated that it had ‘no authority to ignore, strike down or 
declare null and void the charges as confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber’.978 It 
emphasised that the PTC and the TC have separate functions at the different 
stages of the proceedings and that there is no hierarchy or appellate jurisdiction 
of the TC over any decision of the PTC.979 TC I stressed that it ‘has not been 
given a power to review the only decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber that is 
definitely binding on the Trial Chamber’980 and held accordingly that it could not 
nullify or ignore PTC I’s DeCC.981 It did however consider that, so long as the 
facts and circumstances described in the charges were not exceeded, pursuant 
                                         
976 Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN para. 200. 
977 Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-1084 para. 29. 
978 Ibid para. 39. 
979 Ibid para. 43. 
980 Ibid. 
981 Ibid para. 44. 
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to Regulation 55 it could give a different legal characterisation to those facts.982 
TC I therefore gave the parties and participants notice that there was a 
possibility that it may modify the legal characterisation of the armed conflict 
pursuant to Regulation 55.983 In its final judgment, after analysing the relevant 
evidence presented at trial,984 TC I eventually changed the legal characterisation 
of the facts determining that ‘the armed conflict relevant to the charges was 
non-international in character’.985 Consequently, instead of the issue having 
been solved at the pre-trial stage of the proceedings, as would have been 
preferable, the parties and TC I spent time and resources at trial discussing and 
presenting evidence as to the facts relevant to the nature of the conflict.  
Another significant matter that should have been dealt with at the confirmation 
stage in the Lubanga case was the issue of the limited charges brought by the 
Prosecutor. As stated, the Prosecutor only charged Lubanga with the crimes of 
conscripting, enlisting and using children to participate actively in hostilities. 
Without denying the gravity of those crimes, it appears that even at the 
confirmation stage the Prosecutor provided information and evidence related to 
other crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court, which were not included in the 
charges against Lubanga. Indeed, during the confirmation the defence 
complained that the Prosecutor included in the DoCC facts that were not 
relevant to the confirmation or otherwise of the specific charges, yet PTC I was 
of the view that nothing prevented the Prosecution from mentioning facts that 
would be helpful in understanding the context in which the conduct charged 
occurred.986  
In the course of the trial, the testimony of the witnesses was again not strictly 
limited to facts relevant to the crimes charged. The legal representatives of 
victims requested that TC I use Regulation 55 to re-characterise the facts so as 
to include the crime against humanity or war crime of sexual slavery as well as 
                                         
982 Ibid para. 47. 
983 Ibid para. 48. 
984 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842 Judgment pursuant to Article 
74 of the Statute Trial Chamber I, 14 March 2012 paras 543-565. 
985 Ibid 566. 
986 Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN para. 152. 
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the war crime of inhuman and/or cruel treatment.987 TC I by Majority,988 
interpreted Regulation 55 as providing for two distinct sets of proceedings: (i) 
under sub-paragraph 1, the possibility to change the legal characterisation of 
the facts at the time of the issuance of TC’s final judgment, subject only to the 
limitation of not exceeding the facts and circumstances described in the charges 
and any amendments to the charges,989 and; (ii) under sub-paragraph 2, the 
possibility to re-characterise at any time during the trial, subject to the 
safeguards of sub-paragraph 3, but not limited by the facts and circumstances 
described in the charges.990 Accordingly, the Majority of TC I gave notice to the 
parties and participants of the possibility that the legal characterisation of the 
facts might be subject to change in order to include the crimes mentioned by 
the victims.991  
It transpires from the dissenting opinion that both the DoCC and the DeCC made 
reference to the severe sanctions and rigorous and strict discipline faced by 
children.992 Accordingly, PTC I could also have made use of Article 61(7)(c) at 
the confirmation stage in relation to these additional facts that might have 
amounted to crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court but were not included in 
the charges, and could have asked the Prosecutor to provide further evidence, 
conduct further investigations or amend the charges. PTC I could have also 
combined its power under Article 61(7)(c) with that of Regulation 48 to ask for 
additional information or documents and Article 53(3)(b) to review the 
Prosecutor’s decision not to proceed in the interests of justice. The PTC could 
have requested the Prosecutor to provide information as to whether his decision 
                                         
987 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-2049 Decision giving notice to the 
parties and participants that the legal characterisation of the facts may be subject to change in 
accordance with Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court Trial Chamber I, 14 July 2009 
para. 1. 
988 Judge Adrian Fulford dissented arguing that Regulation 55 creates an indivisible or singular 
process and that the Statute left control over the framing and effecting of any changes to the 
charges exclusively to the PTC, as part of a scheme clearly designed to ensure that, once the 
trial has begun, the charges are not subject to any further amendment, addition or substitution 
and can only be withdrawn at the request of the Prosecutor with leave of the Chamber. See The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-2069-Anx1 Second Corrigendum to 
Minority opinion on the 'Decision giving notice to the parties and participants that the legal 
characterisation of facts may be subject to change in accordance with Regulation 55(2) of the 
Regulations of the Court' of 17 July 2009 Trial Chamber I, 31 July 2009 paras 16-17, 21-33. 
989 Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2049 para. 27. 
990 Ibid paras 28-29. 
991 Ibid para. 35. 
992 Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2069-Anx1 paras 46-49. 
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not to prosecute these conduct was based on the belief that it was not in the 
interests of justice to do so. Dealing with these matters at the confirmation 
stage would have addressed, if not altogether pre-empted, some of the 
criticisms raised in relation to the Lubanga case, particularly, as discussed in 
Sections 3.2.3.1 and 3.4.2, the application and interpretation of the principle of 
complementarity and of the gravity threshold.  
Deciding on the appeal against the TC I’s Majority Regulation 55 Notice, the AC, 
in a judgment of great significance for the future understanding of the concept 
of ‘facts and circumstances underlying the charges’, reversed the decision on 
the basis that Regulation 55(2) and (3) ‘may not be used to exceed the facts and 
circumstances described in the charges or any amendments thereto’.993 In the 
AC’s view, Regulation 55 is aimed at avoiding: 
the risk of acquittals that are merely the result of legal qualifications 
confirmed in the pre-trial phase that turn out to be incorrect, in particular 
based on the evidence presented at trial. This would be contrary to the aim 
of the Statute to ‘put an end to impunity’.994  
Accordingly, the purpose of Regulation 55 is to close accountability gaps, which 
is fully consistent with the Statute.995 It may not be used, the AC stressed, by 
the TC to extend proprio motu the scope of the trial to facts not alleged by the 
Prosecutor, as this would be contrary to the distribution of powers under the 
Statute, which gives the Prosecutor the power to proffer charges against 
suspects.996  
The AC further noted that while Regulation 55 authorises the modification of the 
legal characterisation of the facts underlying the charges,997 it does not stipulate 
what specific changes may be permissible.998 By way of clarification, the AC 
stated that Article 74(2), which limits the scope of the trial decision on the 
                                         
993 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-2205 Judgment on the appeals of 
Mr Lubanga Dyilo and the Prosecutor against the Decision of Trial Chamber I of 14 July 2009 
entitled 'Decision giving notice to the parties and participants that the legal characterisation of 
the facts may be subject to change in accordance with Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the 
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merits to the facts and circumstances described in the charges and any 
amendments, confines the scope of Regulation 55 as well to the facts and 
circumstances described in the charges and any amendment thereto.999 In a 
seminal statement which, despite being perhaps the most significant of the 
whole decision was to be found in a footnote, the AC specified: 
In the view of the Appeals Chamber, the term ‘facts’ refers to the factual 
allegations which support each of the legal elements of the crime charged. 
These factual allegations must be distinguished from the evidence put 
forward by the Prosecutor at the confirmation hearing to support a charge 
(article 61(5) of the Statute), as well as from background or other 
information that, although contained in the document containing the 
charges or the confirmation decision, does not support the legal elements 
of the crime charged. The Appeals Chamber emphasises that in the 
confirmation process, the facts, as defined above, must be identified with 
sufficient clarity and detail, meeting the standard in article 67(1)(a) of the 
Statute.1000 
This fundamental distinction made by the AC between the factual allegations 
‘supporting’ the legal elements of the crimes charged, and the evidence and 
background information which ‘do not support’ the legal elements of the crimes, 
although apparently straightforward, has proven in practice to be a difficult line 
to draw.  
In the Banda & Jerbo case, PTC I attempted to clarify the issue. It first 
reiterated the PTC’s power to circumscribe the factual ambit of the case for the 
purpose of trial.1001 It specified that ‘no delimiting or otherwise constraining 
power can be ascribed to facts and circumstances which, despite having been 
mentioned or dealt with at the pre-trial stage, do not appear in the charges as 
confirmed by the Chamber’.1002 Accordingly, it distinguished those facts and 
circumstances ‘underlying the charges’ – which would limit the factual scope of 
the case – from other facts ‘subsidiary’ or otherwise related to the charges, 
providing background information but not mentioned in the charge itself, which 
                                         
999 Ibid para. 93. 
1000 Ibid para. 90, footnote 163 [emphasis added]. 
1001 Banda and Jerbo, ICC-02/05-03/09-121-Corr-Red para. 34. 
1002 Ibid para. 36. 
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would be ‘deprived of any limiting power vis-à-vis the Trial Chamber’.1003 Again 
in a footnote, the Chamber noted: 
[i]t is understood that the ‘legal elements of the crime charged’ include all 
the constitutive elements of such a crime as well as the objective and 
subjective elements of the mode of liability according to which the crime 
charged has been confirmed by the Chamber.1004  
However, when assessed in the context of the Banda and Jerbo DeCC, this 
clarification does not cast much light upon what exactly the Chamber meant by 
the facts and circumstances ‘underlying the charges’ and the ‘legal elements of 
the crimes charged’, nor is it conclusive as to whether the Chamber did in fact 
draw a line between underlying and subsidiary facts. Examining this particular 
DeCC highlights the uncertainty at play: did the Chamber understand its 
‘constraining power’ to be limited to the ‘charges’ or ‘counts’ as referred to in 
paragraph 5 of the DeCC?1005 Or was it referring instead to the more detailed 
description of the ‘charges’ as mentioned at pages 4-5 of the DeCC?1006 Footnote 
49 clarifies that the Chamber understood the ‘legal elements’ to include 
‘constitutive elements’ of the crimes as well as ‘subjective and objective’ 
elements of the mode of liability, yet does this mean that the Chamber 
understood its ‘limiting power vis-à-vis the Trial Chamber’ to include every 
factual finding mentioned between paragraphs 48 and 161 of the DeCC? Or were 
the operative elements limited to the description of the counts in paragraphs 59, 
88, 110 and 124?  
The DeCC in the Banda and Jerbo case was also ambiguous as to the dividing line 
between ‘underlying’ and ‘subsidiary’ facts, despite the significance of the 
distinction for the criminal liability of the accused. In particular, PTC I did not 
consider it necessary to examine the potential responsibility of the accused as 
                                         
1003 Ibid paras 36-37. 
1004 Ibid para. 37, footnote 49. 
1005 Paragraph 5 of the DeCC baldly states: ‘Accordingly, the Prosecutor charges Abdallah Banda 
and Saleh Jerbo with the war crimes of: I. violence to life and attempted violence to life, within 
the meaning of articles 8(2)(c)(i), 25(3)(a) and 25(3)(f) of the Rome Statute (“Statute”); II. 
intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, materials, units and vehicles 
involved in a peacekeeping mission, within the meaning of articles 8(2)(e)(iii) and 25(3)(a) of the 
Statute; and III. pillaging, within the meaning of articles 8(2)(e)(v) and 25(3)(a) of the Statute’, 
see ibid para. 5. 
1006 Ibid 4-5. 
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indirect co-perpetrators1007 as it was satisfied that the suspects personally 
participated in the attack1008 and otherwise made essential contributions 
thereto, including planning, ordering and providing the troops. Accordingly, it 
confirmed the charges for their alleged responsibility as co-perpetrators.1009 It is 
an open question whether, as a consequence of this decision, the TC will be 
limited to consideration only of the facts relevant to the alleged confirmed co-
perpetration. What if it were not proven at trial beyond reasonable doubt that 
the suspect participated in the attack? Must the suspect therefore be acquitted? 
Or will it be possible for the TC to rely on other facts considered in the DeCC or 
mentioned in the DoCC that may be relevant to a re-characterisation of the 
criminal liability as indirect co-perpetration pursuant to Regulation 55? As 
illustrated, the clarification given by PTC I is simply insufficient. 
In the Ruto et al. and the Kenyatta et al. cases, PTC II also attempted to clarify 
its understanding of the extent to which the DeCC establishes the factual 
subject matter of the trial. It also upheld the view that the facts ‘underlying the 
charges’ are ‘the only ones that cannot be exceeded by the Trial Chamber once 
confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber’.1010 It further specified that facts or 
evidence that are subsidiary to the facts described in the charges ‘are of 
relevance only to the extent that facts described in the charges may be inferred 
from them’.1011 As such, the Chamber found it unnecessary to engage in the 
examination of each and every subsidiary fact mentioned in the DoCCs, as it had 
only to analyse them to the extent necessary to satisfy the evidentiary 
threshold.1012 The Chamber further stressed that this  
does not prevent the Prosecutor from relying on these or other subsidiary 
facts in the future, in the same way that the parties are not precluded 
                                         
1007 Ibid para. 125, 162. 
1008 Ibid para. 155. 
1009 Ibid para. 162. 
1010 Ruto et al., ICC-01/09-01/11-373 para. 47; Kenyatta et al., ICC-01/09-02/11-382-Red para. 
59. 
1011 Ruto et al., ICC-01/09-01/11-373 para. 47; Kenyatta et al., ICC-01/09-02/11-382-Red para. 
59. 
1012 Ruto et al., ICC-01/09-01/11-373 para. 48; Kenyatta et al., ICC-01/09-02/11-382-Red para. 
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from relying at trial upon new or additional evidence from that presented 
at the pre-trial stage of the case.1013 
Notably, in relation to these cases, the Chamber included some additional 
specifications. In the Kenyatta et al. case, PTC II included in the DeCC a special 
section called ‘overall conclusions of the chamber’,1014 where the individuals, 
charges and mode of liability were specified in relation to which the Chamber 
believed the required threshold was satisfied. The Chamber further stressed that 
the charges ‘must be confirmed to the extent specified’ in that paragraph1015 
and, although the operative part only states that certain charges are confirmed 
against certain suspects, it seems clear that the charges are not merely 
confirmed as described in the DoCC by the Prosecutor, but rather made subject 
to the general specifications included in the conclusions. It should be recognised 
that, as a consequence, the temporal and geographical scope of the case was 
restricted1016 and the conduct further specified.1017 It remains to be seen 
whether these specifications will be actually helpful at trial. At first sight, it 
appears that issues may arise in relation to, among other things, the fact that 
the temporal scope of the case was limited to only four days and, in the absence 
of a settled description of the facts on which the assessment of criminal liability 
is based, the description of the conduct was either too general or too specific. 
By the same token, in the Ruto et al. case, PTC II included two brief paragraphs 
in which it summarised the conduct which it was satisfied had met the required 
threshold.1018 In the dispositive part of the decision, PTC II clearly stated that 
                                         
1013 Ruto et al., ICC-01/09-01/11-373 para. 48; Kenyatta et al., ICC-01/09-02/11-382-Red para. 
60. 
1014 Kenyatta et al., ICC-01/09-02/11-382-Red paras 428-430. 
1015 Ibid para. 429. 
1016 The Prosecutor has brought charges for crimes allegedly committed ‘from on or about 30 
December 2007 to 31 January 2008 (…) in or around locations including Nakaru town (Nakuru 
District, Rift Valley Province) and Naivasha town (Naivasha District, Rift Valley Province)’. 
However, the Chamber was satisfied of the commission of crimes only ‘in or around Nakuru 
between 24 and 27 January 2008 and in or around Naivasha between 27 and 28 January 2008’. 
See ibid paras 21, 428. 
1017 For example, in Count 7 the Prosecutor brought charges for the crime against humanity of 
‘other inhumane acts’ describing the conduct as ‘the inflicting of great suffering and serious 
injury to body or to mental or physical health by means of inhumane acts upon civilians 
supporters of the [ODM]’. However, PTC II was satisfied of more specific conduct amounting to 
‘(i) severe physical injury of perceived ODM supporters; and (ii) infliction of serious mental 
suffering to perceived ODM supporters by way of subjecting them to witnessing the killings and 
mutilations of their close relatives’. See ibid paras 21 (Count 07), 428(d). 
1018 Ruto et al., ICC-01/09-01/11-373 paras 349, 367. 
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the charges were confirmed ‘to the extent specified’ in those paragraphs.1019 
Although in both cases PTC II arguably attempted to afford the TC sufficient 
latitude to adopt its own interpretation of the facts of the case, the manner in 
which it did so may have inadvertently actually limited the TC’s freedom. 
In both cases the potential limiting effect of the DoCC on the PTC’s power to 
frame the factual allegations was also discussed. In the Ruto et al. case, when 
presented with a request from a legal representative of victims to make use of 
Article 61(7)(c)(ii) adjourning the hearing and request the Prosecutor to consider 
amending a charge in order to include additional conduct, PTC II was of the view 
that it could not do so, insofar as the provision referred to ‘amending’ a charge 
and not ‘adding’ a new one.1020 Presented with the same situation, in the 
Kenyatta et al. case, PTC II stated that ‘consistent with the principle of 
prosecutorial discretion, the Chamber is not vested with the authority to request 
the Prosecutor to consider adding a new charge, i.e. to expand the factual ambit 
of the charges as originally presented’.1021  
This restrictive approach to the role of the PTC seems unjustified. As previously 
stated, in effect the PTC cannot usurp the Prosecutor’s power to bring conduct 
and suspects before the Court. The PTC is not allowed to amend by itself the 
charges without the agreement of the Prosecutor pursuant to the procedure 
outlined in Article 61(7)(c). However, nothing prevents the PTC from exercising 
its powers under Regulation 48 to ask the Prosecutor for information as to 
whether he has decided not to prosecute certain conduct. The very reason for 
the victims having been given the right to present their views and concerns in 
the different stages of the proceedings was to help the Court in the truth-finding 
process. As discussed in previous Chapters, the Prosecutor may have several 
reasons for not prosecuting, including, of course, the failure to obtain sufficient 
evidence to secure a conviction, in which case the victims themselves could 
assist the Prosecutor in the completion of the investigations. It may also be the 
case that a prosecution is not warranted in accordance with the Prosecutor’s 
policy decisions. Further, the assessment of the available evidence may have led 
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the Prosecutor to conclude that the conduct did not amount to a crime under 
the Statute, or that the case would not be admissible under Article 17, either 
because it has been investigated or prosecuted at the national level or because 
it is not of sufficient gravity to justify action by the Court. In each of these 
scenarios, the State or the UNSC making the referral may ask the PTC to review 
the prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute, yet this only becomes possible to the 
extent that the referring party is aware that such a decision has been taken and 
the reasons thereof. Most importantly, the Prosecutor may have decided not to 
prosecute the conduct for considerations related to the ‘interests of justice’. As 
has been extensively discussed in the previous Chapters, in this case the PTC has 
the power to review proprio motu the Prosecutor’s decision pursuant to Article 
53(3)(b) and this review can be triggered by a request for information under 
Regulation 48. Accordingly, in order to exercise its functions under the Statute 
and allow those affected by the Court’s work to exercise their rights, the PTC 
should use these opportunities to demand from the Prosecutor more transparent 
decision-making, contributing to a more positive public perception of the Court’s 
legitimacy. 
Learning from these previous experiences, the recent decisions in the Ntaganda 
and Gbagbo cases include greater detail as to the actual factual scope of the 
alleged conduct. In the Ntaganda case, although not specifically stating that it 
was distinguishing between material and subsidiary facts, PTC II highlighted 
certain paragraphs that summarised the Chamber’s findings and included 
additional detail as to the contextual elements, the specific conduct and the 
mode of liability, before indicating in the operative part of the decision that the 
charges were confirmed ‘to the extent specified’ in those paragraphs.1022 
Similarly, in the Gbagbo case, a more complete section was added to the DeCC 
in which the specific facts and circumstances and their legal characterisation as 
confirmed by the Chamber were briefly summarised.1023 These paragraphs are 
distinguishable from those included in previous decisions in that, without going 
into the full details of the evidence analysed, they include a description of the 
main facts to be extracted from the overall analysis of the evidence. It remains 
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to be seen whether this approach will be effective in providing suitable 
flexibility for the exploration of issues that may arise at trial, while at the same 
time respecting the rights of the accused to be informed promptly and in detail 
of the nature, cause and content of the charges for which he has been 
committed to trial in accordance with Article 67(1)(a).    
6.3.2 How much evidence and information is necessary to provide the PTC with 
substantial grounds to believe? 
Another issue that has been highly debated is the amount and strength of the 
evidence that the Prosecutor should provide to the PTC in order to satisfy the 
evidentiary threshold of Article 61. This is directly related to the issue of the 
depth in which the PTC should engage with the facts and evidence in order to 
determine whether the case should be committed to trial. 
In an unexpected and unprecedented move, in the Banda & Jerbo case the 
Prosecutor and the suspects reached an agreement after the hearing as to all 
material facts alleged in the DoCC. Accordingly, the Prosecutor asked the 
Chamber to consider all alleged facts as proven.1024 However, PTC I was of the 
view that the proceedings for the confirmation of charges ‘are not provided for 
the sole benefit of the parties’. It stressed that, in accordance with Rule 69,1025 
the Chamber retains discretion to allow the facts ‘to be presented in full 
whenever either the interests of justice, which are paramount, or the interests 
of the victims, which are also critical, so require’.1026 In addition, the Chamber 
noted that, pursuant to Article 61(7), it must satisfy itself that the evidence 
submitted provides ‘substantial grounds to believe’, irrespective of whether the 
parties agree on the facts of the case.1027 Accordingly, the Chamber confirmed 
the charges only after assessing whether the evidence submitted was sufficient 
to commit the suspects to trial. This approach is consistent with the role of the 
PTC as providing judicial control over the Prosecutor’s actions. The Chamber has 
                                         
1024 Banda and Jerbo, ICC-02/05-03/09-121-Corr-Red para. 43. 
1025 According to Rule 69, once the Prosecutor and defence have agreed on alleged facts ‘a 
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the responsibility to ensure that only cases supported by sufficient evidence are 
committed to trial and cannot permit an agreement between the parties, 
reached for whatever reasons, to frustrate the necessary judicial filtering of 
cases before they are committed to trial. 
However, as to the level of judicial scrutiny that the PTC should exercise, in the 
Bemba case PTC II dismissed the defence’s complaint that the Prosecutor should 
not be allowed to use expressions such as ‘included, but not limited to’ when 
listing the incidents in the charges, finding that it would not infringe the rights 
of the defence at the confirmation stage.1028 The Chamber justified its view by 
stating that, for the confirmation proceedings, the Prosecutor ‘needs to provide 
not all but only sufficient evidence which allows the Chamber to determine 
whether there are substantial grounds to believe that the suspect committed 
each of the crimes charged’.1029 This approach appears to be consistent with the 
position that, while there should be judicial scrutiny of the charges before the 
case is committed to trial, the pre-trial stage should not become a ‘mini-trial’ or 
a ‘trial before the trial’. The same approach as to the amount of evidence the 
Prosecutor must submit was followed in the Banda & Jerbo case, in which PTC I 
stressed that ‘the Prosecutor is not required to tender into the record of the 
case more evidence than is, in his view, necessary to convince the Chamber that 
the charges should be confirmed’.1030 Indeed, pursuant to Article 61(7), if the 
Chamber is not satisfied that the evidence is sufficient, it has the option to 
either decline to confirm the charges or to request the Prosecutor to consider 
providing further evidence or conducting further investigations. There is no need 
for the PTC to duplicate work that will be done later by the TC and enter into a 
full analysis of the totality of evidence of the case. 
In the Mbarushimana case, PTC I slightly altered its approach. While continuing 
to stress the limited object and purpose of the confirmation hearing,1031 it 
rejected the use of the expression ‘included but not limited to’. The Chamber 
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highlighted that, pursuant to Articles 61(3)(a),1032 67(1)(a)1033 and 74(2),1034 Rule 
121(3)1035 and Regulation 52,1036 the use of such an expression was ‘untenable 
insofar as it attempts to reserve for the Prosecution the right to expand the 
factual basis of the charges through the addition of entirely new material facts 
after the charges have been confirmed’.1037 In the view of the Chamber, the 
Prosecutor, 
must know the scope of its case, as well as the material facts underlying 
the charges that it seeks to prove, and must be in possession of the 
evidence necessary to prove those charges to the requisite level in advance 
of the confirmation hearing.1038 
In relation to the specificity of acts charged, PTC II in the Bemba case held that 
the Prosecutor is expected to specify, to the extent possible, inter alia, the 
location, approximate date and means by which the acts were committed.1039 
However, taking into account the evidentiary threshold at the pre-trial stage 
‘and the fact that in case of mass crimes, it may be impractical to insist on a 
high degree of specificity’, PTC II was of the view that it was not necessary for 
the Prosecutor to demonstrate, for each individual act, the identity of the 
victim and of the direct perpetrator or to determine the precise number of 
victims.1040  
In the Mbarushimana case, however, PTC I stated that the DoCC ‘must contain a 
statement of the material facts underlying the charges, to include the dates and 
locations of the alleged incidents to the greatest degree of specificity possible in 
the circumstances’.1041 Going even further, PTC I harshly reprimanded the 
Prosecutor, stressing that ‘the charges and the statements of facts in the [DoCC] 
                                         
1032 Which gives the suspect the right to be provided with a copy of the DoCC within a reasonable 
time before the hearing. 
1033 Which lists among the rights of the accused the right to be informed promptly and in detail 
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1036 Which details the information that shall be included in the DoCC, see footnote 952 above. 
1037 Mbarushimana, ICC-01/04-01/10-465-Red para. 81. 
1038 Ibid para. 82. 
1039 Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08-424 para. 133. 
1040 Ibid para. 134. 
1041 Mbarushimana, ICC-01/04-01/10-465-Red para. 82. 
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have been articulated in such vague terms that the Chamber has serious 
difficulties in determining, or could not determine at all, the factual ambit of a 
number of charges’.1042 In particular, the Chamber noted serious inconsistencies 
such as the listing of incidents in the charges without describing them in the 
factual allegations, the specification of conduct in the charges without clear 
correspondence to any described incident and the description of incidents 
without a corresponding charge.1043 The Chamber stressed that pursuant to 
Article 67(1)(a) and Rule 121(3),1044 ‘the Prosecutor was obliged to produce a 
[DoCC] framing the charges in a coherent manner, providing sufficient detail of 
the factual allegations underlying each of the charges and supporting each of 
the factual allegations with sufficient evidence’.1045 In the view of the Chamber, 
the Prosecutor’s duty to provide sufficient factual details in the DoCC is a 
‘corollary of the right of the suspect to be clearly informed of the charges 
against him’.1046 In order to properly defend himself against the charges, the 
suspect cannot be expected to ‘go through voluminous evidence (…) in order to 
identify for himself the factual basis of the charges’.1047  
The Chamber was cognisant of the fact that in cases involving mass criminality 
to which the suspect is indirectly related, the Prosecutor may not be in the 
position to identify the precise number of victims, their identity, or the identity 
of the direct perpetrators and the means by which the crimes were 
committed.1048 However, the Chamber noted that this does not absolve the 
Prosecutor from his duty to inform the suspect of the factual allegations 
underlying the charges against him.1049 As such, the Chamber did not analyse a 
series of the incidents mentioned in the charges for which insufficient factual 
description was provided in the DoCC.1050 With this approach, PTC I appears to 
have struck the right balance between the limited object and purpose of the 
confirmation hearing and the need to protect the rights of the suspects. 
                                         
1042 Ibid para. 110. 
1043 Ibid paras 110, 182. 
1044 See footnotes 1033 and 1035 above. 
1045 Mbarushimana, ICC-01/04-01/10-465-Red para. 111. 
1046 Ibid para. 112. 
1047 Ibid. 
1048 Ibid. 
1049 Ibid. 
1050 Ibid paras 113-121. 
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Ruling on the appeal to the Mbarushimana DeCC, the AC reiterated that:  
the confirmation of charges hearing exists to separate those cases and 
charges which should go to trial from those which should not (…) ensure the 
efficiency of judicial proceedings and to protect the right of persons by 
ensuring that cases and charges go to trial only when justified by sufficient 
evidence.1051  
The confirmation is by its nature an evidentiary hearing in which the PTC is 
required to evaluate the evidence in order to determine whether it is sufficient 
to establish substantial grounds to believe.1052 Accordingly, in the view of the 
AC, the investigation should ‘largely be completed’ at the confirmation stage 
and ‘most of the evidence should therefore be available’ – it will be then up to 
the Prosecutor to submit this evidence to the PTC.1053 However, stressing the 
limited purpose of the confirmation proceedings, the AC reiterated that that the 
Prosecutor ‘must only produce sufficient evidence’; the PTC does not need to be 
convinced beyond reasonable doubt and the Prosecutor ‘need not submit more 
evidence than is necessary to meet the threshold’.1054 
Following a similar approach to that adopted in the Mbarushimana case, PTC II 
in the Ruto et al. case indicated that although the DoCC does not need to be 
exhaustive in the provision of information in support of the charge, it has to 
‘provide a sufficiently clear picture’ of the facts underpinning the latter, 
particularly ‘in relation to the crimes, the dates and locations of their alleged 
commission.’1055 As to the use of the word ‘including’ in the charges, the 
Chamber understood it as encompassing exclusively the incidents mentioned and 
stressed that such a formulation could not be used by the Prosecutor to expand 
the parameters of the case at trial.1056 In the view of the Chamber, the degree 
                                         
1051 Mbarushimana, ICC-01/04-01/10-514 para. 39. 
1052 Ibid. 
1053 Ibid para. 44 and footnote 89, referring to a previous decision (ICC-01/04-01/06-568, para. 
54) in which the AC acknowledged that the Prosecutor may continue his investigation beyond the 
confirmation hearing, but stated that ‘ideally, it would be desirable for the investigation to be 
complete by the time of the confirmation hearing.’  
1054 Ibid para. 47. 
1055 Ruto et al., ICC-01/09-01/11-373 para. 98. 
1056 Ibid para. 99. 
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of specificity of the DoCC should refer to the ‘precise locations of the alleged 
incidents where crimes took place.’1057 
Applying for the first time Article 61(7)(c) in adjourning the hearing, PTC III in 
the Bemba case clarified that the nature of the determination under that 
provision was substantially different to that under sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), 
which refer to the PTC’s powers to confirm or decline to confirm the charges.1058 
A decision under sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) would be a decision on the merits of 
the case. However, under sub-paragraph (c), the Chamber is not in a position to 
take a decision on the merits and adjourns the hearing in order to overcome 
deficiencies concerning the evidence or the legal characterisation of the 
facts.1059 In the view of PTC III, for a determination under sub-paragraph (c)(i) 
requesting the Prosecutor to provide further evidence or conduct further 
investigations, the submitted evidence, while failing to meet the required 
threshold, must not be ‘irrelevant and insufficient to a degree that merits 
declining to confirm the charges under article 61(7)(b)’.1060  
In the Gbagbo case, PTC I followed the Bemba interpretation of Article 
61(7)(c)(i) and decided by Majority to adjourn the hearing requesting the 
Prosecutor to consider providing further evidence or conducting further 
investigations.1061 The Prosecutor had distinguished four incidents during which 
the crimes charged allegedly occurred from a total of 45 incidents, which 
together formed the attack against the civilian population that constituted the 
contextual element of the charged crimes against humanity.1062 In order to prove 
the occurrence of these 45 incidents, the Prosecutor relied extensively on 
reports from NGOs and the UN, as well as on press articles.1063 The Majority of 
PTC I held that its duty was to evaluate whether there was sufficient evidence 
‘for each of the “facts and circumstances” advanced by the Prosecutor in order 
to satisfy all of the legal elements of the crime(s) and mode(s) of liability 
                                         
1057 Ibid. 
1058 Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08-388 para. 13. 
1059 Ibid paras 13-14. 
1060 Ibid para. 16. 
1061 Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/11-432 paras 15, 44. 
1062 Ibid para. 36. 
1063 Ibid. 
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charged.’1064 In the Chamber’s view, the standard to scrutinize the evidence was 
the same for all factual allegations, whether they pertain to the crimes charged, 
contextual elements or the criminal responsibility of the suspect.1065  
Although it reiterated the PTC’s case law as to the existence of other factual 
information not central to the charges,1066 the Majority did not give any 
examples of facts that would fall under this category. It did however specify 
that individual incidents identified as constituting an attack against the civilian 
population, ie supporting the contextual elements rather than the specific 
crimes charged, were part of the facts and circumstances that must be proven 
to the required threshold.1067 In its view, contextual elements form part of the 
substantive merits of the case and are subject to the same evidentiary threshold 
applicable to all other facts.1068 The Majority asserted that, although proof of 
incidents alleged to constitute the attack may be less specific than that of the 
crimes charged, it is still required to be sufficiently probative and specific.1069 
Accordingly, the evidence should include, for example, the identity of the 
perpetrators or information as to the group they belong to, in addition to the 
identity of the victims or information as to their real or perceived allegiance.1070 
As to the sufficiency of the evidence presented, the Majority was of the opinion 
that it ‘must assume that the Prosecutor has presented her strongest possible 
case based on a largely completed investigation.’1071 In its view, such an 
approach safeguards the rights of the defence by ensuring continuity in the 
presentation of the case (the suspect ‘should not be presented with a wholly 
different evidentiary case at trial’), and helps to avoid delay in the 
commencement of the trial.1072  
The assessment of PTC I’s Majority appears to be correct insofar as the 
Prosecutor is required to prove to the required threshold all facts and 
circumstances relevant to proving each element of the crimes charged, including 
                                         
1064 Ibid para. 19. 
1065 Ibid. 
1066 Ibid para. 20. 
1067 Ibid para. 21. 
1068 Ibid para. 22. 
1069 Ibid. 
1070 Ibid. 
1071 Ibid para. 25. 
1072 Ibid. 
  
271 
contextual elements. However, the Majority failed to find the right balance and 
to recognise the limited extent of the confirmation proceedings when: (i) 
requesting the Prosecutor provide exceedingly detailed information and 
evidence related to each individual attack;1073 (ii) imposing upon him the 
obligation that the investigation should be largely completed at the time of the 
confirmation; and (iii) assuming that the Prosecutor will present for confirmation 
‘her strongest possible case’. These requirements tend to envisage an effective 
duplication of the TC’s fact-finding role and appear to require proof beyond 
reasonable doubt, rather than the ‘substantial grounds to believe’ standard 
imposed by the Statute for the purpose of confirmation.  
In her dissenting opinion, Judge Silvia Fernández expressed her disagreement 
with the Majority’s interpretation of the role of the PTC.1074 In particular, she 
argued that regardless of the desirability of investigations being largely 
completed before confirmation, a policy objective could not be turned into a 
legal requirement without the necessary amendment of the legal framework.1075 
In her view, even where the Prosecutor has completed his investigations, there 
is no legal requirement for him to submit to the Chamber all his evidence or to 
present the strongest possible case.1076 Indeed, the amount and quality of 
evidence presented at pre-trial may be different from that presented at trial. 
Judge Fernández correctly pointed out that the PTC does not have to evaluate 
whether it received the ‘strongest possible’ evidence, but solely whether it is 
satisfied that the evidence is sufficient to establish substantial grounds to 
believe.1077  
However, Judge Fernández was careful to insist that the PTC should 
nevertheless exercise its gatekeeping function with utmost prudence, avoiding 
                                         
1073 Ibid para. 44. For example, in order to decide on charges of crimes against humanity rather 
than war crimes, the Majority requested further evidence or investigations as to ‘the position(s), 
movements and activities of all armed groups opposed to the “pro-Gbagbo forces” (…) including 
information about confrontations between those and the “pro-Gbagbo forces”’. Further, in 
relation to ‘each of the incidents constituting the attack’, as opposed to solely the 4 incidents 
charged, the Chamber required ‘information as to the number of victims, the harm they suffered 
as well as their real or perceived political, ethnic, religious or national allegiance(s).’  
1074 The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/11-432-Anx-Corr Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge Silvia Fernández de Gurmendi to the Decision adjourning the hearing on the confirmation 
of charges pursuant to article 61(7)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute Pre-Trial Chamber I, 3 June 2013. 
1075 Ibid para. 15. 
1076 Ibid para. 17. 
1077 Ibid para. 21. 
  
272 
an expansive interpretation of its role, which is unsupported by law and may 
affect the entire architecture of the Court’s procedural system.1078 In her view, 
the PTC does not have the power to shape the factual allegations of the charges 
or to request the Prosecutor to reframe the charges and adapt them to the 
Chamber’s understanding of the case.1079 In particular, she stressed that it ‘is for 
the Prosecutor and not for the Chamber to select her case and its factual 
parameters. The Pre-Trial Chamber is not an investigative chamber and does not 
have the mandate to direct the investigations of the Prosecutor’.1080 Although 
Judge Fernández is correct in that the PTC is not an investigative chamber and 
does not have the power to direct the Prosecutor’s investigation (as argued 
throughout this work), the PTC’s role goes beyond the mere validation of the 
Prosecutor’s framing of cases. In exercising judicial control of the Prosecutor’s 
selection of cases the PTC is entitled to guide, if not to direct, the Prosecutor’s 
selection of cases and to ensure transparency in the Court’s decision-making. 
In its Judgment on the appeal, the AC, while confirming the Majority 
decision,1081 stressed that Articles 67(1)(a) and 61(3), Rule 121(3) and Regulation 
521082 in fact do not distinguish between ‘material facts’ and ‘subsidiary 
facts’.1083 It also emphasised that in its prior jurisprudence it had not 
determined how narrowly or broadly the term ‘facts and circumstances 
described in the charges’ should be understood.1084 Without clarifying the 
matter, the AC simply stated that ‘it is for the Prosecutor to plead the facts 
relevant to establishing the legal elements and for the Pre-Trial Chamber to 
determine whether those facts, if proven to the required threshold, establish 
the legal elements’.1085 Regrettably, PTC I did not grant the appeal as to the 
issue of the interpretation and application of the standard of proof of 
‘substantial grounds to believe’ under Article 61(7).1086 As such, the AC declined 
                                         
1078 Ibid para. 26. 
1079 Ibid para. 50. 
1080 Ibid para. 51. 
1081 The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/11-572 Judgment on the appeal of the 
Prosecutor against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 3 June 2013 entitled 'Decision 
adjourning the hearing on the confirmation of charges pursuant to article 61(7)(c)(i) of the Rome 
Statute' Appeals Chamber, 16 December 2013 para. 67. 
1082 For the provisions see footnotes 1032 to 1036 above. 
1083 Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/11-572 paras 36-37. 
1084 Ibid para. 37. 
1085 Ibid para. 47. 
1086 Ibid paras 60-61. 
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to express its view as to whether investigations have to be largely completed at 
the confirmation stage and whether the Prosecutor should present all his 
evidence or the strongest possible case at confirmation.1087   
The Majority of PTC I, differently composed, eventually confirmed the charges 
against Gbagbo.1088 In her dissenting opinion, Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert 
expressed the view that the ‘charges should only be confirmed if the evidence 
has a realistic chance of supporting a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.’1089 
Although acknowledging that the standard of proof for confirmation is lower, she 
was of the view that, when it is clear that ‘even if the available evidence is 
taken at its highest, there is a substantial doubt that this will be enough to 
support a conviction, there is no point in confirming the charges.’1090 This 
approach appears to disregard the different role of the PTC and TC and the 
substantially different character of the assessment that each Chamber is called 
upon to perform at different stages of proceedings. Requesting that the 
evidence submitted at the pre-trial stage be sufficient to support a conviction is 
to effectively require proof beyond reasonable doubt at the pre-trial stage. It 
disregards the fact that pursuant to Article 61(5), which allows the Prosecutor to 
support each charge with ‘sufficient’ evidence and rely on documentary or 
summary evidence, the evidentiary rules at confirmation are more relaxed than 
those for trial and the Prosecutor is therefore likely still to bring the majority of 
his evidence to support a conviction at trial.  
6.4 The PTC’s role in the legal characterisation of the facts 
As was stressed by PTC I in the Banda & Jerbo case, the delimiting power of the 
PTC vis-à-vis the Trial Chamber is restricted to the factual as opposed to the 
legal elements of the charges, since ‘the Trial Chamber is vested with 
                                         
1087 Ibid para. 65. 
1088 Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/11-656-Red 131. 
1089 The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/11-656-Anx Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Christine Van den Wyngaert to the Decision on the confirmation of charges against Laurent 
Gbagbo Pre-Trial Chamber I, 12 June 2014 para. 4. 
1090 Ibid. 
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unrestricted powers to retain, modify or otherwise amend the legal 
characterisation of the facts and circumstances appearing in the charges.’1091 
Arguably learning from the Lubanga experience discussed in Section 6.3.1 above, 
in the Katanga case the Prosecutor submitted that the crimes charged were 
committed ‘irrespective of whether the conflict was characterised as non-
international or international.’1092 Consequently, the Prosecutor charged all the 
conduct constituting a war crime as relating to either international or, in the 
alternative, non-international armed conflict.1093 However, after analysing the 
evidence, PTC I was satisfied that, during the relevant time, the armed conflict 
was of an ‘international’ character.1094 Accordingly, it considered, for the 
purposes of confirmation, only the offences charged in connection with an 
international armed conflict.1095 The Chamber neither entered into an analysis of 
the relevant facts nor confirmed or declined to confirm the charges submitted 
alternatively in relation to the ‘non-international’ characterisation of the 
conflict. This restrictive approach adopted by PTC I caused unnecessary delays in 
the subsequent proceedings. At trial, the nature of the conflict was contested 
and evidence was submitted in that regard. Eventually, after analysing the 
evidence,1096 TC II reached the conclusion that, at the time relevant to the 
charges, the conflict was ‘non-international’.1097 Since PTC I had only confirmed 
the charges as to the international armed conflict, TC II had to use Regulation 55 
in order to change the legal characterisation of the facts.1098 
Similarly, the Prosecutor charged Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo as co-
perpetrators under Article 25(3)(a) and, in the alternative, for ordering the 
commission of crimes under Article 25(3)(b).1099 In the view of PTC I, a finding as 
principals to the crimes ‘renders moot further questions of accessorial 
liability.’1100 Given that it was satisfied that there were substantial grounds to 
                                         
1091 Banda and Jerbo, ICC-02/05-03/09-121-Corr-Red para. 35. 
1092 Katanga and Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-717 para. 15. 
1093 Ibid paras 21, 23-24, 26, 28-32. 
1094 Ibid para. 240. 
1095 Ibid para. 243. 
1096 Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3436 paras 1198-1228. 
1097 Ibid para. 1229. 
1098 Ibid para. 1230. 
1099 Katanga and Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-717 paras 469-470. 
1100 Ibid para. 471. 
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believe that the suspects committed the crimes jointly through other persons 
within the meaning of Article 25(3)(a),1101 it confirmed the charges under that 
mode of liability and declined even to examine the facts relevant to the 
alternative mode of liability charged. Once again, this course of action brought 
complications and further litigation at trial. TC II eventually acquitted Mathieu 
Ngudjolo because his responsibility as a co-perpetrator was not proven beyond 
reasonable doubt at trial.1102 Similarly, TC II was of the view that the 
responsibility of Germain Katanga under Article 25(3)(a) was not 
demonstrated.1103 It then decided to re-characterise the mode of participation 
pursuant to Regulation 551104 and eventually convicted Katanga for his 
responsibility under Article 25(3)(d) for some of the crimes charged.1105 
As illustrated, the restrictive approach adopted by PTC I does not appear to be 
entirely appropriate for a finding at the pre-trial stage. Although the PTC’s 
assessment as to the legal characterisation of the facts does not formally bind 
the TC, the latter’s freedom to adjust the characterisation is limited in practice 
where the PTC fails to assess facts relevant to alternative charges or modes of 
liability. Since the TC may only rely for the purposes of re-characterisation on 
‘facts and circumstances described in the charges’, it cannot draw on facts 
pleaded in the DoCC in the alternative where these are not carried forward into 
the DeCC. As discussed above, although judicial scrutiny of the charges is an 
essential feature of the Court’s architecture, the PTC’s assessment of the 
evidence at the pre-trial stage is necessarily limited and provisional. It therefore 
seems most appropriate that – provided the evidence submitted at pre-trial 
supports alternative findings at the required threshold – the PTC should confirm 
charges in the alternative and leave it to the TC, when assessing the totality of 
the evidence of the case, to determine the proper legal characterisation of the 
facts that may be proven beyond reasonable doubt. 
                                         
1101 Ibid paras 574-576. 
1102 The Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-02/12-3-tENG Judgment pursuant to article 
74 of the Statute Trial Chamber II, 18 December 2012 paras 490-503. 
1103 Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3436 para. 1420. 
1104 Ibid paras 1422-1479. 
1105 Ibid 709-710. 
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In the Bemba case, PTC III was of the view that a determination to adjourn the 
hearing and ask the Prosecutor to consider amending a charge under Article 
61(7)(c)(ii), which allows the PTC to adjourn the hearing and request the 
Prosecutor to consider amending a charge because the evidence submitted 
appears to establish a different crime, is subject to a lower evidentiary 
threshold than a decision to confirm the charges, to decline to confirm the 
charges, or to adjourn and request the Prosecutor to provide further evidence or 
to conduct further investigations under sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c)(i). As 
such, an in-depth analysis of the evidence is not warranted when applying 
Article 61(7)(c)(ii),1106 it being sufficient for the Chamber to ‘make a prima facie 
finding that it has doubts as to the legal characterisation of the facts’ as 
reflected in the DoCC.1107  
PTC III noted that, even where the PTC decides to exercise its powers under 
Article 61(7)(c)(ii), the wording of the provision affords the Prosecutor discretion 
to decide whether or not to amend the relevant charge.1108 In the view of the 
Chamber, its responsibilities ‘lie in exerting judicial oversight during the pre-
trial proceedings’, it being the Prosecutor’s responsibility ‘to build and shape 
the case according to his statutory mandate pursuant to article 54(1)(a)’,1109 
which provides that, in order to establish the truth, the Prosecutor should 
extend the investigation to cover all facts and circumstances. The Chamber was 
of course correct in pointing out that even if requested by the Chamber to 
‘consider’ amending a charge, the Prosecutor is not obligated to do so. 
However, as previously stressed, that should not prevent the PTC from 
exercising the full extent of their powers. Their judicial oversight should guide 
the Prosecutor’s building and shaping of cases, ensuring transparency and 
guaranteeing that those who may be affected by the Prosecutor’s choices can 
properly exercise their rights under the Statute. 
As to the notion of a ‘different crime’ included in Article 61(7)(c)(ii), PTC III 
understood it to relate to both the crime as defined in Articles 6 to 8 as well as 
                                         
1106 Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08-388 paras 17-25, the Chamber basing its conclusion on the use of 
the word ‘appears’ in Article 61(7)(c)(ii). 
1107 Ibid para. 25. 
1108 Ibid para. 38. 
1109 Ibid para. 39. 
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the mode of liability established in Articles 25 and 28.1110 In light of a series of 
submissions made by the parties and participants, the Chamber was of the view 
that ‘the legal characterisation of the facts of the case may amount to a 
different mode of liability under article 28 of the Statute.’1111 Consequently, it 
adjourned the hearing and requested the Prosecutor to consider so amending the 
charges as to the mode of liability under Article 28.1112 Following the 
adjournment, the Prosecutor charged Bemba as a co-perpetrator under Article 
25(3)(a) and, in the alternative under Article 28(a) or (b).1113  
Based on its assessment of the evidence, PTC II found that the threshold 
required to confirm the charges under Article 25(3)(a) had not been met.1114 It 
then considered the alternative mode of responsibility charged,1115 reaching the 
conclusion that there was sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to 
believe that Bemba was criminally responsible under Article 28(a).1116 However, 
further difficulties were presented in the case at trial since PTC II, having been 
satisfied that the suspect ‘knew’ that the forces were committing or about to 
commit the crimes under discussion, did not choose to examine in the 
alternative the construction of knowledge on the basis that ‘owing to the 
circumstances at the time, [he] should have known’.1117 TC III again relied upon 
Regulation 55 at trial and gave notice to the parties and participants that, in its 
trial decision it might modify the legal characterisation of the facts so as to 
consider, in the same mode of responsibility, the alternate form of knowledge 
contained in Article 28(a)(i) of the Statute.1118   
In the Abu Garda and Banda & Jerbo cases, the Prosecutor attempted to 
broaden the charges by averring that, although he had charged the suspects as 
co-perpetrators or as indirect co-perpetrators under Article 25(3)(a), he did so 
                                         
1110 Ibid para. 26. 
1111 Ibid para. 46. 
1112 Ibid para. 49. 
1113 Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08-424 para. 341. 
1114 Ibid paras 344-401. 
1115 Ibid para. 403. 
1116 Ibid paras 444-501. 
1117 Ibid paras 478-489. 
1118 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08-2324 Decision giving notice to 
the parties and participants that the legal characterisation of the facts may be subject to change 
in accordance with Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court Trial Chamber III, 21 
September 2012 para. 5. 
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‘without excluding any other applicable mode of liability’.1119 Based on Article 
67(1)(a), Rule 121(1) and Regulation 52(c),1120 PTC I did not allow such broad 
charging and analysed only the modes of liability specifically charged.1121  
As discussed in Section 5.4.2 above, in the Ruto case PTC II dismissed the 
Prosecutor’s attempt to bring charges based on alternative modes of liability at 
the time of the issuance of the summons to appear.1122 A similar approach was 
followed at the confirmation of charges hearing.1123 Learning from previous 
experiences, TC V(a) gave early notice pursuant to Regulation 55 of the 
possibility that the charges against Ruto may be subject to change to accord 
with Article 25(3)(b), (c) or (d), which deal with different forms of participation 
as accessory to a crime.1124 
In a significant change of approach, in the Ntaganda case PTC I accepted that 
the Prosecutor might generally charge in the alternative and confirmed 
alternative modes of liability.1125 The Chamber stressed that at the confirmation 
stage the PTC is ‘not called upon to engage in a fully-fledged trial and to decide 
on the guilt or innocence of the person charged. Rather, the mandate of the 
Pre-Trial Chamber is to determine which cases should proceed to trial.’1126 
Accordingly, it considered that at pre-trial, it might confirm alternative charges 
so long as each of the charges is supported by sufficient evidence to establish 
substantial grounds to believe.1127 
The same approach was followed in the Gbagbo case, in which the Majority of 
PTC I also confirmed alternative modes of liability.1128 The Chamber 
                                         
1119 The Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, ICC-02/05-02/09-91-Red Prosecution's Document 
Containing the Charges Submitted Pursuant to Article 61(3) of the Statute Office of the 
Prosecutor, 24 September 2009 para. 117. 
1120 For the content of the provisions see footnotes 1033, 1035 and 1036 above. 
1121 Abu Garda, ICC-02/05-02/09-243-Red para. 158; Banda and Jerbo, ICC-02/05-03/09-121-
Corr-Red para. 124. 
1122 Ruto et al., ICC-01/09-01/11-01 para. 36. 
1123 Ruto et al., ICC-01/09-01/11-373 paras 284-285. 
1124 The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, ICC-01/09-01/11-1122 
Decision on Applications for Notice of Possibility of Variation of Legal Characterisation Trial 
Chamber V(A), 12 December 2013. 
1125 Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06-309 paras 97-100. 
1126 Ibid para. 100. 
1127 Ibid. 
1128 Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/11-656-Red paras 230-259 and 278. PTC I confirmed Gbagbo’s 
responsibility under Article 25(3)(a), (b) or (d). However, it declined to confirm the alternative 
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acknowledged that this more flexible approach was built upon the past 
experience of the Court and was intended to reduce further delays at trial and 
provide early notice to the defence of the different legal characterisations that 
may be considered at trial.1129 The Chamber nevertheless stressed that 
alternative characterisations would only be confirmed when satisfactorily 
established by the evidence at the required threshold for confirmation, in order 
for the TC to determine whether any of the confirmed legal characterisations 
are established to the applicable standard of proof at trial.1130 It remains to be 
seen if this new approach adopted by the PTC actually serves to expedite 
proceedings. There is certainly the risk that it may lead to uncertainties and 
further delays in the proceedings as the parties may engage in lengthy 
submissions and discussions of evidence relevant to each and every mode of 
liability, in the hope that at least one – or none – will be proven beyond 
reasonable doubt. 
6.5 Conclusions  
The confirmation of charges hearing is one of the key novelties of the new 
system of international criminal justice created by the Statute. It essentially 
involves entrusting a collegial chamber of three judges with the responsibility of 
providing judicial control over the Prosecutor’s selection of cases for 
prosecution in order to ensure that only cases supported by sufficient evidence 
are committed to trial.  
As the analysis of the Court’s jurisprudence illustrates, however, there exist two 
clearly conflicting approaches to the role of the PTC at the pre-trial stage and to 
the object and purpose of the confirmation proceedings. Some argue that the 
Prosecutor’s independence, as the cornerstone of the Court’s jurisdiction, is 
paramount. For them, the PTC should not restrict in any way the Prosecutor’s 
discretionary power to select cases for prosecution. The role of the PTC at the 
                                                                                                                           
charge brought by the Prosecutor under Article 28 for lack of sufficient evidence, see ibid paras. 
260-265. Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert dissented since in her view there was no sufficient 
evidence to confirm the charges under Article 25(3)(a), (b) and (d), but would have confirmed 
some of the charges on the basis of Article 28, see Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/11-656-Anx. 
1129 Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/11-656-Red para. 228. 
1130 Ibid para. 227. 
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confirmation proceedings should be limited to a summary review of the charges 
brought by the Prosecutor in light of the evidence submitted and to decide 
whether or not the evidentiary threshold has been satisfied. At the other end of 
the spectrum, others see the confirmation proceedings as a fully-fledged 
evidentiary hearing, a step created in order to prevent trials from concluding in 
acquittals. For them, the PTC should only commit a case to trial when wholly 
convinced that the evidence is sufficient to secure a conviction. Neither of these 
approaches properly reflects the spirit of the Statute or the object and purpose 
of the confirmation of charges. 
The confirmation of charges hearing has been created as the first stage of the 
adversarial debate. It was devised in order to give the Prosecutor the chance to 
present his initial picture of the case, to put the suspect on notice and allow him 
to react and contest wholly unfounded accusations, and to give the victims the 
opportunity to present their views and concerns. All parties and participants are 
afforded the opportunity to present their version of the events. Based on such 
submissions, the PTC decides whether and to what extent the ‘snapshot’ it 
received from the parties and participants deserves to be explored further. Only 
in case of a positive determination by the PTC will a full adversarial debate and 
detailed analysis of the facts and evidence at trial be warranted.  
In accordance with the Statute, the Prosecutor is independent and has discretion 
to select cases and charges for prosecution – the PTC cannot charge a suspect by 
itself nor alter the charges brought by Prosecutor. At the same time however, 
the Prosecutor and the Chambers have been entrusted with ‘finding the truth’ 
not merely with attempting to secure a conviction or otherwise determining 
whether the Prosecutor has sufficiently substantiated his allegations. 
Accordingly, the PTC does not have to follow the Prosecutor’s characterisation 
of the factual and legal scope of the cases for prosecution, and, in effect, ignore 
what is brought to their attention during the hearing. The PTC should exercise 
meaningful judicial control over the Prosecutor’s selection of cases. Where it is 
convinced that the Prosecutor has failed to properly capture the extent of the 
criminality in a case, it should not hesitate to use the full extent of its powers 
under the Statute and, at this early stage of the proceedings, request the 
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Prosecutor to consider providing further evidence, conducting further 
investigations or amending charges. Similarly, where warranted, the PTC should 
demand from the Prosecutor more transparent decision-making, insisting on 
clarifications as to whether and why he may have decided not to prosecute 
certain conduct and reviewing such decisions when applicable. At the same 
time, the PTC should keep in mind that its assessment of the facts and evidence 
is necessarily limited and provisional. Accordingly, it should not impinge upon 
the TC’s capacity to freely assess the facts of the case and should recognise the 
essential difference between the functions of the PTC and the TC.  
As illustrated in this Chapter, the confirmation proceedings are a key feature of 
the Court’s architecture and a fundamental expression of the PTC’s gatekeeping 
function. The confirmation proceedings are necessary to avoid wholly unfounded 
allegations and focus the Court’s efforts and resources upon the cases for which 
there is substantial evidence going beyond mere suspicion. At the same time, 
the confirmation proceedings ensure respect for the rights of the suspects and 
victims and guarantee the fairness and effectiveness of the Court’s proceedings 
as a whole.  
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Conclusion 
The PTC, designed to be the Court’s gatekeeper, has been empowered by the 
Court’s legal framework to provide an essential counter-balance to the 
significant discretionary powers of the Prosecutor. It was created in order to 
ensure the legality of the Prosecutor’s actions through the judicial review of his 
most critical discretionary decisions. By way of that judicial control, the PTC is 
meant to examine the rationale behind those decisions in order to guarantee 
that the Prosecutor’s exercise of discretion is not abusive or the result of 
improper political pressures. This is necessary to safeguard the legitimacy of the 
institution as a whole and to protect the rights of those that can be affected by 
the Court’s investigations and prosecutions.  
Against the background of the high level of criticism that the Court received in 
its early days – accusing it of partiality and arbitrariness – this research was 
aimed at determining whether there is systematic evidence to support the 
argument that the PTC is empowered to provide an essential counter-balance to 
the significant discretionary powers of the Prosecutor. The research question 
was then formulated in terms of whether the Court’s legal framework actually 
enables the PTC to guarantee the independence and legitimacy of the Court 
effectively.  
In principle, save for one critical limitation discussed below, the powers that the 
Court’s legal framework grant to the PTC provide it with sufficient tools to serve 
as the Court’s gatekeeper. However, a systematic evaluation of the way in which 
those powers have been applied in the Court’s jurisprudence reveals that the 
PTC’s judges have adopted a rather cautious approach to their role, showing 
reluctance to firmly scrutinise the Prosecutor’s policy decisions. These 
deficiencies, both in the Court’s design and practice, explain in part why the 
criticisms have not diminished but rather persisted through the years, with the 
Court as yet unable to affirm its independence from power politics. 
As regards the critical deficiency in the Court’s design, this arises because the 
Statute does not bestow a supervisory role on the PTC over the Prosecutor’s 
power to initiate an investigation following a referral by a State Party or the 
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UNSC. This threatens the delicate balance of power more generally achieved in 
the Statute, risking the introduction of inappropriate political influence over the 
function of the institution and jeopardising the independence and impartiality of 
the Court.  
With regard to the situations in Sudan and Libya the UNSC has, as discussed in 
Chapter 4, successfully imposed on the Court personal and temporal limitations 
to the scope of the situation to be investigated, which were in clear violation of 
the Statute, thereby undermining the Court’s autonomy. The Prosecutor did not 
object to the referrals or its limitations, raising serious doubts as to his capacity 
to prevent the Council’s attempts to interfere with the Court.  
Similarly, the Prosecutor has not been able to ‘resist the temptation’ presented 
by ‘highly cooperative’ self-referring States. Although, as argued, self-referrals 
are a legal and suitable way of triggering the Court’s jurisdiction, the safeguards 
provided by the Statute in order to minimize the risks that they entail are 
insufficient. In particular, the power granted to the Prosecutor to reject 
frivolous or politically motivated referrals and to define the scope of the 
situation to investigate may be meaningless if, in practice, the Prosecutor is too 
eager to initiate cases and secure cooperation from States. A close examination 
of the first three situations triggered by interested States supports this view. In 
Chapter 4, for example, it is discussed how, in the situation in Uganda, some ten 
years after the referral only one case has been initiated and only against the 
LRA’s leaders, despite the Prosecutor’s apparent assurance that all parties to 
the conflict would be investigated. Similarly, in the situations in the DRC and the 
CAR the Prosecutor has targeted only rebel groups and not governmental forces. 
Although the rebels have not been targeted without justification, when 
proceedings are only initiated against those that may be recognised as enemies 
of the governments that referred the situations to the Court, the credibility and 
legitimacy of the institution is necessarily at stake.  
An amendment to the Statute in this regard would mean that the PTC could 
independently assess the legality of the referrals, thereby ensuring that the 
Prosecutor’s decision to open an investigation is a legitimate exercise of his 
powers under the Statute and not the result of undue political influence. As 
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such, an amendment of the Statute is suggested in order to extend the PTC’s 
powers under Article 15(3) and (4) to all triggering proceedings under Article 13. 
Pursuant to that reform, the PTC should be given the function of reviewing the 
Prosecutor’s positive assessment that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with 
an investigation, assessing the legality of the referrals and determining the 
extent of the situation of crisis to be investigated by the Prosecutor.  
As argued in Chapter 4, the fact that the PTC is given a role in reviewing the 
Prosecutor’s positive assessment as to the need to open an investigation will 
not, in itself, exclude the risk of selective prosecutions. As noted with regard to 
proprio motu investigations, in spite of the role given to the PTC by the Statute, 
the different PTCs have so far failed to properly determine the contextual scope 
of the situations they authorise the Prosecutor to investigate. This deficiency 
has the risk of undermining the rationale behind the authorisation procedure 
itself. In effect, without a concrete definition of the material scope of the 
situation to be investigated, there is uncertainty as to the cases the Prosecutor 
may focus on and a significant risk that he may concentrate on cases totally 
unrelated to the situation of crisis the PTC had in mind when authorising the 
commencement of the investigation.  
Accordingly, as argued in Chapters 4 and 5, the PTC’s review process should be 
complemented by the adoption of a proactive stance demanding more 
transparent decision-making within the OTP and facilitating public scrutiny of its 
activities. To this end, the PTC should make use of its powers under Regulation 
48 in relation to Articles 54(1)(a) and 53(3)(b) and Rule 110. The resulting 
requirement for the Prosecutor to explain the concrete reasons for not 
proceeding against certain individuals, groups or crimes will encourage his 
efforts to investigate fully and discourage attempts to dissuade him from 
proceeding – or not – for political reasons. It would, moreover, further encourage 
genuine national proceedings and cooperation with the Prosecutor and the 
Court, as any lack of State cooperation would also be exposed to public scrutiny.  
From a broader perspective, the need to encourage the adoption of a more 
proactive role by the PTC highlights the main problem of application of the 
PTC’s gatekeeping function: the PTC’s reluctance to firmly scrutinise the 
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Prosecutor’s exercise of discretion. As systematically explored throughout this 
thesis, the Prosecutor has been tasked with investigating and prosecuting cases 
in a highly political environment but lacks enforcement powers. Therefore, he is 
highly dependent on international cooperation and resources, a state of affairs 
that may leave him especially susceptible to political pressures. As a 
consequence, there is a concrete risk that the Court may become politicised or 
be used as an instrument of victor’s justice. The adoption of a proactive and 
firm role by the PTC in scrutinising whether the Prosecutor’s actions are a 
legitimate exercise of his discretion will not only encourage a more transparent 
decision-making process within the OTP, but will also urge cooperation and 
genuine investigations and prosecutions at the national level, therefore 
minimising the risk of the Court’s political instrumentalisation.  
In line with its role, the PTC should be more prepared to make politically 
difficult decisions. Indeed, while operating within the legal framework of the 
Statute, it should be responsive to the specific demands of the different 
scenarios it faces. For instance, as stressed in Chapter 3, when determining the 
scope of the highly sensitive issues of complementarity, gravity and the interests 
of justice, judges should exercise their supervisory role by carefully balancing 
the need to apply uniform criteria – applying impartially the same general rule 
to all those who are alike, without prejudice, special interests or caprice and 
thereby ensuring legal certainty – against the need to identify when different 
cases should be treated differently. When a situation or case warrants a 
different interpretation, it has been argued that the PTC should resort to the 
flexibility purposely included by the drafters of the Statute and be ready to 
depart from previously devised tests or interpretations, all the while ensuring 
that the context, objects and purposes of the Statute are respected. 
Similarly, it has been demonstrated that the PTC should avoid the promotion of 
formal or procedural legitimacy at the cost of substantive justice. The approach 
to victims’ participation at the situation stage of the proceedings is a clear 
example in which formalism has so far prevailed over substance. As emphasised 
in Chapter 5, although an important part of the PTC’s efforts and resources were 
devoted for some years to facilitating victims’ ‘participation’ during the 
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investigation stage, the limited practical role they have so far played has not 
resulted in any concrete advantages for either the victims themselves or for the 
Court’s fact-finding and truth-searching mandate. Victims’ participation during 
the investigation of crimes has remained formal and has in fact represented 
nothing more than their ‘symbolic’ recognition. Victims have not been granted a 
meaningful right to present or to have their ‘views and concerns’ considered, 
while the PTC has missed the opportunity to ‘profit’ from their ‘privileged’ 
position as regards evidence and information. 
In the same vein, although specifically authorised by the Statute, the PTC has 
been reluctant to interfere during the stage of the investigation and monitor the 
Prosecutor’s work. Considering the length of the proceedings before the Court 
thus far, the allegations of witness tampering in the Bemba and Kenya cases, 
and the serious difficulties in prosecuting high-level officials such as Presidents 
Al Bashir and Kenyatta, the PTC should re-assess its approach as soon as 
possible. In this respect, it is suggested that the PTC rely upon Regulation 48 
more readily to request from the Prosecutor information and documents that 
may allow the PTC to exercise its powers under Articles 53(3)(b), 56(3)(a) and 
57(3)(c).  
Lastly, proceedings under Articles 58 and 61 – the issuance of warrants or 
summonses and confirmation of charges – are key features of the Court’s 
architecture and fundamental expressions of the PTC’s gatekeeping function. 
They are necessary to avoid wholly unfounded allegations and to focus the 
Court’s efforts and resources upon the cases for which there is substantial 
evidence of wrongdoing beyond mere suspicion. At the same time, they ensure 
respect for the rights of the suspects and victims and guarantee fairness and 
effectiveness in the Court’s proceedings as a whole. As such, in Chapters 5 and 6 
it is argued that the PTC should exercise meaningful judicial control over the 
Prosecutor’s selection of cases. When the PTC is convinced that the Prosecutor 
has failed to properly capture the extent of the criminality of a given case, it 
should not hesitate to use the full extent of its powers under the Statute. 
Similarly, if warranted, the PTC should demand from the Prosecutor more 
transparent decision-making by requiring clarification as to whether and why he 
  
287 
has decided not to prosecute certain conduct and by reviewing such decisions 
when appropriate.  
The PTC should indeed be less reluctant to perform its role in the way intended, 
particularly taking into account that its reticence so far has brought undesired 
consequences. For example, issues that should have been clearly addressed at 
that pre-trial stage (like the nature and scope of the charges brought by the 
Prosecutor) have created complications at trial and perceptions of selective 
prosecutions have been allowed to develop. It is argued that, for as long as the 
PTC boldly embraces its full powers, the ICC will function smoothly and 
strengthen its reputation as a fair and impartial means by which to obtain 
international criminal justice.   
At the same time, the PTC’s judges should always keep in mind that the drafters 
of the Statute conceived of them as the ultimate pre-trial arbiters of the 
controversial choices inherent in international criminal justice and as guarantors 
of the Court’s institutional equilibrium. The PTC’s judicial review of the 
Prosecutor’s discretion cannot be adequately exercised from the perspective of 
a formalist legalistic approach to the judicial function, as complied with when 
applying a literal interpretation of the Court’s legal framework and providing 
procedural legitimacy. The PTC should rather actively exercise its role ensuring 
that the ultimate values embodied in the Statute are respected. It is incumbent 
upon the judges of the PTC, charged with determining the concrete scope of the 
principles and values embodied in the Statute, to confidently and assertively 
police the operative distinction between law and politics within the context of 
the system of international criminal justice created by the Statute and, in so 
doing, to ensure the Court’s impartiality, independence and legitimacy. 
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